HISTORY OF SANSKRIT POETICS

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CHAPTER I

FROM BEGINNINGS TO BHĀMAHA

(1)

Of the unknown beginnings of Poetics as a discipline, our enquiry in the preceding volume[1] has indicated that we can only make a few surmises, by implication, from the oldest surviving works on the subject, from stray references in general literature, from the elaboration of similar ideas in other disciplines, and from the fully developed Kāvya-style which would warrant the pre-existence of some doctrines of Poetics regulating its art and usage.

Apart from such surmises, the sixteenth chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* gives us for the first time an outline of Poetics which is probably earlier in substance, if not in date, than the earliest existing Kāvya. In this chapter, one meets with a developed dogma, if not a theory, of Poetics which enumerates four poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*), ten excellences (*guṇas*), ten defects (*doṣas*), and thirty-six characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of poetic composition. These apparently constituted the principal contents of the discipline as it existed at a very early period ; and this may be taken, in the absence of other data, as the first known period in the history of Sanskrit Poetics.

It is proper to note in this connexion that in the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, Bharata is principally concerned with Dramaturgy and allied topics[2], and deals with Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand. In later poetic theories, Dramaturgy is taken as a part of the discipline of Poetics, and the drama

1 See vol. i, pp. 1-17.

2 An outline of the different chapters of Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* is given in Winternitz *GIL* iii, pp. 7f, and in Kane *HSP*, pp. vi-vii.

is accordingly considered to be a species of the Kāvya. But there are reasons to believe that in older times Dramaturgy and Poetics formed separate disciplines, the former being probably the earlier in point of time, as well as in substance. We have seen[3] that the existence of *naṭa-sūtras*, which were presumably works in the *sūtra*-style on the histrionic art, was known even in the time of Pāṇini ; but there is no reference, direct or indirect, to such *alaṃkāra-sūtras*, and indeed the term Alaṃkāra itself in the technical sense was unknown in early literature. The earliest surviving works on Poetics, on the other hand, do not include a treatment of the theme of Dramaturgy which, having been a study by itself, was possibly excluded from the sphere of Poetics proper. Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, no doubt, speak of *nāṭaka* as a species of *kāvya*, but they refer to specialised treatises for its detailed treatment[4]. Vāmana, the next important writer on Poetics, shows indeed an unusual partiality towards the drama (1. 3. 30-32), but even he did not think it proper to devote any special attention to it. Among later writers, it is not until we come to the time of Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha, when the study was already entering upon a period of critical elaboration and summing-up of results, that we find special chapters dealing with the topic of Dramaturgy. Of these late writers, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha explicitly refer to and summarise the *Daśa-rūpaka*, a recognised work on the dramatic art ; while the encyclopaedic Hemacandra, who professes great admiration for Bharata and his commentator Abhinavagupta, deals with the subject rather summarily, referring the reader to the standard works of Bharata and Kohala.

It seems, therefore, that the school of Dramaturgy had an existence separate from the orthodox school of Poetics.

3 Vol. i, p. 16.

4 *Kāvyādarśa* i. 31, *Bhāmahālaṃkāra* i. 24. The word *anyatra* in Daṇḍin is interpreted by the cmmentators as referring to Bharata.

It is thus not surprising that Bharata should set apart, as he does, a chapter of his work for dealing with the ornaments of Poetry, so far they apply to the drama (*nāṭakāśraya*). In his discussion of the *guṇas* and *doṣas* in their application to the drama, he expressly designates them as *kāvya-guṇas* and *kāvya-doṣas* (xvi. 92, 84) respectively ; and with reference to the *alaṃkāras* he says *kāvyasyaite hyalaṃkārāḥ* (xvi. 41)[5], making it clear at the same time that he considers them only as embellishments of the dramatic speech.

Bharata opens this chapter on Poetics with the discussion of what he calls the *lakṣaṇas* (lit. characteristics), which appear to be partly formal and partly material elements of poetry[6]. Bharata mentions 36 of them and devotes a considerable part of this chapter to their definition ; and the whole discipline appears to have received from them the designation of Kāvya-lakṣaṇa referred to in xvi. 17[7]. From his treatment it appears that he considers Lakṣaṇas to be of greater importance

5 Ed. Kāvyamālā (N.S.P.), ed. GOS xvi. 41; but the Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. ed. xvii. 42 reads the line differently. Our references in the following pages are throughout to the Kāvyamālā ed.—Cf also verses 104, 110. Bharata uses the word *kāvya* many times here, as in other chapters, to signify the drama, but we must bear in mind that his conception of poetry is dramatic and justifies such employment of the term *kāvya*. But in this chapter he appears to imply a distinction between the *kāvya* and the *nāṭaka* as species of composition.

6 The part of the text dealing with Lakṣaṇas and Guṇas exists in two recensions, which we shall call here A and B. Both the recensions are known to Abhinavagupta; but he follows the text of A on Lakṣaṇas, as it had been handed down to him through his teachers (*asmad-upādhyāya-paramparāgataḥ*, p. 384). The editions of Kāvyamālā and Gaekwad's Series give this recension A, which consists of 39 verses starting with Upajāti and proceeding with Anuṣṭubh stanzas. The B recension, found in Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. ed. (which also gives A in the footnote), consists of 42 stanzas all in Anuṣṭubh. A is followed by the *Daśa-rūpaka*, but B is accepted by Śiṅga-bhūpāla and Viśvanātha. Bhoja appears to know both the recensions, but he makes out 64 Lakṣaṇas; he is followed by Śāradātanaya.

7 In Kāvyamālā and Gaekwad's ed.; ed. Chowkhamba p. 204, st. 16.

than Alaṃkāras which are mentioned as just a few in number.

It is not very clear, however, from Bharata's treatment as to what position these Lakṣaṇas should occupy in a formal scheme of Poetics ; but the function of most of these is assigned in later Poetics to Alaṃkāras or Guṇas. Daṇḍin mentions them summarily (ii. 366) under Alaṃkāras in the wider sense, along with *saṃdhyaṅga* and *vṛttyaṅga* which belong properly to the drama, and refers to *āgamāntara* (interpreted by Taruṇavācaspati as alluding to Bharata) for their treatment. So does Dhanañjaya (ed. N. S. P. iv. 84) ; while Viśvanātha (ed. Durgaprasad, vi. 171-211, pp. 316-332) takes them in connexion with the drama, calling some of them *nāṭyālaṃkāra* (dramatic embellishment), and is at the same time of opinion that although some of them are properly included under *guṇa, alaṃkāra, bhāva* and *saṃdhi,* they require a particular mention inasmuch as in the drama they are to be accomplished with some care (p. 332). In later literature the Lakṣaṇas, which linger conventionally in Dramaturgy, entirely disappear from Poetics proper, Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* being the only later work on Poetics which deals with them. This phenomenon would probably indicate not only that the Lakṣaṇas were regarded as strictly proper to the drama, but also the conclusion that what were, in the infancy of Poetics, considered so important as to deserve separate treatment and to be differentiated from the Guṇas and the Alaṃkāras, were with the growth of critical insight assigned to the Guṇas and Alaṃkāras themselves to whose sphere in ultimate analysis they were thought properly to belong[8].

V. Raghavan has already given[9] a detailed account of the

8 For instance, *āśīḥ* is one of the *lakṣaṇas* of Bharata, Bhāmaha mentioning it rather doubtfully as an *alaṃkāra* with the remark: *āśīr api ca keṣāṃcid alaṃkāratayā matā* (iii. 54). In Daṇḍin ii. 357 (as well as in Bhaṭṭi), it is already established as an Alaṃkāra. It is significant that Kuntaka finds fault with those who regard it as an Alaṃkāra.

9 *Some Concepts of the Alaṃkāra-śāstra,* Adyar Library 1942, pp. 1-47.

history of the concept of Lakṣaṇa ; but since the Lakṣaṇa-paddhati perished very early, or lingered as a superfluous relic in the history of Poetics and Dramaturgy, it is not necessary for us to make more than a passing reference. Abhinavagupta, while explaining Bharata's text, mentions as many as ten different views concerning Lakṣaṇa ; but it appears that Lakṣaṇa, otherwise called Bhūṣaṇa, is generally taken (on the analogy perhaps of Sāmudrika Lakṣaṇa), to be an innate beautifying element belonging to the body of poetry, or rather as constituting the body itself. Although similar in function to the Alaṃkāra in being a Kāvya-śobhākara Dharma, it is not a separate entity, but Apṛthak-siddha ; that is to say, it imparts beauty to poetry by itself, and is not added, as an Alaṃkāra is added, for extra beauty. It is obvious that the concept of Lakṣaṇa, even at its birth, had an overlapping of function with Alaṃkāra, which in course of time swallowed it up. Even as a Nāṭaka-dharma, connected with dramatic Saṃdhyaṅgas, it had little individuality, and the attitude of the *Daśa-rūpaka* in not considering it separately is significant. The main view, however, which takes Lakṣaṇa, like Alaṃkāra, as a beautifying characteristic, appears to have died out with Abhinavagupta's somewhat apologetic formulation.

From Lakṣaṇas Bharata goes on to the more interesting topic of *kāvyālaṃkāras* or poetic figures. It appears from his treatment that only four such poetic figures were known or recognised in his time, viz. *upamā* (simile), *rūpaka* (metaphor), *dīpaka* (lit. illuminator[10]) and *yamaka* (repetition

10 It is difficult to translate some of these terms, for there are no equivalents for them in European Rhetoric, and therefore attempts at such translation are as a general rule avoided here. The poetic figure *dīpaka* may be generally explained as a figure in which two or more objects, some relevant and some irrelevant, having the same attributes, are associated together; or in which several attributes, some relevant and some irrelevant, are predicated of the same object. It is called *dīpaka* or "illuminator" because it is like a lamp which, when employed for illuminating one object, illuminates others.

of words or syllables similar in sound). The Upamā is subdivided into four kinds, according as the object compared (*upameya*) or the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) is one or many[11], Bharata expressly making use of these technical terms. From another standpoint, five varieties of Upamā are distinguished and illustrated, viz. (1) *praśaṃsopamā* (2) *nindopamā* (3) *kalpitopamā* (4) *sadṛśī upamā* and (5) *kiṃcit-sadṛśī upamā*[12], according as these qualifications apply to the *upamāna*. Bharata is apparently unaware of the finer shades of distinction (grammatical or otherwise) introduced later on into the treatment of Upamā by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa, or of its comprehensive definition given by Vāmana; but the very fact that the idea of comparison was even by this time analysed thus far shows a considerable amount of speculation on this point[13]. Bharata's first two kinds, however, are criticised by Bhāmaha (ii. 37), but accepted by Daṇḍin without question (ii. 30-31); while the name, if not the idea, of the third kind lingers in Vāmana iv. 2. 2. Of Rūpaka and Dīpaka[14] no subvarieties are mentioned, and possibly these were comparatively late inventions. Of Yamaka, on the other hand, ten subspecies are elaborately defined and illustrated[15], a number exceeding even that given by Bhāmaha. It would appear that in the earlier stages of Poetics, what in later authors is known as a *śabdālaṃkāra*

11 Viz. (i) *ekasya ekena* (ii) *ekasya anekena* (iii) *anekasya ekena* (iv) *bahūnāṃ bahubhiḥ*.

12 Abhinavagupta notices the reading *asadṛśī*.

13 This figure is certainly one of the most ancient, and the idea of it was not unknown to Yāska (see vol. i, pp. 3-6).

14 The arrangement of the text dealing with these two figures differ in the different editions. But the wordings agree with the exception of *saṃprakīrtitam* xiv. 55 (in Kāvyamālā ed.), which is obviously a misreading for *saṃpradīpakam* (as Abhinava's comm. shows), given correctly in other editions.

15 Most of the names of these varieties have survived in Bhaṭṭi, Daṇḍin and other writers; but they are in most cases differently defined, See vol. i, p. 54 footnote 2.

(of which the artifices of Yamaka in particular seem to have found the greatest favour) received a more elaborate treatment[16], although the process repeats itself in comparatively modern decadent authors who delight in such external poetic devices. The later distinction between *śabdālaṃkāra* and *arthālaṃkāra* is not referred to by Bharata[17], as also by Bhāmaha ; but Bharata uses the word *śabdābhyāsa* with reference to Yamaka, which term might have suggested, as Abhinava's commentary on this point indicates, the later classification, which is implied for the first time by Daṇḍin's treatment.

After the Alaṃkāras, comes the treatment of ten *doṣas* (xvi. 84f) and ten *guṇas* (xvi. 92f), which seem to have constituted the orthodox number of faults and excellences of poetic composition. We shall have occasion to deal with the doctrine of Guṇa and Doṣa in connexion with the Rīti-theorists, who for the first time take it up seriously ; but it

16 As in Bhaṭṭi, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, the *Agni-purāṇa* and Bhoja among older authors. Bhāmaha gives only five varieties, and Udbhaṭa is the only old writer who altogether omits its treatment. This figure, as Bharata's elaborate treatment would show, must have been very early comprehended, e.g., in *Rāmāyaṇa*, Sundarakāṇḍa v 15-17, in Rudradāman inscription of the 2nd century A. D. Possibly it was favoured as a not unlikely substitute for rhyme, which is nearly absent in earlier Sanskrit and which probably originated from *antyānuprāsa* in later literature. But Mammaṭa and later writers, following perhaps the dictum of Ānandavardhana (on ii. 16 f) that *yamaka*, in order to be really poetical, requires a special effort on the part of the poet, and is in no way accessory to *rasa*, allude to it but dismiss it in a few words. As critical insight into the aesthetic requirements of poetry grew, the number of such figures as depended for their appeal chiefly on clever verbal arrangement, as well as their treatment in Poetics, naturally dwindled, although *yamaka* itself (as well as *anuprāsa*) played a much larger part in later decadent poetry. Bhoja, with an inaccuracy characteristic of later writers, speaks of tricks like *muraja-bandha* as having been *bharata-kathita* !

17 Abhinava, however, reads into Bharata such a distinction, and in his °*Locana* p. 5 he says: *cirantanair hi bharata-muni-prabhṛtibhir yamakopame śabdārthālaṃkāratveneṣṭe.*

may be pointed out here that Bharata's enumeration and definition of individual Doṣas and Guṇas do not exactly correspond to those of his nearest successors. Except keeping to the conventional number of ten (although Bhāmaha introduces an eleventh fault from the standpoint of logical correctness[18] and a list of ten intrinsic poetic faults in a different context, as he also mentions onlv three poetic excellences), both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin do not appear to have accepted implicitly this part of Bharata's teaching.

The faults mentioned by Bharata (xvi. 84) are:[19]

i. *gūḍhārtha*=circumlocution or periphrase (*paryāya-śabdābhihitam*[20]),

ii. *arthāntara*=digression into irrelevant matter (*avarṇyasya varṇanam*[21]),

18 With the exception of the eleventh fault, Daṇḍin is not only in complete agreement with Bhāmaha but really follows the latter's enumeration and definitions almost literally. This point will be discussed later.

19 On Bharata's Doṣas see V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, pt. ii, pp. 229-233. In Kauṭilya's Artha-śāstra the defects of the art of writing are: vyāghāta (contradiction), punarukta (repetition), apaśabda (grammatical incorrectness) and saṃplava (misarrangement of words).

20 This phrase in Bharata cannot mean "expression by means of a synonym", for it would then be difficult to differentiate this Doṣa from *ekārtha* given below. Possiblv this is the fault which appears in later writers as the figure of speech known as *paryāyokta* (=roughly, circumlocution or periphrase as a poetic figure). It is apparently so explained by Abhinavagupta. It is possible that later rhetoricians perceived that periphrase might sometimes be an ornament of expression, and thus analysed it into a poetic figure; and this may be taken as an instance in point of the process by which poetic figures were multiplied in later speculation.

21 Abhinava takes it in the sense of description of matters which should not be described in words (*śabdenāvarṇanīyam api varṇitam*), and rejects the sense of *aprākṛta-varṇanaṃ*. We are, however, inclined to prefer the sense of *digression* rejected by Abhinava. The defect *vācyāvacana*, mentioned by Mahimabhaṭṭa (p. 100), would possibly be this Doṣa of Bharata. This seems to be the fault in Māgha i. 43. Abhinava regards the *sva-śabda-vācyatā-doṣa* of Rasa and Bhāva as

iii. *artha-hīna*=incoherence (*asaṃbaddha*), or multiplicity of meaning (*aśeṣārtha*),

iv. *bhinnārtha*=(a) rusticity or want of refinement (*asabhya* or *grāmya*), or (b) changing the desired sense by another sense (*vivakṣito'nya evārtho yatrānyārthena bhidyate*),

v. *ekārtha*=tautology (*ekārthasya abhidhānam*),

vi. *abhiplutārtha*=aggregation of complete lines without merging them into a complete sentence (*yat padena samasyate*[22]),

vii. *nyāyād apetam*=defective logic (*pramāṇa-varjitam*),

viii. *viṣama*=defective metre (*vṛtta-doṣa*),

ix. *visaṃdhi*=disjunction in which the words are not well knit[23],

x. *śabda-hīna*=use of ungrammatical words (*aśabdasya yojanam*[24]).

But the faults discussed by Bhāmaha are (ch. iv):

i. *apārtha*=absence of complete sense[25],

ii. *vyartha*=incongruity with the context,

iii. *ekārtha*=tautology (Bhāmaha noting that others call

included in Bharata's *arthāntara-doṣa*, although it is not clear whether Bharata himself regarded this *sva-śabda-vācyatā* to be a Doṣa at all.

22 Abhinava explains: *abhiplutārthaṃ yathā—sa rājā nīti-kuśalaḥ saraḥ kumuda-śobhitam / sarva-priyā vasanta-śrīḥ grīṣme mālatikā-gamaḥ/iti* ; *atra pratipadam arthasya parisamāptavād abhiplutārtham, eka-vākyatvena nimajjanābhāvāt.*

23 The reading *anupratiṣṭhāśabdaṃ yat* is obviously incorrect. Abhinava's explanation is not clear ; but he appears to read *anupārūḍha-śabdam*. By *saṃdhi* or *saṃdhāna* he appears to mean compactness, congruity or merging, i.e. where the words are well knit. The Gaekwad ed. reading *anupaśliṣṭa-śabdam* is more apposite, but perhaps it is not original.

24 *aśabda=apaśabda*, Abhinavagupta.

25 Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin say *samudāyārtha-śūnyaṃ yat*, and this incompletion of the total sense arises, they explain, from the non-satisfaction of the natural expectancy of words in a sentence (*ākāṅkṣā*), a point already dealt with by grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas.

it *punarukta*, which well-known term is apparently unknown to Bharata),

iv. *sasaṃśaya*=ambiguity,

v. *apakrama*=violation of syntactical regularity,

vi. *śabda-hīna*=use of words not approved by correct usage (grammatical),

vii. *yati-bhraṣṭa*=deviation from the rules of metrical pause,

viii. *bhinna-vṛtta*=use of long or short syllables in the wrong place in a metre,

ix. *visaṃdhi*=disjunction of euphonic *liaison* when it is necessary,

x. *deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-nyāyāgama-virodhi*=inconsistency with regard to (a) place (b) time (c) the fine or mechanical arts (d) worldly usage (e) logic (f) *āgama* (=*dharma-śāstra*[26] i. e. codes of law or jurisprudence).

Bhāmaha also adds another fault to these ten, viz.. the Doṣa which arises from a faulty logical proposition (*pratijñā*), a faulty middle term (*hetu*), and a faulty logical illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*); but this blemish is treated in a separate chapter (ch. v), being interesting to Bhāmaha from the standpoint of the logic of poetry. In another context, while discussing the general characteristics of poetry (i. 37f), Bhāmaha mentions ten other defects which a poet should avoid, viz.:

i. *neyārtha*=farfetchedness, when the sense does not follow from the logical order of words but has to be guessed from the general intention,

ii. *kliṣṭa*=obstruction of the sense,

iii. *anyārtha*=disappearance of the sense,

iv. *avācaka*=inexpressiveness, when in the expressed words the sense does not appear to be openly dominant,

26 *āgamo dharma-śāstrāṇi, loka-sīmā ca tat-kṛtā / tad-virodhi tadācāra-vyatikramaṇato...//* says Bhāmaha himself in explanation (iv. 48).

v. *gūḍha-śabdābhidhāna*=use of difficult expressions,
vi. *ayuktimat*=impropriety, e.g. making clouds massengers in poetry,
vii. *śruti-duṣṭa*=expressly indecent[27],
viii. *artha-duṣṭa*=implicitly indecent (later writers calling it *aślīlatva*),
ix. *kalpanā-duṣṭa*=defective conception, where in the alliance of two words an undesirable sense is produced,
x. *śruti-kaṣṭa*=unmelodious or harsh in sound[28].

After giving these ten Doṣas Bhāmaha points out (i. 54-58) how these Doṣas may sometimes become Guṇas. As to how these two different series of ten faults are to be distinguished, Bhāmaha says nothing; but it is conceivable from his treatment that the latter concerns the inner nature or essence of poetry, while the former refers to only such defects as are more or less external. A glance at these two lists of faults, given by Bharata and Bhāmaha respectively, will at once shew that while some of Bhāmaha's faults correspond generally to Bharata's in name or in substance, Bhāmaha in his elaborate treatment is certainly more advanced than his predecessor. It is also noteworthy that Bhāmaha lays down, in his discussion of the last-named fault of *śruti-kaṣṭa,* the general proposition (i. 54) that a particular combination or arrangement sometimes makes even defective expressions allowable; in other words, a fault sometimes is converted into an excellence. Bharata, on the other hand, regards, as we shall see, all Guṇas or excellences to be mere negations of Doṣas or faults.

After dealing with the Doṣas, Bharata speaks of the Guṇas or excellences of composition which are also enumerated as

27 Bhāmaha's text is obviously corrupt on this point. But the distinction between *śruti-duṣṭa* and *śruti-kaṣṭa* of earlier writers is explained by Abhinava in his °*Locana* p. 82 (on ii. 12).

28 The examples given of this fault are words like *ajihladat* (Bhāmaha), or *adhākṣīt, akṣautsīt, tṛṇeḍhi* (Abhinava, °*Locana* loc. cit.).

ten in number[29]. He states summarily at the outset (xvi. 91) that the Guṇas are negations of the Doṣas (*guṇā viparyayād eṣām*), an opinion which is indeed extraordinary in view of the fact that later writers like Vāmana (ii. 1. 1-3) rightly consider Guṇas in a theory of Poetics to be positive entities, of which the Doṣas are the negations known by implication. It appears, on the other hand, that Guṇas like *mādhurya* and *audārya*, mentioned by Bharata in xvi. 91 and 92, are not really, as defined by himself, negations of any particular defect discussed by him. Jacobi's explanation[30] is probably right that Bharata's description of the Guṇas as negations of the Doṣas is in conformity with the common-sense view of the matter, for it is not difficult for one to seize upon a fault instinctively, while an excellence cannot be conceived so lightly unless its essence is comprehended by differentiating it from a more easily understood fault. The Guṇas, according to Bharata (xvi. 92), are the following[31]:

i. *śleṣa*=coalescence of words, connected with one another through the aggregate meaning desired by the poet, and consisting of a subtlety which in appearence is clear but in reality difficult to comprehend[32].

ii. *prasāda*=clearness, where the unexpressed sense appears from the word used through the relation of the easily understood word and sense[33].

29 Abhinava reads *kāvyasya guṇāḥ* in xvi. 92 as in Gaekwad and Chowkhamba eds., and not *kāvyārtha-guṇāḥ* as in Kāvyamālā ed.

30 In *Sb. der preuss. Akad.* xxiv, 1922, p. 223.

31 The alternative readings show that the text for some Guṇas also existed in two recensions. Abhinavagupta attempts throughout to approximate Bharata's Guṇas to those of Vāmana and strains to make Guṇas of Śabda and Artha out of each. Hence he is not a safe guide for this portion of the text. On the Guṇas of Bharata see V. Raghavan *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, pp. 271-81.

32 Hemacandra (p. 196) and Māṇikyacandra (p. 191) remark: *svabhāva-spaṣṭaṃ vicāra-gahanaṃ vacaḥ śliṣṭam iti bharataḥ*. Abhinava thinks that this excellence corresponds to Vāmana's *śabda-guṇa śleṣa*.

33 Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain: *vibhakta-vācya-*

iii. *samatā*=evenness, which is easy to understand and in which there is no redundance of expression nor excess of *cūrṇa-padas*[34].

iv. *samādhi*=superimposition (*samādhāna*) of something special or distinguishing in the sense[35].

vācakāyogād anuktayor api śabdārthayoḥ pratipattiḥ prasāda iti bharataḥ. Jacobi proposes (*ZDMG* lxiv, p. 138 contd. fn.) to read *mukhya* instead of *mukha* in the text, and thinks that Bharata's *prasāda* corresponds to Daṇḍin's *samādhi*. But Abhinava reads *sukha* and explains: *sukhayati, na prayatnam apekṣate yaḥ śabdārthaḥ*. Perhaps by this Guṇa, Bharata means to imply some kind of hint (*anukta artha*), transparent from the words used (such as we find, e. g., in the figure *mudrā* in *Candrāloka*, ed. Jivananda, v. 139, and *Kuvalayānanda*, ed. N.S.P., 1917, pp. 146-7), which may correspond partly to the metaphorical mode of expression included by Vāmana in his peculiar definition of *vakrokti* (iv. 3. 8.), or comprised by later writers under *lakṣaṇā* or *upacāra*. Referring to Vāmana's definition of *artha-guṇa prasāda* as *artha-vaimalya* (iii. 2. 3), Abhinava seems to support our suggestion when he says *so'rtho vaimalyāśrayo'pi vaimalyam upacārāt*, thus attempting to approximate Bharata's *prasāda* to Vāmana's *artha-guṇa* of that name.

34 The *cūrṇa-pada* is defined by Bharata himself in xviii. 50b, 51 Cf. Vāmana 1. 3. 22, 24 where *cūrṇa* is the name given to a kind of prose, which contains short compounds. Commenting on this passage in Vāmana, Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla interprets the word as: *cūrṇa-padena upacārād vyasta-pada-samāhāro lakṣyate, tena vyasta-pada-bahulaṃ cūrṇam*. Vāmana himself in his Vṛtti gives two characteristics, viz., *adīrgha samāsa* and *anuddhata pada*, short compounds and soft vocables. Referring to Vāmana's *śabda-guṇa* of the same name in iii. 1. 12, and trying to approximate it to Bharata's *samatā*, Abhinavagupta remarks: *śabdānāṃ samatvāt samaḥ, cūrṇa-padair a-samāsa-racanā yatra sātiśayā na bhavati,.........dīrgha-samāso'pyatyanta-samāsaś ca viṣamatā, tad-viparyayeṇa samatā, upakrānta-mārgāparityāga-rūpety uktam.*

35 Abhinava explains: *yasyārthasya abhiyuktaiḥ pratibhānātiśaya-vadbhir viśeṣo'pūrvaḥ svollikhita upapadyate sa samāhita-manaḥ-saṃpādya-viśeṣatvād artho viśiṣṭaḥ samādhiḥ*. In the second line of the text Abhinava reads *parikīrtitaḥ* (and not *parikīrtyate*), and takes *arthena* as referring to the word *samādhi*: *samādhi-śabdasya yo'rthaḥ parihāra-lakṣaṇas tena parikīrtitaḥ paritaḥ samantād ākrāntyā uccāraṇe saṃpannaḥ*. This explanation of *saṃpanna* is probably given to make the definition correspond to that of Vāmana's *ārohāvaroha-kramaḥ samā-*

v. *mādhurya*=sweetness, where a sentence heard or repeated many times does not tire or disgust[36].

vi. *ojas*=strength, which consists in the use of varied and dignified compounded words, having letters agreeable to one another[37].

vii. *saukumārya*=smoothness, where an agreeable sense is realised by means of agreeably employed words and well-connected euphonic conjunctions[38].

viii. *artha-vyakti*=explicitness, which describes the nature of things, as they appear in the world. by means of well known predicates[39].

dhiḥ (iii. 1. 13) ; for Abhinava goes on explaining *ākrāntyoccāraṇe ārohāvaroha-krama eva*, the *āroha* and *avaroha* depending, as he discusses in detail, on *uccāraṇa.* Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain Bharata's definition simply as *arthasya guṇāntara-samādhānāt samādhir iti bharataḥ.*

36 Abhinava reads *śrutam* and *vākyam* instead of *kṛtam* and *kāvyam* in the printed text (Kāvyamālā ed.) ; and this is supported by what Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra say with regard to this excellence of Bharata. The other eds. give the words correctly.

37 Abhinava reads *bahubhiḥ* (instead of *vividhaiḥ)* and *sānurāgaiḥ* (instead of *sā tu svaraiḥ*), explaining the latter reading thus: *yatra varṇair varṇāntaram apekṣate tatra sānurāgatvam.* Hemacandra, however, attributes a different definition to Bharata, viz., *avagītasya hīnasya vā śabārtha-saṃpadā yad udāttatvaṃ niṣiñcati kāvayas tad oja iti bharataḥ* ; and Māṇikyacandra says to the same effect (this follows the reading of Recension B): *avagīto'pi hīno'pi syād udāttāvabhāsakaḥ/ yatra śabdārtha-saṃpattyā tad ojaḥ parikīrtitaḥ/.*

38 Abhinavagupta reads *sukha-prayojyaiś chandobhiḥ* (for *sukha-prayojyair yac chabdaiḥ*) in the text. Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra simply paraphrase: *śukha-śabdārthaṃ saukumāryam iti bharataḥ.*— The "agreeable sense" (*sukumārātha*), which corresponds to the *aniṣṭhurākṣara-prāyatā* of Daṇḍin's Guṇa of this name, or to the *ajaraṭhatva* or *apāruṣya* of Vāmana's twofold *saukumārya*, implies probably the avoidance of disagreeable or inauspicious (*amaṅgala*) statements: Thus instead of *mṛtaḥ*, one should say *kīrtiśeṣaṃ gataḥ*. It is on this ground that theorists after Mammaṭa object that this is no Guṇa but a negation of the *amaṅgala doṣa*, which some writers include in the fault known as *aślīlatva.*

39 The text is obviously corrupt. Abhinava reads *suprasiddhā-*

ix. *udāra*=exaltedness. where there are superhuman sentiments, varied feelings, and the Erotic and the Marvellous moods[40].

x. *kānti*=loveliness, which delights the ear and the mind, or which is realised by the meaning conveyed by graceful gestures (*līlādi*[41]).

It will be noticed from this enumeration that in some cases it is difficult to see what Bharata means exactly by a particular Guṇa, and that the classification is by no means exhaustive nor free from overlapping. On the other hand, some of the Guṇas can be taken (as Abhinavagupta takes them) as approximating roughly to the individual *śabda-guṇas* and *artha-guṇas* elaborated by Vāmana and other later theorists. The development of the Guṇa-doctrine is intimately connected

bhidhānā tu instead of *suprasiddhā dhātunā ca*, which phrase, however, may mean use of well known verbs. Read also *loka-dharma°* instead of *loka-karma°* Hemacandra explains: *yasminn anyathā-sthito'pi tathā-sthita evārthaḥ pratibhāti so'rthavyaktiḥ*. He also points out that this Guṇa of Bharata corresponds to Vāmana's *artha-guṇa arthavyakti* (defined as *vastu-svabhāva-sphuṭatvam* iii. 2. 13), and would be equivalent to the poetic figure *jāti* or *svabhāvokti* of Daṇḍin and others. Cf. Mammaṭa p. 583: *abhidhāsyamāna-svabhāvoktyalaṃkāreṇa vastu-svabhāva-sphuṭatva-rūpārthavyaktiḥ svīkṛtā*, but Viśvanātha would include it in *prasāda-guṇa*.

40 The implication of *adbhuta* Rasa in this excellence and the characteristic that it deals with *divya-bhāva* indicate a certain *utkarṣavān dharmaḥ*, causing wonder, such as Daṇḍin's *udāra* would contain. See the illustration of this Guṇa given by Hemacandra p. 199. The inclusion of the *śṛṅgāra* and *adbhuta* Rasas makes this Guṇa of Bharata correspond partly to Vāmana's *artha-guṇa kānti*. But Daṇḍin adds: *ślāghyair viśeṣaṇair yuktam udāraṃ kaiścid iṣyate*. There is no reference in Bharata to such 'praiseworthy epithets', although Hemacandra says: *bahubhiḥ sūkṣmaiś ca viśeṣaiḥ sametam udāram iti bharataḥ*. In the *Agni-purāṇa* 346. 9, however, we read: *uttāna-padataudāryaṃ yutaṃ ślāghyair viśeṣaṇaiḥ*, which might be a direct echo of Daṇḍin.

41 *līlādi*=*līlādi-ceṣṭā*, Abhinavagupta. This would be comprehended by the *dīpta-rasatvam* of Vāmana's *artha-guṇa kānti*,—Kauṭilya (ii. 28) mentions the following characteristics of the art of writing: artha-krama (arrangement of subject-matter), saṃbandha (relevancy), paripūrṇatā (completeness), mādhurya (sweetness), audārya (dignity), and spaṣṭatva (clearness).

with the central theory of the Rīti-school and will be dealt with later ; but it may be pointed out here that although the definitions of the individual Guṇas, given by Bharata, do not correspond exactly to those of later writers, there can be no doubt that here we have for the first time a definite statement, if not a proper theoretic treatment, of the doctrine. The disagreement between different theorists with regard to the definitions of individual Guṇas is a well known fact in the history of Sanskrit Poetics, and one need not therefore be surprised that later authors give us definitions which do not agree with those of Bharata. To Bharata, again, the relation of the *guṇas* to *rīti*, as elaborated by Vāmana, or to *rasa*, as first clearly enunciated by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, was probably unknown. So was also Vāmana's distinction between *śabda-guṇa* and *artha-guṇa*, although Bharata's *guṇas* are mostly of the nature of *artha-guṇas*, and some of them can be interpreted (as done by Abhinavagupta) as constituting *śabda-guṇas* as well. But the number and nomenclature of the Guṇas, as well as the substance of some of them, as outlined by Bharata, are conventionally adhered to by all later writers, excepting Bhāmaha who, as we shall see, was a radical thinker in this respect, until we come to the Dhvanikāra and his followers who give a new interpretation to the Guṇa-doctrine. It is also important to note that Bharata takes the *guṇas*, as well as the *doṣas* and *alaṃkāras*, to be subservient to the purpose of awakening *rasa*, which is taken as the principal business of the drama. In this he anticipates and probably influences the view of the Dhvanikāra and his school who, as we shall see, borrow Bharata's idea of Rasa from the case of the drama and apply it to that of poetry.

(2)

It has been noted above that Bharata makes all these elements, *lakṣaṇa*, *guṇa*, *doṣa* and *alaṃkāra*, subordinate to the principal purpose of awakening *rasa* in the drama.

These elements constitute what he calls *vācika abhinaya* (defined in viii. 6, 9), which is dealt with in chapters xiv-xx and which forms an important factor, the *anubhāva* (vii. 5), in calling forth the Rasa. Hence Bharata expressly considers (xvi. 104 f) the question of their employment in relation to Rasa. It is necessary, therefore, to consider here briefly Bharata's teachings regarding Rasa[42], which is dealt with in the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, chapters vi and vii[43].

It must be observed at the outset that Rasa does not appear to be Bharata's principal theme, and that it is discussed only in connexion with his exposition of dramatic representation with which he is principally concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that Rājaśekhara, probably following some current tradition, should regard Bharata as an authority on Rūpaka (drama) rather than on Rasa, and mention one Nandikeśvara[44] as the original exponent of the Rasa-doctrine which, if Rājaśekhara is right, Bharata must have borrowed and worked up into his dramaturgic system. That the Rasa-doctrine was older than Bharata is apparent from Bharata's own citation of several verses in the Āryā and the Anuṣṭubh metres in support of or in supplement to his own statements; and in one place, he appears to quote two Āryā-verses from an unknown work on Rasa[45].

The idea of Rasa, apart from any theory thereon, was

42 The question has been dealt with briefly in S. K. De, Theory of Rasa in *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume,* Orientalia, vol. iii, 1922. reprinted in *Some Problems of Skt. Poetics,* Calcutta 1959, pp. 177-235.

43 In some other chapters Bharata deals with the cognate topics of the Nāyaka and Nāyikā and their adjuncts and emotional states, which will be referred to in their proper place below (ch. viii).

44 See vol. I p. 1, 2, 19.

45 *atrārye rasa-vicāra-mukhe*, ed. Kāvyamālā p. 67. The line is wanting in Grosset's edition. Keśava Miśra, a comparatively recent writer of the 16th century, speaks of one *bhagavān* Śauddhodani who, according to him, was a *sūtra-kāra* on Rasa; but the opinions of this otherwise unknown writer (see vol. I, p. 219), as recorded by Keśava Miśra, do not deviate materially from the conventional views

naturally not unknown to old writers; and Bharata's treatment would indicate that some system of Rasa, however undeveloped, or even a Rasa school, particularly in connexion with the drama, must have been in existence in his time. But the bearings of this doctrine on poetry were seldom discussed, and the importance of Rasa as one of the essential factors of poetry was indeed naïvely understood but was not theoretically established.[46] As Dramaturgy was in the beginning a separate study, from which Poetics itself probably took its cue, the Rasa-doctrine, which sprang up chiefly in connexion with this study, confined its activity in the first stage of its development to the sphere of dramatic composition and exerted only a limited influence on poetic theories.[47] The importance of this dramaturgic Rasa-system must have been somewhat overshadowed by the early dominance, in Poetics

of those later writers of the new school who admit the essentiality of Rasa.

46 We get the first definite exposition, as we shall see, of the idea of Rasa and its relation to poetry in the works of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana : and its importance in poetry, as distinguished from the drama, was probably understood from that time. Māgha in some verses (see vol. i pp. 61, fn 3) shows himself conversant with some theory of Rasa; but it is to *nāṭya-rasa* (such as described by Bharata) rather than to *kāvya-rasa* that he appears to refer. It is not maintained that older Sanskrit Poetry was devoid of Rasa or that the earlier poets never possessed any idea of it; but it is suggested that the theory of Rasa was not critically set forth, nor its aesthetic importance in poetry properly understood until the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana came into the field. The presence of Rasa is such a familiar fact in Sanskrit Poetry as well as in comparatively modern Sanskrit writers on Poetics that one is apt to lose sight of this fact of historical importance.

47 That the doctrine of Rasa was originally associated with dramaturgy and later on applied to Poetics is clear from the tradition which survives even in very late writers, and makes them not only discuss the theory directly in connexion with the drama (e. g. Viśvanātha) but even borrow the illustrations mostly from dramatic poetry. Abhinava speaks of the Kāvya as *loka-nāṭya-dharmi-sthānīya,* and says : *nātya eva rasaḥ, kāvye ca nāṭyāyamāna eva rasaḥ kāvyārthaḥ.*

proper, of the Alaṃkāra and Rīti systems, whose traditions are carried on by the two earliest writers on Poetics, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, both of whom allow a very subsidiary place to Rasa in their scheme ; but at the same time the comparative antiquity of such a Rasa-system in connexion with the drama, going back to a time even earlier than Bharata, cannot be doubted.

The oldest known exponent of this system is Bharata, from whom spring all later systems and theories such as we know them, and whom even Ānandavardhana himself (p. 181), in applying the Rasa-theory to Poetics, names as his original authority. It is necessary for this reason to take into account Bharata's doctrine of *nāṭya-rasa* as the original source of the doctrine of *kāvya-rasa* elaborated in later Poetics. But long before the new interpretation of the relation of Rasa to poetry, given by the Dhvanikāra and authoritatively established by Mammaṭa, was dominant, Bharata's views on Rasa appear to have been discussed in some detail in dramaturgic systems with the result that divergent theories came to prevail under the names of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others, all of whom are supposed to have been commentators on Bharata's text[48], or at least to have taken Bharata as their starting point. With Bharata, therefore, we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark in respect of the Rasa-doctrine.

It is worth noticing, however, that although all theorists take Bharata as their starting point and build up their own theories round his authoritative, if somewhat meagre, text, Bharata himself, like all old masters, is tantalisingly simple in his statements ; for the subject does not appear to have yet been brought into the realm of scholastic speculation. Bharata's work is encyclopaedic in its scope, but its primary theme is the drama and its conception of poetry dramatic, a view which perhaps inspired Vāmana's partiality towards

48 See vol. i pp. 31f.

dramatic composition already alluded to, and which is concisely put by Abhinavagupta by saying *kāvyaṃ tāvad daśa-rūpātmakam eva*. In such a composition Rasa, according to Bharata, should be predominant, and there are numerous passages which clearly indicate that there can be no sense of poetry, in his view, without Rasa[49]. Although Bharata does not enter into technicalities, he seems to be of opinion that the *vibhāvas* and the *anubhāvas*, which later theory takes to be essential factors, call forth or evolve Rasa; but he is not clear as to what this process of evolution exactly is. He takes the *bhāva* as the basis of Rasa and explains it generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, viz., through words, gestures, and internal feelings (*vāg-aṅga-sattvopetān kāvyārthān bhāva-yantīti bhāvāḥ*). This Bhāva, which consists of an emotional state of the mind, reaches, when permanent and not transitory, the state of Rasa through the elements known as *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*. A *vibhāva* is explained thus: *vibhāvo nāma vijñānārthaḥ, vibhāvyante'nena vāg-aṅga-sattvābhinayā ity ato vibhāvaḥ*. The term *vibhāva*, therefore, is used to connote knowledge or cognition, and is explained generally as denoting that which makes the three kinds of representation capable of being sensed. In the same way, the *anubhāva* is explained as that which follows upon and makes the three kinds of representation actually sensed. The third element of Rasa, the *vyabhicāri-bhāva*, consists of accessory emotional facts which help and strengthen it, and is etymologically explained as: *vi abhi ity etāvupasargau, cara gatau dhātuḥ, vividham ābhimukhyena rasān carantīti vyabhicāriṇaḥ*. As to what relation these elements bear to Rasa and how this state of relish is brought about, Bharata simply lays down in a cryptic formula: *vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ*, a formula which, in spite of his own explanation, is so ambiguous with respect to the exact significance of the

49 e. g. *na hi rasād ṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate*, ed. Grosset p. 87=ed. Kāvyamālā p. 62. Cf. also vii. 7.

terms *saṃyoga* and *niṣpatti* that a great deal of controversy has centred round their interpretation, giving rise to a number of theories about Rasa. Bharata's own explanation, if it can be called an explanation, is that just as a beverage is accomplished through various seasoned articles and herbs, so the permanent mood (the *sthāyi-bhāva*), reinforced (*upagata*) by various *bhāvas*, attains the state of Rasa ; and it is so called because its essence consists in its taste or relish (*āsvādyatvāt*), this being the etymological meaning of the word *rasa*[50]. He also explains[51] that the *sthāyi-bhāva* is the basis of Rasa because it attains, as it were, mastery or sovereignty among forty-nine different *bhāvas* mentioned by himself[52], which naturally rest upon it as being presumably the principal theme or mood in the composition in question.

Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that, in Bharata's opinion, the *sthāyi-bhāva* or the principal mood in a composition is the basis of Rasa, the essence of which consists in *āsvāda* or relish by the reader or spectator, while the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and the *vyābhicāri-bhāva* awaken this state of emotional realisation or 'relish' in the reader's mind. But this explanation by its very ambiguity or vagueness taxed the ingenuity of theorists and commentators, its general trend anticipating theories like the *utpatti-vāda* of Lollaṭa and the *anumiti-vāda* of Śaṅkuka, and special terms in the passage in question like *vyañjita* and *sāmānya-guṇa-yoga* suggesting specialised doctrines like the *vyakti-vāda* of Abhinavagupta and the *bhukti-vāda* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

The original outlines of the theory, however, are accepted as fixed by Bharata. It is practically admitted on all hands, on semi-psychological considerations of poetry, that the Rasa

50 ed. Grosset p. 87=ed. Kāvyamālā p. 62. It should be noticed that all the terms which describe the essence of Rasa such as *rasanā*, *carvaṇā*, or *āsvāda*, refer etymologically to the physical pleasure of taste ; this point will be dealt with below.

51 ed. Grosset p. 102, ll. 7-19=ed. Kāvyamālā p. 70, ll. 13-22.

52 viz., 8 *sthāyi-bhāvas*, 8 *sāttvika bhāvas* and 33 *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*.

is a state of relish in the reader of the principal sentiment in the composition, a subjective condition of his mind which is brought about when the principal or permanent mood (*sthāyi-bhāva*) is brought into a relishable condition through the three elements, the *vibhāva*, the *anubhāva* and the *vyabhicāri-bhāva*, exhibited in the drama. Of these elements, the first two are important, the *vyabhicārin* being only concomitant or accessory. Bharata's explanation of these terms is rendered with greater precision by his followers. By the *sthāyi-bhāva* in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent mental states, such as Love, Grief, Anger or Fear. This permanent mood, constituting the principal theme of a composition and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland, cannot be overcome by those akin to it or those opposed to it, but can only be reinforced. Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the *sthāyi-bhāva* are in poetry and drama known as *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāri-* (also called *saṃcāri-*) *bhāva*[53], corresponding in ordinary life (as opposed to the extraordinary world of poetry) to the mundane causes and effects (*laukika kāraṇa* and *kārya*). Devoid of technicalities, a *vibhāva* may be taken as that which makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed, an *anubhāva* as that which makes it actually sensed, while a *vyabhicāri-bhāva* is that which acts as an auxiliary or gives a fresh impetus to it. In the case of Love as a permanent mood, the stock-examples given of a *vibhāva* are women and the seasons; of *anubhāva*, glance and embrace; of *vyabhicārin*, the transient subordinate feelings of joy or anxiety. Now Bharata says that the reader is enabled to realise or relish as Rasa the permanent mood of a composi-

53 Ballantyne renders these terms conveniently, if not adequately, as the Excitant, the Ensuant and the Accessory respectively, a nomenclature which is followed by Ganganatha Jha in his translation of the *Kāvya-prakāśa*. Jacobi, however, uses (*ZDMG*. 1902, pp. 394 f) the terms Factor, Effect and Concurrent.

tion through a certain correlation of these elements with the permanent mood, the correlation taking place apparently for the purpose of manifesting it and bringing it to a relishable condition. The question, therefore, arises, to which Bharata himself gives no definite solution, viz. what relation these elements bear to Rasa, or in other words, how do they bring about this subjective condition of relish in the reader's mind, the solution depending, as we have noted above, upon the explanation of the two much-discussed terms *saṃyoga* (lit. correlation) and *niṣpatti* (lit. consummation) in the original *sūtra* of Bharata. This is the central pivot round which all later theories move, and we shall take it up again in their connexion below (ch. iv).

Bharata mentions eight different moods or Rasas in the drama, of which a detailed account is given in *Nāṭya-śāstra* ch. vi, which is the authoritative source drawn upon by all later writers, although they sometimes differ, as we shall see, in the enumeration of the orthodox number of eight. Properly speaking, the primary Rasas, according to Bharata, are only four in number, viz., *śṛṅgāra* (the Erotic), *raudra* (the Furious), *vīra* (the Heroic) and *bībhatsa* (the Disgusting). The other four Rasas proceed from these, as follow: *hāsya* (the Comic) from *śṛṅgāra*, *karuṇa* (the Pathetic) from *raudra*, *adbhuta* (the Marvellous). from *vīra*, and *bhayānaka* (the Terrible) from *bībhatsa* (xvi. 39-40).

The eight *sthāyi-bhāvas* or permanent moods, corresponding to the eight Rasas, are given categorically as (i) *rati* (Love) (ii) *hāsa* (Mirth) (iii) *krodha* (Anger) (iv) *utsāha* (Courage) (v) *bhaya* (Fear) (vi) *jugupsā* (Aversion) (vii) *vismaya* (Wonder) and (viii) *śoka* (Sorrow), forming the basis respectively of *śṛṅgāra*, *hāsya*, *raudra*, *vīra*, *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa*, *adbhuta* and *karuṇa*. The *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* are mentioned as thirty-three in number and include the subordinate feelings of self-disparagement (*nirveda*), debility (*glāni*), apprehension (*śaṅkā*), envy (*asūyā*), intoxication (*mada*), weariness (*śrama*), indolence (*ālasya*), depression (*dainya*),

reflection (*cintā*), distraction (*moha*), recollection (*smṛti*), equanimity (*dhṛti*), shame (*vrīḍā*), unsteadiness (*capalatā*), joy (*harṣa*), flurry (*āvega*), stupefaction (*jaḍatā*), arrogance (*garva*), despondency (*viṣāda*), longing (*autsukya*), drowsiness (*nidrā*), dementedness (*apasmāra*), dreaming (*supta*), awakening (*vibodha*), impatience of opposition (*amarṣa*), dissembling (*avahittha*), sternness (*ugratā*), resolve (*mati*), sickness (*vyādhi*), madness (*unmāda*), death (*maraṇa*), alarm (*trāsa*) and doubt (*vitarka*)[54]. The *sāttvika bhāvas*, which can be taken generally as involuntary evidences of internal feeling, are then specified as eight in number[55], viz., stupor (*stambha*), perspiration

54 The English equivalents follow generally Ballantyne's renderings.—It must be borne in mind that the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* are independent Bhāvas but occurring as accessory or concurrent to the principal mental state depicted, which is known as the *sthāyi-bhāva*. Sometimes it may happen that the *vyabhicārin* is principally manifested in a composition, and the *sthāyin* is merely awakened; such cases later theorists would call *bhāvas* (and not *rasas*) which are thus incomplete *rasas*. Attempts have been made to distinguish between Rasa and Bhāva, and this question will be discussed later on. It would appear from the enumeration of the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* that the older theorists consider many conditions from the spiritual point of view, which we would regard from the standpoint of the body (e.g. *vyādhi* or *maraṇa*). See Jacobi in *ZDMG* lvi, 1902, p. 395 fn 2.

55 Regarding the *sāttvika bhāva* (which later theorists, e.g. Abhinavagupta, connect with the *sattva guṇa* of the Sāṃkhya philosophers), Bharata says (ed. Grosset p. 129=ed. Kāvyamālā, p. 82): *iha hi sattvaṃ nāma manaḥ-prabhavam, tac ca samāhita-manastvād utpadyate, manaḥ-samādhānāc ca sattva-nirvṛtir iti; tasya yo'sau svabhāvo romāñcāsrādi-kṛtaḥ sa na śakyate'nya-manasā kartum iti; loka-svabhāvānukaraṇāc ca nāṭyasya sattvam īpsitam.* Thus Bharata connotes by it certain tokens of *mental* feelings, delineated in the dramatic representation by an imitation of human nature through steady concentration of the mind. Bharata adds the illustration: *iha hi nāṭya-dharma-pravṛttāḥ sukha-duḥkha-kṛto bhāvās tathā sattva-viśuddāḥ kāryā yathā svarūpā bhavanti.* For, how can sorrow, he says, which must be manifested by weeping, or joy which must be expressed by laughter, be delineated except by these involuntary evidences? This is apparently what Bharata means by *sattvābhinaya* or *sāttvikābhinaya*. In the *Daśa-rūpaka*, however, *sattva* is taken to mean 'a sympathetic heart' and *sāttvika* is explained as *sattvena*

(*sveda*), horripilation (*romāñca*), break of voice (*svara-bhaṅga*), trembling (*vepathu*), change of colour (*vaivarṇya*), tears (*aśru*) and loss of consciousness (*pralaya*). This psycho-physical analysis, however formal it may appear to us, is taken up in detail in chapter vii, and each of these states is categorically defined and illustrated strictly from the standpoint of the drama ; but in later literature they are established authoritatively for poetry as well[56].

(3)

This is a rough outline of the teachings, relevant to Poetics proper, that we can gather from the somewhat meagre text of Bharata, and it may be taken as an outline of the discipline as it existed in the earliest known period of its history. With Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra, on the other hand, begins the next period of its history, a comparatively brief but exceedingly important stage of extraordinary creative genius. Of the period anterior to Bharata our knowledge is extremely scanty ; and between Bharata and the definite formulation of poetic theories which begins with Bhāmaha, lies, again, a long gap of which we do not possess much knowledge. It is clear, however, that certain poetical *guṇas*, *doṣas*, *alaṃkāras* and *lakṣaṇas* were known to Bharata and dealt with by him even as decorative devices of the dramatic speech. It would not be wrong to presume from this fact that the study of Alaṃkāra-śāstra, even if it was not yet fully

nirvṛttaḥ (Cf *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* iii. 134). Bhānudatta, in his *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* gives a somewhat different interpretation, and takes *sāttvika* to mean physical gestures as evidences of natural feeling (*sattvaṃ jīva-śarīram, tasya dharmāḥ sāttvikāḥ, itthaṃ ca śārīra-bhāvāḥ stambhādayaḥ sāttvikā bhāvā ity abhidhīyante*). Later writers like the author of the *Kāvyaprakāśa-pradīpa* bring in philosophical implications and interpret *sāttvika* as originating in the *sattva-guṇa*. Whatever difference there might be as to the meaning of the term *sāttvika* itself, all the writers on this subject agree in applying the term to denote those gestures (enumerated above) which give an involuntary expression to internal feelings.

56 e. g., in Mammata.

developed and self-conscious, was probably older than Bharata himself. It follows from this conclusion that the tradition of opinion, which crystallises itself in the oldest available manuals of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, or in the memorial verses of the Dhvanikāra, comes to us in a definite shape indeed at a date much posterior to Bharata, but it is probable that in substance, if not in actual formulation, it may have been much anterior to Bharata, who himself gives an indication of such teachings. Excepting what we get in Bharata, however, the history of this process of crystallisation (for the different systems appear in a relatively developed form in Bhāmaha and others) is not known to us ; but it must have covered a tentative stage whose productions, if they had been extant today, would have shown Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra in the making, and would have partly filled up the presumably long gap between Bharata and these earliest formulators of Poetics.

Even if they were the earliest formulators, neither Bhāmaha, nor Daṇḍin, nor the Dhvanikāra, however, claims entire originality of having created the system which he individually represents. None of them can be taken as the absolute founder of the particular doctrines of *alaṃkāra, rīti* or *dhvani* with which they are respectively associated ; and with them we do not start at the absolute beginnings of the discipline. Indebtedness of these writers to their predecessors in the line, acknowledged by themselves, has already been noted in the first volume of this work (pp. 50, 67-68, 109) ; but apart from such explicit admissions, one can easily argue that certain fundamental concepts and formulas (such as *vakrokti, rīti, guṇa* or *alaṃkāra*) appear in writers like Bhāmaha without a preliminary explanation, as things traditionally handed down or already too well known to require any detailed discussion. It is also unthinkable that these early writers could have, as they certainly do not claim to have, evolved by themselves the relatively developed form and treatment of the main topics of Poetics in the absence of earlier tentative works.

It will be profitable, therefore, to pause and enquire if these works of Bhāmaha and others give us any indication of the stage or stages through which the discipline might have passed in the interval between Bharata and themselves. Fortunately there are passages in these writers which would give us hints as to the existence of such intermediate stages. Jacobi has already shown[57] that Bhāmaha, in his treatment of the poetic figures, groups them in a curious but suggestive way which probably indicates the different stages in the growth and multiplication of such figures before his time. Unlike later authors who, adopting some definite principle of classification, enumerate the poetic figures *en masse*[58], Bhāmaha begins (ii. 4) by naming and defining first a group of five such figures only, and then goes on to enumerate other such limited groups of figures, taking 24 remaining figures in a final group. The first group of figures thus mentioned comprises *anuprāsa, yamaka, rūpaka, dīpaka* and *upamā*, recognised, as Bhāmaha says, by others (*anyair udāhṛtāḥ*) and accepted by himself. These five correspond in reality to the four ancient poetic figures known to and defined by Bharata, viz. *yamaka, rūpaka, dīpaka* and *upamā*. The additional figure *anuprāsa*, mentioned by Bhāmaha, can be taken as falling in the same class as *yamaka*[59], the one being *varṇābhyāsa* and the other *padābhyā-*

57 In *Sb. der preuss. Akad.* xxiv, 1922, pp. 220-222.

58 By the time of Daṇḍin, for instance, a large number of poetic figures appears to have been recognised, and he does not find any necessity of 'reporting' them or mentioning them successively in groups as Bhāmaha does; but he arranges them in his own way, taking the *arthālaṃkāras* first and the *śabdālaṃkāras* next, in two separate chapters. Udbhaṭa, a follower of Bhāmaha, deals with the first three groups of Bhāmaha in the first three chapters of his own work (omitting, however, Bhāmaha's phrases like *anyair udāhṛtāḥ, aparaḥ, abhihitāḥ kvacit* etc, with reference to these groups), the other three chapters taking up the remaining twenty-four figures of the last group. Although he follows generally the sequence as well as the definition of Bhāmaha, he does not recite them in the manner of groups after Bhāmaha.

59 The distinction between *yamaka* and *anuprāsa* may be explained thus: in the *anuprāsa* there is a repetition of one or more consonants,

sa, while both are what Bharata would call *śabdābhyāsa*. Abhinavagupta very significantly takes[60] *anuprāsa* as implied in *yamaka* by Bharata ; and the very fact that the *anuprāsa* in Bhāmaha is thus clearly differentiated from *yamaka* may indicate further refinement in the analysis of these figures and betoken a somewhat later stage.

In course of time, six other figures appear to have been analysed and added, and Bhāmaha mentions them next in a group in ii. 66. They are *ākṣepa, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti* and *atiśayokti*. Of these there is no trace in Bharata. This constitutes probably the second stage of development, in which can also be included a seventh figure *vārtta*, which is referred to by Daṇḍin in i. 85, but which is not accepted by Bhāmaha as non-poetic utterance in which there is no Vakrokti (ii. 87)[61]. The third stage indicated by Bhāmaha's treatment does not appear to have been very productive, for in it we have the addition of only two more figures *yathāsaṃkhya* and *utprekṣā* (ii. 88), and possibly of a third *svabhāvokti*. In this connexion it is noteworthy that by Daṇḍin's time *svabhāvokti* (also called *jāti*, recognised by Bāṇabhaṭṭa) is established as the primary or first figure (*ādyā*

sometimes but not necessarily along with the accompanying vowels ; in *yamaka*, the consonants as well as the vowels are repeated strictly in the same order or sequence. In *yamaka*, the same group of vocables is repeated but it need not have the same meaning, and may even be quite meaningless in itself ; but in the repetition of the *anuprāsa* one should consider the meaning. *Nicitaṃ kham upetya nīradaiḥ priyahīnā-hṛdayāvanīradaiḥ* would be an example of one variety of *yamaka* ; while *adri-droṇī-kuṭīre kuhariṇi hariṇārātayo yāpayanti* would be an example of *anuprāsa*.

60 *tenānuprāsa-lāṭīyāder anena* (=*yamakena*) *evopasaṃgrahāt*.

61 V. Raghavan (*Some Concepts*, p. 99f), however, argues that in Bhāmaha Vārttā is no name of an Alaṃkāra.—Here Bhāmaha speaks of three other poetic figures *hetu, sūkṣma* and *leśa*, which he rejects as not involving that he calls *vakrokti*. These, however, appear not in direct connexion with this enumeration of poetic figures but in the immediate context of *vakrokti* alluded to in the previous verse. These figures, however, are illustrated (as interpreted by commentators) by Bhaṭṭi, and were probably recognised before Bhāmaha's time.

alaṃkṛti), while in Bhāmaha it occupies a rather dubious position ; for the latter, in pursuance probably of his peculiar theory of Vakrokti, does not appear to favour this figure very much. With regard to *utprekṣā* [62], which is indeed an important addition to the Poetics of this period, Bhāmaha reports (ii. 88) that Medhāvin called it *saṃkhyāna*[63]. Is it possible that Bhāmaha's predecessor Medhāvin was the first to analyse and name this figure? Daṇḍin, in a well known passage, considers in detail the question whether the word *iva* is indicative of *utprekṣā*, a question which was apparently disputed by other rhetoricians between Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin ; but in Vāmana we find this is already an established fact. From Bhāmaha ii. 40, again, we learn that Medhāvin set up

62 The *utprekṣā* and *ākṣepa* as poetic figures are expressly mentioned by Subandhu, ed. Srirangam p. 146 ; while *upamā* and *dīpaka* are recognised by Bāṇabhaṭṭa (introd. to *Kādambarī*). Both Subandhu and Bāṇa speak of composition enlivened by *śleṣa ;* but it is not perfectly clear whether they mean by it a *prabandha-guṇa* (as in Bharata) or the specific poetic figure of that name. Bhāmaha not only speaks of *śleṣa* but mentions three kinds or cases of its occurrence. Subandhu's boast of having used Śleṣa (as his commentators interpret) in every word of his composition is not an idle one ; and from his use of it, one can indeed incline to the view that Subandhu's Śleṣa is no other than our modern poetic figure of the same name, especially as Bharata's definition of Śleṣa as a Guṇa is hardly applicable to Subandhu's case.

63 The text reads (Bhāmaha ii. 88):

yathāsaṃkhyam athotprekṣām alaṃkāra-dvaṃ viduḥ /
saṃkhyānam iti medhāvinotprekṣābhihitā kvacit / /

It should be noted in this connexion that Daṇḍin (ii. 273) gives *saṃkhyāna* (and *krama*) as alternative names, not of *utprekṣā*, but of *yathāsaṃkhya*, which seems to be more plausible. It is possible that the text is corrupt here. Kane *HSP*, pp. 61-62 suggests the emendation : *saṃkhyānam iti medhāvī notprekṣābhihitā kvacit*, which he translates as "Medhāvin (calls *yathāsaṃkhya*) by the name of *saṃkhyāna*, and in some places (in works on *alaṅkāra*) *utpreksā* has not been spoken of as an Alaṅkāra." But the difficulty in accepting this emendation lies in the fact that Daṇḍin's elaborate treatment of *utprekṣā* would indicate that this figure must have assumed enough importance, even in Bhāmaha's time, to have been entirely overlooked in works on Alaṃkāra. Vāmana calls *yathāsaṃkhya* by the name of *krama*.

seven *upamā-doṣas*, and this statement appears to have been accepted by Nami-sādhu (on Rudraṭa xi. 24), who mentions and illustrates the seven Doṣas by examples. Unfortunately we do not possess any other information about Medhāvin (or Medhāvirudra)[64]; and to Nami-sādhu and Rājaśekhara, who cite him, he was possibly nothing more than a name. From Bhāmaha's references, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that Medhāvin was the first writer on Poetics who, at an early period, gave an exposition of two very important poetic figures like *upamā* and *utprekṣā*.[65]

After dealing with these groups of figures, Bhāmaha takes up (iii. 1-4) in the next chapter the remaining poetic figures recognised in his time, all in a body, without any further break. These constitute a long list as twenty-four figures. This may be taken as the fourth stage which brings us down to Bhāmaha's own time, and which must have ended with the elaboration of a large number of figures, although the number is not as large as we find it in Daṇḍin's time.[66] This stage is also represented by a canto in the *Bhaṭṭi-kāvya* which illustrates in all thirty-eight independent poetic figures, although

64 See vol i p. 50. Nami-sādhu's quotation from Medhāvin (on xi. 24) merely refers to Bhāmaha ii. 40 which hardly adds anything to our knowledge. Rājaśekhara and Vallabhadeva (on *Śiśu* xi. 6) cite Medhāvin as a poet, the former coupling his name with that of Kumāradāsa, and the latter actually citing a verse from Medhāvirudra (see *ZDMG* lxxiii, 1919, p. 190 fn 1).

65 The problems regarding *upamā-doṣas* and *utprekṣā* appear to have engaged, to a great extent, the attention of early writers. See vol. i. p. 60, fn 1 on *upamā-doṣas*. On *utprekṣā*, see Daṇḍin ii. 226-234, Vāmana iv. 3. 9 vṛtti, Udbhaṭa ed. Telang, pp. 43-46.

66 The differentiation and multiplication of poetic figures with the growth of speculation is a familiar fact in Alaṃkāra literature; and it is not surprising that as the study advanced, the process of refining went on until a time came when the number became too unwieldy and the distinctions too fastidious; and then they had to be systematised in the light of some central principle. Such attempts were made from time to time, the earliest of which, as we shall see, was perhaps that of Vāmana.

as we have already discussed[67]) Bhaṭṭi appears to have made use of a text possibly unknown to Bhāmaha, if not materially differing from the latter's sources. There can be no doubt, however, that by this time the standpoint of the Alaṃkāra-śāstra was clearly defined and firmly established. With Bhāmaha begins a new epoch in which the uncertain groupings of the earlier periods vanish with the setting up of a more or less authoritative standard.

67 See vol i pp. 52-56.

CHAPTER II

BHĀMAHA, UDBHAṬA AND RUDRAṬA

(The Alaṃkāra System)

BHĀMAHA

(1)

In Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, the different topics of Poetics are formulated not incidentally, as in Bharata, but in such well-defined outline as would indicate that the Alaṃkāra-śāstra had already attained the rank of an independent discipline. We have seen that Bharata considered certain important elements of poetry as devices for embellishing dramatic speech and as subservient to the principal purpose of producing the dramatic Rasa. In Bhāmaha, on the other hand, the poetical embellishments form the principal object of study; and, while Dramaturgy and Rasa are entirely ignored, we find for the first time a definite scheme of Poetics more or less systematically elaborated and authoritatively established. Bharata's treatment would show that even before his time some of the older poetic figures, most of the Guṇas and Doṣas, had been recognised and clearly defined, even if no particular theory of Alaṃkāra had been in existence. But Bhāmaha throws into prominence these poetic embellishments and the consideration of Guṇas and Doṣas in their connexion, in conformity perhaps to a tradition from which the whole discipline appears to have received the significant designation of Alaṃkāra-śāstra. We have attempted to explain in the preceding chapter that the comparative antiquity of this tradition or of this school of opinion cannot be denied; and the presumption is not unlikely that a system of Alaṃkāra or an Alaṃkāra school[1] (if the term is allowed from the em-

1 The word 'School' is used here in a very general sense to indicate affiliation to a particular doctrine or system. Only Udbhaṭa

phasis it puts on the consideration of *alaṃkāra* or the poetic figure as the principal element of poetry)[2] existed side by side with the Rasa school or the dramaturgic Rasa-system, and influenced it, as it was to a limited extent influenced by it. But this doctrine or system of Poetics is represented to us by a comparatively late writer like Bhāmaha, who was by no means its original founder.

The general doctrine of this Alaṃkāra-system is almost co-extensive with what appears to have been the original standpoint of the Alaṃkāra-śāstra itself as an objective, empirical, and more or less mechanical discipline ; for, despite the previous or synchronous existence of a system which elaborated the idea of Rasa in the service of the drama, there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis, which we have already indicated and which is confirmed by the very early existence of the Alaṃkāra-system itself, that Sanskrit Poetics started apparent-

and Vāmana, we are told, had their groups of followers respectively designated Audbhaṭas and Vāmanīyas. But there is no evidence to show that the particular doctrines of Rasa, Alaṃkāra, Rīti and even Dhvani were worked out in proper schools, consciously or unconsciously founded by a great writer and supported by his followers. At the same time it can hardly be doubted that in spite of mutual and inevitable contamination or appropriation, these doctrines or systems had a tradition and a history of their own which naturally differentiated them from one another ; and each writer conformed, in his fundamental principles, to some theory which threw into prominence one or other of these doctrines. One could say, for instance, that Abhinavagupta owes his allegiance principally to the Dhvani-system of Ānandavardhana, although he acknowledges the importance of Rasa or brings in Vāmana's ideas of Guṇa in his interpretation of those of Bharata. With these reservations, the word 'school' is meant here to denote the different systems which emphasise respectively the Rasa, Alaṃkāra, Rīti or Dhvani theories.—Samudrabandha (p. 4) speaks of five Pakṣas or views about Kāvya, namely (i) of Udbhaṭa (ii) of Vāmana (iii) of Vakroktijīvita-kāra (iv) of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and (v) of Ānandavardhana. The Anumāna-pakṣa of *Vyakti-viveka* is said to be unworthy of serious consideration.

2 Referring to Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and other elder writers, Ruyyaka says: *tad evem alaṃkāra eva kāvye pradhānam iti prācyānāṃ matam* (p. 7).

ly from some theory of embellishment (*alaṃkāra*) which took into consideration the whole domain of poetic figures and confined its energies to the elaboration of more or less mechanical formulas with reference to the technique of expression.[3] Just as there may be a theory of painting consisting of a collection of information regarding the techniques of tempera, of oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportion of the human body and on the laws of perspective, the art of poetry was supposed to comprise a collection of precepts relating to the forms of expression, its structural beauty, its damaging faults and its rhetorical ornaments, without going further into the speculative aspects of the problems involved. The whole aesthetic judgment was directed to these means of externalisation, and aesthetic pleasure was regarded objectively from the standpoint of extraneous facts which contributed to it. It cannot indeed be dogmatically stated that the necessity and inevitability of postulating an ultimate principle did not trouble these older writers ; but the study must have begun with a method which resulted in the establishment of a series of more or less rigid definitions and categories elaborated to a degree of fineness. The question as to what constitutes poetry or poetic charm, the aesthetic fact, does not arise until Vāmana and the Dhvanikāra come into the field ; for earlier authors like Bhāmaha (i. 23) and Daṇḍin (i. 10) propose to confine themselves chiefly to what they call the *kāvya-śarīra*[3] or the 'body of poetry', as distinguished from its

3 Vol. i p. 7. Sanskrit Poetry, more than ever in this 'classical' period of its history, appeared as the careful work of a trained and experienced specialist. The tradition of such poetry points naturally to the working of the rules and means of the art into a system. This, combined with a natural and characteristic love of adornment, which demanded an ornamental fitting out of thought and word, probably supplied the original motive-force which brought the study of Poetics into existence. The word "Alaṃkāra" (lit. embellishment), applied to the discipline itself, as well as to the poetic figure, which forms the main topic of discussion in the earliest extant works from Bhāmaha to Rudraṭa, would indicate that Sanskrit Poetics had probably grown out of a theory and practice of

ātman, its 'soul' or animating principle.[4] The advantages of verbal arrangement with due regard to the expression of an agreeable sense and of clever clothing of the sense with

embellishment, which included and threw into prominence the whole domain of verbal and ideal figures of speech, those decorative devices by which poetic expression may be rendered attractive. It seems that originally *Ars Poetica* in India, as Jacobi suggests, did not go further than being a series of advice to the poet in his profession, and consisted more or less in formulating prescriptions for the practical working out of poetry. It pointed out the faults to be avoided and the excellences to be attained, and described the poetical embellishments which should enhance the beauty of expression, insomuch as the whole study came to receive the designation of Alaṃkāra-śāstra, or the Science of Poetical Embellishment. This theme of the "education" of the poet became in later literature a separate study when the theoretical aspects of the problems involved began to occupy an important place in the discipline, and we find a group of writers devoting themselves entirely to the subject of *kavi-śikṣā* which, having the practical and somewhat mechanical training of the poet in his art for its object, really represents the original standpoint of Poetics. Sanskrit poetics was probably raised to the rank of an independent discipline almost about the time when Sanskrit 'Classical' poetry was already overstepping itself in its development.

4 The metaphorical expression *kāvya-śarīra* with its implied *kāvyātman* plays an important part in Sanskrit Poetics throughout its history. Its origin has been traced to the allegory of the Veda-puruṣa in *Ṛgveda* vi. 58. 3 (*catvāri śṛṅgā°*), and Rājaśekhara indulges in an analogous poetic conception of the Kāvya-puruṣa (Spirit of Poetry) and his bride Sāhitya-vidyā. According to Rājaśekhara's somewhat fanciful description, the body of this Kāvya-puruṣa is composed of word and sense (*śabda* and *artha*), the face made of Sanskrit, the arms of Prakrit, the hips and loins of Apabhraṃśa, the feet of Paiśāca, and the breast of mixed languages. This is evidently from the linguistic point of view. It is further added that his speech is rich in different modes of poetic expression (*ukticaṇam*); moods and sentiments (*rasa*) make up his soul; metres form the hair of his body; his conversation consists of questions and answers and riddles; and he is adorned by poetic figures like alliteration and simile. The later writers attempt to arrive at greater precision, first indicated by Vāmana, who makes 'diction' (*rīti*) to be the soul of poetry. That the external art of poetry can be systematised formed one of the fundamental postulates of Sanskrit Poetics; but at the same time the necessity of some deeper principle to explain the manifold character of its content

poetical or rhetorical ornaments absorb the attention of these writers; and whatever may be the theoretic basis of poetic charm, it is enough if it is realised by the objective beauty of ingenious expression.

The two important factors, which go to make up the *kāvya-śarīra*, i.e. the 'body' or external framework of poetry,

could not be ignored. Hence the attempt to find the 'soul' or the animating principle in the 'body' or external framework of poetry. Bhāmaha perhaps vaguely realised this when he proposed to take *vakrokti* as the underlying principle of artistic expression; but Daṇḍin goes a step further and designates the Guṇas as the 'life-breath' (*prāṇāḥ*) of the diction (*mārga* or *rīti*), which he sets up as the most important part of poetry. Vāmana is the first known writer to comprehend and state distinctly what this 'soul' is, and the Dhvanikāra takes the last step in completing this figurative idea by defining systematically the mutual relation of the 'body' and the 'soul' of poetry. The Dhvanikāra implies in ii. 7 that *vyaṅgya artha* is this *ātman*, the *guṇas* being compared to natural qualities like courage, and the *alaṃkāras* likened to external ornaments like bracelets which adorn the body. This view is apparently accepted by Mammaṭa (viii. 1) and taken as authoritative by all subsequent writers, while Nami-sādhu (on Rudraṭa xii. 2) gives a similar but not accurate explanation of Rudraṭa's opinion on the subject. The final extension of this metaphorical conception is thus set forth by Viśvanātha: *kāvyasya śabdārthau śarīram, rasādiś cātmā, guṇāḥ saundaryādivat, doṣāḥ kāṇatvādivat, rītayo'vayava-saṃsthāna-viśeṣavat, alaṃkārāḥ kaṭaka-kuṇḍalādivat*, thus comprehending all the elements of poetry, discussed by previous writers, into this elaborate metaphor. Whatever may be the value of this metaphor as an index to the conception of poetry gradually evolved by Indian theorists, one point is clear, viz., that they all take, from Bhāmaha to Jagannātha, the *śabda* and *artha* as constituting what they call the 'body' of poetry; and with this idea the theories start, ultimately ending in a search for its 'soul'. From another point of view, the *śabda* and *artha* form the central pivot round which all theories move (for they are all theories starting with *expression*) with particular reference to the question of the function *par excellence* operative in poetry. And as the study of Poetics itself, on the admission of some of its greatest exponents, drew its original inspiration from grammatico-philosophical speculations on speech, it is not surprising that enormous emphasis should be put on these two elements.

are supposed to be *śabda* (word) and *artha* (sense)[5], and the *alaṃkāras* or poetic figures which adorn these are taken as forming the essential sign of a Kāvya. In other words, poetry consists of a verbal composition in which a definite sense must prevail, and which must be made charming by means of certain turns of expression to which the name of poetic figure is given. This general standpoint is implied by Bhāmaha at the very outset in connexion with his general discussion of the two kinds of figures based respectively on word and sense[6]:

rūpakādim alaṃkāraṃ bāhyam ācakṣate pare/
supāṃ tiṅāṃ ca vyutpattiṃ vācāṃ vāñchanty alaṃkṛtim//
tad etad āhuḥ sauśabdyaṃ nārtha-vyutpattir īdṛśī/
śabdābhidheyālaṃkāra-bhedād iṣṭaṃ dvayaṃ tu naḥ//

This passage, quoted with approval in the *Vakrokti-jīvita* (on i. 8) and the *Kāvya-prakāśa* vi, is difficult to translate, but the meaning is clear and may be freely rendered

5 See above footnote 3. *Śabārthau sahitau kāvyam,* Bhāmaha i. 16, from which, as Kuntaka indicates, the name *sāhitya* was probably given to poetry. The earliest use probably of this term *sāhitya* in Sanskrit Poetics occurs in Mukula (pp. 21 and 22) and in his pupil, Pratīhārendurāja, while Rājaśekhara expressly uses the term *sāhitya-vidyā*. The orthodox etymology of the term, which derives it from the above definition of poetry, as the union of word and sense, is thus put by Rājaśekhara: *śabdārthayor yathāvat saha-bhāvena vidyā sāhitya-vidyā,* an interpretation with which Kuntaka agrees. This Sāhitya or alliance of word and sense is admitted as a fundamental postulate from a very early time, and with proper modifications, by all schools and authors. Cf Daṇḍin i. 10, Vāmana i. 1. 1 (vṛtti), Rudraṭa ii. 1. Ānandavardhana admits as unquestioned: *śabdārthau tāvat kāvyam, na vipratipattir iti darśayati.* The view is alluded to by Māgha in ii. 86b, and apparently by Kālidāsa in the first verse of *Raghu°*.

6 This distinction between Alaṃkāras cf Śabda and of Artha began to be recognised, if not directly stated, from the time of Bhāmaha. Although Daṇḍin is not explicit, he has the same distinctive view when he deals with Arthālaṃkāras in ch. ii and Śabdālaṃkāras in ch. iii. It is Bhoja who classifies Alaṃkāras into those of Śabda, of Artha or of both, defining and illustrating 24 of each in his *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhā°*.

thus: "Others regard metaphor and the like to be external ornaments. They postulate that grammatical correctness adorns speech, and call it excellence of language, (implying that) there is no such corresponding correctness of sense. We, however, accept two kinds of ornaments, referring respectively to word and sense". Daṇḍin, who does not strictly belong to this school but who substantially agrees on this point with Bhāmaha, is more explicit in his statement, and lays down (i. 10) that the 'body' of poetry consists of a series of words regulated by an agreeable sense.

Although Bhāmaha is the oldest representative of this system whose work has survived, he was, as we have stated more than once, by no means its originator. The system, as we find it set forth in his work, is certainly not primitive, but indicates the clear existence of a developed teaching on the subject. Rājaśekhara, as we have noted (vol. i, p.1), gives us a long list of mythical names with which he identifies the original treatment of the various topics relating principally to the poetic figures. He assigns the elaboration of the poetic figures *anuprāsa, yamaka* and *citra, śabda-śleṣa, vāstava, upamā, atiśaya, artha-śleṣa*, and *ubhayālaṃkāra* respectively to Pracetāyana, Citrāṅgada, Śeṣa, Pulastya, Aupakāyana, Pārāśara, Utathya and Kubera. While the antiquity of the distinction between *śabdālaṃkāra* and *arthālaṃkāra* generally (in spite of the above passage of Bhāmaha's) and of *śabda-śleṣa*[1] and *artha-śleṣa* in particular may be seriously doubted, some of these poetic figures may be allowed to have been very early recognised, as Bharata mentions some of them and Bhāmaha acknowledges nearly all (excepting *citra* which we find in Daṇḍin and *vāstava* which we find in Rudraṭa). Medhāvin, cited by Bhāmaha, probably belonged to this school, and his is the only authentic name of an early exponent of this system.

With Bhāmaha's work, however, we emerge from the region of conjecture and doubt, and arrive at the first classic statement of a definite doctrine of Poetics. We must not yet

look to his work, nor to that of his follower Udbhaṭa, for a thoroughly critical system. We can deduce certain broad conceptions, but the practical object, underlying the speculation of this school in general, and its more or less normative character did not allow sufficient scope for purely theoretic treatment ; nor can we expect such treatment at this early stage. Bhāmaha, therefore, nowhere attempts a formal definition of poetry, nor does he state clearly the theory of Vakrokti and Alaṃkāra which, as we shall see, was first systematically enunciated by his follower, the Vakroktijīvitakāra. The first chapter of Bhāmaha's work gives us some preliminary remarks about the general characteristics of poetry and its subdivisions, but a large part of it is taken up with the enumeration of the general faults which obstruct the proper expression of an idea.

Bhāmaha states at the outset the purposes of poetry (*kāvya-prayojana*) and the qualifications of a poet (*kāvya-hetu*), incidentally mentioning the 'sources' of poetry (*kāvya-yonayaḥ*). Regarding the first topic of the aim and purpose of poetry, it is not necessary to discuss the different views in detail, as they generally enumerate extraneous objects and throw little light on the general theory of poetry. In the older writers there is a more or less uncritical mention of fame (*kīrti*) for the poet and delight (*prīti*)[7] for the reader as the chief objects of poetry ; and herewith Bhāmaha (i. 2), Daṇḍin (i. 105), Vāmana (i. 1. 5), Rudraṭa (i. 21, 22) and Bhoja (i. 2), though belonging to different schools of opinion, seem to be content. But it became customary to add,[8] from the poet's standpoint, 'wealth', 'social success' and 'escape from ills'. From the reader's point of view, poetry is said to bring 'solace', 'instruction in knowledge' and 'proficiency in the arts and ways of the world' ; and these are sometimes summarily comprehended by the term *trivarga*, viz., profit, pleasure and

7 Bharata had already laid down this pleasure-giving function of the dramatic art as *krīḍanaka* (i. 11), *vinodakāraṇa* (i. 86).

8 E. g. Mammata i. 2, Hemacandra p. 2 etc.

virtue, to which later on the *caturvarga*, anticipated by Bhāmaha (i. 2), adds *mokṣa* or liberation of the soul. This is probably an attempt to bring poetry on a level with other arts or sciences which profess similar ends, and is in harmony with the deep-rooted idea of the functions of Śāstra. It is, however, pointed out by later theorists like Mammaṭa and his followers,[9] who in their turn develop Abhinavagupta's idea (°*Locana* p. 12), that the Kāvya, as distinguished from the scriptures and the sciences, is *kāntā-sammita*, i. e., like the teaching of a loving mistress, implying thereby that the pedagogic powers of poetry resolve themselves into a peculiar power of suggesting a condition of artistic enjoyment. The famous opening verse of the *Kāvya-prakāśa* makes this clear when it describes poetic speech as comprehending a creation ungoverned by nature's laws and consisting of pure joy. The *caturvarga* and the other material objects of poetry are mentioned in almost unbroken tradition; but with the elaboration of a full-fledged scheme of Poetics in connexion with the suggestion of Rasa, the purpose of poetry was brought into a level with the ultimate theory about its nature ; and poetry was supposed to create a peculiar mood of aesthetic pleasure, conveyed generally by the philosophic term *ānanda*[10].

9 Abhinava uses the terms *prabhu-sammita, jāyā-sammita* and *mitra-sammita*, which are accepted by Mammaṭa (ed. B.S.S, 1917, p. 9). Later writers distinguish (e. g. *Ekāvalī* pp. 13-15) between the Vedas which are *prabhu-sammita*, the Itihāsa etc. which are *mitra-sammita*, and the Kāvya which is *kāntā-sammita*.

10 Abhinavagupta's comment on Bhāmaha i. 2 on this point is interesting (°*Locana* p. 12, partially copied by Hemacandra in his commentary, p. 3): *yathoktam—dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣesu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca / karoti kīrtiṃ prītiṃ ca sādhu-kāvya-niṣevaṇam // iti, tathāpi prītir eva pradhānam. Anyathā prabhu-sammitebhyo vedādibhyo mitra-sammitebhyaś cetihāsādibhyo vyutpatti-hetubhyaḥ, ko'sya kāvya-rūpasya vyutpatti-hetor jāyā-sammitatva-lakṣano viśeṣa iti prādhānyenānanda evoktaḥ. Caturvarga-vyutpatter api cānandaḥ pāryantikaṃ mukhyaṃ phalam*. The essence of Rasa, which came to be considered as the most important thing in poetry, is said to consist of this *prīti or ānanda*; naturally *ānanda* or *prīti* became in later

Jagannātha completes the idea by defining it as a 'disinterested' or 'dissociated' (*alaukika*) pleasure, which depends upon a taste formed by repeated representation of beautiful objects, and which can be enjoyed by a man initiated into the poetic mysteries.

With regard to the other two questions, viz. the equipment of a poet and the sources of poetry, Bhāmaha appears to be cognisant of their importance. His remarks on these points are, however, brief as compared with those of Vāmana, who deals with the subject elaborately for the first time. It may be pointed out in this connexion that Sanskrit Poetics, consistently with the original idea of its having been a more or less mechanical discipline, gives a long list of the essential qualifications which a poet should possess and lays down elaborate rules for his 'education'. With the advance of the theoretical aspects of the science, this theme was, no doubt, made the object of a separate study by a group of writers who make it their business to instruct the poet in his profession; but all early writers on general Poetics, more or less, touch upon the point. We shall have occasion to deal with this school of *kavi-śikṣā*; but it will be convenient to indicate here briefly the earlier speculations on the subject. While not denying the supreme necessity of genius or poetic gift (*sat-kavitva*, Bhāmaha i. 4) which consists in *pratibhā* (poetic conception), all writers, early or late, agree in emphasising the necesssity of study and experience. Both Bhāmaha (i. 5) and Daṇḍin (i. 103-4) acknowledge *pratibhā* which is said to be natural (*naisargikī*) or inborn (*sahajā*); and Vāmana puts it into a formula that in *pratibhā* lies the seed of poetry, and defines it (i. 3. 16 Vṛtti) as an antenatal capacity of the mind[11] without which no poetry is possible, and if possible, it is only ridiculous, a dictum which is almost literally copied by

Poetics the chief object of poetry. Mammaṭa calls it *sakala-prayojana-maulībhūtam*.

11 *janmāntara-gata-saṃskāra-viseṣaḥ kaścit*. Daṇḍin describes it as *pūrva-vāsanā-guṇānubandhi*.

Mammaṭa who, however, uses the more general term *śakti*.[12] Abhinavagupta (°*Locana* p. 29) defines it as intelligence (*prajñā*), capable of fresh invention (*apūrva-vastu-nirmāṇa-kṣama*), its distinguishing characteristic being the capacity of creating poetry possessed of passion, clarity and beauty (*tasya viśeṣo rasāveśa-vaiśadya-saundarya-kāvya-nirmāṇa-kṣamatvam*) ; and he quotes the authority of Bharata (vii, 2) who designates it as the 'internal disposition' of the poet (*antargata bhāva*). This agrees with the definition of *pratibhā* as *prajñā nava-navollekha-śālinī*, given in a verse cited anonymously by Hemacandra, but attributed by Kṣemendra (*Aucitya-vicāra*° *ad śl.* 35) to Abhinava's guru, Bhaṭṭa Tauta ; and it is recognised as canonical by later writers, to whom Abhinava and Mammaṭa were the final lawgivers, but who sometimes add that it is *lokottara* and capable of producing an indefinable charm variously termed *vaicitrya, vicchitti. cārutva, saundarya, hṛdyatva* or *ramaṇīyatva*.

While these theorists believed in *pratibhā*, they also believed in "making a poet into a poet," and maintained the importance of what Daṇḍin calls *śruta* and *abhiyoga*, but what later writers call *vyutpatti* (culture) and *abhyāsa* (practice). Rudraṭa, therefore, thinks that *pratibhā* is not only *sahajā* or inborn, but also *utpādyā* or capable of attainment by *vyutpatti* or culture. The poet is thus required to be an expert in a long list of sciences or arts. The earliest of such lists is given by Bhāmaha in i. 9, where mention is made of the following studies as 'sources' of poetry,[13] viz., grammar, prosody, lexicography, stories based on Itihāsa, ways of the world, logic and and the fine arts. This substantially agrees

12 Used by Rudraṭa (i. 14-15), who distinctly gives two alternative terms *śakti* and *pratibhā* and by Abhinavagupta (°*Locana* p. 137) who says: *śaktiḥ pratibhānam, varṇanīya-vastu-viṣaya-nūtanollekha-śālitvam*.

13 Read *kāvya-yonayaḥ* (instead of *kāvyayairvaśī* in the printed text), as indicated by Vāmana i. 3. 1 (*kāvyāṅgāni*) and Rājaśekhara viii (*kāvya-yonayaḥ*). Cf. Jacobi in *op. cit.* p. 224.

with Rudraṭa's list (i. 18), but Vāmana deals with the topic in greater detail in i. 3. 21-22, and requires the poet to be conversant with grammar, lexicon, metrics, arts, morals, erotics, politics, and, above all, the ways and means of the world. It is also sometimes implied that the poet must have studied the theory of poetry and made himself proficient in poetical exercise (*abhyāsa*). He must be clever at weaving metaphors and other poetic figures, at the trick of producing a double meaning, at manipulating complicated schemes of alliteration and rhyming, at following up quick composition, at making complete verses out of broken lines and sentences, and similar ingenious practices. When a new work is published, it is submitted to and approved by assemblies of experts, as we are told by Maṅkhaka, Rājaśekhara and others. It was obviously expected to answer all the demands of theory, although it was by no meaas an easy test ; for style, says an Indian stylist, is like a woman's virtue which cannot bear the least reproach. The public likewise possessed or were expected to possess a certain amount of theoretical knowledge ; for the *rasika* or *sahṛdaya*, the man of taste, the true appreciators of poetry, must be, according to the conception of the Sanskrit theorists, not only well read and wise, and initiated into the intricacies of theoretic requirements, but also possessed of fine instincts of aesthetic enjoyment[14]. The poet naturally liked to produce an impression that he had observed all the rules, traditions and expectations of such an audience ; for the ultimate test of poetry is laid down as consisting in the appreciation of the *sahṛdaya*. Thus, the poet is required to be true to his natural gifts and yet conform to the rigid demands of theory. The art of poetry in this way came to flourish in a learned atmosphere, and the theory of Poetics, as we shall see, naturally assumed a scholastic

14 On the subject of the "education" of the poet, see F. W. Thomas, The Making of the Sanskrit Poet in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume* p. 375 f.

and dialectic character in common with the whole scientific literature of ancient India. It is true that a certain amount of inevitable difference is always to be found between theory and practice ; and, as on the one hand, we have gifted poets aspiring to untrammelled utterance, so on the other, there is a tendency to degenerate towards a slavish adherence to rules, which naturally resulted in a strong overloading of a composition by complicated or artificial expressions.

With these general remarks we may now turn to a brief consideration of other topics in the work of Bhāmaha[15]. Bhāmaha rests content by taking the Kāvya to consist of *śabda* and *artha* (*śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam*), giving equal prominence to word and sense in poetry. But he implies by his treatment that the Kāvya should also be faultless (*nirdoṣa*) and embellished by poetic figures (*sālaṃkāra*). Then follows the classification of poetry (i) according to form, into verse and prose, (ii) according to the language employed, into Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa, (iii) according to the subject-matter, into fourfold division, so far as it deals respectively with incidents human or divine, incidents invented by the poet's imagination, or incidents based on the several arts or sciences, (iv) according to the conventional way of grouping compositions into fivefold recognised division, viz. *sarga-bandha* (*mahākāvya*), *abhineyārtha* (drama), *ākhyāyikā*, *kathā* and *anibaddha-kāvya* (i. e. detached poems like *gāthās* or individual *ślokas*). Bhāmaha's definition of *mahākāvya* is more or less conventional, and practically agrees with that to be found in Daṇḍin (i. 14f) and in the *Agni-purāṇa* (336. 24-32). With regard to *abhineyārtha*, he omits its treatment because others have treated of it already. Bhāmaha lays down a somewhat hard-and-fast line of demarcation between the *kathā* and the *ākhyāyikā*, a view which is not accepted

15 Bhāmaha's work consists of six chapters: ch. i on poetry generally (60 verses), ch ii and iii on Alaṃkāra (160 verses), ch. iv on Doṣa (50 verses), ch. v on logical correctness or Nyāya (70 verses) and ch. vi on grammatical correctness (60 verses).

by Daṇḍin and which Vāmana does not enter into as being too fine[16]. With regard to the formal classification of verse and prose, it may be remarked that poetry, according to the view of Sanskrit theorists, has a twofold aspect according as it consists of verse (*padya*) or prose (*gadya*), although some authors speak of a mixed kind (*miśra*), e. g., the drama in which both prose and verse occur. The doctrine that prose is the opposite, not of poetry but of verse, which began to be realised rather late in European critical theories, was very early admitted without question by Sanskrit authors with whom metre does not play the same part as it does in European poetry ; for in India from the earliest time, it was usual to put down even the driest teachings in a metrical form[17].

Bhāmaha, however, appears (i. 31-35) to be indifferent

16 Vol. i. p. 65. We have tried to show elsewhere (*The Kathā and the Ākhyāyikā in Classical Sanskrit* in *BSOS*, vol. iii (reprinted in *Some Problems*, pp. 65-79) that two or three well-defined stages are distinguishable in the development of these two species of the Kāvya in Classical Sanskrit, the earliest being represented by the characteristics given by Bhāmaha and the latest by those given by Rudraṭa ; and that while Bhāmaha cannot be taken as having accepted Bāṇa's two masterpieces as his prototype, Rudraṭa has only generalised their important features into universal definitions of the *kathā* and the *ākhyāyikā*. Lacôte in his *Essai sur Guṇāḍhya et la Bṛhatkathā* suggests (p. 282) that Daṇḍin must have found that Guṇāḍhya did not observe the traditional distinction between the *kathā* and the *ākhyāyikā* (e. g. in the original *Bṛhatkathā*, on Lacôte's showing p. 220, there was a narration by Naravāhanadatta of his own victories, which is contrary to the rule laid down by Bhāmaha). He was, therefore, led to reject it altogether. Bhāmaha, no doubt, refers to a *kathā* in Apabhraṃśa in i. 28 but it is not known whether he was aware of the existence of the *Bṛhatkathā*.

17 One need not emphasise the point that Sanskrit theorists define poetry so as to include any literary work of the imagination in its scope, and absolutely refuse to make of rhyming or versing an essential. This tradition is so well established that the question is nowhere discussed and never doubted. Thus, the theorists include under the head of poetry romances like *Kādambarī* or *Harṣa-carita* which are written for the most part in prose. Vāmana even quotes a dictum which says that prose is the touchstone of the poets (*gadyaṃ kavīnāṃ nikaṣaṃ vadanti*, cited in Vṛtti on 1. 3. 21).

to the literary value of *rīti* (roughly, 'diction'), to which Daṇḍin and his followers of the Rīti school attach so much importance. He thinks that the distinction made by the Rīti-theorists between *vaidarbha* and *gauḍa* is meaningless ; and though he does not use the terms *mārga* (Daṇḍin) or *rīti* (Vāmana), his statement would imply that he is speaking of *vaidarbha*- and *gauḍa-kāvyas* respectively, in which some had apparently seen differences of manner and treatment.[18] As a necessary corollary apparently to this view, he does not think it worth while to devote much attention to the *guṇas*, which the Rīti-theorists take as forming the constituent excellences of *rīti*, and summarily mentions in another context (ii. 1-3) only three Guṇas, viz., *mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, apparently rejecting Bharata's ten orthodox excellences. He does not, however, connect them directly with the Rīti, and thinks that they are distinguished according to the presence or absence, in varying degrees, of compound words, *ojas* employing long compounds, and *mādhurya* and *prasāda* not doing it. These Guṇas, in his opinion, are not qualities of any particular diction, but of the good Kāvya generally. It is noteworthy that this brief description of the Guṇas precedes in context the treatment of Alaṃkāras, implying probably that they are analogous to each other. It is also noteworthy that Bhāmaha does not employ the term Guṇa at all, except in another context in connexion with the Bhāvika Alaṃkāra which he, like Daṇḍin, designates as a *prabandha-guṇa*.

Bhāmaha then proceeds to define and discuss, with illustrations, the poetic figures or *alaṃkāras*, to which he devotes two long chapters (ii. 4-95, iii. 1-56), consisting of nearly one hundred and fifty verses. Then come (ch. iv) the *doṣas* or demerits of composition (some of which are already dealt with in i. 37-56), and the whole subject is wound up

18 As each of these types have certain distinguishing features. Bhāmaha is of opinion that one need not condemn Gauḍa nor praise the Vaidarbha ; but he himself does not deal with these types which must have been well known in his time.

with two chapters (v-vi) on the logical[19] and grammatical[20] correctness of poetry respectively. Now leaving aside these two requirements and the Doṣas, all of which are in a sense negative requirements, the only thing of the highest importance in poetry, in Bhāmaha's view, is apparently the Alaṃkāra or the poetic figure, which takes up the bulk of his treatment.[21] Bhāmaha attempts to classify poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories; and from this point of view his work possesses the general appearance of a technical manual, comprising a collection of definitions with illustrations and empirical canons for the benefit of the artist desirous of externalising his ideas. But in the course of his enquiry, it probably struck him that a philosophical or scientific classification of expressions is not possible; for, although every single expressive fact may be grouped together generically, the continuous variation of the individual content results in an irreducible variety of expressive facts. He attempts, therefore, to arrive at a synthesis by holding that there may be *modes* or *grades* of expression, of which the best mode is that which involves *vakrokti*[22], by which a certain peculiarity or charm of expression is posited as the essential principle of all Alaṃkāras.

19 In which are discussed such *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* topics as the *pramāṇa, prajñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta* etc.

20 Giving practical hints for attaining grammatical correctness (*sauśabdya*), and corresponding to the last *adhikaraṇa* of Vāmana's work.

21 Excluding subvarieties the Alaṃkāras mentioned or defined by Bhāmaha are 39 (+4) in number, viz. in this order: *anuprāsa* (two varieties), *yamaka* (five kinds), *rūpaka* (two varieties), *dīpaka, upamā, prativastūpamā* (as a variety of *upamā*), *ākṣepa* (two kinds), *arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti, atiśayokti, yathāsaṃkhya, utprekṣā, svabhāvokti, preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvi, paryāyokta, samāhita, udātta* (2 kinds), *śliṣṭa, apahnuti, viśeṣokti, virodha, tulyayogitā, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, vyāja-stuti, nidarśanā, upamā-rūpaka, upameyopamā, sahokti, parivṛtti, sasaṃdeha, ananvaya, utprekṣāvayava, saṃsṛṣṭi, bhāvika, āśīḥ* (according to some), as well as *hetu, sūkṣma leśa* and *vārttā* (to which the status of Alaṃkāra is denied).

22 It is true that in one place Bhāmaha speaks of the figure

The etymological meaning of the term *vakrokti* is "crooked speech"; and this meaning appears in the verbal poetic figure defined by Rudraṭa (ii. 13-17) and, after him, by all later theorists, who connote by this figure a kind of pretended speech based on paronomasia (*śleṣa*) or peculiarities of intonation (*kāku*). In Vāmana, on the other hand, *vakrokti* appears not as verbal figure (*śabdālaṃkāra*) but as a figure based on the sense (*arthālaṃkāra*) ; and it is defined as a metaphorical mode of speech based on "transference of sense" (*lakṣaṇā*). Bhāmaha, while admitting it, apparently in common with Daṇḍin (ii. 363), as a collective designation of *all* Alaṃkāras[23], uses the term to imply a selection of words and turning of ideas peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of matter-of-fact speech. Kuntaka, who develops this idea and builds a unique theory of *alaṃkāra* on its basis, makes this meaning clear when he indicates by such *vakratā* the peculiar charm (*vicchitti*) or strikingness (*vaicitrya*) which can be imparted to ordinary expression by the conception of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā*). When words are used in the ordinary manner of common parlance, as people without a poetic turn of mind use them, there is no special charm, no strikingness; and

bhāvika as the characteristic excellence of a composition as a whole, a view which coincides with that of Daṇḍin, as well as of Bhaṭṭi who (according to commentators) illustrates this figure in one whole canto (canto xii). It is defined as the representation of objects, whether past or future, as if they were present, the condition of the representation being that the story or theme must have picturesque, strange and exalted meaning (*citrodāttādbhutārthatvaṃ kathāyāḥ*) and must be capable of being enacted well (*svabhinītatā*), and that the words used must be agreeable (*śabdānukulatā*). Bhāmaha, however, does not appear to lay any special emphasis on *bhāvikatva* in Poetry, but deals with it as he does with any other poetic figure. No doubt, he speaks of *bhāvika* as a *prabandha-guṇa,* but Bhāmaha does not seem to have made any theoretical distinction between Guṇa and Alaṃkāra as such, and the word *guṇa* here should not be taken in any technical sense.

23 On this subject, see S. K. De, introd. to Kuntaka's *Vakrokti-jīvita,* 2nd Ed. pp. xiv-xxv.

consequently it is not poetical in the sense in which Bhāmaha and his follower understand it. Such *svabhāvokti* or 'natural' mode of speech, which Daṇḍin calls *ādyā alaṃkṛti* and distinguishes from *vakrokti*, is not acceptable to Bhāmaha[24] and to Kuntaka, who refuse to acknowledge *svabhāvokti* as a poetic figure at all; for these theorists apparently imply a distinction between the "artistic", or ornamental or extra-ordinary, on the one hand, and the "naturalistic", or unadorned or ordinary expression, on the other[25].

24 See Jacobi in *ZDMG* lxiv 130 f, and in *Sb. der preuss. Akad.* xxiv, 1922, pp. 224 f. Kuntaka also uses the term *vakrokti* as almost co-extensive with the term *alaṃkara* (p. xxx), and regards the so-called poetic figures as aspects of *vakrokti*.—Bhāmaha does not, as Kuntaka does, elaborately argue against Svabhāvokti; he acknowledges it, but the terms by which he refers to it (ii. 93-94) would make one think that it is not as acceptable to him as it is to Daṇḍin. Daṇḍin would divide Vāṅmaya into Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti, the latter including in its scope all the poetic figures. Bhoja (*Sarasvatī-k.*) would divide Vāṅmaya into Svabhāvokti, Vakrokti, and Rasokti.

25 To Bhāmaha and Kuntaka, *svabhāvokti*, which consists in a description of the natural disposition (*svabhāva*) of an object, is obviously wanting in the requisite strikingness to be poetical; for they take it to be merely plain or unadorned description and imply that a poet should express things or ideas differently from the banality or prosiness of the Śāstras or of common life. But Daṇḍin and later theorists, on the contrary, reckon *jāti* or *svabhāvokti* among the poetic figures. On this point we quote what we said elsewhere (Introd. to *Vakrokti-jīvita*, p. xix, fn 19). "Though formally the expression of the *svabhāvokti* may not differ from a statement or description in common life there is still a substantial difference. For the poet sees or conceives the very same thing not in the same way as common people. In the case of the latter, all things stand in some relation to his personal interests, which should be understood to connote also scientific interest in them as objects of knowledge. But for the poet the object has no connexion with his or anybody's interests, not even as an object of knowledge; he has a vision of the thing in itself in its true nature. This is what is partially understood by *lokātikrānta-gocaratā*, and Jagannātha makes it clear (ed. Bombay, 1915, p. 4) while explaining the term *lokottaratva* as an element of poetic charm. Literally *lokottara* means supermundane, but in the sense indicated above it may be translated roughly as 'disinterested' or 'dissociated'. Now, Daṇḍin, adopting the traditional term *alaṃkāra* and applying it to the *svabhāvokti*, could not very

Bhāmaha, therefore, lays down, in his classification of the different kinds of Kāvya, that the subdivisions of poetry mentioned by him are admissible to that designation in so far as they possess *vakrokti* (i. 30); and this is made more explicit by declaring later on that whatever value might be attached to the function of Rīti in poetry, the *vakrokti* is desirable as an embellishment of poetic speech (i. 36), which he characterises elsewhere as *vakrā* (vi. 23). Therefore he calls upon the poet to be diligent in accomplishing this, as the *vakrokti* manifests the sense of poetry and as no embellishment of poetry is possible without *vakrokti* (ii. 85). It is not surprising, therefore, that he rejects figures like *hetu, sūkṣma* and *leśa* on the ground that they do not involve *vakrokti.*

It is curious, however, that Bhāmaha nowhere explicitly defines or explains the word *vakrokti.* Perhaps here we have the work of early theorisers who have not yet learnt to theorise systematically, but who are carried away more or less by their practical object of establishing definite norms and prescribing general formulas as a means of attaining literary expression. Or, perhaps the idea of *vakrokti* was traditional or already too well known in his time to require detailed explanation. At any rate, after enumerating and defining the poetic figures up to and including *atiśayokti*, he says generally *saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktiḥ* (ii. 85), with a hint (as it appears from the context) of identifying the *vakrokti* in substance with the idea involved in *atiśayokti.* Kuntaka appears

well accept Bhāmaha's statement that *vakratā* is the characteristic of *all* poetic figures, because *vakrokti* excludes the *svabhāvokti* (Daṇḍin ii. 362); but he tries to reconcile his own view with Bhāmaha's opinion by extending the latter's remarks regarding the *atiśayokti* (ii. 81) to *all* poetic figures, thus including the *svabhāvokti.* The Indian theorists have almost neglected an important part of their task, viz., to find a definition of the nature of the subject of a poem as the product of the poet's mind ; this problem is the main issue of Western Aesthetics. Only *svabhāvokti* and *bhāvika* can be adduced as a proof that the Indian theorists were conscious of the problem, but did not attack it in its entirety, treating it only in some of its aspects". See also, on this point, Jacobi in *Sb. der preuss. Akad.* cited above, pp. 224 f.

to agree with Bhāmaha that some kind of *atiśaya* is involved in *vakrokti*, and thinks that the *atiśaya* is a necessary element in what he calls *vicitra-mārga*, where *vakrokti-vaicitrya* prevails (i. 27). Daṇḍin probably arrives at the same conclusion in a different way when he speaks of all poetic figures as depending on *atiśayokti*, a view which is explained thus by one of his commentators: *alaṃkārāntarāṇām api eṣa (=atiśayoktyalaṃkāraḥ) upakārī bhavati, atiśaya-jananatvaṃ vinā bhūṣaṇatayā na syād ity abhiprāyaḥ.* Ānandavardhana's remarks in this connexion are illuminating. He says that it is possible to include *atiśaya* in all poetic figures, as it has been successfully done by great poets, for the purpose of increasing the beauty of poetic composition ; and citing Bhāmaha's idea of *atiśayokti* and *vakrokti* he remarks (pp. 208)[26]: "There is an excellence of charm in that poetic figure in which the *atiśayokti* is established by the imagination of the poet ; other figures are merely so called. Since it is able to enter into the body or composition of all poetic figures, it is, by assuming it to be identical with them, called their essence". The *atiśayokti*, therefore, is taken, in the words of Abhinavagupta's explanation, as the common token or generic property of all poetic figures (*sarvālaṃkāra-sāmānya-rūpam*), or as Mammṭa puts it, as their life-breath or essence (*prāṇatvenāvatiṣṭhate*, p. 743). One can realise from this the close connexion between this important figure and Bhāmaha's notion of *vakrokti*.

Bhāmaha defines *atiśayokti* as *nimittato vaco yat tu lokātikrānta-gocaram* (ii. 81), which Daṇḍin paraphrases as *vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya loka-sīmātivartinī* (ii. 214). It would seem, therefore, that the *atiśaya* in the *vakratā* of poetic figures consists essentially in this *lokātikrānta-gocaratā*, and Abhinava makes this clear when he explains in this connexion (°*Locana* p. 208): *śabdasya hi vakratā abhidheyasya ca vakra-*

26 *tatrātiśayoktir yam alaṃkāram adhitiṣṭhati kavi-pratibhā-vaśāt tasya cārutvātiśaya-yogah. anyasya tvalaṃkāra-mātrataiveti. Sarvālaṃkāra-śarīra-svīkaraṇa-yogyotvenābhedopacārāt saiva sarvālaṃkāra-rūpety ayam evārtho'vagantavyah.*

tā lokottīrṇena rūpeṇāvasthānam. From this it is reasonable to conclude that by *vakratā* Bhāmaha implies a kind of heightened or extraordinary turn given to expression (what Kuntaka would call *bhaṅgī* or *vicchitti*), which constitutes the charm or strikingness of poetic expression, as distinguished from common speech where facts are simply stated. We shall see that Kuntaka elaborates this idea by the peculiar theory of *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti* (which is taken as almost equivalent to the term *vakratā*) of word and sense as forming the basis of all poetic decoration (the so-called poetic figures being mere aspects of it), whereby the poet lifts ordinary speech to the level of extraordinary poetic utterance.

As a necessary corollary from the prominence given to *vakrokti* or *alaṃkāra* in poetry by this system, it follows that ideas of Rasa should be included in the scope of particular poetic figures. We shall see that Bhāmaha actually assigns this function to the particular figure *rasavat*, and if we are to accept Udbhaṭa's position as indicative of that of Bhāmaha, also to the figures *preyas* and *ūrjasvin.* By putting a technical interpretation on the word *vibhāvyate* in Bhāmaha ii. 85, Abhinavagupta attempts to make out that Rasa as well as Alaṃkāra originates in *vakrokti* ; but this is probably an instance of the not-unusual but rather far-fetched ingenuity of the commentator. Regarding *vyaṅgyārtha* or *dhvani,* the "suggested sense", which plays such an important part in later theories, Bhāmaha nowhere expressly alludes to this idea ; but we can never dogmatically affirm that some kind of suggested sense was not known to him. He defines figures like *paryāyokta*, *vyāja-stuti*, *aprastuta-praśaṃsā* and *samāsokti*, in all of which there is an indication of an implied sense. The *paryāyokta*, for instance, is defined as *paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate* (iii. 8), and Udbhaṭa expands this with *vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyāṃ śūnyenāvagamātmanā*, in which there is a clear indication of an *avagamyamāna artha*[27]. This

27 Cf. Ruyyaka's remarks on this figure. See also Bhāmaha's definition of *samāsokti,* ii. 79.

is also apparent from the criticism of Ānandavardhana, who does not agree, however, that in Bhāmaha's *paryāyokta* there is a predominance of the suggested sense, inasmuch as the expressed sense is not intended there to be merely subservient (pp. 39-40). In another place (p. 108), Ānandavardhana further remarks that Udbhaṭa has shown in detail that expressed poetic figures like *rūpaka* can sometimes be a suggested element, a case of what is explained by Dhvani-theorists as *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. Thus, in the opinion of the great exponent of the *dhvani*-theory himself, Bhāmaha as well as Udbhaṭa (cf °*Locana* p. 10) is not an *abhāva-vādin* or one who denies the existence of *dhvani* (as Mallinātha, p. 24, wrongly considers him to be), but an *antarbhāva-vādin* who includes the idea of *dhvani* in other elements of poetry. Discussing this point, Pratīhārendurāja appears to agree with Ānandavardhana ; for, in his opinion, the *dhvani*, which is considered by some school to be the 'soul' of poetry, is not separately dealt with by these early writers because they include it in poetic figures (p. 79). In the same way, Jagannātha (pp. 414-15) remarks that although Udbhaṭa and others, who were earlier than the author of the Dhvani-system, never use the term *dhvani*, it is yet unreasonable to hold on that ground that the concept of *dhvani* was unknown to them, because they indicate some of its aspects in their definitions of figures like *paryāyokta*, *samāsokti*, *vyāja-stuti* and *aprastuta-praśaṃsā*. To the same effect is the general statement of Ruyyaka (p. 3), who says that Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and other ancient writers would comprehend the suggested sense in the Alaṃkāra as an adornment of the expressed sense ; in other words, they do not take it independently but as an accessory to the expressed sense, in the same way as they take Rasa as an accessory element. Following perhaps the tradition of Bhāmaha's *paryāyokta*, the younger Vāgbhaṭa defines (pp. 36-37) the figure as *dhvanitābhidhānam*, and refers the curious reader to the treatise of Ānandavardhana for a detailed treatment of *dhvanitokti* ; while Hema-

candra defines (p. 263) it more briefly as *vyaṅgyasyoktiḥ*. In all this, one can perceive an attempt to read the idea of *dhvani* into older authors like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa and thus to find an orthodox authority for it from an early time ; but it is not unlikely that the general notion of a suggested sense, like the general notion of Rasa, was not unknown to these ancient authors, although it was only naively understood and never independently treated, being uncritically included as an element of some poetic figures.

(2)
UDBHAṬA

The only writer of later times who develops Bhāmaha's notion of *vakrokti* is Kuntaka, the author of the *Vakrokti-jīvita* ; but for this exposition, it disappears from the writings of this school. Udbhaṭa, one of the earliest avowed followers of Bhāmaha, nowhere mentions it, although it is quite possible that we would have got a much more comprehensive idea of Udbhaṭa's standpoint from his lost *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa* or *Kāvyālaṃkāra-vivṛti*[28] than from his existing brief compendium of poetic figures. His *Alaṃkāra-saṃgraha*, as its name implies, consists merely of a collection of verses defining forty-one poetic figures (including three varieties of *anuprāsa*), and we are left absolutely in the dark regarding his views on general problems.

In his treatment of these poetic figures, Udbhaṭa follows

28 See vol. i. p. 46. The six chapters of Udbhaṭa's existing work deal exclusively with the poetic figures in the following order and divisions: I. *punaruktavad-ābhāsa, chekānuprāsa, vṛttynuprāsa* (with three *vṛttis*), *laṭānuprāsa, rūpaka, dīpaka* (3 kinds), *upamā, prativastūpamā*. II. *ākṣepa, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti, atiśayokti* (4 *kinds*). III. *yathāsaṃkhya, utprekṣā, svabhāvokti*. IV. *preyasvat, rasavat, ūrjasvin, paryāyokta, samāhita, udātta* (2 kinds), *śleṣa*. V. *apahnuti, viśeṣokti, virodha, tulyayogitā, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, vyāja-stuti, vidarśanā, saṃkara* (4 kinds), *upameyopamā, sahokti, parivṛtti*. VI. *sasaṃdeha, ananvaya, saṃsṛṣṭi, bhāvika, kāvyaliṅga* (*hetu*) and *kāvya-dṛṣṭānta* (*dṛṣṭānta*).

Bhāmaha very closely, enumerating the figures in the same order and even borrowing literally the definitions of a large number of them. In the case of a few particular poetic figures, however, Udbhaṭa enters into distinctions which were probably unknown to Bhāmaha. Thus, he speaks of four forms of the *atiśayokti*, which Bhāmaha does not mention, but which agree substantially with the four out of the five varieties of that figure recognised by later writers. Bhāmaha spoke (ii. 6-8) of only two kinds of *anuprāsa*, viz., *grāmyānuprāsa* and *lāṭīyānuprāsa*, which classification, Pratīhārendurāja thinks, is based on a tacit admission of the two Vṛttis, viz., *grāmyā* and *upanāgarikā*. Udbhaṭa, on the other hand, distinguishes three varieties of *anuprāsa*, called *chekānuprāsa*, *lāṭānuprāsa* and *vṛttyanuprāsa*, the last of which appears to be classified again on the basis of the three Vṛttis, viz., *grāmyā* (or *komalā*), *paruṣā* and *upanāgarikā*. These Vṛttis, which consist primarily of suitable sound-adjustment with a view to alliteration, appear to have been first recognised, as Abhinavagupta points out, by Udbhaṭa, and from him known to Ānandavardhana (pp. 5-6). We shall see presently that Rudraṭa mentions five Vṛttis (ii. 19 f) ; but we find Udbhaṭa's views accepted by later theorists like Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka who, however, consider the whole question from the point of view of Rasa[29]. Again, the grammatical basis of the divisions of *upamā* (of which there is only a hint in Bhāmaha ii. 31-33) first appears in Udbhaṭa (i. 35-40) in a form which establishes itself in later theory. It is true that Udbhaṭa does not in the present treatise devote, as Bhāmaha does, a special chapter to the question of grammatical correctness, nor does he allude to the theories regarding functions of words already hinted at by Bhāmaha (vi. 6f), yet in deference to the grammatical analysis of speech, he discusses at some length the various

29 These Vṛttis refer primarily to *anuprāsa* (alliteration, or sound-arrangement of letters), and has nothing to do with the four dramatic Vṛttis mentioned by Bharata (vi. 25, xx. 24f).

subdivisions of *upamā*, due to suffixes like *vat*, *kyac*, *kyaṅ*, *kvip*, *kalpap* and the like, indicative of resemblance ; and this analysis became almost standardised in later literature.

Regarding definitions of individual figures, minor differences, as well as further elaboration, are noticeable. Thus, Udbhaṭa's *tulyayogitā* corresponds to that of Mammaṭa, but Bhāmaha's figure of the same name is perhaps equivalent to Mammaṭa's *dīpaka*. The figures *dṛṣṭānta* and *kāvya-liṅga* (also called *kāvya-dṛṣṭānta* and *kāvya-hetu* respectively) are omitted by Bhāmaha, but defined and illustrated by Udbhaṭa for the first time. But Udbhaṭa is the only older writer who entirely omits the treatment of *yamaka*. Again, Bhāmaha recognises *śleṣa* involved in *sahokti*, *upamā* and *hetu*, and Daṇḍin speaks of *śleṣa* as coming in and increasing the charm of all figures. But the well-known controversy regarding the division of *śleṣa* into *śabda-śleṣa* and *artha-śleṣa*, together with the question of its relations to other poetic figures in which it may appear, seems to have started, as Ruyyaka notes, from Udbhaṭa's time ; and Udbhaṭa declares that in cases of combination, the *śleṣa* is stronger than the other figures to the extent even of dispelling their apprehension. We shall also see that Udbhaṭa is certainly more advanced in recognising Rasa and defining its place in the poetic figures, if not in poetry as a whole ; and he even goes so far as using the technical terms *bhāva* and *anubhāva*, which cannot be traced in Bhāmaha. The *saṃsṛṣṭi* of two or more independent poetic figures is found indeed in Bhāmaha and Bhaṭṭi (as also in Daṇḍin and Vāmana), but Udbhaṭa does not refer to the two cases of such *saṃsṛṣṭi* mentioned by Daṇḍin (ii. 360) and distinguishes it definitely from *saṃkara* (pp. 63 and 72), of which he mentions four cases[30].

30 Vāmana gives the *saṃsṛṣṭi* a limited scope, recognising only two varieties, *upamā-rūpaka* and *utprekṣāvayava*, in opposition to Daṇḍin ii. 258-60. Daṇḍin does not mention *saṃkara*. Possibly Daṇḍin's *aṅgāṅgibhāva-saṃsthāna* variety of *saṃsṛṣṭi* comes, as Pratīhārendu indicates, under Udbhaṭa's *anugrāhyānugrāhaka* variety of *saṃkara*.

All this, however, means an advance, and not a deviation; it indicates an aspect of the growth of scholastic activity, which delighted in indulging in fine distinctions and minute classifications, and not a departure from the original standpoint. To later writers, however, it is not Bhāmaha but Udbhaṭa who is the authoritative exponent of this system and whose views are entitled to great respect from all schools of opinion. Bhāmaha indeed commands veneration due to his antiquity; but he was, in course of time, eclipsed by his commentator, and later theorists turn to Udbhaṭa's work as embodying the standard opinions on the subject. We have the testimony of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka that some of the later speculations and controversies (e. g. those regarding *upamā*-divisions, or *śleṣa*) started from Udbhaṭa's time; and Udbhaṭa (as also Daṇḍin and Rudraṭa) probably showed the way to minute analysis and differentiation of poetic figures, which play such an important part in later theories. We can understand what influence Udbhaṭa's teachings exerted in this respect when we bear in mind that they guided very considerably the enquiries of two important later lawgivers in Poetics, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, who fixed for the last time the definitions of most figures, analysed and arranged them on some general principle, and systematised their underlying doctrine. Although Kuntaka elaborated one part of Bhāmaha's teaching which he took as the basis of his own peculiar system of *vakrokti*, it was Udbhaṭa who properly carried on Bhāmaha's tradition and gave a systematic exposition of his work. Along with his contemporary Vāmana, Udbhaṭa may be taken without exaggeration to have been the founder of the Kashmirian school of Poetics which produced its finest fruit in Ānandavardhana; for Udbhaṭa in Kashmir established the *alaṃkāra*-doctrine in Poetics at a time when Vāmana was skilfully constructing a theory of *rīti* on the basis apparently of Daṇḍin's teachings, and both of them prepared the way for Ānandavardhana.

Pratīhārendurāja's interpretation of Udbhaṭa is not always reliable as an indication of Udbhaṭa's standpoint, for the commentator flourished a little over a century later than the text-writer and frequently reads his own notions into the text. For instance, Udbhaṭa can be taken, as we have seen, to have been cognisant of a suggested sense, though he never speaks of *dhvani* or deals with it directly ; but Pratībārendurāja refers to it in clearest terms and attempts by forced interpretation to make out that Udbhaṭa deliberately included it in the treatment of poetic figures. There is no doubt, again, that Pratīhārendurāja was a great deal influenced by the views of the Rīti school of Vāmana. Discussing the mutual relation of *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* (pp. 75 f), Pratīhārendurāja not only cites Vāmana but closely follows his exposition. To Bhāmaha, the distinction between *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra* was hardly of any theoretic importance, and Udbhaṭa appears to have been of the same opinion ; for Ruyyaka distinctly states *udbhaṭādibhis tu guṇālaṃkārāṇāṃ prāyaśaḥ sāmyam eva sūcitam* (p. 7), and Hemacandra adds in the same way: *tasmād gaḍarikā-pravāheṇa guṇālaṃkāra-bheda iti bhāmaha-vivaraṇe... bhaṭṭodbhaṭo'bhyadhāt* (p. 17). Vāmana, on the other hand, putting greater stress on *rīti* elaborately distinguishes between the *guṇas* and the *alaṃkāras* ; and Pratīhārendurāja apparently reads Vāmana's views into Udbhaṭa. Udbhaṭa omits all mention of *rīti* which Bhāmaha had only referred to in passing ; but Udbhaṭa speaks of three *vṛttis*, which are connected in particular with the figure *anuprāsa* but which correspond roughly to the three *rītis* of Vāmana, and like the latter, again, to the three *guṇas* recognised by Ānandavardhana and his followers.[31] But even then it cannot be said that Udbhaṭa's *vṛttis* cover the same ground or possess the same functional value as the three *rītis* of Vāmana or the three *guṇas* of Ānandavardhana. Udbhaṭa, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 134), regards the *guṇas*, again, as the properties of

31 *rīter hi guṇeṣveva paryavasāyitā*, ° *Locana* p. 231.

saṃghaṭanā, but this *saṃghaṭanā* cannot be taken as equivalent to Vāmana's *rīti*[32]. In the same way, Pratīhārendurāja speaks of *rasa* as the 'soul' of poetry (p. 77), although there is nothing to warrant the supposition that Udbhaṭa, fully aware as he appears to be of the importance of this element, would regard it as anything but a subservient factor in some special poetic figures.[33]

(3)

RUDRAṬA

Although influenced considerably by the Rasa-doctrine, Rudraṭa belongs properly to the Alaṃkāra school. He recognises the Rasas and devotes two fairly long chapters to it; but, as we shall see later on, the function he assigns to Rasa is more or less extraneous. On the other hand, what

32 Ānandavardhana speaks of *saṃghaṭanā* as threefold, viz., *a-samāsā*, *dīrgha-samāsā* and *madhyama-samāsā*, according as there is the presence or absence, in varying degrees, of compound words. Each of these is suited, though not invariably, to a particular Rasa. But he thinks that the Guṇas are not of the nature of *saṃghaṭanā*, nor are they dependent upon *saṃghaṭanā*, but that the appropriateness of the *saṃghaṭanā* is determined by the Rasa and by the speaker and the subject (pp. 133-5). See Jacobi in *ZDMG*, lvi, 1902. p. 779, fn 6, and S. K. De, Ānandavardhana on saṃghaṭanā in *Some Problems* pp. 91-94.

33 This point will be discussed in ch. iv below. Rājaśekhara attributes some other doctrines to Udbhaṭa and his school (*audbhaṭāḥ*), which cannot be traced in Udbhaṭa's existing work: (1) that a sentence has a threefold denotation (*vākyasya tridhābhidhā-vyāpāra iti audbhaṭāḥ*), (2) that *artha* is of two kinds, viz., *vicārita-sustha* and *avicārita-ramaṇīya*, the first found in the Śāstras and the second in Kāvyas. The *Vyaktiviveka-vyākhyāna* attributes a similarly untraceable Siddhānta at p. 4. Such citations or association of earlier authoritative names with a particular view may be merely *pūjārtha*, which is not an unusual procedure with later commentators, as Sukthankar in *ZDMG* lxvi, 1912 discusses. Pratīhārendurāja, for instance, attributes a strange opinion to Bharata that grammatical works and the like do not deserve the name of poetry because they are not acceptable as such in the absence of the necessary Guṇas.

he appears to consider as important in poetry is the *alaṃkāra* or poetic figure, to which he devotes ten chapters which form indeed the bulk of his work. His work itself is named *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, apparently after the works of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, and is so designated, as his commentator Namisādhu admits (on i. 2), from the undoubted emphasis laid on *kāvyālaṃkāras* or poetic figures as elements of poetry.

Rudraṭa, like other writers of this school, does not seem to attach much importance to the Rīti or its constituent Guṇas. He speaks, no doubt, of four Rītis (and not two, after Daṇḍin, or three, after Vāmana) viz., *pāñcālī*, *lāṭīyā*, *gauḍīyā* and *vaidarbhī*; but in his exposition he is not influenced by the views of the Rīti school. The classification of 'diction', he thinks, depends on the presence in varying degrees of short (*laghu*), middling (*madhya*) and long (*āyata*) compound words, or on their entire absence as in the case of the Vaidarbhī which is, apparently for this reason, considered to be the best type. Bhāmaha, we have seen, adopts a similar principle of classification, not with regard to the Rīti but to the three Guṇas admitted by himself. The notion of Rīti, therefore, belongs, in Rudraṭa's opinion, altogether to the province of *śabda*, governed by fixed rules of verbal arrangement, or rather, of using compounds, and is therefore called the *samāsavatī vṛtti* of *śabda*. Rudraṭa does not speak of *dhvani*, nor does he appear to have been cognisant of its function; but he implies a suggested sense (as also Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa do) ancillary to the expressed sense in a limited number of poetic figures, e. g., in figures like *paryāya* or *paryāyokta* and in the figure *bhāva* vii. 38-41.[34]

34 The two illustrations that Rudraṭa gives under the figure are quoted in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, and in the °*Locana* p. 45. Abhinava distinctly refers to Rudraṭa's *bhāvālaṃkāra* as a case in which the *vyaṅgya* sense is subordinate. Abhinava thinks that Udbhaṭa would take *bhāvālaṃkāra* as *preyas* (pp. 71-72). It is remarkable that Ruyyaka, in his review of Rudraṭa's opinion on this point, states that Rudraṭa admits the three kinds of suggestion mentioned by the Dhvani-theorists. He says that Rudraṭa implies *vastu-dhvani* in the figure *bhāva*;

Rudraṭa's detailed treatment of the poetic figures or *alaṃkāras*, however, is the distinguishing feature of his work and indeed justifies its title. It is not only elaborate and exhaustive, but also presents considerable difference of method and treatment, which distinguishes him from other earlier writers of this school, and which may lend plausibility to the supposition that he is not only later in time but is also probably following a tradition other than that of Bhāmaha and his followers. To Udbhaṭa's limited number of poetic figures Rudraṭa adds nearly thirty more independent figures[35], besides enumerating several subvarieties of most of the important ones, and devoting an entire chapter to *citra* (already discussed by Daṇḍin). Udbhaṭa (not to speak of Bhāmaha and Bharata) nowhere treats clearly of the distinction between ideal and verbal figures (i. e. figures relating to word and sense respectively), although such a distinction is implied by

alaṃkāra-dhvani in *rūpaka* etc; *rasa-dhvani* in *rasavat* and *preyas*. But it may be pointed out that excepting what is stated with regard to *vastu-dhvani* being traceable in Rudraṭa's *bhāva*, the remark does not apply. Rudraṭa does not mention, define or otherwise deal with the figures *rasavat*, *preyas* etc, nor does he speak of *pratīyamānā utprekṣā* referred to by Ruyyaka in this connexion (although he gives an example of implied *utprekṣā* in ix. 13). See on this point Jacobi in *ZDMG* lxii, 1908, p. 295 fn 5.

35 The number in Udbhaṭa is 41, in Rudraṭa 68 (excluding subvarieties). The sixteen chapters in Rudraṭa deal with the following subjects: (I) the purpose and object of poetry, the qualifications of a poet etc. (II) the four *rītis* (*pāñcālī*, *lāṭīyā*, *gauḍīyā* and *vaidarbhī*), the six *bhāṣās* (Prakrit, Sanskrit, Māgadha, Piśāca, Śaurasenī Apabhraṃśa), and five *alaṃkāras* of *śabda*, of which *vakrokti* and *anuprāsa* are here treated, along with five Vṛttis of *anuprāsa*. (III) *yamaka*. (IV) *śleṣa* and its eight varieties, (V) *citra*. (VI) *śabda-doṣas*, including *doṣas* of *pada* and *vākya*. (VII) four bases of *arthālaṃkāra* (*vāstava*, *aupamya*, *atiśaya* and *śleṣa*), and 23 figures based on *vāstava*. (VIII) 21 figures based on *aupamya*. (IX) 12 figures based on *atiśaya*. (X) 12 figures based on *śleṣa*, *śuddha* and *saṃkīrṇa*. (IX) nine *doṣas* of *artha*, and four *upamā-doṣas*. (XII) ten *rasas*, and treatment of *śṛṅgāra*. (XIII) *saṃbhoga-śṛṅgāra* etc. (XIV) *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra*, and the *upāyas*. (XV) characteristics of other *rasas*. (XVI) kinds of poetic composition, such as *kathā* and *ākhyāyikā* and their characteristics.

his treatment of four *śabdālaṃkāras* first, followed by an exposition of the *arthālaṃkāras*. Daṇḍin also implies a similar distinction by a similar separate treatment without expressly stating it. Rudraṭa, on the other hand, classifies the figures, like Vāmana, clearly into two groups according as relative prominence is given to *śabda* and *artha*. He also gives us for the first time a basis or principle of arranging the individual figures in groups in respect of their general nature or characteristic. The *śabdālaṃkāras* are arranged under five broad heads, viz., *vakrokti* (equivocation), *śleṣa* (paronomasia), *citra* (tricks of pictorial effects, like conundrum etc.), *anuprāsa* (alliteration) and *yamaka* (repetition of sounds or rhyming); while the *arthālaṃkāras* are classified on a principle of his own, viz., under *vāstava* (reality), *aupamya* (comparison), *atiśaya* (elevatedness) and *śleṣa* (coalescence)[36]. The figures mentioned under *arthālaṃkāras* are: (1) VĀSTAVA. *Sahokti, samuccaya, jāti, yathāsaṃkhyā, bhāva, paryāya, viṣama, anumāna, dīpaka, parikara, parivṛtti, parisaṃkhyā, hetu, kāraṇamālā, vyatireka, anyonya, uttara, sāra, sūkṣma, leśa, avasara, milita* and *ekāvalī* (23 figures), (2) AUPAMYA. *Upamā, utprekṣā, rūpaka, apahnuti, saṃśaya, samāsokti mata, uttara, anyokti, pratīpa, arthāntara-nyāsa, ubhaya-nyāsa, bhrāntimat, ākṣepa, pratyanīka, dṛṣṭānta, pūrva, sahokti, samuccaya, sāmya* and *smaraṇa* (21 figures). (3) ATIŚAYA. *Pūrva, viśeṣa, utprekṣā, vibhāvanā, tadguṇa, adhika, virodha, viṣama, asaṃgati, pihita, vyāghāta* and *hetu* (12 figures). (4) ŚLEṢA. Two kinds—*śuddha* and *saṃkīrṇa*, the former subdivided into *aviśeṣa, virodha, adhika, vakra, vyāja, ukti, asaṃbhava, avayava, tattva* and *virodhābhāsa*, and the latter comprising two varieties (10 + 2 = 12 figures).

36 Vāmana had already taken *aupamya* as the basis of his classification, for he would regard all figures as *upamā-prapañca*, implying that all figurative expression forms nothing more than aspects of metaphorical expression. Rudraṭa. however, thinks that *all* figures do not imply comparison ; and in this he is in agreement with all writers excepting Vāmana who is unique in his extreme view.

Daṇḍin, who himself enumerates a very large number of poetic figures[37], very sagely remarks that if for some slight difference, a different figure is to be defined, there would be hardly any end to their infinite multiplication. This remark partly applies to Rudraṭa whose general scheme, as well as particular definitions, is open to such an obvious objection. One of the curious results of rigorously following this classification is that the same figure reappears as an *alaṃkāra* under different groups. Thus *sahokti* and *samuccaya* have two aspects, based respectively on *vāstava* and *aupamya*, while the figure *utprekṣā* appears similarly under *aupamya* and *atiśaya* respectively. Some of Rudraṭa's figures have been abandoned by later writers, while some have changed their names or have been modified[38], later speculation inclining rather towards the more orthodox expositions of Udbhaṭa or even of Daṇḍin ; yet the general merit of Rudraṭa's analysis and definitions, testified to by the more or less implicit acceptance by later theorists like Mammaṭa[39], cannot be denied. They indicate not only a considerable advance in scholastic activity on Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, but also remarkable independence, and consequent divergence of treatment in several notable cases.

Taking the verbal figures, Rudraṭa's *vakrokti*, based on paronomasia (*śleṣa*) and intonation (*kaku*), has nothing in common with that of his predecessors. The intonational *vakrokti* is indeed not accepted by some of his successors

37 Viz. 35 in ch. ii. and *yamaka, citra* and *prahelikā* in ch. iii.

38 E.g., Rudraṭa's *bhāva, mata. sāmya* and *pihita* are not defined by later writers (excepting Vāgbhaṭa in his *Kāvyānuśāsana*), while his *hetu* is not admitted by Mammaṭa. Rudraṭa's *avasara* and *pūrva* (mentioned by the younger Vāgbhaṭa) appear to be the same as the second variety of Mammaṭa's (and Udbhaṭa's) *udātta* and the fourth variety of Mammaṭa's *atiśayokti* respectively.

39 Mammaṭa's indebtedness to Rudraṭa is discussed by Sukthankar in *ZDMG*, lxvi, 1912, p. 478, as well as in many places in Nobel's *Beiträge* already cited. Ruyyaka, on the other hand, while drawing largely on Mammaṭa himself, is more indebted to Udbhaṭa.

(e g. Rājaśekhara p. 31 and Hemacandra p. 234), inasmuch as it is supposed to depend on mere peculiarities of reading (*pāṭha-dharmatvāt*): but on the whole, Rudraṭa's definition of the figure replaced that of Vāmana's metaphorical *vakrokti*, survived Kuntaka's broader interpretation of *vakrokti*, and established itself as the only recognised figure of that name in later literature from Mammaṭa onwards. Again, Rudraṭa's classification of *anuprāsa* is somewhat different from that of Udbhaṭa, the former basing it on the five *vṛttis* of letters (*varṇa*), viz., *madhurā*, *paruṣā*, *prauḍhā*, *lalitā* and *bhadrā*, and the latter admitting only three *vṛttis* (*paruṣā*, *upanāgarikā* and *grāmyā* or *komalā*) only in connexion with one of his three kinds of *anuprāsa*, viz. *vṛttyanuprāsa*. The later writers follow Udbhaṭa, on this point. Udbhaṭa, again, omits the treatment of *yamaka*, in spite of the examples of Bharata and Bhāmaha before him, and in spite of the fact that Daṇḍin had already given one of the fullest treatments of that figure in the whole realm of Alaṃkāra literature. Rudraṭa perhaps ranks next to Daṇḍin in the fulness of his treatment, though there is considerable divergence in the details of classification of these two writers. In the same way, there is no reference to *citra* in Bharata, Bhāmaha or Udbhaṭa, although Māgha says (xix. 41) that it was in his time a figure indispensable in a Mahākāvya. Daṇḍin dilates upon some of its varieties, but Rudraṭa gives a much fuller exposition; and it is noteworthy that although Mammaṭa does not attach much value to such verbal ingenuity, yet in his discussion of this figure he quotes almost all the illustrations from Rudraṭa. In connexion with the faults concerning verbal figures, Rudraṭa points out several cases (vi. 29-33) where *punarukta* or tautology is not a fault; Udbhaṭa, as Nami-sādhu also notes, includes all these cases in the figure *punaruktavad-ābhāsa* or 'semblance of tautology'. Udbhaṭa, again, speaks of *śleṣa* apparently as an *arthālaṃkāra*, and divides it into *śabda śleṣa* and *artha-śleṣa*, which correspond respectively to *abhaṅga-* and *sabhaṅga-śleṣa* of later writers. Rudraṭa, on the other

hand, speaks of *śleṣa* as a *śabdālaṃkāra* which he carefully distinguishes (ii. 13) from the *arthālaṃkāra* of the same name, which he deals with separately in ch. x and which forms the basis of twelve independent figures. The verbal figure *śleṣa*, on the contrary, is elaborately classified according as it relates to *varṇa, liṅga, prakṛti, pratyaya, vibhakti* and *vacana* (iv. 12), Rudraṭa thus avoiding the controversy carried on by later theorists as to whether the *śleṣa* is a figure of *śabda* or of *artha*.

Regarding *arthālaṃkāras*, Rudraṭa mentions only four *upamā-doṣas* (xi. 24), in contradistinction to seven of Bhāmaha and Medhāvin and six of Vāmana[40], viz., *vaiṣamya, asaṃbhava, aprasiddhi* and *sāmānya-śabda-bheda*, the last defect including all cases of change of a word signifying common property (as construed with the *upameya* and the *upamāna*), due to the difference of *liṅga, vacana, kāla, kāraka* and *vibhakti*. We have already noted that Udbhaṭa enters rather minutely into the grammatical subdivisions of *upamā*, but this finds no place in Rudraṭa's treatment, which includes them in a lump in *samāsopamā* and *pratyayopamā*. Again, Bhāmaha positively rejects *hetu* as a poetic figure, although Daṇḍin speaks of it as *vācām uttama-bhūṣaṇam*, including it under *kāvya-liṅga* (*kāraka-hetu*) and *anumāna* (*jñāpaka-hetu*). Udbhaṭa recognises only *kāvya-liṅga*, calling it also *kāvya-hetu* and distinguishing it from *dṛṣṭānta* which he calls *kāvya-dṛṣṭānta*. It is Rudraṭa (vii. 82) who first defines and fixes its characteristics as finally accepted in Poetics. It is needless to cite any more instance ; but what is said above will be enough to indicate, in the first place, that there is a considerable divergence of view between Rudraṭa and his predecessors with regard to the nature and scope of individual figures and their classification ; and what is more important to note, it is easy to demonstrate that most of these differences are fundamental. We can reasonably assume, therefore, that Rudraṭa, possessed as he is of great inventive power, either follows a

40 See vol. i. p. 60, fn 1.

system of classification and definition peculiar to himself, or follows a tradition of opinion different in some respects from that of Bhāmaha and his followers, although in general theory he belongs to a common school.

Although Rudraṭa's work is remarkable indeed for its careful analysis, systematic classification and apposite illustration of a large number of poetic figures, some of which have become more or less standardised, his direct contribution to the theory of Poetics cannot be valued too highly. Indeed, the practical nature and scope of his work, like that of Udbhaṭa's, leave hardly any room for discussion of general principles or of speculative aspects of the questions involved. Rhetoric rather than Poetics appears to be his principal theme, as it is of most writers of this system who concern themselves entirely with the elaboration of rhetorical categories in which they suppose the whole charm of poetry lies. Partly perhaps to his novelty of treatment and partly to his omission of discussion of ultimate principles is due the fact that Rudraṭa has hardly any direct follower in later literature, unless one cites Rudrabhaṭṭa who, however, utilises only his Rasa-chapters. Rudraṭa's name is not associated with the establishment of any particular system, although he shows great fertility and acuteness in his treatment of individual figures, which, in some cases, have been implicitly accepted by later writers on the subject. Rudraṭa is the last great exponent of the Alaṃkāra school, strictly so called ; for after him the school began to decline and merge ultimately, like the two other sister schools relating to Rasa and Rīti, into the finally dominant Dhvani school.

(4)

The decline of the Alaṃkāra-system was probably synchronous with and perhaps hastened by the rise of the rival Rīti-doctrine. The first step towards this is indicated by the general trend of Daṇḍin's work. Daṇḍin who stands, as it were, midway between the Alaṃkāra and the Rīti

schools, admits, no doubt, the great importance of poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*) in a scheme of Poetics (ii. 1) ; but he takes them, along with the *guṇas*, as constituting the essence of what he calls the *mārga* (or *rīti*). As the characteristic of 'embellishing' poetic speech is possessed by both Alaṃkāras and Guṇas, both are, in his opinion, Alaṃkāras in a wider sense, the Guṇas being special embellishments of the Vaidarbha Mārga, while the Alaṃkāras are common to both the Vaidarbha and the Gauḍa Mārgas. Vāmana, who systematically established the Rīti-theory, goes further and lays down that the Guṇas are essential (*nitya*) excellences, while the Alaṃkāras are not essential (*anitya*) but serve only to increase the beauty of a poem already brought out by the former.

With the advent of the Dhvani-theory, there was an elaboration of the concept of Rasa as the principal suggested element not only in the drama but also in poetry ; and both the Guṇa and the Alaṃkāra naturally came to be subservient to it. But the Guṇas were supposed to reside in intimate relation to the Rasa, without which they could not exist and existing with which they only served to heighten its beauty. The Alaṃkāras, on the other hand, were supposed to be extraneous and artificial sources of beauty, just as ornaments are to the body. We shall have occasion to deal with these questions in greater detail in connexion with the views of the Rīti- and the Dhvani-theorists ; it would be enough to indicate here that the later theorists, in their search for a fundamental principle, could no longer regard the discipline as co-extensive with an external theory of embellishment ; and necessarily the Alaṃkāra, as well as the Guṇa, which appertain more or less to the objective beauty of representation, came to occupy a subordinate position as an element of poetry. It was held that the term *alaṃkāra* 'embellishment' should explain the question as to what is to be 'embellished' *alaṃkārya* ; and as such it must confine itself, as the early formulators of the Alaṃkāra-system modestly yet wisely held, to the 'body' or framework of poetry ; it must not attempt to explain its 'soul' or essence.

The Alaṃkāra-system, however, left its undoubted impress on later theories. The Rīti-systems of Daṇḍin and Vāmana amply recognise its influence by devoting considerable attention to the detailed discussion of various poetic figures ; and although no writer after Ānandavardhana seriously contends that the poetic figure is the only element worth considering in poetry, yet all of them acknowledge its importance and assign to it a place in their system. In spite of the emphasis which they put on Dhvani and Rasa, the new school, beginning from Mammaṭa, devote a large section of its work to the elaboration of various poetic figures, and the Alaṃkāra-chapter may justly claim to have been a thoroughly worked out theme. Here was given to Indian scholars rich material for subtle distinction and endless classification ; and with a hair-splitting care, befitting scholastic minds, all kinds of metaphors, similes, alliterations and other figures were minutely analysed and defined. Indeed, the multiplication of limitless varieties of poetic figures[41], based on minute differences, as well as the making of a large number of subvarieties of each figure, went on through the whole course of the history of the discipline ; and down to the latest times, we find traces of new and ever new poetic figures.

The extent to which this specialisation is carried will be understood by taking a typical example. The beauty of a lady's face is described ; this can be done in several ways, resulting in a number of poetic figures, by taking the familiar comparison of the Sanskrit poet as the starting point. "Your face is like the moon"—*upamā* ; "the moon is like your face" —*pratīpa* ; "your moon-face"—*rūpaka* ; "is this your face, or is this the moon"—*sasaṃdeha*; "this is the moon, and not your

41 Excluding subvarieties, Bharata mentions only 4 Alaṃkāras, but in *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* we find 18, Bhāmaha 39 (+4), Daṇḍin 38, Udbhaṭa 41, Rudraṭa 68, Vāmana 31, Mammaṭa 61 (+6), Ruyyaka 75 (+4), Vāgbhaṭa II 63 (+6), Viśvanātha 77 (+7), Jayadeva (*Candrāloka*) 100, Kuvalayānanda 115. Hence Ānandavardhana says (p. 8): *sahasraśo hi mahātmabhir anyair alaṃkāra-prakārāḥ prakāśitāḥ prakāśyante ca* !

face"—*apahnuti* ; "the moon is like your face, and your face is like the moon"—*upameyopamā* ; "your face is only like your face"—*ananvaya* ; "having seen the moon I remembered your face"—*smaraṇa* ; "thinking it to be the moon, the *cakora* (a bird which is said to feed on moonbeams) flies towards your face"—*bhrāntimat* ; "this is the moon, this the lotus, thus the *cakora* and the bee fly towards your face"—*ullekha* ; "this is verily the moon"—*utprekṣā* ; "this is a second moon"—*atiśayokti* ; "the moon and the lotus are vanquished by your face"—*tulya-yogitā* ; "your face and the moon rejoice in the night"—*dīpaka* ; "the moon shines in night, but your face always shines"—*vyatireka* ; "in the heavens the moon, on earth your face"—*dṛṣṭānta* ; "the moon reigns in heaven, your face reigns on earth"—*prativastūpamā* ; "your face bears the beauty of the moon"—*nidarśana* ; "the moon is pale before your face" —*aprastuta-praśaṃsā* ; "by your moon-face the warmth of passion is cooled"—*pariṇāma* ; "your face beautifully spotted with black eyes and adorned with the light of smile"—*samāsokti*. Some of these turns of expression lose their force or point in the translation, but this will roughly indicate the varieties of figures arrived at by nice distinctions, although these constitute only a few, of which comparison forms the basis. They are sharply separated from one another ; and although some of the distinctions may appear to us to be somewhat trivial or formal, we cannot refuse to recognise the amount of ingenuity shown in the matter. Even taking only one figure *upamā*, they subdivide it into a number of inferior varieties, most of which, however, are based on peculiarities of grammatical construction, but which Appayya Dīkṣita, one of the latest writers on the subject, refuses to admit on this very ground in his treatise on poetic figures[42].

42 *evam ayaṃ pūrṇa-lupta-vibhāgo vākya-samāsa-pratyaya-viśeṣa-gocaratayā śabda-śāstra-vyutpatti-kauśala-pradarśana-mātra-prayojano nātīvālaṃkāra-śāstre vyutpādyatām arhati, Citra-mīmāṃsā* p. 27.

But the different theorists are not agreed in their exposition of the exact nature and scope of individual poetic figures. This difference is partly due to the inevitable change of view-points and gradual growth of ideas consequent upon the progress of the study itself, and partly to the favourite refining process which loved to indulge itself in niceties of distinction. The development of the conceptions of the different poetic figures in the writers of different schools affords an interesting field of study in itself, and cannot be comprehended in our limited scope[43]; but one or two instances will make the process clear. The figure *ākṣepa,* which (generally speaking) consists of an apparent denial of something which is intended to be said for the purpose of conveying a special meaning, is variously analysed by different writers. Vāmana defines it as the repudiation of the standard of comparison, *upamānākṣepaś cākṣepaḥ* (iv. 3. 27). One interpretation of this, as given in Vāmana's own Vṛtti, is *upamānasyākṣepaḥ pratiṣedha upamānākṣepaḥ, tulya-kāryārthasya nairarthakya-vivakṣāyām* ; that is to say, the standard of comparison is rejected for the purpose of indicating that it is useless in the presence of the object described. This would be equivalent to the figure *pratīpa* of later writers. But Vāmana adds another explanation which indicates that the figure can also occur when the standard of comparison is only hinted at (*upamānasyākṣepataḥ pratipattir ity api sūtrārthaḥ*). This

43 No complete attempt has yet been made to study the development of the different conceptions of individual poetic figures from the earliest time to that of Jagannātha. Much material, however, will be found in Trivedi's and Kane's notes to their learned editions of *Ekāvalī* and *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* respectively. J. Nobel has published a series of articles on some of the Alaṃkāras studied in their development. His *Beiträge zur älteren Geschichte des Alaṃkāra-śāstra* (Diss. Berlin 1911) deals with the figures *dīpaka, tulya-yogitā, vibhāvanā, viśeṣokti, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, samāsokti, nidarśana,* and *arthāntara-nyāsa* ; while his articles in *ZDMG* lxvi, 1912, pp. 283-93 and lxvii, 1913, pp. 1-36 deal with *vyāja-stuti,* and *sahokti* and *vinokti* respectively, and in lxxiii, 1919, pp. 189f with *prativastūpamā* and *dṛṣṭānta.*

would be equivalent to the *samāsokti* of some writers. Daṇḍin's definition of *ākṣepa*, on the other hand, is very wide; for, according to him, the denial (*pratiṣedha*) need not be of what has been said (*ukta*) or of what is about to be said (*vakṣyamāṇa*), but it may be of anything whatever. Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Mammaṭa limit the denial in so far as it concerns the *ukta* or the *vakṣyamāṇa*. They are followed by Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha, but a second kind is added, viz., the apparent permission of what is not wished for. Jagannātha refers (p. 421f) to both the views of Vāmana and Udbhaṭa, but adds that, according to a third view, which he takes to be the view of the Dhvanikāra, all suggestive negation or denial is the province of *ākṣepa*. This is supported by the fact that the *viśeṣa* or special meaning to be conveyed by the apparent denial is never expressed but always left to be understood. It would, therefore, be classed by the Dhvanikāra under "poetry of subordinate suggestion" (*guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*), for the expressed sense itself is charming here and the suggested sense is subordinated to it. It is probably in reference to such views that the *Agni-purāṇa* lays down: *sa ākṣepo dhvaniḥ syāc ca dhvaninā vyajyate yataḥ*. The case of *ākṣepa* will exemplify, to some extent, the way in which each poetic figure is not only minutely analysed, but elaborately classified into subvarieties by taking into account the different cases of its occurrence. Thus, *upamā* (simile) is classified into six complete and twenty-seven incomplete forms ; the figure *utprekṣā* into thirty-two varieties, the *vyatireka* into forty-eight, the *virodha* into ten. The number of self-standing figures, together with their innumerable adjunct of subvarieties, goes on increasing as the study progresses, until it reaches to a number exceeding one hundred ; and it is not surprising that in the later stages of its history, whole volumes like Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva*, Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* or Appayya's *Kuvalayānanda* are dedicated exclusively to the special purpose of analysing, defining and illustrating the various poetic figures.

The simple basis of classfying the poetic figures, according as they appertain to the word or the idea, into *śabdālaṃkāra* and *arthālaṃkāra* (verbal and ideal figure) obtained throughout from Rudraṭa's time[44], but some writers add figures which are both of the word and the idea (*śabdārthālaṃkāra*). The *Agni-purāṇa* appears to be one of the earliest known works to mention this third division, and the position is taken up by Bhoja in his *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* and *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*. A long controversy, however, has centred round the propriety of such a classification ; and it has been held that although, generally speaking, all figures are both of *śabda* and *artha*, the *raison d'être* of such divisions is the relative prominence given respectively to *śabda*, *artha* or both, on the dictum *yo'laṃkāro yadāśritaḥ sa tad-alaṃkāraḥ*. But this relation of *āśraya* and *āśrayin* (i. e. interdependence) is not accepted by all, and Mammaṭa maintains that *anvaya* (connexion) and *vyatireka* (disconnexion or contrast) must form the test, which consists in considering whether the particular figure does or does not bear a change of synonymous words (*parivṛtti-sahatva*). If the figure disappears with the change of the word by its synonym, it is a verbal figure or *śabdālaṃkāra* ; if not, it is an ideal figure or *arthālaṃkāra*. The number of independent Śabdālaṃkāras has never been large, the largest being probably the twenty-four mentioned by Bhoja. The older writers pay, as a rule, greater attention to this class, which apparently afforded ample scope to decadent classical poets for mere verbal jugglery ; but more recent writers like Ānandavardhana or Mammaṭa do not deal with it with so much care, on the ground that though such word-play brings about variety or *vaicitrya* of expression to some extent, it does not help but only retards the comprehension of Rasa in a composition by entirely engrossing the reader's mind. The Arthālaṃkāras, on the other hand, have always engaged more care and attention, and the favourite refining process has been systematically and

44 See above p. 62.

untiringly pursued in this sphere. Their number, however, has always been subject to fluctuation; but it can be generally stated that while in the older writers the number is limited, in comparatively recent authors the multiplication is more marked. On the one hand, Bharata speaks only of four Arthālaṃkāras; Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana deal with about thirty to forty different figures; the number reaching its maximum perhaps in Rudraṭa's sixty-eight. In Bhoja, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka there is a reaction towards restriction and decrease; but in the latest stage of our history, the *Candrāloka* gives about one hundred, while the *Kuvalayānanda* adds a score more. Daṇḍin, himself a great sinner in this respect, very early protested against such endless differentiation, and Ānandavardhana agrees with him; but it appears to have afforded endless scope to the scholastic ingenuity of later theorists who, after the time of Ānandavardhana, finding hardly anything to systematise in respect of the essentials of theory, occupied themselves in elaborating the details.

As to the classification of the ideal figures (*arthālaṃkāra*) according to their essential characteristic, Daṇḍin divides all figures into *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*; Vāmana makes an early attempt to take *aupamya* as the central principle; while Rudraṭa groups them systematically under *vāstava*, *aupamya*, *atiśaya* and *śleṣa*[45]. Mammaṭa has no definite principle of classification. Ruyyaka suggests one based on (i) *aupamya* (comparison) (ii) *virodha* (incongruity) (iii) *śṛṅkhalā* (linked succession) (iv) *nyāya* (logical reason) (v) *gūḍhārtha-pratīti* (understanding of a concealed sense) (vi) combination of figures (*saṃsṛṣṭi* or *saṃkara*). Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha substantially follow this classification, only splitting up *nyāya* into *tarka-nyāya*, *vākya-nyāya* and *loka nyāya*; but Vidyānātha substitutes the word *sādharmya* for *aupamya* (or *sādṛśya*) and speaks of *adhyavasāya* (complete identification) and *viśeṣaṇa-vaicitrya* (strikingness of adjectives or attributes) as two other bases of

45 iii. 9. See above p. 62.

classification. Perhaps none of these classifications would be regarded as strictly scientific, for they mix broad heads indicating psychological factors (like similarity, contrast or contiguity) with mere formal bases of classification as *gūḍhārtha-pratīti* or *apahnava*.

A development is also noticeable in the general conception of a *kāvyālaṃkāra* or poetic figure. It is true that a "poetic figure" corresponds to a certain extent to a "speech-figure" or to what is known as a figure of speech in a formal scheme; but later theorists explain that something more belongs to a poetic figure as such. The special charm, known as *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*, peculiar to each composition, which rests ultimately on the conception or skill of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā* or *kavi-kauśala*) makes up the *kāvyālaṃkāra* as such, and gives it its distinguishing characteristic. This view would be entirely omitted in a treatise on rhetoric merely; and with this point of view it is misleading to describe the theory of Alaṃkāra as a theory of rhetorical categories only. Originally it might have been, more or less, a theory of externals, but the problem was complicated by the appearance of this new factor of thought, first introduced by Kuntaka and then elaborated in the sphere of individual figures by Ruyyaka, Jayaratha and others, the development of which will be traced hereafter in its proper place.

CHAPTER III

DAṆḌIN AND VĀMANA

(*The Rīti System*)

(1)

DAṆḌIN

Daṇḍin comes chronologically after Bhāmaha ; and Vāmana, who comes after Daṇḍin, was contemporaneous with Bhāmaha's commentator Udbhaṭa ; but the Rīti-system, which Daṇḍin and Vāmana represent in Poetics, was probably older in tradition than Bhāmaha himself, who would not seriously concern himself with the distinction between *vaidarbha* and *gauḍa* Kāvya. It can be traced back to the time of Bāṇabhaṭṭa (first-half of the 7th century) who tells us that the Gauḍas were already notorious for *akṣara-ḍambara*, to which fact Daṇḍin also alludes in his depreciation of the *gauḍa mārga*. It will be seen that although the terms *mārga* or *rīti* in the technical sense might not have been very ancient, both Daṇḍin and Vāmana themselves indicate that some such system as they advocate was traditionally existent ; and they appear to refer to and sometimes actually quote from unknown expositors of the past[1]. It is probable that the Rīti school, if we use this term to separate those writers who put an emphasis on *rīti* as the most important element of poetry, had an independent origin and history, and existed for a long time side by side with the sister schools, which threw into prominence the elements of *rasa*, *alaṃkāra* or *dhvani* respectively.

We have already stated that Daṇḍin is influenced, to some extent, by the teachings of the Alaṃkāra school, and as such

1 e. g. under Vāmana i. 2. 11, 12-13; 3. 15, 21; iii. 1. 9, 25; iv. 1. 7 etc.

stands midway in his view between the Alaṃkāra-system of Bhāmaha and the Rīti-system of Vāmana. At the same time, there can be no doubt that in theory he allies himself distinctly with the views of Vāmana. In Vāmana, however, we find the system in its completely self-conscious form ; and here we have nothing of that vagueness or indefiniteness which characterises the rival Alaṃkāra-system of Udbhaṭa. With a clear-cut scheme and a definite central principle, Vāmana proceeds to set forth his system in the brief but concise *sūtra*-form ; and whatever may be the value of his speculations, there can be no doubt that Vāmana was the first writer to enunciate a definite theory which, before the Dhvanikāra, must have had great influence on the study of Poetics.

With regard to the commonplaces of poetic speculation,[2] Daṇḍin's standpoint does not differ much from that of Bhāmaha ; and both start with the same notion of embellishing sound and sense, which, in their opinion, should constitute the 'body' of poetry. The classification of poetry into species of composition like the *sarga-bandha* (*mahākāvya*) etc., is almost identical,[3] the only remarkable divergence occurring, as already noted, in the case of *kathā* and *ākhyāyikā*, which rigid distinction is not admitted by Daṇḍin.[4] Poetry

2 Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa* consists of three chapters devoted respectively to (i) Mārga-vibhāga, (ii) Arthālaṃkāra and (iii) Śabdālaṃkāra and Doṣa (the last topic is separately given as ch. iv in the Madras ed.).

3 Under verse, Daṇḍin mentions *sarga-bandha* (=*mahākāvya*), *muktaka* (single verse), *kulaka* (five verses), *kośa* (unconnected verses of different authors), and *saṃghāta* (unconnected verses of the same author) ; under prose, he speaks *kathā*, *ākhyāyikā* and *campū*. Vāmana gives two divisions of both prose and verse, viz., *nibaddha* and *anibaddha* (connected and unconnected). He thinks that verse is of various kinds, but divides prose into three varieties, *vṛtta-gandhi* (savouring of verse), *cūrṇa* (having no long compounds and possessing sweet vocables), and *utkalikā-prāya* which is the opposite of *cūrṇa* (i. 3. 21-26).

4 The varieties of *kathā* mentioned by Hemacandra are *ākhyāna*, *nidarśana*, *pravahlikā*, *matallikā*, *maṇikulyā*, *parikathā*, *bṛhatkathā*,

is classified, according to its form, into prose, verse and mixed (*miśra*), while language furnishes another *fundamentum divisionis* yielding four distinct groups, viz., *saṃskṛta, prākṛta, apabhraṃśa*[5] and *miśra*,[6] the last kind in both these divisions not being mentioned by Bhāmaha. The effect of combining these two principles of classification gives us four species of composition, viz. *sarga-bandha* (*mahākāvya*) in Sanskrit, *skandhaka* in Prakrit, *osara* in Apabhraṃśa, and *nāṭaka* in mixed languages, although it is not thought necessary to deal with them all in detail. The old division into *śravya* and *preksya* Kāvya,[7] according as a composition appeals to the eye or the ear, is also referred to in i. 39; but regarding *preṣya kāvya*, by which dramatic composition is generally meant, Daṇḍin summarily refers to specialised treatises on the subject.

These speculations, of course, constitute the common stock-in-trade of Poetics, and find themselves repeated in a more or less similar form in most writers irrespective of the school or tradition to which they belong. Thus, Vāmana also gives us preliminary chapters on the divisions of poetry

khaṇḍa-kathā, sakalakathā and *upakathā* (pp. 338 f). The last three are also admitted by Ānandavardhana (p. 141) and defined by Abhinava. The *Agni-purāṇa* 337. 20 defines *kathānikā*.

5 It is not known what Bhāmaha signifies by the term *apabhraṃśa*, but Daṇḍin gives to it a definite connotation as the language of the Ābhīras and others in the Kāvya, as distinguished from the Śāstra where it is the name applied to all languages other than Sanskrit. Namisādhu sententiously says: *prākṛtam eva apabhraṃśaḥ*. Hemacandra adds to Apabhraṃśa another kind called *grāmyāpabhraṃśa*. Cf. Bharata xvii. 49, which makes it clear that the Apabhraṃśa was a *jāti-bhāṣā* and not a *deśa-bhāṣā*. The Ābhīras were ancient settlers in the land and are mentioned by Patañjali (i. 252). See *IA*, 1918, p. 26.

6 The mixed variety of Kāvya is cryptically summed as *nāṭakādi tu miśrakam*. But if mixed language is meant, it probably refers to what is now called Hybrid Sanskrit or mixed Sanskrit.

7 This division occurs again in Hemacandra, who divides *prekṣya* Kāvya into *pāṭhya* and *geya*.

(*kāvya-viśeṣa*), on the auxiliary aids or sources of poetry (*kāvyāṅga*), on the persons entitled to study the science (*adhikāri-nirūpaṇa*). Although belonging to a different school, Rudraṭa in the same way devotes two chapters (i and xvi) to these general topics of Poetics.

But in respect of the attention which Daṇḍin pays to the elaboration of poetic figures, his sympathy obviously allies him with the standpoint of the Alaṃkāra school. He shares the views of this school in his general opinion that a good Kāvya should be embellished by those decorative devices which go by the name of *alaṃkāra*. At the same time, it is important to note that while Daṇḍin believes, with all early writers, in the theory of embellishment, he differs in his view as to the means by which this embellishment should be realised; for he apparently holds that it is not the poetic figures only but the several literary excellences, the *guṇas* (which are also designated *alaṃkāras* by him), that constitute the essence of the poetic manners (*mārgas*) or poetic diction, in the realisation of which alone the essence of poetry lies. Indeed, the marked emphasis laid on the Mārga, which is almost equivalent to Vāmana's Rīti,[8] and on its constituent excellences, known as Guṇas, to which the Alaṃkāra school is apparently indifferent, is a distinct feature of Daṇḍin's work, and places Daṇḍin in his fundamental theoretic attitude in the Rīti school. Although he does not go so far as Vāmana in setting up the Rīti as the essence of poetry, there can be no doubt that he attaches special importance to its literary value. It is true that Daṇḍin never uses the term Rīti throughout his work, but his employment of the term Mārga (i. 9, 40, 42, 67, 75, 101) or Vartman (i. 42, 92), implying 'mode,' 'manner', or style in the objective sense, may be taken as almost synonymous. His general definition of poetry, or rather its 'body' or framework, as *iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī* (i. 10)—a series of words characterised by an agreeable sense or idea—naturally

8 Vāmana also uses the term *mārga* in iii. 1. 12.

leads him to consider, first of all, the question of appropriate expression of appropriate ideas, or in other words, to discuss the suitable arrangement of sound and sense for the purpose of producing poetic effect, which is technically denoted by the term *mārga* or *rīti*. Speech, he says, is diversified in its mode of expression (*vicitra-mārga*, i. 9 ; also i. 40), and he is aware of the fine distinctions which mark off one mode from another (i. 40) and result in a multifarious variety of modes. All these he broadly divides into two clearly distinguishable types, called the *vaidarbha* and the *gauḍa*, to the critical study of which his whole work is avowedly devoted. This classification is probably not Daṇḍin's own but derived from some recognised tradition (i. 40), although Bharata, who mentions the *kāvya-guṇas*, does not refer to *mārga* or *rīti*, and Bhāmaha's analysis of the two types[9] (as well as of the *guṇas*) is somewhat different. Of the two types, Daṇḍin gives preference to the *vaidarbha mārga*, which, in his opinion, results from a harmonious unification of the ten *guṇas* or excellences of composition, the *gauḍa* being the exactly opposite type.

The ten Guṇas, which are spoken of as the *prāṇāḥ* or life-breath of the Vaidarbha Mārga and which are said to be generally wanting in the Gauḍa,[10] are therefore essential in a good composition. They are thus enumerated by Daṇḍin:

9 Bhāmaha does not use the terms *mārga* or *rīti* but distinguishes between the *vaidarbha* and the *gauḍa* Kāvya as two types of poetry obtaining in two different places. Bāṇa has already told us that people of different places liked different poetic devices (*Harṣa-carita* i, *śl*. 7), with which statement Daṇḍin's remarks regarding the partiality of the Gauḍas to certain tricks and excellences agree. As Vāmana distinctly says, the Rītis, which took their names from localities, were probably analysed empirically from the styles which prevailed in these localities. With regard to Guṇas, Bhāmaha mentions them independently of the Rīti. They are *mādhurya* and *prasāda* marked by the absence of compounds, and *ojas* by their presence. They would thus correspond to the Rītis of Rudraṭa. Bharata mentions ten Guṇas only as essential to a good Kāvya, and not in relation to Rīti.

10 Daṇḍin says: *eṣāṃ* (i.e. of the ten Guṇas) *viparyayaḥ prāyo-*

(i) *śleṣa*, the quality of being well knit, the opposite being *śithila* or looseness.

(ii) *prasāda*, or lucidity, the opposite being *vyutpanna* or far-fetchedness.

(iii) *samatā*, or evenness (in the grouping of word-sounds), the opposite being *vaiṣamya* or unevenness.

(iv) *mādhurya*, or elegance, consisting of alliteration of similar sound (*śrutyanuprāsa*[11]) and absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*)[12], respectively termed *vāg-rasa* and *vastu-rasa*. The name of the opposite of *mādhurya* is not given, but the opposite of *śrutyanuprāsa* is *ulbaṇa-varṇāvṛtti* (i. 35)[13] and that of *agrāmyatva* is *grāmyatva*, the latter rejected in both the Mārgas.

(v) *sukumāratā*, or absence of harshness due to the use of soft vocobles, the opposite being termed *niṣṭhura* or *dīpta*.[14]

(vi) *artha-vyakti*, or explicitness of sense (common to both the Mārgas, the opposite *neyatva* or *neyārthatva* being rejected in both).

dṛśyate gauḍa-vartmani. It implies that in his opinion the Viparyayas are *generally* found in the Gauḍa Mārga and not the ten Guṇas. The word *prāyas* is significant, and the older commentators draw attention to it. Thus, Taruṇavācaspati: *prayaḥ-śabdaḥ arthavyakty-audārya-samādhyādayo guṇā ubhaya-sādhāraṇā iti darśayati* ; Hṛdayaṅgama: *prāyo-grahaṇaṃ sākalya-nivṛtyartham, tena arthavyakty-audārya-samādhi-guṇā ubhaya-mārga-tulyā iti gamyate*. Some of the Guṇas, therefore, are common to both the Mārgas.

11 The *śrutyanuprāsa* is the name given to the grouping of similar sounds which exist between letters belonging to the same *sthāna*, such as *kaṇṭha*, *tālu*, *mūrdhan*, *danta* etc. It is thus distinguished from *varṇānuprāsa*. The subdivisions of *anuprāsa* are infinite ; but Bhoja (ch. ii. 71f) gives an elaborate scheme of classification containing six main varieties, viz. *śruti*, *vṛtti*, *varṇa*, *pada*, *nāma-dvirukti* and *lāṭa*.

12 For the meaning of the terms *grāmyatva* and *rasa* occurring in this definition, see below ch. iv.

13 This implies "an excess of a wild variety of Anuprāsa" as V. Raghavan interprets it (*Śṛṅgāra-pr*. pt. ii, p. 283). For an historical analysis of the Guṇas of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, see this work of V. Raghavan (pp. 282-299).

14 Dīpta is explained by Daṇḍin as Kṛcchrodya=hard to pronounce.

(vii) *udāratva*, or elevation consisting of the expression of some high merit (common to both the Mārgas).

(viii) *ojas* or force due to the presence of compounds (common to both the Mārgas, but the Vaidarbha attempts a simpler kind of prose, while the Gauḍa attempts a hightened style both in prose and in verse, long compounds prevailing in the latter case).

(ix) *kānti*, or agreeableness due to conformity to general usage ; in other words, absence of the unnatural, the exaggerated or the grotesque, the opposite being *atyukti*.

(x) *samādhi*, or transference of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, i. e. metaphorical expression generally (common to both the Mārgas).

It will be noticed that the above enumeration of the literary excellences of diction, which differs greatly from that of Bharata[15], is neither exhaustive nor strictly logical. The *artha-vyakti*, for instance, may well be included in the *prasāda*. The definition of *udāratva* is rather vague, so also is that of *kānti*, in both of which Daṇḍin apparently admits subjective valuations not clearly indicated. Again, the *mādhurya*, though defined primarily as a particular mode of word-arrangement, is regarded more or less as a subtle excellence which defies analysis[16]. A similar indefinable psychological factor is apparently admitted in the *samādhi*, the definition of which makes it difficult to distinguish from it poetic figures like *rūpaka* or metaphor, where there is also poetic superimposition of an object or its qualities on another. It is quite possible that from Daṇḍin's point of view, the difference between the *samādhi-guṇa* and the *rūpaka-alaṃkāra* may consist in the fact in the Guṇa there is a transference only of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, while in the Alaṃkāra

15 See above pp. 12-15.

16 Daṇḍin's treatment implies that he considers it both as a *śabda-guṇa* (illustrated in i. 53) and as an *artha-guṇa* (illustrated in i. 64), although this distinction is not mentioned by him (but cf. the word *vibhakta* in i. 68).

either one *dharmin* itself is substituted for another, or the new *dharma* entirely supplants the existing *dharma*. But this process of poetic transference is essentially a mode of figurative expression resting finally on *lakṣaṇā*, and Vāmana would regard Daṇḍin's definition of the *samādhi-guṇa* as constituting the figure *vakrokti* which, in his opinion, consists in a similar transference based on resemblance.

It must also be pointed out that some of Daṇḍin's Guṇas refer to *śabda* (word), some to *artha* (sense), while others to both these elements. The *mādhurya* and *sukumāratā* are primarily *śabda-guṇas*, depending on the use of specific vocables, while between themselves the *mādhurya* requires sound-alliteration, and *sukumāratā* the prevailing use of tender vocables. But the use of words or syllables suggesting a vulgar sense must be avoided in *mādhurya*, a fact which precludes us from taking it strictly as a *śabda-guṇa*. Daṇḍin does not make a hard-and-fast distinction between *śabda-guṇas* and *artha-guṇas*, as his successor Vāmana does; but taking his definitions as they stand, it would appear that he probably regards some of them (e. g. *śleṣa, samatā, sukumāratā* or *ojas*, all of which refer to sound-effects) as constituting what later theorists would call *śabda-guṇas*, and others (e. g., *prasāda, artha-vyakti, udāratva, kānti* or *samādhi*) as constituting *artha-guṇas*; while Guṇas like *mādhurya* he would in the same way classify as belonging both to *śabda* and *artha*. Daṇḍin himself was perhaps conscious of the defective nature of his classification, and consequently added (i. 101-102) that in the midst of a general agreement regarding the usage of Guṇas, there always exist differences between writers and writers as regards the emotional value of their composition or their artistic presentation.

After dealing with the Guṇas in relation to the two opposite types of Mārga, Daṇḍin begins (ch. ii) the treatment of those poetic embellishments which are specifically called Alaṃkāras or poetic figures. It must be distinctly understood that the word *alaṃkāra* is used by Daṇḍin in the general sense

of that which causes beauty in poetry, *kāvya-śobhākarān dharmān alaṃkārān pracakṣate*, ii. 1. It appears to include in its wide scope both Guṇas and Alaṃkāras properly so called. Referring to his own discussion of the Guṇas in the previous chapter, in relation to the Vaidarbha Mārga of which they constitute the essence, Daṇḍin speaks of them in ii. 3 as *alaṃkāras*, and goes on to mention the figures as *sādhāraṇam alaṃkāra-jātam*. In other words, poetic figures are Alaṃkāras common to both the Mārgas (*sādhāraṇa*), while Guṇas are Alaṃkāras belonging exclusively to the Vaidarbha. He says, therefore, at the outset of his treatment of the poetic figures (ii. 3)

kāścin mārga-vibhāgārtham uktāḥ prag apy alaṃkriyāḥ||
sādhāraṇam alaṃkāra-jātam adya pradarśyate||

"For the purpose of classifying the *mārgas*, some *alaṃkāras* have been already spoken of (by me in the previous chapter) ; now are shown those *alaṃkāras* which are common (to both the *mārgas*)". Taruṇavācaspati rightly comments, on this verse[17]: "The *śleṣa* and the like are already spoken of as the ten *guṇas*. If it is objected, therefore, that they cannot also be called *alaṃkāras*, the reply is that the characteristic of an *alaṃkāra* consists in its capacity of embellishing, and that on account of this characteristic they (*guṇas*) are also *alaṃkāras*. The learned teachers have already said that the *guṇas* are indeed *alaṃkāras*. Hence *alaṃkāras*, like the *śleṣa*, which are essentially *guṇas*, were mentioned before to indicate the difference between the (two) *mārgas* ; but now are enumerated those *alaṃkāras* which are common to the two *mārgas*." Daṇḍin, it may be pointed out, uses the word *alaṃ-*

17 *pūrvaṃ śleṣādayo daśa guṇā ity uktam. Kathaṃ te'laṃkāra ucyante iti cet, śobhākaratvaṃ hi alaṃkāra-lakṣaṇam, tallakṣaṇa-yogāt te'pyalaṃkārāḥ.........guṇā alaṃkāra eva ity ācāryāḥ.........tataḥ śleṣādayo guṇātmakālaṃkārāḥ pūrvaṃ mārga-prabheda-pradarśanāya uktāḥ, idānīṃ tu mārga-dvaya-sādhāraṇā alaṃkārā ucyante.*

kriyā in same general sense in iii. 137 (or iv. 14 in Madras ed.). From what is said above it follows that Daṇḍin does not make a fundamental theoretic distinction between the *guṇa* and the *alaṃkāra* as such (as later writers from Vāmana onwards do), but apparently regards them both essentially as *alaṃkāra*, taking the word in its wider sense of that which embellishes ; the *guṇas* being of primary importance as essentials of a good diction, and the *alaṃkāras* (i. e. poetic figures) of subsidiary value as constituents of diction, both good and bad. It is noteworthy that Daṇḍin never makes a confusion in the use of the two terms, but invariably applies the former term to denote (except in one case in ii. 364) the literary excellences of diction (i. 42, 76, 81, 100), and the latter to designate the poetic figures to which the name is traditionally restricted (ii. 7, 116, 214, 220, 268, 300, 340, 359 ; iii. 141, *alaṃkāratā* in ii. 237, 287, 367). In this way he practically foreshadows, if he does not theoretically develop, the rigid differentiation of the Guṇa and the Alaṃkāra of the Rīti school.

The subsidiary *alaṃkāras*, consisting of poetic figures, are dealt with by Daṇḍin in two chapters (ii and iii), devoted respectively to the treatment of the verbal (*śabda-*) and ideal figures (*artha-alaṃkāras*). He does not expressly state this distinction, which is implied in his treatment, but he gives his general opinion that verbal tricks like those of *yamaka* are not especially attractive (*naikānta-madhuram*). He deals with them, however, in greater detail than his predecessor Bhāmaha. The *prahelika* (conundrum),[18] for instance, which is merely alluded to in one verse by Bhāmaha, is elaborately discussed and illustrated by Daṇḍin (iii. 96-124) who mentions sixteen different kinds of this figure. He also gives a detailed treatment of *yamaka*, and defines with illustrations such

18 Some *prahelikās* are already mentioned by Bāṇa. Bhāmaha in a somewhat obscure verse states that a *prahelikā* is a serious composition possessing varied constituent meanings as well as the tricks of *yamaka*, and is so called in Rāmaśarman's *Acyutottara*. Daṇḍin men-

difficult tricks as *gomutrikā, ardha-bhrama* and *sarvato-bhadra.*

To the Arthālaṃkāras, however, Daṇḍin naturally pays greater attention. He mentions by name (ii. 4-7) only thirty-five poetic figures[19] ; but the special feature of his treatment, as contrasted with those of Bhāmaha and Vāmana, consists in his attempt to make a large number of subordinate varieties, the most remarkable instance being that of *upamā,* which has thirty-two subdivisions, of which eight at least have the value of independent figures to later writers. Daṇḍin also anticipates Udbhaṭa in pointing out the importance of *śleṣa* as the cause of special charm in other figures (ii. 362), and agrees with Bhāmaha in holding that the *atiśayokti* is essential in all poetic figures (ii. 220). The term *vakrokti* is used only once and is reserved by him as a collective name of all poetic figures barring the *svabhāvokti.* According to Daṇḍin's scheme (as indicated in ii. 362), the whole realm of poetic figures can be divided into two distinct groups, consisting of *svabhāvokti,* on the one hand, and *vakrokti,* on the other. By the former, which he characterises as the first or primary figure (*ādyā alaṃkṛtiḥ*), he implies a plain and direct description of things belonging to a genus (*jāti*), or of an action

tions 16 kinds of *prahelikā.* Rudraṭa, like Daṇḍin, deals with the *prahelikā* as well as the *citra-bandhas* in some detail. But Vāmana excludes them. Some of the *citra-bandhas* are mentioned by Bāṇa and Māgha. Under the general designation of *citra-kāvya,* they are discredited by Ānandavardhana, and their importance diminished in later Poetics. They became the subject of specialised treatises like the *Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana* of Dharmadāsa Sūri (vol. i, pp. 283-84).

19 The figures dealt with in their order of treatment are: *svabhāvokti, upamā, rūpaka, dīpaka, āvṛtti, ākṣepa, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti, atiśayokti, utprekṣā, hetu, sūkṣma, leśa* (or *lava*), *yathā-saṃkhya* (or *saṃkhyāna* or *krama*), *preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvin, paryāyokta, samāhita, udātta, apahnuti, śleṣa, viśeṣokti, tulya-yogitā, virodha, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, vyāja-stuti, nidarśanā, sahokti, parivṛtti, āśīs, saṃkīrṇa* and *bhāvika.* The verses ii. 4-7, which give a prefatory list of figures, are suspected to be an interpolation, but the list substantially agrees with the poetic figures dealt with in ch. ii.

(*kriyā*), of a quality (*guṇa*), or of an individual (*dravya*)[20]. In this so-called natural description, there is apparently no scope for any artificial or ingenious mode of expression, and it should, therefore, be distinguished from all other poetic devices, figurative or otherwise, collectively designated as the *vakrokti*[21]. Among other figures, defined by Daṇḍin for the first time, may be mentioned the *āvṛtti*, *leśa* (=*vyājokti* or *vyāja-stuti*), *sūkṣma* and *hetu* (the last included by Udbhaṭa in his *kāvya-liṅga*). He does not define *ananvaya* and *sasaṃdeha*, calling them *asādhāraṇopamā* and *saṃśayopamā* respectively, and includes *upamā-rūpaka* and *utprekṣāvayava* under *rūpaka* and *utprekṣā* respectively. With Bhāmaha, he alludes to *vārttā* (i. 85), which is apparently illustrated by Bhaṭṭi, but which disappears from later Poetics, being included perhaps in the scope of *svabhāvokti*. The *prativastūpamā* is not an independent figure in Daṇḍin but a variety of *upamā*, while the *samāhita* of Daṇḍin is different from the same figure of Udbhaṭa and Vāmana. These few instances would indicate that, compared with the work of his predecessor, Daṇḍin's work attempts to present many new ideas. Possessing great inventive powers and gift of lucid exposition, as well as a notable degree of scholastic acumen, he endeavoured not only to refute and correct in many places the earlier views, but sometimes gave a new shape to them.

It will be convenient to examine here briefly the doctrine of Doṣa, which forms a counterpart of the doctrine of Guṇa enunciated by the Rīti school. Daṇḍin mentions, after Bharata, ten flaws or Doṣas of literary composition (ch. iii. 125f, or ch. iv Madras ed.), but he defines them differently in most cases. They are in name and substance identical with Bhā-

20 These terms are to be taken in the sense they have in grammar (and not as they have in philosophy).

21 This interpretation is supported by Daṇḍin's commentators (see Madras ed. pp. 201-2). We have already dealt with the question in our Introd. to *Vakrokti-jīvita*, 2nd Ed. pp. xiv f. See above pp. 48f.

22 See above pp. 9-11. Also Jacobi in *Sb. der preuss. Akad.* xxiv,

maha's first list of Doṣas noted above[22], with the only exception of the eleventh fault of defective logic, which is recognised by Bhāmaha but vigorously rejected by Daṇḍin as a fault difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss. But even with reference to this fault, Daṇḍin agrees with Bhāmaha in the enumeration of its six subdivisions. With regard to Bhāmaha's second list of faults, which concern the inner essence of poetry they would correspond in general to the Doṣa (or rather the opposites of Guṇa) which Daṇḍin mentions as being absent in the Vaidarbha Mārga and as generally characterising the opposite Gauḍa Mārga. We have noted that some of these Guṇa-viparyayas are expressly named by Daṇḍin. They are (i) the opposite of *śleṣa*, called *śithila* (ii) the oppisite of *prasāda*, called *vyutpanna* (iii) the opposite of *samatā*, called *vaiṣamya* (iv) the opposite of *sukumāratā*, called *dīpta* (v) the opposite of *kānti*, called *atyukti* (vi) the opposite of *artha-vyakti*, called *neyatva* and (vii) the opposite of *mādhurya* (unnamed). These form *seven* faults as against *ten* of Bhāmaha, but Daṇḍin speaks of the excellences *udāratva*, *samādhi* (and probably *ojas*) as having no opposites (or corresponding faults), inasmuch as they are common to both the Mārgas. Daṇḍin does not regularly deal with Upamā-doṣas.

But Daṇḍin does not enter into the question first raised by Bharata as to whether the Doṣas in Poetics are positive entities or mere negations of Guṇas. Bharata holds that Guṇas signify nothing more than the negative condition of *doṣābhāva*, so that Doṣas are, in his opinion, positive entities, from which the Guṇas are known by implication. It is clear from Daṇḍin's treatment, however, that he mentions in ch. iv the external faults apparently as positive entities, after the manner of Bhāmaha ; while the essential faults are taken as negations of some of the Guṇas of the Vaidarbha Mārga and consequently as positive characteristics of the Gauḍa Mārga. He attempts to avoid the controversy by making use of the distinction of

1922, pp. 222-3. On Daṇḍin's idea of Doṣa see V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, pt. ii, p. 234f.

the two opposite types of diction, making the so-called Guṇas the characteristics of the Vaidarbha type and some of the so-called Doṣas the characteristics of the Gauḍa type. Vāmana, on the other hand, in conformity to his clear-cut theory of Rīti, goes directly against the opinion of Bharata and expressly makes the Guṇas positive entities, defining the Doṣas as opposites of Guṇas and as known from the latter by implication (*guṇa-viparyātmano doṣāḥ, arthatas tad-avagamaḥ*). But he adds that the Doṣas should be dealt with separately for the sake of clear understanding. He, therefore, divides the Doṣas into four classes (i) defects of words (*pada doṣas*) (ii) defects of the meaning of the words (*padārtha-doṣas*) (iii) defects of sentences (*vākya-doṣas*) and (iv) defects of the meaning of sentences (*vākyārtha-doṣas*)[23].

23 Rudraṭa, apparently accepting both Guṇas and Doṣas as independent entities, enumerates and classifies Doṣas on a different principle. Taking *śabda* and *artha* as the two elements of poetry, he mentions in two series (1) *śabda-doṣas* or defects of words and (2) *artha-doṣas* or defect of sense. The first series includes eleven faults, viz. (i) *pada-doṣas* like *asamartha, apratīta, visaṃdhi, viparīta-kalpanā, grāmya, avyutpanna* and *deśya* (7 kinds) (ii) *vākya-doṣas,* such as *saṃkīrṇa, garbhita, gatārtha* and *analaṃkāra* (4 kinds). The second series comprehends (besides four *upamā-doṣas*) nine faults, viz., *apahetu, apratīta, nirāgama, bādhayat, asaṃbaddha, grāmya, virasa, tadvat* and *atimātra.* Rudraṭa recognises (xi. 24) only four Upamā-doṣas, viz., *sāmanya-śabda-bheda, vaiṣamya, asaṃbhava* and *aprasiddhi,* but Bhāmaha mentions seven. (On Rudraṭa's general idea of Guṇa and Doṣa respectively see V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa,* pt. ii, pp. 302 f and 239 f). Like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Rudraṭa believes that with change of conditions Doṣas become Guṇas. After the advent of the Dhvani-theorists, the Doṣa (like the Guṇa) came to be related to the Rasa, the poetic mood in a composition, and began to be defined as that which depreciates or hinders the awakening of Rasa. The doctrine of Doṣa was taken along with the doctrine of Guṇa, of which it formed the counterpart, and was considered from the standpoint of Rasa alone. They were no longer absolute entities, but attributes or absence of attributes relative to the development of Rasa, and must therefore be governed by the theory of *aucitya* or propriety which these theorists put forward in their treatment of Rasa. The Doṣas

(2)

VĀMANA

Vāmana's work[24], in comparison with Daṇḍin's, shows further progress and elaboration of the ideas discussed above. Indeed, what is vague and unsystematic in Daṇḍin appears fully developed and carefully set forth in Vāmana, who may thus be fittingly regarded as the best representative of the Rīti-system. To Vāmana belongs the credit of being the first writer on Poetics who, before the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, gave us a well thought-out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naïve or tentative, which

came to be defined generally as *rasāpakarṣaka* (Viśvanātha) ; but specific *rasa-doṣas* also came to be defined and discussed. The question whether the Doṣa is *nitya* or *anitya* (already raised by Bhāmaha and Rudraṭa) is solved by supposing that a Doṣa may sometimes become a Guṇa if it helps (and not hinders) the development of the Rasa. Mammaṭa and most later theorists accept the distinction of Doṣas relating to *pada*, *vākya* and *artha* ; but they speak also of *rasa-doṣas* and *alaṃkāra-doṣas*. The later opinion regarding the respective character of Guṇa and Doṣa appears to be that each of them conveys a positive meaning, in spite of the fact that some Doṣas approach the condition of *guṇābhāva* and some Guṇas approach the condition of *doṣābhāva*. Even Daṇḍin in ch. iv separately mentions ten Doṣas which he does not regard as constituting the opposite of any of his Guṇas.

24 Instead of having *adhyāyas* first and *adhikaraṇas* thereunder, Vāmana reverses the order of older *sūtra*-writers and divides his work into five *adhikaraṇas*, each of which consists of two *adhyāyas* (excepting the first and the fourth which contain three each), the whole work thus having five *adhikaraṇas* and twelve *adhyāyas*. The arrangement of these *adhikaraṇas* is as follows. I. *śarīra*: dealing with the object of poetry, persons qualified to receive instructions in the subject, the Rīti and its subdivisions, the subsidiary aids and divisions of poetry. II. *doṣa-darśana*: treating of the defects or flaws of composition. III. *guṇa-vivecana :* considering the Guṇas or excellences of composition. IV. *ālaṃkārika*: devoted to the definition and illustration of poetic figures. V. *prāyogika*: setting forth the poetic conventions and propriety of poetic usages, and *śabda-śuddhi* (corresponding to the last chapter of Bhāmaha's work), explaining grammatical solecism.

in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable.

The enquiry as to what is the 'soul' or essence of poetry is for the first time definitely posed and systematically worked out by Vāmana ; his predecessors, to whom the 'body' of poetry was more important, never having troubled themselves with this question. Vāmana lays down in clear terms: *rītir ātmā kāvyasya* 'the Rīti is the soul of poetry' (i. 2. 6) ; and working out this figurative description he points out (on i. 1. 1) that the word (*śabda*) and its sense (*artha*) constitute the 'body', of which the soul is the Rīti[25]. He defines the Rīti as *viśiṣṭapada-racanā* or particular arrangement of words. This particularity (*vaśiṣṭya*) of arrangement, again, rests upon certain definite combination of the different Guṇas or fixed excellences of composition. For instance, of the three kinds of Rīti proposed by Vāmana, the Vaidarbha unites all the ten Guṇas, the Gauḍī abounds in *ojas* and *kānti*, the Pāñcālī is endowed with *mādhurya* and *saukumārya*. This is how Vāmana would distinguish the different Rītis from one another. On these three Rītis poetry takes its stand, just as painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas (on 1. 2. 13). The Vaidarbhī is of course recommended, for it contains all the excellences ; and as the genius of each diction is peculiar to itself, Vāmana rejects the view that the other two inferior dictions ought to be practised as steps leading up to the Vaidarbhī. He argues that the proper

25 Vāmana says (i. 1. 1) that the word *kāvya* applies in strictness to word and sense embellished with Guṇa and Alaṃkāra, but it is employed in the secondary sense (*bhaktyā*) to mere word and sense. By Kāvya-śarīra he means elsewhere (i. 3. 10) *itivṛtta* or the content or subject-matter of poetry. But the first chapter of his work is designated Śarīra ; and on i. 2. 6 he says that the word *śarīra* must be understood after the word *kāvya* in the Sūtra, meaning thereby that Kāvya consisting of word and sense is the Śarīra, of which the Ātman is Rīti. For the history of the concept of Rīti see V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts*, pp. 131-172 ; Prakash C. Lahiri, *Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa*, Dacca University 1937.

diction cannot be attained by one who begins with the improper. If the weaver practises weaving with jute, he does not attain proficiency in the weaving of silk. It will be seen from this analysis of the three kinds of diction that the Vaidarbhī is the complete or ideal one which unifies all the poetic excellences, whereas the other two encourage extremes. The one lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, the other on softness and sweetness, whereby the former loses itself often in bombast, the latter in prolixity. It will be noticed also that the names of the different Rītis are derived from those of particular countries, and Vāmana expressly says in this connexion (i. 2. 10) that the names are due to the fact of particular excellence of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries[26]. This makes it probable that the theory of diction, peculiar to this school, originally arose from the empirical analysis of the prevailing peculiarities of poetic expression in different places, and furnishes another proof of the general *a posteriori* character of the discipline itself.[27]

26 *vidarbha gauḍa-pāñcāleṣu tatratyaiḥ kavibhīr yathā-svarūpam upalabdhatvād tat-samākhyā, na punar deśaiḥ kiṃcid upakriyate kāvyānām.*

27 In the absence of proper data, it is not possible to determine when the distinction between the Eastern and Southern styles—Gauḍa and Vaidarbha—was first recognised. We have already noted that Bāṇa speaks of people of different localities affecting different tricks of style, some putting stress on sound, some on sense, while others indulging in a play of fancy. In Daṇḍin's time the distinction must have been fully established. Jacobi (*Māhārāṣṭrī*, pp. xvi) suggests that the simpler Vaidarbha style was a reaction against the older and more ornate Gauḍa-style (which Daṇḍin disfavours), and that it came into existence probably in the 3rd century A. D., being known to us from Hāla's *Saptaśatī* (5th century A.D.). It is possible to argue, on the contrary, that the Gauḍa-style itself is a sign of further development or decadence, exhibiting a tendency to a more elaborate style (as opposed to an earlier and simpler Vaidarbha-style) which we find, as a matter of practice, asserting itself more and more in later decadent Sanskrit Kāvya. Cf Keith, *Classical Sanskrit Literature* p. 50.

It should be observed that the term Rīti is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style', by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation. Although *artha* (i. e. sense or idea) is admitted as an element by Sanskrit writers, the Rīti consists essentially of the objective beauty of representation (of the intended idea), arising from a proper unification of certain clearly defined excellences, or from an adjustment of sound and sense. It is, no doubt, recognised that appropriate ideas should find appropriate expression ; or in other words, the outward expression should be suitable to the inward sense. Bharata goes further and formulates that in the drama the expression should also be in keeping with the temperament and character of the speaker to whom it is attributed. But at the same time, the Rīti is not, like the style, the expression of poetic individuality, as it is generally understood by Western Criticism, but it is merely the outward presentation of its beauty called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences.' Of course, the excellences are supposed to be discernible in the sense or import, as much as in the verbal arrangement, but this subjective content is not equivalent to the indefinable element of individuality which constitutes the charm of a good style. If we accept the nomenclature of a modern analyst of style[28], we may say that the Sanskrit authors admit what he would call the 'mind'-in-style, as a subject of technical formulation, but not the 'soul'-in-style, which is elusive and which they leave to individual writers to evolve in their own way.

28 Walter Pater's essay on Style in his *Appreciations*. V. Raghavan (*Some Concepts*, p. 140) demurs to our views ; but it does not help to refer to Demetrius or Aristotle ; for we are not concerned here with European classical literature but with modern literature, as viewed by Walter Pater or Benedotte Croce. It is not until we come to Kuntaka that poetry is brought in strict relation to poetic individuality (*kavi-svabhāva*) or poetic conception (*kavi-pratibhā*). This is admitted by Raghavan himself.

Vāmana, therefore, teaches that the Guṇas are essential in poetry, as they go to make up the Rīti, which is the 'soul' of poetry. The objection of the author of the *Ekāvalī* (p. 51) is that to conceive the Guṇas, on the one hand, as the principal element and therefore as something fit to be adorned (*upaskārya*) and to call them, on the other hand, properties that adorn poetry (*upaskāraka,*) involves contradiction in terms. This raises only a scholastic quibble which does not bear serious examination. The Guṇas are, no doubt, spoken of as *śabdārthayor dharmāḥ*, but this, as the commentator points out, is a loose or popular use of the term ; for, strictly speaking, they are concerned directly with Rīti (*guṇā vastuto rīti-niṣṭhā api, upacārāc chabda-dharmā ity uktam* p. 69, ed. Benares), which is described as *guṇātmā*. To the objection that these entities have no absolute existence, Vāmana replies that their existence is vouched by their cognition as such by men of taste (*saṃvedyatvāt* iii. 1. 26, on which comm. : *sahṛdaya-saṃvedanasya viṣayatvāt*), and that these excellences are not found in all cases of recitation but depend upon the presence or absence of certain well-defined characteristics (iii. 2. 28 and Vṛtti).

Like Daṇḍin, Vāmana enumerates the Guṇas as ten, which appears to have been the standard number from Bharata's time, but he really doubles the number by clearly differentiating between the *śabda-guṇas* and the *artha-guṇas*, and regarding each Guṇa as belonging respectively to *śabda* and *artha*. In other words, each Guṇa is looked at from two different points of view, and the distinction thus proposed between verbal and ideal excellences comes in, as technically put, according as the word or the idea is the denoter (*vācaka*) or the denoted (*vācya*). We find in Vāmana, for the first time, the definite classification of Guṇas of Śabda and Artha respectively. This sharp distinction, no doubt, clears away some of the vagueness surrounding definitions of Bharata's and Daṇḍin's individual Guṇas ; and Vāmana, though widely differing from his predecessors in the peculiar connotation

he attaches to some of them, is careful in distinguishing the allied Guṇas from one another. In most essentials Vāmana undoubtedly continues and expands Daṇḍin's somewhat unsystematic scheme, but his definitions bear in some cases an altogether different complexion, and justify us in presuming that Vāmana develops his ideas from elsewhere, as he himself often supports his analysis by verses quoted from unknown sources (e. g. under iii. 1. 9, 25 ; 2. 15 etc.).

His scheme of the Guṇas may be tabulated thus:

Śabda-guṇa	Artha-guṇa
i. *ojas*, or compactness of word-structure (*gāḍha-bandhatva*, where *bandha*= *pada-racanā* iii. 1. 4)	i. *ojas*, or maturity of conception (*arthasya prauḍhiḥ*)
ii. *prasāda*, or laxity of structure (*śaithilya*)	ii. *prasāda*, clearness of meaning (*artha-vaimalya*) by avoidance of superfluity (*anupayogi-parivarjanāt*, as Abhinavagupta explains)
iii. *śleṣa*, or coalescence of words resulting in smoothness (*masṛṇatvam, yasmin sati bahūny api padāny ekavad bhāsante*)	iii. *śleṣa*, or coalescence or commingling of many ideas (*ghaṭanā*)
iv. *samatā*, or homogeneity of manner, i. e., of construction (*mārgābhedaḥ, yena mārgeṇopakramas tasyātyāgaḥ*)	iv. *samatā*, or non-relinquishment of proper sequence of ideas (*prakramābheda*)
v. *samādhi*, or symmetry due to orderly ascent and descent, i.e. when the heightening effect is toned down by softening effect, and *vice versa* (*ārohāvaroha-krama*)	v. *samādhi*, or grasping of the original meaning arising from concentration of the mind (*artha-dṛṣṭiḥ samādhi-kāraṇatvāt*)

Śabda-guṇa	Artha-guṇa
vi. *mādhurya*, or distinctness of words (*pṛthak-padatva*) due to absence of long compounds (*samāsa-dairghya-nivṛtti*)	vi. *mādhurya*, or strikingness of utterance (*ukti-vaicitrya*), i. e. in an impressive periphrastic manner for special charm
vii. *saukumārya*, or freedom from harshness (*ajaraṭhatva*)	vii. *saukumārya*, or freedom from disagreeable or inauspicious ideas (*apāruṣya*)
viii. *udāratā*, or liveliness in which the words seem as if they are dancing (*yasmin sati nṛtyantīva padāni*) i. e. *pada-vicchedāt*?	(viii. *udāratā*, or delicacy i. e. absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*)
ix. *artha-vyakti*, or explicitness of words whereby the meaning is easily opprehended (*jhaṭitya-artha-pratipatti hetutva*)	ix. *artha-vyakti*, or explicitness of ideas which makes the nature of things clear (*vastu-svabhāva-sphuṭatva*)
x. *kānti*, or brilliance, i.e. richness of words (*aujjvalya*)	x. *kānti*, or prominence of the *rasas* (*dīpta-rasatva*)

It will be seen from this brief enumeration that Vāmana's Guṇas differ considerably from those of Bharata or Daṇḍin. Vāmana's *ojas*, for instance, would correspond to Daṇḍin's *śleṣa*, while Daṇḍin's *mādhurya* is split up into *pṛthak-padatva* and *agrāmyatva*. Vāmana brings in the idea of Rasa in the *artha-guṇa kānti* (cf. Bharata's *kānti*), thereby admitting it in one of the essentials of poetry, while Daṇḍin acknowledges it in some of the non-essential poetic figures. Vāmana's *artha-guṇa artha-vyakti* would be regarded by Daṇḍin as an instance of *svabhāvokti alaṃkāra*. But it must be observed that Vāmana's scheme, while being more systematic and thus marking an advance on the speculation of Daṇḍin's, is hardly satisfactory as a whole. The somewhat pedantic classification of Guṇas, into external and internal, verbal and

ideal, is in itself open to objections and has been controverted by later theorists[29]. The distinctions are sometimes unconvincing, and it is natural to suspect that they are made for the sake of symmetry of having two sets each of ten excellences. Taking the individual Guṇas, it appears that Vāmana himself was perhaps conscious of the defective nature of some of his definitions, although he must have elaborated the ten Guṇas according to some current convention. For instance, his *śabda-guṇa prasāda* is merely a negation of his *ojas* ; Vāmana himself admits this and adds the qualification that the *prasāda* is an excellence when appearing along with *ojas* and not by itself, for when it appears by itself it is clearly a defect. If it is objected that there cannot be a combination of two such contradictory Guṇas, Vāmana replies that such a combination is a fact of common experience. Vāmana's *śleṣa* is rejected by Mammaṭa as an independent excellence, inasmuch as it is only a particular form of *ojas.* In the same way, the *saukumārya* is not admitted by later theorists on the ground that it is merely the negation of the defect of harshness, just as Vāmana's *udāratā* is a negation of vulgarity (*grāmyatva*). His *samādhi* as an *artha-guṇa* is different from Daṇḍin's *samādhi,* but it is hardly an 'excellence.' It is supposed to consist in comprehending the original meaning, but this happens in the case of all compositions ; for there can hardly be any poetry, worth the name, of which the meaning is not comprehended. These and other objections are brought forward by Mammaṭa and his followers, who protest against this needless multiplication and differentiation of the Guṇas, and who sum up the literary 'qualities,' which they admit as an embellishment of the principal sentiment (Rasa) of the composition, under three broad categories, differentiated on entirely psychological grounds, viz., *ojas* (energy), *prasāda* (lucidity) and *mādhurya* (sweetness).

29 e. g. Mammaṭa viii, Hemacandra pp. 195-200, Māṇikya-candra pp. 191f, Jagannātha 62f etc.

It is also noteworthy that the Rīti-system assigns to some of the Guṇas functions which other systems assign to Alaṃkāras or poetic figures. Vāmana's *artha-guṇa kānti* corresponds to figures like *rasavat* of the Alaṃkāra-system,[30] while Daṇḍin's *samādhi* in some cases will be equivalent to the *rūpaka* and analogous metaphorical figures. Vāmana's *artha-guṇa artha-vyakti* is nothing more than the *svabhāvokti* of Daṇḍin, and Daṇḍin's *kānti* only defines the limit, as Hemacandra puts it, to the figure *atiśayokti* (*seyam atiśayokter yantraṇā, na punar guṇāntaram*). On the basis of Bhāmaha's *vakrokti*, the later writers of the Alaṃkāra school, we shall see, postulate *ukti-vaicitrya* as the fundamental principle of all figurative expression, but this is comprehended merely as one of the excellences by Vāmana's definition of the *artha-guṇa mādhurya*.

It will be clear from the above, as well as from the elaborate review of the Guṇa-doctrine by Hemacandra (pp. 195-200) and Māṇikyacandra (pp. 191f) that the writers of the Rīti school, especially the followers of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, differ widely in their attempts at defining and classifying the Guṇas, and that such attempts are open to criticism. Some of Bharata's definitions, on the other hand, do not always agree with those either of Daṇḍin or Vāmana. For instance, Bharata's *ojas*, which consists in the use of high-sounding compound words of varied strikingness, may correspond to Daṇḍin's *ojas*, but Hemacandra states that the essence of this Guṇa consists in imparting loftiness to an object which is low or treated with contempt. Again, Bharata's *prasāda*, corresponding to Daṇḍin's *samādhi*, is a metaphorical mode of expression, which Vāmana would include in his peculiar definition of the *vakrokti*-figure, and which comes generally under *lakṣaṇā* or *upacāra* of later theorists. Bharata's *udārā* differs considerably from Vāmana's *udāratā* which does not comprehend, as Bharata's *udāra* does, the Rasas and Bhāvas in its scope ; but it corresponds partially to Vāmana's

30 For this reason Vāmana does not define the *rasavat* as a figure.

artha-guṇa kānti. At the same time, it would seem that, in spite of such minor discrepancies, Bharata's scheme of the Guṇas as a whole is developed to its furthest possibilities by Vāmana. That there are inevitable differences in the definition of particular Guṇas in the earlier writers on the subject, and that the whole doctrine, despite the care of its exponents, is still unsatisfactory, only indicate the fruitlessness of the efforts of early theorists in comprehending all the literary excellences of a composition within the hard-and-fast limits of a few categories, on the interpretation of which they spend so much ingenuity but on which they cannot in the nature of things arrive at any absolute agreement.

Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra in their review of this doctrine cite the opinion of an authority[31], called Maṅgala who, we are told, agrees with Bharata in his definition of *ojas* and maintains with Vāmana that Daṇḍin is not right in emphasising it in the Gauḍī Rīti inasmuch as it is common to all Rītis. The only other reference to this writer is made by Rājaśekhara, who cites some opinions of this writer agreeing substantially with those of Vāmana, and quotes at p. 14 a dictum from Maṅgala which occurs in a slightly different form in Vāmana i. 2. 1. From these citations by Rājaśekhara it appears that Maṅgala, if he is not earlier in date than Vāmana, belongs most probably to the same school of opinion. There can hardly be any doubt that the system existed even before Vāmana gave a definite form to it ; and Vāmana's systematic formulation certainly obtained for it a large number of adherents and followers, so that important later authors like Rājaśekhara, Hemacandra and Jayaratha cite with respect the opinions of the Vāmanīyas, just in the same way as they cite the Audbhaṭas, the followers of Vāmana's contemporary and rival Udbhaṭa.

31 Vāmana himself quotes some verses giving us ancient definitions of the various *śabda-guṇas* (under iii. 1. 25).

After the Guṇas, Vāmana deals with the poetic figures or Alaṃkāras as elements of subsidiary importance. This definite differentiation of Guṇa from Alamkāra we meet for the first time in Vāmana; for Bhāmaha was indifferent to it, Daṇḍin does not accept it, and Udbhaṭa appears to have denied any difference[32]. At the outset Vāmana states, no doubt, that poetry is acceptable from embellishment (*alaṃkāra*) ; but he is careful to explain embellishment, not in the narrow sense of poetic figure, but in the broad and primary sense of beauty or charm (*kāvyaṃ grāhyam alaṃkārāt, saundaryam alaṃkāraḥ*). He also points out that it is only in the secondary instrumental sense that the term *alaṃkāra* or embellisment is applied to simile and other poetic figures (*alaṃkṛtir alaṃkāraḥ, karaṇa-vyutpattyā punar alaṃkāra-śabdo'yam upamādiṣu vartate*). In this view, Vāmana apparently develops logically Daṇḍin's teaching ; but Vāmana does not make the presence of poetic figures a necessary condition. What makes poetry acceptable, in his opinion, is the presence of charm or beauty (i. e. Alaṃkāra in its broad sense of Saundarya) which he does not define and which is in some respects undefinable[33]. The Rīti and its constituent Guṇas come in as a *sine qua non* in the production of this beauty, but the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening. This distinction between the Guṇa and the Alaṃkāra as to their respective position in a formal scheme of Poetics, which is vaguely hinted at by Daṇḍin, is fully developed for the first time by Vāmana (iii. 1. 1-3). The Guṇas, being essential to the Rīti, are defined as those characteristics which create the charm of poetry (*kāvya-śobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ*) —a function which is assigned to both Guṇas and Alaṃkāras by Daṇḍin—but Alaṃkāras are such ornaments as serve to enhance the charm already so produced (*tad-atiśaya-hetavaḥ*).

32 The distinction was established by the *Dhvanyāloka*.

33 Vāmana simply says that this beauty is to be attained by avoiding Doṣas and employing Guṇas and Alaṃkāras (*sa doṣa-guṇālaṃkāra-hānādānābhyām*).

The Guṇas are said to be *nitya* (permanent), implying that the Alaṃkāras are *anitya* (*punar alaṃkārā anityā iti gamyate eva, Kāmadhenu* com. p. 71), for there can be charm of poetry without the Alaṃkāras but no charm without the Guṇas (*tair vinā kāvya-śobhānupapatteḥ*). In other words, the Guṇa stands to poetry in the *samavāya*-relation (see *Kāmadhenu* on iii. 1. 4), while the Alaṃkāra in *saṃyoga*-relation, *saṃyoga* being explained as mere conjunction and *samavāya* implying inseparable connexion or inherence (*nitya-saṃbandha*)[34]. To put it in the usual figurative language, the Guṇa is related to the 'soul' of poetry (viz. Rīti), while the Alaṃkāra rests merely on the 'body' (viz. *śabda* and *artha*). The Alaṃkāra, without the Guṇa, cannot of itself produce the beauty of a poem, but the latter can do so without the former. But Vāmana justifies at the same time the existence as such of the Alaṃkāra as an element of poetry, and supports a phase of poetry, which is indeed admitted by Ānandavardhana but not properly dealt with by him, and which is elaborated only by his follower Ruyyaka who, however, takes his inspiration on this point from the Vakroktijīvita-kāra.

Vāmana's treatment of the poetic figures is in some respects peculiar to himself in its general outline, as well as in the specific definition of individual figures. Vāmana is the only old writer who deals with the smallest number of poetic figures[35]. He recognises only two kinds of *śabdālaṃkāra*, viz., *yamaka* (rhyming) and *anuprāsa* (alliteration). He rigidly excludes *prahelikās* and *bandhas*. With regard to

34 This is criticised by Mammaṭa viii, p. 470; for he maintains that Guṇas like *ojas* and Alaṃkāras like *anuprāsa* and *upamā* reside in the relation of inherence (*samavāya-sthiti*).

35 They are in their order of the treatment: *yamaka, anuprāsa, upamā, prativastūpamā, samāsokti, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, apahnuti, rūpaka, śleṣa, vakrokti, utprekṣā, atiśayokti, saṃdeha, virodha, vibhāvanā, ananvaya, upameyopamā, parivṛtti, krama, dīpaka, nidarśana, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, viśeṣokti, vyāja-stuti, vyājokti, tulya-yogitā, ākṣepa, sahokti, samāhita*, and *saṃsṛṣṭi* (including *upamā-rūpaka* and *utprekṣāvayava*):—30 figures excluding Saṃsṛṣṭi.

the *arthālaṃkāras*, he lays down in general terms that the *upamā* or comparison lies at the root of all poetic figures, which are defined in relation to it and to which is given the collective name of *upamā-prapañca*[36]. The importance of *upamā*, involved in other figures, is recognised from Bhāmaha's time ; and consequently this figure, which is the source of all the figures grouped together by later writers as *sādṛśya-mūla* or *aupamya-garbha* Alaṃkāras, is always given a place of honour at the beginning of most treatises on Sanskrit Poetics[37]; but Vāmana goes to the extreme of defining *all* figures with reference to the idea of comparison, or in terms of the relation of the *upamāna* and the *upameya*. On account of this fundamental postulate, his definitions of some of the figures differ widely from those given by other writers ; and he has also to exclude such figures as *paryāyokta*, *preyas*, *rasavat*, *ūrjasvin*, *udātta*, *bhāvika* and *sūkṣma* which he does not define. He gives a peculiar definition of the figure *vakrokti* as a mode of metaphorical expression. His *viśeṣokti* would correspond to the *rūpaka* of Jagannātha, and his *ākṣepa* to the *pratīpa* or *samāsokti* of some later writers. Vāmana defines *apahnuti* as the concealment of one thing by a similar thing with a view to impose the character of the latter on the former ; in other words, the *upameya* is denied its nature and the *upamāna* is established in its place. Daṇḍin states that denial of something and the representing of some other thing in its place constitute the figure which need not be based on *aupamya* ; and following him, some later writers (e. g. Viśvanātha) speak of a second variety of

36 The commentator explains: *prativastu-pramukhānām alaṃkārāṇaṃ upamā-garbhatvād upamā-prapañca iti vyapadeśaḥ kṛtaḥ* (on iv. 3. 1).

37 *upamaivāneka-prakāra-vaicitryeṇālaṃkāra-bījabhūteti prathamaṃ nirdiṣṭā*, Ruyyaka p. 26 ; *sādṛśya-vicchitti-viśeṣaī rūpaka-dīpakādyanekālaṃkāra-bījatayopamāyāḥ prathamaṃ nirūpaṇam*, Mallinātha p. 195. Although Upamā need not be involved in *all* poetic figures, Vāmana appears to accept only those figures which are based on poetic comparison, as it imparts a special charm to them.

apahnuti in which there is no *gamyamāna aupamya* or implied comparison[38].

(3)

This brief summary of the views of the leading authors of this school will shew that the Rīti-teachings mark a great advance on the Alaṃkāra-doctrine in many respects. There are many points which are common to both these systems ; but, by clearly defining and working out the doctrine of Rīti as that distinct characteristic of poetry which sharply separates it from dry philosophical or technical writings, the Rīti school seems to have first suggested and started the enquiry (only hinted at by Bhāmaha's theory of *vakrokti*) as to what constitues the essential charm of poetry, and anticipated the theory of *vicchitti* (or *ukti-vaicitrya*) elaborated later by Kuntaka and other adherents of the Alaṃkāra-doctrine. The Dhvanikāra pays an indirect compliment (iii. 52) to the Rīti school for having first perceived, however dimly, the true nature of poetry, although he does not agree with its peculiar theory of Rīti. The Rīti school also goes a step further than the Alaṃkāra school in including Rasa among the necessary characteristics (in Kānti as an Artha-guṇa). It is possible that Vāmana's partiality for the drama, which he considers to be the best form of composition and from which he supposes other forms of poetry to proceed (i. 3. 30-32), led him to realise the importance of Rasa, already worked out as fundamental in the drama by the dramaturgic Rasa school, and to incorporate it in one of the essential properties of poetry (iii. 2. 15 and Vṛtti). But, at the same time, it was perhaps his idea to make his definition of poetry comprehensive enough to cover a larger field and include those instances, e. g., which develop no Rasa. The *kāvya-śobha*, a term which he probably borrows from Daṇḍin (ii. 1), or *saundarya* which conveys the same general idea as

38 Cf *Uddyota*, ed. Candorkar, p. 39.

the word 'beauty', is regarded as the ultimate test of all poetry ; and this beauty, in his opinion, agreeing with the common-sense view of the matter, is realised by carefully worked-out diction, which avoids the damaging flaws by adopting primarily the so-called literary excellences, as well as the poetic figures for the secondary purpose of heightening the effect thus produced.

But the Rīti-system, in spite of Vāmana's well-reasoned formulation and the advocacy of his followers, never appears to have wielded very great influence, and its existence was comparatively short-lived[39]. There is no doubt that like the Rasa and the Alaṃkāra-systems, it left its impress on later theories, but it never found a serious champion after Vāmana among latter-day writers, and its theories never found unqualified acceptance. Its general doctrine of Rīti began to be discredited and severely criticised from Ānandavardhana's time as too crude an explanation of the nature of poetry ; and Mammaṭa, the foremost authority of the latest school, ingeniously combats and sets aside the leading views of Vāmana.

It may, however, be noted that some of the broad principles enunciated by the Rīti school have been tacitly recognised by later theorists. The importance of Rīti or diction, as such, became established as a stock-idea in Poetics: but it was accepted with grave modifications. It was accepted by the Dhvani school in so far as it contributed to the development of the *rasa-dhvani*, and its chief characteristic was supposed to consist in an arrangement or disposition of words or letters for that purpose[40]. This modification naturally diminished the value of all discussion and elaborate

39 A commentator on Vāmana, named Sahadeva, tells us that Vāmana's work went out of vogue, and its tradition was restored by Bhaṭṭa Mukula (!) who obtained a copy of the work. See notes to the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, ed. Gaekwad Oriental Series, p. 5.

40 *varṇa-saṃghaṭanā-dharmatva*, Ānandavardhana p. 5; see also ii. 8-11.

classification of the Rītis into different types, and the function of the three Rītis of Vāmana was made practically equivalent to the three Guṇas admitted by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* ; but they do not yet appear to have lost all interest with later theorists. Even those writers, who do not subscribe to the doctrine either of the Rīti school or of the Dhvani school, pay considerable attention to this question. Thus, Rudraṭa adds *lāṭi* to the enumeration of the three Rītis of Vāmana, although by Rīti Rudraṭa means a definite usage of compound words. The *Agni-purāṇa* accepts this fourfold classification, but the distinction is supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of the sentences but also in the qualities of 'softness' or 'smoothness', as well as in the prominence of metaphorical expression (*upacāra*). Bhoja, who carries the elaboration still further, adds two more types of Rīti to the *Agni-purāṇa's* four, viz. *māgadhī* and *āvantikā*, the former being an intermediate diction between Vaidarbhī and Pāñcālī, and the latter forming only a *khaṇḍa-rīti*, i. e. a defective or incomplete type. Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* gives us the same three Rītis as Vāmana does, but in his *Karpūra-mañjarī* he appears to speak of three Rītis, respectively named *vacchomī* (from Vatsagulma[41]), *māahī* (*māgadhī*) and *paṃcāliā* (*pāñcālī*). The older Vāgbhaṭa mentions only two Rītis, viz., *pāñcālī* and *lāṭīyā*, the one having some compound words and the other having none ; but the younger Vāgbhaṭa accepts the three Rītis of Vāmana and classifies them on the basis of the three excellences, *mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, which were the only three Guṇas recognised since Mammaṭa's time. The Dhvanikāra does not discuss this question, but Ānandavardhana appears to assign equal functional value to the three *vṛttis* of Udbhaṭa and the three *rītis* of Vāmana, a view which Mammaṭa enunciates thus: *etās tisro vṛttayo vāmanādīnāṃ mate vaidarbhī-gauḍī-pāñcālyākhyā rītayo matāḥ.*[42]

41 In Vidarbha; so this is really Vaidarbhī.

42 But a distinction has always been theoretically maintained

Abhinavagupta, however, thinks (p. 6) that the three Rītis of Vāmana, which, in his opinion, characterise an elevated, soft and middling theme respectively through a peculiar combination of the Guṇas, have, together with Udbhaṭa's Vṛttis, no separate existence from Guṇas and Alaṃkāras. Attention, therefore, was naturally directed to the Guṇas and Alaṃkāras more than to the Rīti itself, of which they formed, in Vāmana's opinion, the constituent elements ; and the Rīti, if recognised at all, was recognised as consisting in a particular disposition of words, letters or syllables which favours the development of Rasa, and stands in the same relation to it as (in the usual figurative conceit) the conformation of the 'body' to the 'soul' (*pada-saṃghaṭanā*

between the *vṛtti* and the *rīti*. The Vṛttis, originally styles of dramatic composition (Bharata iii. 25), have been included by Udbhaṭa (i. 4 f) under *anuprāsa* or alliteration, as they are formed by a special arrangement of letters for conveying different ideas, suitable (Abhinavagupta adds, °*Locana* pp. 5-6) to different Rasas. Ruyyaka, therefore, says: *vṛttis tu rasa-viṣayo vyāpāraḥ, tadvatī punar varṇa-racaneha vṛttiḥ*, pp. 20-21. The Rīti, on the other hand, is mostly a matter of objective adjustment of the different 'excellences' of a composition, although admitting *artha* as an element of consideration ; while the Vṛtti concerns itself with the psychological effect produced by the arrangement, as well as by the sense of which that arrangement is a vehicle. One and the same Rīti may conceivably produce different Vṛttis, and the same Vṛtti may be produced in different Rītis, although a fondness for symmetry led the theorists to assign a distinct Vṛtti to each Rīti. Ānandavardhana expressly distinguishes between the dramatic Vṛtti and the poetical Vṛtti by saying that the former is dependent upon the sense, the latter upon the expression : *vācyāśrayo yo vyavahāras tā etāḥ kauśikādyā vṛttayaḥ, vācakāśrayaś copanāgarikādyāḥ*. They enhance the beauty of drama and poetry respectively by being used according to the drift of the Rasa in the composition: *vṛttayo hi rasādi-tātparyeṇa saṃniviṣṭaḥ kām api nāṭyasya kāvyasya ca chāyām āvahanti* p. 182. Rājaśekhara (*Kav. mīm*. p. 9) sums up the differences wittily and concisely, if not accurately: *tatra veśa-vinyāsa-kramaḥ pravṛttiḥ, vilāsa-vinyāsa-kramo vṛttiḥ, vacana-vinyāsa-kramo rītiḥ*. On the concept of Vṛtti generally see V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts* p. 182-93 ; *Śṛṅgāra-pr*. pp. 196-215.

rītir aṅga-saṃsthā-viśeṣavat/upakartrī rasādīnām, Viśvanātha ix. 1). It follows from this that the respective functions assigned to Guṇa and Alaṃkāra are not in relation to the Rīti but to Rasa, which is one of the fundamental elements of poetry with the later schools. We have already noted that, after Ānandavardhana, the Guṇas are taken as inseparable attributes and causes of excellence (*aṅgino rasasya utkarṣa-hetavaḥ acala-sthitayo guṇāḥ*, Mammaṭa viii. 1) of the Rasa or the principal poetic mood in the composition (and not, as Vāmana thinks, of the Rīti). The poetic figures, on the other hand, are only attributes of *śabda* and *artha*[43], which constitute the 'body' of poetry, and therefore heighten the poetic mood or Rasa in an indirect way (*ibid*, viii. 2). Vāmana's ideas about 'poetic charm' are also taken as axiomatic, but they appear in later theories in a somewhat different form as the *vicchitti*, or *vaicitrya*, or *kavi-prauḍhokti* underlying all figurative expression.

In spite of these and other important contributions to the general theory of Poetics, it is obvious that the fundamental doctrine of the Rīti school could not have been accepted in its entirety. Nor could it have competed against that of the Dhvanikāra, because Vāmana comprehended poetry only from the formal point of view, whereas the former showed a deeper insight into its inner nature. The more or less objective definition of the Rīti, given by this school, was hardly enough to satisfy the search for ultimate principles. Viśvanātha, following the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in this respect, states this objection when he says that the Rīti is a particular kind of formal arrangement, a peculiar disposition or posture of parts ; what is called the 'soul' or

43 Mammaṭa, we shall see, takes the Guṇa as directly related to the Rasa as the *aṅgin*, and if we sometimes speak of them as belonging to *śabda* and *artha*, we do so only figuratively (*upacāreṇa*) ; but Jagannātha (pp. 33-35), going back to Vāmana's old position, combats this view and thinks that this usage is not figurative.

essence of poetry is something quite different[44]. Again, the analysis of the several types of diction shows considerable ingenuity indeed, but it was found almost impossible, as Daṇḍin himself admitted very early (i. 101-2), to label and classify all the modes of poetic expression with definite and unalterable characteristics. As the Rīti school, therefore, tended to make invidious and essentially unprofitable (except as empirical facts) distinctions between the Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī and other kinds of diction with regard to whose exact significance there was bound to be inevitable difference of opinion, it naturally provoked criticism and opposition. In the same way, the endeavour to exhaust and classify all the literary excellences and flaws within clear-cut bounds on the basis of more or less formal analysis, was sure to prove unconvincing ; and a protest against minute differentiation or endless multiplication of the Guṇas was rightly and definitely propounded by Mammaṭa who (following Ānandavardhana, pp. 79 f) reduced the number to three only, viz. *mādhurya, ojas* and *prasāda,* in relation to the ultimate factor of the poetic sentiment. The attempt, therefore, to stereotype the entire poetical output into so many ready-made dictions and fixed excellences, was bound ultimately to be discarded in favour of other and more penetrating principles. We shall see in the next few chapters that such a principle in poetry came to be recognised in the suggested element of Rasa, which was being already elaborated in the service of the drama and which was utilised by the Dhvani-theorists as one of the most important aesthetic foundations of poetry.

44 *yat tu vāmanenoktam—rītir ātmā kāvyasya iti, tan na, rīteḥ saṃghaṭanā-viśeṣatvāt, saṃghaṭanāyāś cāvayava-saṃsthāna-rūpatvāt, ātmanaś ca tad-bhinnatvāt,* p. 18 ed. Durgaprasada, 1915. (It will be noticed that Viśvanātha here speaks of Rīti as a kind of *saṃghaṭanā*).

CHAPTER IV

LOLLAṬA AND OTHERS

(*The Rasa System*)

(1)

While the orthodox schools of Poetics were elaborating systems of Alaṃkāra and Rīti, there flourished several writers who discussed the question of the dramatic Rasa after Bharata, and formulated explanations of the latter's much discussed *sūtra* on the subject[1]. Their exposition, however, concerned the dramatic art, and their theories did not as yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics, which was entirely dominated by the Alaṃkāra- and Rīti-systems. The aesthetic importance of the Rasa, therefore, was never realised, as we shall see, until it was taken up and worked into Poetics by the Dhvanikāra and his followers. The dramaturgic Rasa school, however, had in the meantime elaborated several theories of Rasa and brought it into prominence as an element of the drama ; and in this way it succeeded, to a certain extent, in reacting upon and influencing the orthodox theories of Poetics, which appear to have possessed, even at an early period a limited acquaintance with Rasa, and which actually accord it a place, however small, in their general systems of Alaṃkāra or Rīti.

This will be obvious from a reference to the views of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin on this subject. To Bhāmaha, the most important element in poetry is *alaṃkāra* or *vakrokti*. He does not seem to possess any clear notion of the function of Rasa in poetry, the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure *rasavat* which, in his opinion, must manifest the Rasas clearly (*rasavad darśita-spaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādi-*

1 See above p. 20. The Sūtra runs thus: *vibhāvānubhāva-vyavhicāri-saṃyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ.*

rasam, iii. 6). The Rasa is thus included in the scope of a particular figure only and given a very subordinate place in his system[2]. Bhāmaha seems to have been aware of the existence of the *śṛṅgāra* and other dramatic Rasas ; but the speculations regarding the origin and function of Rasa do not appear to have started in his time ; and, in common with Daṇḍin, he never thought it necessary to use the technical terms *vibhāva, anubhāva* etc., so familiar to later writers on this subject. In Bhāmaha's opinion, the Rasa need not be invariably present in poetry, but it may sometimes be delineated in some poetic figure. In i. 21, no doubt, Bhāmaha lays down that a Mahākāvya must separately depict all the Rasas ; and in v. 3 he speaks of the *kāvya-rasa* as mitigating the rigour of the Śāstras, a sentiment which is endorsed by Rudraṭa (xii. 1-2) and which probably inspired the dictum of Abhinavagupta that the Śāstra is *prabhu-sammita,* while the Kāvya is *jāyā-sammita.* The term *kāvya-rasa* is used here probably to indicate 'the flavour of poetry' in an untechnical sense ; but even if we read, with Abhinavagupta (°*Locana* p. 182), a technical meaning into it, it only shews that the earlier authors were content with assigning a pleasing but extraneous function to Rasa in poetry,[3] although all the Rasas may be developed in the drama (i. 21).

2 Commenting of Bhāmaha's central verse on *vakrokti* (ii. 85), *saiṣā sarvaiva vakroktir anayārtho vibhāvyate*, Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of the importance of Rasa and interprets *vibhāvyate* technically as *pramadodyānair vibhāvatāṃ nīyate, viśeṣeṇa ca bhāvyate, rasamayīkriyata iti.* He apparently makes Bhāmaha mean that by *vakrokti*, the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of Rasa, so that by using the word *vibhāvyate* with the technical meaning given to it Bhāmaha would imply that the Rasa as well as Alaṃkāra originates in *vakrokti.*

3 Such a distinction appears to be implied also in Daṇḍin ii. 292 ; and one can differentiate two meanings of *rasa* (see below): (1) *kāvya-rasa,* the flavour of poetry or the aesthetic delight produced by it, and (2) *rasa* in the technical sense of *nāṭya-rasa.* It is worthy of note that in the latter sense it is very rarely used in earlier classical poetry (except

The same remarks with regard to the recognition of Rasa apply more or less to Daṇḍin; but Daṇḍin seems to have been more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin allows the Rasas to be included in figures like *rasavat*, which appear to have been the only means by which they could permit the Rasa to play any rôle in their systems. It may be contended[4] that Daṇḍin gives prominence to Rasa by including it in one of the essential excellences (Guṇas) of the diction (Rīti), viz., in *mādhurya*, which is defined as the establishment of Rasa in the word and in the object (*vāci vastuny api rasa-sthitiḥ*, i. 51); but from ii. 292 it appears that Daṇḍin means by the term Rasa in the *mādhurya-guṇa* to connote absence of vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*)[5], and does not contemplate the inclusion of Rasa in the technical sense[6]. The *mādhurya-guṇa*, according to Daṇḍin (i.51-7), may appear in two different aspects, in so far as it creates *vāg-rasa* and *vastu-rasa*, the former consisting of repetition of similar sounds (*śrutyanuprāsa*)[7] and the latter connoting absence of

perhaps in Māgha). This *kāvya-rasa* in its essence is not very different from Bhāmaha's *vakrokti*; for it is possibly a kind of heightened expression inconsistent with commonplace utterance. The word *rasa* must be taken in this untechnical sense when one meets with it in early classics and in such expressions as *rasavat* or *rasāvaha* in Daṇḍin.

4 Jacobi in *ZDMG* lvi, 1902, p. 401 fn.

5 Strictly speaking, *grāmya* is not 'vulgar' in its usual restricted sense, although Daṇḍin seems to bring under its connotation the *aślīla* or the indecent. It means 'the low', 'the rustic', or 'the common', as opposed to the noble or the refined, and probably corresponds to the French word *vulgaire*.

6 This is made clear by the *Hṛdayaṅgama* commentary on this point: *mādhurya-guṇe pradarśitaḥ śabdārthayor a-grāmyatayā jāto raso vākyasya bhavati, alaṃkāratayā nirdiṣṭaṃ rasavattvam aṣṭa-rasāyattam* (p. 167), the last part of the passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases where the eight (dramatic) *rasas* are admitted by Daṇḍin occur in connexion with his inclusion of the *rasas* in figures like *rasavat*. In i. 64 Daṇḍin speaks of *agrāmya artha* as *rasāvaha*.

7 See above p. 80, fn 11. Daṇḍin speaks of *anuprāsa* as *rasāvaha* in this sense in the same context (i. 52).

vulgarity (*agrāmyatva*). Thus, Hemacandra explains (p. 198) the Rasa in Daṇḍin's *mādhurya*, according as it resides in the *vāk* or *vastu* in this way: *śruti-varṇānuprāsābhyāṃ vāg-rasaḥ........ agrāmyābhidheyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ*[8]. Thus, the Rasa in Daṇḍin's *mādhurya* has a distinct connotation which separates it from the technical dramatic Rasa of the Rasa school[9].

At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Daṇḍin was entirely ignorant of the concept of Rasa as elaborated by Bharata and his followers. He declares (i. 18) that a Mahā-kāvya should invariably depict *rasa* and *bhāva*; so does Bhāmaha (i. 21). His treatment of the figures *rasavat*, *preyas* and *ūrjasvin* (ii. 280-87) gives a much clearer indication of his undoubted acquaintance with the eight recognised Rasas, all of which he enumerates by their respective names, and four of which (viz. *śṛṅgāra*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *karuṇa*) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupt's statement[10],

8 With this explanation Māṇikyacandra agrees: *śruti-varṇānuprāsābhyāṃ vāg-rasaḥ, agrāmyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ, itthaṃ raso dvedhā* (p. 189, ed. Ānandāśrama).

9 A similar untechnical use of the term *rasa* (which, however, Daṇḍin does not explain, as he does in this case) is to be found in iii. 149 (or iv. 26, Madras ed.) where the phrase *girāṃ rasaḥ* (=*vāgrasaḥ*) is interpreted by Taruṇavācaspati merely as *sādhutvam*. The modern commentators, misled, no doubt, by their own idea of the importance of Rasa, read into Daṇḍin their own ideas on the subject. Daṇḍin nowhere speaks of the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa-dhvani*) as the 'soul' of poetry, but Premacandra, commenting on i. 10, reads this into Daṇḍin. The *artha-rasa* in i. 62 seems also to have a distinct reference to *agrāmyatā*.

10 On Bharata vi, partially reproduced by Hemacandra p. 57f. The text of Abhinava's valuable commentary on Bharata's *rasa-sūtra*, so far as it is relevant to the theories on Rasa discussed below, has been published as an appendix to S. K. De, *Theory of Rasa* in *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume* (Orientalia, vol. iii 1922). It is cited below as "Abh. on Bh.," with references to the pages of the article, which has been largely utilised in this chapter. It is reprinted in S. K. De, *Some Problems*, pp. 219-35.

Daṇḍin's conception of Rasa is similar to that of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (which we shall deal with presently), and he believes therefore in the development of Rasa as an effect from the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. Daṇḍin's somewhat meagre treatment hardly justifies us in making a definite assumption on this point, but we may assume that Daṇḍin apparently speaks of Rasas like *śṛṅgāra* or *raudra* being developed as effects from such permanent moods as *rati* or *krodha*. For, speaking of the figure *rasavat* which should possess the characteristic of manifesting the Rasas, he gives an example of the manifestation of *śṛṅgāra* in such a figure with the remark: *ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā* / *rūpa-bāhulya-yogena* (ii. 281). Similarly, with reference to the development of *raudra* from *krodha*, he says: *ity āruhya parāṃ koṭiṃ krodho raudrātmatāṃ gataḥ* (ii. 283). But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself of which it serves as a means of embellishment (*alaṃkāratayā smṛtam*) ; in other words, the Rasa is developed not for its own sake but as increasing the beauty of expression. It would seem, therefore, that Daṇḍin was, to some extent, cognisant of *rasa* and *bhāva*, but he could not give it a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense ; and this objective view of the function of Rasa, if we may presume it in these early authors, was apparently responsible for this subordinate position given to it by the Alaṃkāra and Rīti-systems.

Although Vāmana improves upon Daṇḍin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further in the treatment of Rasa. His idea of making all poetic figures an aspect of metaphorical expression precludes him from defining the figure *rasavat*, but he attempts to include Rasa in one of the essential (*nitya*) characteristics of poetry, viz., in the *artha-guṇa kānti*, which he defines as an 'excellence of sense' in which the Rasas should be conspicuously present (*dīpta-rasatvaṃ kāntiḥ*, iii, 2. 15). The suggestion for this inclusion of the Rasas

in one of the excellences was probably found in Bharata's definition of the *kānti-guṇa*, or more directly in Bharata's peculiar definition of the *udāra-guṇa*; but it is clear that this certainly marks an advance upon the treatment of Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha, who include the Rasa in some of the non-essential figures.

Udbhaṭa adheres in the main to the views of Bhāmaha and deals with Rasa as an element of the some of the figures like *rasavat*. One verse, however, which occurs in the text of Udbhaṭa published by Jacob in *JRAS*, 1897, p. 847:

rasādyadhiṣṭhitaṃ kāvyaṃ jīvad-rūpatayā yataḥ|
kathyate tad rasādīnāṃ kāvyātmatvaṃ vyavasthitam||

apparently designates Rasa as the essence or 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up an aesthetic system on its basis. But the verse is quite out of place in the context in which it occurs[11], and in the text published by the Nirnay Sagar Press, it is wanting, although given as a quotation (with a *tad āhuḥ*) in the accompanying commentary of Pratīhārendurāja (p. 77). Misled by Jacob's text, Jacobi supposes[12] that Udbhaṭa was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the 'soul' of poetry and to regard Rasa as such. It is clear, however, that the verse in question is not Udbhaṭa's, and cannot be reconciled either with its immediate context or with Udbhaṭa's general standpoint, as well as with his definition of *rasavat*. It cannot be denied at the same time that Udbhaṭa betrays an acquaintance with some theory of

11 This verse (vi. 17) occurs after the figure *kāvya-liṅga* (vi. 16), after the definition of which one should expect its illustration, which is given in the verse vi. 18 next after the verse in question. If Jacob's text is accepted, then the verse *rasādyadhiṣṭhitam* (vi. 17) would be abruptly thrust in between the definition of *kāvya-liṅga* and its illustration. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Pratīhārendurāja's commentary on *kāvya-liṅga* and is erroneously incorporated in Udbhaṭa's text by the editor.

12 *ZDMG*, 1902, p. 396.

Rasa and its technicalities using, as he does, terms like *vibhāva sthāyin*, *sañcārin* (iv. 4) and *anubhāva* (iv. 2), and enumerating, after Bharata, the eight orthodox *nāṭya-rasas* with the addition of a ninth Rasa (viz. *śānta*) in the category. But Udbhaṭa takes all this into account as an embellishment of an expressed figure like *rasavat*[13]; the Rasa is not considered on its own account, but because it helps to emphasise or constitute the charm of a particular figure. Hence Pratīhārendurāja remarks that the question as to the nature of Rasa and Bhāva, and as to how far they may stand as the very 'soul' of poetry is not discussed by Udbhaṭa at all, partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is irrelevant[14].

Rudraṭa, on the other hand, seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes Rasa in his treatment of Poetics, and devotes four chapters to its discussion. At the beginning of his work, he praises the poets who have won eternal fame by composing Kāvyas enlivened by Rasa. In ch. xii he speaks of ten Rasas (adding *preyas* and *śānta* to the orthodox eight of Bharata)[15], describing *śṛṅgāra* (love) and the charac-

13 Udbhaṭa's definitions of *rasavat* etc. differ from those of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; and he admits a new figure, namely, *samāhita*. In his view, *preyas* consists of development of emotions like love to the extent of a Bhāva and not Rasa; *rasavat* occurs when Rasas are fully developed through *sva-śabda*, *sthāyin*, *sañcārin*, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*; *ūrjasvi* is development of improper or incongruous (*an-aucitya-pravṛtta*) Rasa or Bhāva, which would correspond to Rasābhāsa of later writers; *samāhita*=calming down of Rasa, Bhāva or their Ābhāsa.

14 Udbhaṭa might have been one of the commentators on Bharata, and was probably conversant with Bharata's text, as his citation of a half-line (iv. 5, though it is doubtful if this is at all a *kārikā*-verse of Udbhaṭa's) from Bharata vi. 15 and use of technical terms like *vibhāva* etc. would indicate. But it does not prove that Udbhaṭa belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand, Udbhaṭa in his theoretical standpoint was undoubtedly a follower of Bhāmaha.

15 If Udbhaṭa iv. 5 is a *kārikā*-verse (and not wrongly incorporated into the text from Pratīhārendurāja's commentary), then Udbhaṭa was

teristics of the hero and heroine in that connexion. The next two chapters take up the two kinds of *śṛṅgāra* (*saṃbhoga* and *vipralambha*—love in union and in separation) and questions cognate to each. This treatment is rounded off by a short chapter describing the nature and character of the diction (*rīti*) suitable to each[16]. It is not clear, however, as to what significance Rudraṭa attaches to Rasa as an element of poetry, for he is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspect of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided, only four chapters deal with Rasa not theoretically but descriptively, while the rest of his work is taken up with the details of the poetic figures on which obviously he puts greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem *sarasa* from the standpoint of the reader, he says (xii. 1) that to those, who enjoy Rasa but fight shy of Śāstra, instruction in the *caturvarga* is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing; and this is the chief motive, in his opinion, for inspiring the sense of poetry with Rasa. Rudraṭa starts with *śabda* and *artha* as the two constituents of poetry, and elaborates his views about poetic figures as embellishment of these elements; but he does not discuss how the Rasa comes into his system, a fact which may lead one to suspect that these chapters on Rasa were probably later engraftment extraneous

the first writer to admit *śānta* into Bharata's category of eight Rasas. The *preyas* Rasa of Rudraṭa is probably suggested by the poetic figure *preyas* admitted by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Udbhaṭa. Rudraṭa appears to allude (as Nami-sādhu rightly comments) to Bharata by the term *ācārya* in xii. 4.

16 Rudraṭa defines Rīti, as we have already seen, with reference to the employment of compound words. He recommends the Vaidarbhī and Pāñcālī Rītis in the cases of the four Rasas, *preyas*, *karuṇa*, *bhayānaka* and *adbhuta*, and the Lāṭīyā and Gauḍīyā in the case of *raudra*, there being apparently no fixed rule with regard to the remaining Rasas. He uses the term *aucitya* in this context, which anticipates the theory of Aucitya first elaborated by Ānandavardhana in connexion with the delineation of Rasa.

to, if not inconsistent with, his general standpoint. Rudraṭa, in his theoretical tendencies, has no affinity with the Rasa school, but belongs to the Alaṃkāra school, a fact which would distinguish him from Rudrabhaṭṭa, the keynote of whose system is to be found in the idea of Rasa. We have to this effect the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha. Ruyyaka says[17] that Rudraṭa laid special stress on *alaṃkāra*, in which were comprised the three kinds of suggestion (*dhvani*), including the suggestion of Rasa, and that in figures like *rasavat*, the *rasa* and *bhāva* implied are taken as elements which heighten the charm of the expressed idea[18].

The older writers on Poetics, therefore, before the advent of the Dhvani-theorists, content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the 'body' of poetry, and hardly trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the 'soul' of poetry ; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this 'soul' with the psychological factor known as Rasa. Vāmana, no doubt, starts the question and offers to solve it by declaring that the diction or Rīti is this 'soul' ; but we have seen that in Vāmana's view, the Rīti is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by a definite adjustment of certain fixed literary excellences. The older writers, therefore, put the greatest emphasis on the *alaṃkāra* (or poetic figure), or on the *rīti* (or diction in the objective sense), the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry ;

17 ed. Kāvyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandha agrees with this view.

18 Nami-sādhu, explaining Rudraṭa xii. 2, states that in the opinion of his author, *śabda* and *artha* constitute the 'body' of poetry, the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments, while Rasa resembles natural qualities like prowess and beauty (*rasās tu saundaryādaya iva sahajā guṇāḥ*). But there is nothing in Rudraṭa which will support this description of his standpoint, especially as Rudraṭa can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures, which are of great importance in his view of poetry, as mere artificial embellishments of poetry. See above pp. 59-60, 61.

and, cognisant as they were of that aesthetic delectableness which must be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of *rasa*, they could not harmonise it well with their theory of externals and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in poetic figures or by allowing it to form an element of one of the excellences of diction. This was the only way in which they could recognise Rasa. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikāra (iii. 52) condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry, and expounds his own system in which the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa-dhvani*) plays such an important part.

(2)

The reason why Rasa was, even thus perfunctorily, admitted into the older systems appears to have been the fact that Bharata's treatment of Rasa in the drama had already established itself, having been further elaborated by a number of commentators and writers on the subject, and it naturally influenced, to a limited extent, the enquiry of early thinkers. We have already noted that Bharata's famous *sūtra* on Rasa[19] by its ambiguity taxed the ingenuity of his followers and led to a great deal of controversy regarding its true interpretation ; and as each writer tried to explain it in his own way, it gave rise to a number of theories on Rasa. There are four such theories associated with the names of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta ; but Jagannātha (*Rasa-gaṅgādhara* p. 28) speaks of eight different interpretations.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa appears to have been one of the earliest formulators of such an explanation. His work is unfortunately lost, and very little can be gathered from the brief review

19 Viz. *vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ* (see above p. 20), the different theories starting with the different explanations given of the terms *saṃyoga* and *niṣpatti*. Besides the vagueness of these two terms, it is noteworthy that term *sthāyin* or *sthāyi-bhāva* does not occur in this dictum.

of his opinion in Abhinavagupta's commentary on Bharata[20], which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers who deal with Lollaṭa's views[21]. But it is clear even from this summary exposition by an adverse critic that Lollaṭa, in explaining Bharata's *sūtra*, took the *vibhāva* as the direct cause (*kāraṇa*) of Rasa, which therefore is an effect (*anukārya* or *utpādya*), and the term *niṣpatti* of Bharata should be explained as *utpatti* or *puṣṭi*. The Rasa, found in characters like Rāma, is attributed to the actor, who imitates the characters in form, dress and action, and thereby charms the spectator. Mammaṭa and his followers make this interpretation of Lollaṭa's view more clear by saying that the permanent mood or *sthāyin* is directly connected (*mukhyatayā vṛttyā=sākṣāt saṃbandhena*) with the hero like Rāma, but it is recognised as existing in the actor through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm to the spectator. The Rasa, therefore, resides in the hero; but the objection is that it is not clear how a mental state which belongs to the hero can be transferred to the actor, and how the spectator can be charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. The spectator's mere apprehension of the feeling imitated by the actor cannot produce even a semblance of the original feeling and consequent delight in the mind of the spectator; otherwise such a delight would be brought about even on witnessing a love-affair in the ordinary world, as distinguished from the world of poetry[22]. It is

20 Abhinava's review of the opinions of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, which is followed by Mammaṭa and all later writers, is extensively reproduced by Hemacandra (pp. 57-66) and Māṇikyacandra (pp. 40f, ed. Ānandāśrama). This portion of Abhinava's commentary will be found in the article already mentioned above on the *Theory of Rasa* (reprinted in S. K. De, *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics*, Calcutta 1959). Detailed references, therefore, are not as a rule given here.

21 See for instance, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra p. 57, Mallinātha on Vidyādhara p. 85, Govinda on Mammaṭa p. 63 etc.

22 Govinda criticises Lollaṭa's view thus: *tad apeśalam, sāmājikeṣu*

also argued that this cause-and-effect theory of Lollaṭa cannot satisfactorily explain the relation of the *vibhāvas* etc. to the Rasa. An effect may exist even when its efficient cause is destroyed ; but as the life of the Rasa is circumscribed by the exhibition of the *vibhāvas*, it disappears when the latter disappear, a fact which goes to prove that the Rasa must not be taken as an ordinary *laukika* effect[23]. Again, the cause and the effect cannot be contemporaneous ; if the Rasa is supposed to be an effect, its relish cannot be, as it actually is, contemporaneous with the appearance of the *vibhāvas*. Hence Viśvanātha remarks (p. 86) that if the Rasa is an effect, having for its cause the perception of the *vibhāvas*, then at the time of the relish of Rasa the *vibhāvas* would not be perceived ; for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandalwood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously, however rapidly the one may succeed the other.

Śaṅkuka, the next important writer on this subject mentioned by Abhinavagupta and others[24], therefore rejects this interpretation of the *utpatti-vādins*, who are said to follow, in their peculiar theory, the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophers. Lollaṭa's view does not deal with Rasa as a matter of the spectator's feeling. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, thinks that the Rasa is not *produced* as an effect, but *inferred* by the spectator, and the inferred feeling is relished by him as Rasa. The permanent mood of the hero is inferred to exist in the actor (though not actually existing in him) by means of the *vibhāvas* etc., cleverly exhibited by him in acting, so as to produce an illusion of identity with the

tadabhāve tatra camatkārānubhava-virodhāt, na ca tajjñānam eva camatkāra-hetuḥ, laukika-śṛṅgārādi-darśanenāpi camatkāra-prasaṅgāt (ed. Kāvyamālā 1912, p. 63).

23 Govinda p. 69, Mallinātha pp. 87, 93-4.

24 The reference to Śaṅkuka's views is to be found in Mammaṭa and others, as cited above in fn 21.

feelings of the hero[25]; and the mood thus inferred, being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty, adds to itself a peculiar charm[26], and thus develops into a relishable condition of his own mind which is called Rasa. The realisation of Rasa, therefore, is a process of logical inference, and the *niṣpatti* of Bharata's *sūtra* is explained as *anumiti*, the *vibhāvas* standing to Rasa in the relation of *anumāpaka*, or *gamaka* to *anumāpya* or *gamya*. But the mood itself, though inferred in this way from the relation of logical major and middle terms, is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference, being inferred, as it were, by force of its connexion with the *vibhāvas*, which factors, though artificial in themselves, are not then recognised as such. This cognition or knowledge is characterised as being based on what is called *citra-turaga-nyāya* (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true ('he is Rāma'), the false ('he is Rāma' with a following negation 'he is not Rāma'), the doubtful ('he may or may not be Rāma') knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity ('he is like Rāma')[27]. The theory, however, has been discredited by later schools on the ground (as Govinda concisely puts it[28]) that it disregards the well-recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as direct cognition. It has also been pointed

25 *rāmādyabheda-bhāvitena naṭe tat-prakāśitair eva vibhāvādibhir anumitaḥ*, Mallinātha p. 85.

26 *vastu-saundarya-balād rasanīyatvena sthāyinām anyānumeya-vailakṣaṇyāt* Govinda p. 65, practically paraphrasing Mammaṭa.

27 As interpreted by Mammaṭa as well as Abhinava p. 241. Hemacandra expanding the exposition of Abhinavapupta and Mammaṭa puts it in this way: *na cātra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ, nāpyayam eva rāma iti, na cāpyayaṃ na sukhīti, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti, na cāpi tat-sadṛśam iti, kiṃ tu samyaṅ-mithyā-saṃśaya-sādṛśya-pratītibhyo vilakṣaṇā citra-turagādi-nyāyena yaḥ sukhī rāma asāvayam iti pratītir asti* (p. 59).

28 *pratyakṣam eva jñānaṃ sa-camatkāraṃ nānumityādir iti loka-prasiddhim avadhūyānyathā-kalpane mānābhāvaḥ*, p. 65.

out that the Rasa is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of a hero like Rāma, being past, cannot be cognised directly by the organs of sense belonging to the present.[29] The *anumāna*-theory is criticised elaborately in connexion with the theory of 'suggestion', coming topically within the province of the suggestion of Rasa (*rasa-dhvani*). We shall have occasion to deal with this aspect of the theory in its proper place; but the general argument with which it is sought to be discarded is that the *vibhāvas* cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the *sthāyin*, because the former do not stand in the same relation to the latter as the middle term (*sādhana*) does to the major term (*sādhya*), but are simply its suggestors (*vyañjaka*).

The *vibhāvas*, therefore, do not constitute either the efficient cause (*kāraka-hetu*) or the logical cause (*jñāpaka-hetu*) of Rasa, as held respectively by Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, Apart from technicalities, Lollaṭa's view appears to be that the spectator ascribes to the well-trained actor the same mental state as belonged to the hero, and his apprehension of this imparted feeling *produces* a similar feeling in his mind, causing delight. Śaṅkuka thinks that the well-trained actor so cleverly simulates the action of the hero that the spectator apprehends the actor to be identical with the hero, and *infers* from this illusion the actual feeling of the hero in his own mind, being moved by the extraordinary beauty of the represented action. In both these theories, however, the difficulty remains, viz. that if Rasa is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors (*vibhāvas* etc.) are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that the Rasa exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feeling of a particular hero (like Rāma, who is different from or superior

29 Vidyādhara p. 94.

to the spectator himself) can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator? These objections are thus ably set forth by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka[30], as interpreted by Abhinavagupta in his °*Locana* (pp. 67-8): "If the *rasa* is perceived as belonging to another person, then it is a case of *tāṭasthya* i. e. one would not himself be personally affected by it. It is also not perceived as belonging to oneself out of poetry dealing with the deeds of heroes like Rāma. If it is perceived as belonging to oneself, then origin of *rasa* in self is admitted. But this is not reasonable, for there is nothing there which can operate as a *vibhāva* for the audience. If it is objected that the generalised idea of the beloved (*kāntātva*), which lies dormant and awakens in us germs of latent impressions, operates in the capacity of a *vibhāva*, then how can it be applied to the description of a deity and the like ? The recollection of one's own beloved does not intervene in one's consciousness. How can *vibhāvas*, like the construction of a bridge over the sea, which form the attributes of an extraordinary hero like Rāma, become generalised (in the mind of an individual spectator) ? One does not recollect only Rāma's energy, because it has no resemblance (to one's own energy). The *rasa* is not perceived when one learns it from a verbal composition, because a man would learn it in the same way from the direct observation of a pair of lovers. If it is assumed that *rasa* is produced, then a man would feel disinclined to tragedy, inasmuch as he finds only pain following upon the production of the pathetic mood (*karuṇa*) "[31]

30 Another objector to Śaṅkuka's view appears to be Bhaṭṭa Tauta, whose opinions are summarised by Abhinava (who refers to him simply as *asmad-upādhyāya*) in a passage which is substantially reproduced by Hemacandra at p. 59 under Bhaṭṭa Tauta's name. See also Māṇikyacandra p. 43 who draws also upon Abhinava's exposition of Tauta's view.

31 *Raso yadi para-gatatayā pratīyate, tarhi tāṭasthyam eva syāt. Na ca sva-gatatvena rāmādi-caritamayāt kāvyād asau pratīyate. Svātma-*

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, attempts to refute these earlier theories and set up a peculiar doctrine of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) which makes the relish of Rasa possible. He argues (as interpreted by Mammaṭa and others) that (i) Rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes (namely, the *vibhāvas*), being non-realities, cannot bring about a real effect ; (ii) it cannot be inferred, because the real character (e. g. Rāma), not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (*na tattvato rāmasya smṛtiḥ, anupalabdhatvāt*). Nor is it a case of revelation (*abhivyakti*) of something potentially existing (*śakti-rūpa*); for in that case, the potential emotions, once awakened, would occupy their field of action in diverse degrees, thus contradicting the nature of Rasa as one. Moreover, there would be the same difficulty as to whether the Rasa is revealed in oneself or in another person. To solve these and other difficulties, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (as interpreted by Abhinavagupta) maintains that Rasa is enjoyed in connexion with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the enjoyer (*bhojaka*) and the enjoyed (*bhojya*). This school[32] postulates three different functions of a word, namely, *abhidhā* (already admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians), *bhāvakatva* and *bhojakatva*, and thus ascribes to a poem threefold potency of its own, namely, the powers

gatatvena ca pratītau svātmani rasasyotpattir evābhyupagatā syāt, sā cāyuktā, sāmājikaṃ praty avibhāvatvāt. Kāntātvaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ vāsanā-vikāsa-hetur vibhāvanāyāṃ prayojakaṃ cet, devatā-varṇanādau tad api katham? Na ca sva-kāntā-smaraṇaṃ madhye saṃvedyate. Aloka-sāmānyānāṃ ca rāmādīnāṃ ye samudra-setu-bandhādayo vibhāvās te kathaṃ sādhāraṇyaṃ bhajeyuḥ? Na cotsāhādi-mātraṃ smaryate, ananurūpatvāt. Śabdād api tat-pratipattau na rasopajanaḥ, pratyakṣād iva nāyaka-mithuna-pratipattau. Utpatti-pakṣe ca karuṇasyotpādād duḥkhitve karuṇa-prekṣāsu punar apravṛttiḥ syāt, tan na.

32 Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views are set forth and criticised by Abh. on Bh. p. 244, °*Locana* p. 68, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra pp. 61 f., Govinda p. 66.

of denotation, of generalisation and of enjoyment.[33] The *abhidhā* is not merely the actual Denotation of a word, but is given an extended meaning so as to include *lakṣaṇā* or Indication in its scope *(abhidhā lakṣaṇaiva)*,[34] thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. It is meant probably that the Denotation (as postulated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) also gives to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of Rasa. The *bhāvakatva* (or *rasa-bhāvanā*), which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of *bhāva*, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the *vibhāvas* as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. The *vibhāva*, Sītā, for instance, is understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman, and the *sthāyi-bhāva* (here Rāma's love towards her) is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object. In this way the audience can appropriate the *vibhāvas*, as well as the *sthāyi-bhāva*, as universal. After the Rasa is thus generalised, comes its enjoyment. By the third function of *bhojakatva*, the *sthāyin* is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the *vibhāvas*, sensed also in a general form ; and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened, self-sufficient and blissful knowledge, arising (in the language of the Sāṃkhya philosophers, which is borrowed by these theorists) from the prominence

33 T. R. Cintamani would prefer the terms signification, idealisation and illumination.

34 T. R. Chintamani (*JOR* i, 1927, p. 275 fn) would read *abhidhā-vilakṣaṇaiva*. He thinks that having been a Mīmāṃsaka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka would not include Lakṣaṇā in Abhidhā. But K. P. Trivedi (*Ekāvalī* p. 425) reads as we do: *abhidhā lakṣaṇaiva*. V. Raghavan appears to agree (*JOR* vi, 1932, p. 211 fn) that Abhidhā is "here used not in its restricted sense of Śakti but in its larger and more general meaning, viz., the poet's expression as a whole."

of the attribute of goodness (*sattva*) in a man, and different from what is known as wordly happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests. It is differentiated from the two kinds of knowledge, *anubhava* and *smaraṇa* ; and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind, it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation (*brahmāsvāda-sacivaḥ*). According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, Rasa consists in the *sthāyi-bhāva* or the permanent mood, experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of *abhidhā* and *bhāvakatva*, and enjoyed by a blissful process, known as *bhoga*, till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not wordly (*a-laukika*) but disinterested and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

It will be noticed that these different theories about Rasa, though applied to drama and poetry, are yet generally tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Lollaṭa, it is clear, is a Mīmāṃsaka who believes in the far-reaching function of the Denotation of a word and thinks that it is capable of expressing all other implied or suggested sense in the shape of the Rasa. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, is a Naiyāyika or logician who would demonstrate the Rasa by means of syllogistic reasoning. He believes that the implied Rasa can be reached by the logical process of inference from the expressed sense, although he has to admit that the inferred mood is cognised differently from the objects of ordinary inference, being sensed by the spectator through the force of its exquisite charm. In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka we mark a further development. In his theory there is not only a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of Rasa, and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of the spectator's inward experience, but also the fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*bhoga*) is substantially following the teachings of the Sāṃkhya philosophers.

We need not enter here into the details of Sāṃkhya psychology or metaphysics, but we may indicate briefly the application of its main teachings to the conception of poetry and the artistic delight resulting from it[35]. The purpose of evolution in Sāṃkhya is the attainment of *bhoga* (experience of pleasure and pain) and *apavarga* (spiritual emancipation through right knowledge). The enjoyer of Rasa in poetry is like the knower of Brahma, but the aesthetic attitude is different from the philosophic. The aesthetic attitude is indeed one of *saṃvit* (or *cit-svabhāvā*), i.e., pure contemplation dissociated from all personal interests, and results in *viśrānti* or composure ; but in the philosophical attitude there is complete detachment or aloofness from pleasure and pain and egoistic impulses, for the knower becomes impersonal by transcending his *buddhi*. This comes about through the predominance of the *sāttvika guṇa* in both cases ; but in the spiritual attitude the *buddhi*, which contains in it *vāsanās* or acquired impulses, modifying its intrinsic *sāttvika* charactor, is purged of all its egoistic tendencies, and the true knower, realising the intrinsic disparateness of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, transcends the empirical plane. Such complete detachment is not possible in the aesthetic attitude. The world of poetry, being idealised, is different from the natural world and does not evoke egoistic impulses ; for the objects contemplated in poetry have no reference to any one in particular but are entirely impersonal. These impersonalised forms, therefore, afford to the enjoyer of poetry escape from the ills which arise from personal relations, but they are the means only of *temporary* release from the natural world, for he cannot, like the ordinary man, transcend his *buddhi* altogether. The three stages in the appreciation of poetry which lead ultimately to the aesthetic experience of Rasa indicate that the apprehension of the meanings of words

35 M. Hiriyanna, Indian Aesthetics, in *Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference*, Poona, vol. ii, has dealt with the subject at some length.

(*abhidhā*) is not important in itself but only as a means of apprehending the generalised conceptions which are unrelated to any one in particular, the *bhāvakatva* being the process of such generalising, by which the factors of the feelings, as well as the feeling itself, become impersonalised. These idealised creations of poetry lead to enjoyment or *bhoga*, which implies that the condition produced is one of pleasure, as distinguished from the case of the natural attitude which is not always pleasurable, as well as from the spiritual attitude which is neither pleasurable nor painful.

(3)

If we may judge from the somewhat elaborate criticism levelled against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory, it seems to have produced a greater impression than earlier theories, and paved the way, no doubt, for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom belongs the credit of explaining the new aesthetic system of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana.

The Dhvanikāra, however, in his exposition of *rasa-dhvani* and *rasa*, seems to have been greatly influenced by the Dramaturgic Rasa school. Bharata had declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight Rasas ; and therefore a more or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art even before poetic theories began to be seriously discussed. Bharata's ideas on these psychological processes and on Rasa, which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain condition of the ego, were elaborated by his commentators and followers, until the Dhvanikāra, followed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, came into the field. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, the idea of Rasa was naturally taken over to poetry and poetic theory ; and as the transition from naïve to sentimental poetry was accomplished, the theorists went a step further and erected Rasa into one of its essential foundations. Ānandavardhana is quite explicit on this point.

when he says (p. 181): *etac ca rasādi-tātparyeṇa kāvya-nibandhanaṃ bharatādāvapi suprasiddham eva.* In other words, what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry, profoundly modifying, as it did, the entire conception of the Kāvya[36]. From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the work of Bharata and his followers, Abhinavagupta goes further and lays down: *nāṭyāt samudaya-rūpād rasaḥ, rasa-samudayo hi nāṭyaṃ ; na nāṭya eva ca rasaḥ kāvye'pi nāṭyāmāna eva rasaḥ kāvyārathaḥ.* These theorists realised that no system of Poetics, as no system of Dramaturgy, can ever ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments, and must find an important place for Rasa, the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama. Gradually stress came to be laid on the emotional mood, as well as on the imaginative thought, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us ; the outward expression, on which the older writers pinned their faith so much, being regarded only as a means of suggesting or pointing to the implicit significance of such a mood in poetry.

The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on Rasa are obvious and are therefore rightly criticised by Abhinavagupta ; but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the theory of 'suggestion' or *dhvani* formulated by the new school. It is not necessary for us here to enter into the details of the Dhvani-theory, which will be treated in its proper place ; but we may for convenience and continuity of treatment indicate here generally how the idea of Rasa was worked up into them. The Dhvani school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one

36 Rudrabhaṭṭa states (i. 5) in the same way that Bharata and others have already discussed Rasa in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry. Cf M. Lindenau, *Rasalehre*, p. 2.

is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words ; the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of the reader or listener. The unexpressed or suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*vyañjanā*), is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers, it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech, in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words, was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical, which Vāmana had already amply recognised and on which the Alaṃkāra and the Rīti schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric, however veiled it may be, is still in a sense express d and must be taken as such ; but the suggestive is always unexpressed, and is therefore a source of greater charm by its capacity of concealment. This unexpressed or inexpressible is called into being by a particular function of suggestion, appertaining to words and their meanings, which this school postulates.

Now the unexpressed, through the suggestive power of sound or sense, may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*), or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alaṃkāra*), but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school, therefore, took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of *rasa* with the theory of *dhvani*.[37] It was realised that poetry was not, as Daṇḍin thought, the

37 Ānandavardhana himself says (*Dhv.* p. 163) that his object is not merely to establish Dhvani but also to harmonise it with Rasa.

mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language ; the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *vibhāvas* etc.; but with the help of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural *(laukika)* world, but as they may be imagined in the world of poetry, the poet can awaken in us, through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular *alaukika* (dissociated) condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as, for instance, Rāma whom he describes felt, but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects ; and the condition of the reader's soul in the enjoyment of such feeling is in poetry and drama the relish of Rasa, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas.

Here comes in the new colour given to the Rasa-theory by the exponents of the Dhvani school. They interpret Bharata's central dictum to mean that the Rasa is *suggested* by the union of the *sthāyin* with the *vibhāvas* through the relation of the suggested (*vyaṅgya*) and the suggestor (*vyañjaka*) ; the *niṣpatti* of Bharata, therefore, should mean *abhivyakti.*

The elaboration of the Rasa-theory, however, by this school in the direct tradition of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is associated by Mammaṭa and others with the name of Abhinavagupta[38]. Commenting on Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory, Abhinava points out that there is no need, as there is no authority, for assuming the two powers of *bhāvakatva* and

38 There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will be noticed later.

bhogīkaraṇa ; for they are implicitly included in the idea of *rasa-vyañjanā* and its ultimate *āsvāda*. Bharata's dictum *kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvaḥ* implies that *bhāvakatva* is an inherent capacity of all *bhāvas*, as the means of bringing into consciousness the sense of poetry, the term sense indicating here the principal sense consisting of the relish of Rasa. Hence the *sthāyin*, together with the *vyabhicārin*, being *bhāvas* themselves, bring into existence through this inherent power the extraordinary relishable sense of poetry, cognised in a general or impersonalised form. In this way, the *sthāyin* may be regarded as the *bhāvaka* or *niṣpādaka* of Rasa ; and this so-called *bhavakatva*, according to Abhinava, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of Guṇa and Alaṃkāra (*samucita-guṇālaṃkāra-parigrahātmakam*) for the ultimate purpose of awakening Rasa through the suggestive power of word and sense. Thus, partially admitting *bhāvanā* or *bhāvakatva* but explaining it somewhat differently, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as *bhoga* or *bhogīkaraṇa* by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He remarks that beyond *pratīti* or perception of Rasa, he is not aware of any other process called *bhoga*. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted as the essence of Rasa, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name. Abhinava thinks that the *bhoga* supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nothing more than the *āsvāda* or relish of Rasa, based on permanent moods like *rati* etc., and made possible by the suggestive power of poetry. It falls naturally, therefore, within the domain of suggestion and need not be taken as a separate function (*bhogīkaraṇa-vyāpāraś ca kāvyātmaka-rasa-viṣayo dhvananātmaiva*).

This *prātīti* of Rasa, Abhinavagupta maintains, results from its *abhivyakti* or manifestation by the power of suggestion, and consists of a state of relish known as *rasanā*, *āsvāda* or *carvaṇā*. What is manifested is not the Rasa itself, but its relish ; not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cogni-

tion ; it is nevertheless different from the ordinary *laukika* forms of the process, because its means (viz. the *vibhāvas*) are not to be taken as ordinary or *laukika* cause[39]. Although Rasa requires these three factors for its manifestation and cannot exist without them, it cannot yet be regarded as an ordinary effect, and the cause-and-effect theory is inapplicable ; for in the transcendental sphere of poetry, it is

39 This will make it clear why the Rasas like *karuṇa*, *bībhatsa* and *bhayānaka*, which cause pity, disgust or horror, can be termed Rasas in which enjoyment is essential. The relish of Rasa is supposed to be an extraordinary bliss, dissociated from personal interests, and not to be likened to ordinary pleasure and pain in which personal or egoistic impulses predominate. The mind is so entirely lost in its contemplation that even when the sentiment of grief or horror relished in such a state, pain is never felt, and even when felt it is a pleasurable pain. This fact is borne out by the common experience that when grief is represented on the stage, the spectator says 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence Abhinavagupta says : *samājikānāṃ harṣaika-phalaṃ nāṭyaṃ na śokādi-phalam*. Viśvanātha similarly remarks (iii. 6-7 and Vṛtti) that those very things which are called causes of pleasure and pain in the world (e.g. banishment of Sītā in the forest), when consigned to poetry and drama, possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming such an impersonalised form, *alaukika vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance. If pain were really felt, no one would have been inclined to poetry and drama (*kiṃ ca teṣu yadi duḥkhaṃ na ko'pi syāt tad-unmukhaḥ)*. It is also maintained that tears constitute no proof that anything but pleasure is felt in poetry ; for the tears that are shed by the reader are not those of pain but those of sentiment. Jagannātha's remarks in this connexion are interesting. He says (p. 26) that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of particular pleasures, and not to pain. Hence in a devotee tears arise on listening to a description of the deity ; in this case there is not the slightest feeling of pain. Such is the power of detachment which poetry produces that even unpleasant things like sorrow generate dissociated pleasure ; and this pleasant relish of impersonalised or idealised artistic creations should be distinguished from the ordinary experiences of life.—The *Nāṭya-darpaṇa*, however, sets forth a theory (pp. 158-59) that Rasa has a touch of sorrow in it, and Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* says: *rasā hi sukha-duḥkhāvasthā-rūpāḥ*. See V. Rāghavan. *Number of Rasas* (Adyar 1940), p. 155.

said, the connexion between cause and effect gives place to an imaginative system of relations, which has the power of stirring the reader's soul into Rasa. The resulting Rasa cannot be identified with the constituent *vibhāvas*, for the latter are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as Rasa, which is thus simple and indivisible. At the time of relish nothing else but the Rasa itself is raised to our consciousness. The writers on Poetics are fond of explaining this phenomenon under the analogy of a beverage which, made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients, gives us yet a taste different from that of its constituents. The result, therefore, is an indissoluble unity of taste from which every trace of the constituent elements is obliterated.

Abhinavagupta goes a step further also in maintaining that the permanent mood (*sthāyin*) inferred from its *laukika* causes (e.g. women, garden etc.) remains in the hearts of the appreciating audience in the subtle form of latent impressions, the idea of *vāsanā* or latent impression having been already admitted by the philosophers. On reading a poem or witnessing a drama, this permanent mood, remaining in the form of latent impression, is suggested by the depicted *vibhāvas* etc., which cease to be called *laukika* causes but go by the name of *vibhāvas* etc. in poetry and drama, and which are taken in their general form without specific connexions. The *vibhāvas*, therefore, are generalised or impersonalised in the minds of the reader, and do not refer to particularities, not through the power of *bhāvakatva*, as supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but generally through the suggestive power of sound and sense and specifically through a skilful use of Guṇa and Alaṃkāra in poetry, and clever representation in the drama. In the same way, the *sthāyi-bhāva*, which is the source of Rasa[40], is also generalised, because the germ of it is already

40 The *sthāyin* is so called because, in spite of its being transient like all feelings, its impression in the form of *vāsanā* or *saṃskāra* is

existent in the reader's mind in the form of latent impressions; and this, together with the beauty of the generalised representation of the *vibhāvas* ete., removes all temporal and spatial limitations. The mood is generalised also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general, so that the particular individual, while relishing it, does not think that it is relished by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. This subjective relish in the mind of the spectator or reader is known as Rasa in poetry and drama.

To state it briefly and without any technicality, there is in the mind a latent impression of feelings which we once went through (or which we acquired from previous births), and this is roused when we read a poem which describes similar things. By universal sympathy or community of feeling we become part and parcel of the same feeling and imagine ourselves in that condition. Thus the feeling is raised to a state of relish, called *rasa*, in which lies the essence of poetic enjoyment. It will be noticed that these theorists presuppose latent impression of experience *(vāsanā)* and univeral sympathy (*sādhāraṇya* ar *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*). Those who have not experienced the feeling of love, for instance, and have therefore no impression of experience left in them, as well as those who have no sense of community of human feelings, can never relish Rasa. The *vāsanā*, we are told, is natural (*naisargikī*) and may have been left in our mind through the *saṃskāra* of previous births, but it may also be acquired by

more or less permanent, being called up when the Rasa is cognised. Cf *Prabhā* p. 61: *antaḥkaraṇa-pravṛtti-rūpasya ratyāder āśu-vināśatve'pi saṃskārātmanā cirakāla-sthāyitvād yāvad-rasa-pratīti-kālam anusaṃdhānāc ca sthāyitvam.* But possibly it was originally called *sthāyin* because it constituted the permanent mood or sentiment in the composition, which nothing akin to it or opposed to it could overcome, but which could only be strengthened by other *bhāvas*. But the *sthāyin* itself is not *rasa*; it must be *vyakti-viśiṣṭa* and *vibhāvādi-melaka*, and thus made *carvaṇopayogī* or relishable, Govinda p. 62. The ultimate relish of *rasa* is free from the contact of the *sthāyin*, as it is of the *vibhāvas*.

study and experience. The writers on Poetics, therefore, are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and old Mīmāṃsakas, to whom such relish of Rasa is denied, and they declare unanimously that the *rasika* alone is capable of realising the *rasa*; for Rasa is not an objective entity which can reside in the hero or the actor, but a subjective condition realised by the reader's own capacity of aesthetic enjoyment. Thus, a degree of culture, experience and aesthetic instinct is demanded in the critic, the *rasika* or *sahṛdaya*, in conformity with this subtle conception of poetry. As Abhinavagupta puts it, *adhikārī cātra vimala-pratibhāna-śāli-hṛdayaḥ*, and describes such a *sahṛdaya* (*°Locana* p. 11) as *yeṣāṃ kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsa-vaśād viśadībhūte mano-mukure varṇanīya-tanmayībhavana-yogyatā te hṛdaya-saṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ*.

It may be pointed out here that this subtle conception of Rasa makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour,' 'relish,' 'gustation,' 'taste,' 'Geschmack' or 'saveur'; but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word 'mood', or the term 'Stimmung' used by Jacobi may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. Most of the terms employed have association of subtle meanings of their own, and are therefore not strictly applicable. For instance, the word 'taste' or 'relish' though literally correct, must not be understood to imply aesthetic judgment, 'good or bad taste,' but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of tasting food. At the same time, this realistic description must not lead us to drag it down to the level of a bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as *ānanda*, being lifted above worldly joy.

This peculiar condition of the mind, the *rasa*, is realised, according to Abhinavagupta, through the characteristic func-

tion of *vyañjanā* or suggestion inherent in word and sense. The idea is elaborated by later theorists who take pains to shew that it does not not come under the province of Denotation (*abhidhā*), nor of Import (*tātparyā*), nor of Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), nor of Perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor of Inference (*anumāna*), nor of Reminiscence (*smaraṇa*), which means of knowledge are admitted by philosophers and grammarians. Into these technicalities which properly come under the discussion of the *vyañjanā-vṛtti*, we need not enter; but it may be noted here that Abhinava describes this *abhivyakti*, which is taken as synonymous with *carvaṇā*, as *vītavighna-pratīti* or realisation freed from obstacles. Jagannātha and the author of the °*Prabhā* commentary on *Kāvya-pradīpa* describe *vyakti* as *bhagnāvaraṇā cit*. Both these terms constitute a link connecting the present theory with the teachings of the Vedānta. The dismissal of the *avidyā* and the elimination of *kāma* and *karman* (interest and activity) lead us to a point of detachment where we realise the intrinsic identity of self with Brahma and apprehend the bliss or *ānanda* resulting from such a realisation. The idea of Vedāntin's Mokṣa, which consists of a condition, not to be produced but to be made manifest by the removal enveloping obstacles, finds an analogy in the idea of the manifestation of Rasa, implied in its *abhivyakti*, which consists not in the expression of anything new but in the revealing of something already existing. The *brahmāsvāda* is likened to the *rasāsvāda* because in both cases the intimate realisation comes after the limitations of the ego-centric attitude are transcended, and all separate existence is merged in the unity or harmony realised. This happens in the case of *rasāsvāda* when the poetic sentiment, which remains in his heart in the form of latent impression, is made to shine forth, and the spectator's mind is purged of all egoistic impulses by the force of the idealised or generalised creations of poetry, consisting of the *vibhāvas* etc, which are therefore termed *vighnāpasārakas* or removers of obstacles. It is, therefore,

alaukika, being unlike the taste of interested worldly happiness and being incompassable by the ordinary processes of knowledge. Its essence consists in its relish or taste, *āsvāda*, *carvaṇā*, or *rasanā* ; but it is a relish in which the Rasa alone, apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness. It is, therefore, described as a relish in which the contemplation of anything else but Rasa is lost (*vigalita-vedyāntara*), or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (*vedyāntara-sparśa-śūnya*), like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of Brahma. It is not capable of proof or designation and cannot be made known, because its perception is inseparable from its existence; or in other words, it is identical with the knowledge of itself. The only proof of its existence is its relish itself by the *sahṛdaya* or the man of taste (*sakala-sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-saṃvedana-sākṣika*) ; and the *sahṛdaya* to whom alone this bliss is vouchsafed, is like the *yogin* or devotee who deserves this preference through his accumulated merits (*puṇyavantaḥ pramiṇvanti yogivad rasa-saṃtatim*)[41].

This, in its general outline, is the Rasa-theory as finally fixed by the Dhvani school ; and all later writers, from

41 The artistic attitude is, therefore, different from the natural, and more akin to the philosophic. But art affords only a *temporary* release from the ills of life by enabling one to transcend his personal relations or practical interests, and restores equanimity of mind (*viśrānti*) by leading him away from the common world and offering him another in its place. This is an attitude of pure pleasure, of disinterested contemplation (*saṃvit*), but not of true enlightenment which comes to the knower who, no longer on the empirical plane, transcends *completely* the sphere of pleasure as well as of pain. The attitude is variously termed *camatkāra-nirveśa* (awakening of poetic charm), *rasanā* (relish), *āsvāda* (taste), *bhoga* (fruition), *samāpatti* (accomplishment), *laya* (fusion) and *viśrānti* (repose), which terms indicate the philosophical colouring given to the doctrine. For the idea of *camatkāra* involved in Rasa, see S. K. De, introd. to *Vakrokti-jīvita* (2nd ed. 1928) p. xxxvi, fn 33 and below under Jagannātha (ch. vii). See also V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts*, pp. 268-71.

Dhanañjaya to Jagannātha, accept, more or less, this new interpretation and attempt to work it out in detail. Even Mahimabhaṭṭa, who tried to demolish the Dhvani-theory, acknowledges the importance of Rasa and declares that on this point there is no difference of opinion between himself[42] and the Dhvanikāra, the only difference existing with regard to the function *par excellence* which manifests the Rasa. Thus, an endeavour was made by the Dhvani-theorists not only to explain the concept of Rasa in terms of inward experience, but also to absorb this idea of aesthetic delectation into the new theory of Dhvani, and make it applicable to poetry as well as to the drama; and the Rasa school, properly so called, began to merge from this time onwards into the dominant Dhvani school, to the consideration of which we now turn, leaving the treatment of the later development of the Rasa-theory to a subsequent chapter.

42 *kāvyasyātmani saṅgini (aṅgini ?) rasādi-rūpe na kasyacid vimatiḥ*, p. 22.

CHAPTER V

THE DHVANIKĀRA AND ĀNANDAVARDHANA

(*The Dhvani System*)

The origin of the Dhvani school, like that of other schools of Poetics, is lost in obscurity ; but the first clear formulation of its theory of *dhvani* as a whole is to be found in the memorial verses of the Dhvanikāra, whose date is unknown but who could not have been very far removed from the time of his commentator Ānandavardhana. It is possible, however, that the Dhvanikāra himself is following a much older tradition. The fact that he shows himself conversant with some theory of *rasa*, *alaṃkāra* and *rīti* need not be cited to the credit or discredit of this conjecture ; for these systems themselves cannot be traced back to any definite period of time, and there is also no conclusive evidence that the Dhvanikāra was aware of the particular views of Bharata, Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin, with whom we begin the historic period of growth of these systems. But the very first line of the first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka* itself states that the theory that *dhvani* is the essence of poetry was traditionally maintained by earlier thinkers (*kāvyasyātmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvaḥ*). Accepting this statement of the Dhvanikāra, it is difficult, however, to explain why the *dhvani*-theory did not in the least, as the *rasa*-theory did to a certain extent, influence such early writers on Poetics as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin or Vāmana. It is easy to maintain, on the other hand, that the *vyañjanā* as a function must have been evolved by the school which set up a theory of *vyaṅgya artha* or *dhvani*, as this function is not traceable in philosophers or philosophical grammarians before the time of Ānandavardhana. Bhāmaha[1],

1 See above ch. ii, pp. 52f.

Vāmana (iv. 3. 8) and other early theorists discuss or show themselves cognisant of such a 'suggested sense' in general; but they never use the terms *vyañjanā*, or *vyaṅgya artha* or *dhvani*, as they probably would have done if it had been so universally known or accepted as the Dhvanikāra's statement would apparently imply. But this non-recognition by other schools need not be taken as a serious argument, as it admits of several reasonable explanations. It is well known that the philosophers refuse to recognise the *vyañjanā* as a Vyāpāra *sui generis*[2], and even after it was put forward by the Ālaṃkārikas, they would explain it by another recognised function as *anyathā-siddha* ; it is not surprising, therefore, that orthodox grammarians or philosophers should entirely ignore it. The absence of any direct reference to *dhvani* in early writers on Poetics may be explained by the not unlikely supposition that probably the Dhvanikāra himself, who summed up and uttered the theory in a definite form, was contemporaneous with these writers, as we cannot put him much later if we are to leave sufficient margin between him and his commentator, as well as make room for intermediate scholastic activity evidenced by the recapitulation-stanzas cited by Ānandavardhana in his Vṛtti[3]. Even leaving aside this conjecture, the cases of such non-recognition are actually explained by the Dhvanikāra himself, in the verse we have already cited, as constituting really cases of *half*-recognition ; for he seems to indicate that these early writers were cognisant of *dhvani*, but not having understood its nature they naïvely and uncritically looked at it from other points of view, some comprehending it in other elements of poetry, some thinking it incomprehensible, and others (like the poet Manoṛatha cited by Ānandavardhana) going to the extreme of denying its existence altogether. One of the objects of the Dhvanikāra in this statement was, no doubt, to indicate that he was not putting forward something entirely

2 See Jacobi in *ZDMG*, lvi, 1902, p. 397 fn 2, and p. 398 fn 1.

3 See vol. i. p. 108, and *BSOS* i, 4, 1920, pp. 7-8.

new, and to find an authority for his procedure in the implied attitude (real or imaginary) of certain older writers; but, apart from this, it is clear that although there is nothing explicit in the older writers, one can never affirm that some kind of 'suggested sense' was not known to them.

It would be extraordinary indeed that a work like Dhvanikāra's could have sprung into existence without having had a previous history, although such earlier forms of the theory as might have enabled us to trace directly its origin and growth were either not committed to writing or had disappeared in course of time; for at its first appearance as we have it in these Kārikās, we find the theory in a relatively complete shape, the outlines of which, definitely settled, may require considerable filling up but no important or substantial modification. This is probably implied by Abhinavagupta's gloss on the word *paramparā* in Ānandavardhana's explanation of the phrase *samāmnāta-pūrvaḥ* used by the Dhvanikāra with reference to the previous existence of the theory. Abhinava explains (p. 3) that the theory was stated in unbroken tradition by previous thinkers without its being discussed in particular books (*avicchinnena pravāheṇa tair etad uktam, vināpi viśiṣṭa-pustakeṣu vivecanāt*). It is true that Mukula refers (p. 21) to a theory of *dhvani* being newly described by some men of taste (*sahṛdayair*[4] *nūtana-tayopavarṇitasya*) as something not comprehensible by the recognised function of *lakṣaṇā*, and dces not discuss it for its over-subtlety (*etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam...ityalam*

4 The word *sahṛdaya* here cannot be taken (see vol. i, p. 105f) as a proper name referring to the Dhvanikāra; nor is it to be taken as a title of the propounder of the *dhvani*-theory. As in most of the places, it refers in general to the critics or men of taste who established the new theory, or in particular to the Dhvanikāra or Ānandavardhana; and there is no need to go beyond this ordinary meaning of the term in Alaṃkāra literature. Possibly the reference is directly to Ānandavardhana who was a contemporary of Mukula's father Kallaṭa (see vol. i, p. 74).

ati-prasaṅgena) ; but he may in this passage be directly referring to the Dhvanikāra, who for the first time probably summed up in his memorial verses the floating traditions, or to Ānandavardhana to whom belonged the credit of fixing the theory into a new and complete shape.

This conjecture about the traditional existence of the *dhvani*-theory in some form or other even before the Dhvanikāra receives support from the fact that the theory in its essence derived its inspiration from the works of early grammarians and their semi-philosophical speculations on speech. Originating as a theory of expression, the theory of *vyañjanā*, no doubt, received no recognition from orthodox grammarians ; but not choosing to appear as an entirely novel theory, it sought the protection of the grammarian's authority by pretending that it was founded on the analogy of their ancient *sphoṭa*-theory. We have already noted[5] the great influence of the older science of grammar on poetics, and Ānandavardhana himself is careful in noting that the system demonstrated by him is built on the system of the grammarians, who were the earliest theorists to apply the term *dhvani* to the spoken letter which reveals the *sphoṭa*[6]. Abhinavagupta commenting on this passage, perhaps goes too far in following up, after the authority of the *Vākyapadīya*, all the details of the *sphoṭa*-theory, but there is hardly any doubt that the writers on Poetics had this theory before them when they

5 See vol. i, pp. 6-7.

6 *prathame hi vidvāṃso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇa-mūlatvāt sarva-vidyānām. Te ca śrūyamāṇeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyaharanti. Tathai-vānyais tan-matānusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kāvya-tattvārtha-darśibhir vācya-vācaka-saṃmiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatva-sāmyād dhvanir ity uktaḥ* (pp. 47-8). See °*Locana* on this. Cf also : *pari-niścita-nirapabhraṃśa-śabda-brahmaṇāṃ vipaścitāṃ matam āśrityaiva pravṛtto'yaṃ dhvani-vyavahāra iti taiḥ saha kiṃ virodhāvirodhau cintyete* (p, 199). In this last passage, the reference is not to Vedānta, as some would think, but to the grammatico-philosophical theory of *śabda-brahma*. See Jacobi's note on this passage in *ZDMG* lvii, 1903, p. 56 fn 1.

elaborated their own system of *dhvani.* The *sphoṭa,* which has been likened to the neo-platonic *logos,* is often translated by the terms 'expression,' 'concept' or 'idea'; but none of these terms brings out its essential nature. Some philosophers propounded and the grammarians took it for granted that a word has intrinsically a word-prototype corresponding to it. The *sphoṭa* is not exactly this word-prototype, but it may be explained as the sound of a word as a whole, and as conveying a meaning apart from its component letters (*varṇas*). The *sphoṭa* does not contain exactly the sounds of the word in the order peculiar to the letters, but the sounds or something corresponding to them are blended indistinguishably into a uniform whole. When a word is pronounced, its individual sounds become reflected in some degree in the order of the *sphoṭa* in which the particular sounds are comprised ; and as soon as the last sound dies away, the *sphoṭa,* in which the idea corresponding to all these sounds is comprised, becomes manifest and raises to our consciousness the idea thus associated. The sounds of a word as a whole, therefore, and apart from those of the constituent letters, reveal the *sphoṭa.*

Taking their cue from this somewhat mystical conception, the Ālaṃkārikas developed the idea of *dhvani* by analogy. The several expressed parts of a poem, they held, reveal the unexpressed deeper sense, which is something singular and different from the denotātive and indicative elements both in order and in essence, and which is termed the *dhvani* (lit. 'sound', 'echo', 'tone') or *vyaṅgya artha* (suggested sense) in poetry. The word *dhvani* itself, as Ānandavardhana pointed out, is sometimes used by the grammarians for the word or letters which reveal the *sphoṭa.* Mammaṭa's remarks in this connexion are pertinent. In his Vṛtti on the definition given by him of *dhvani* (i. 4), he says that the *dhvani* is, according to the grammarians, that word which reveals the all-important *sphoṭa,* inasmuch as through it arises the knowledge of the word's meaning. Others, by whom he signifies the writers on the *dhvani*-theory in Poetics, carry this doctrine of the gram-

marians a step further and apply the term *dhvani* to the meaning, as well as to the word which is capable of suggesting a meaning superseding the one which is directly expressed. Intrinsically the two theories have scarcely any mutual connexion; but what the Ālaṃkārikas really wanted was an authority for their assumption of the power of *vyañjanā*, which the great grammarians did not acknowledge. The *sphoṭa*-theory of the grammarians, however, presupposed something similar, for the *varṇas* of a word reveal, as it were, the ideal word. Hence it afforded an analogy which could at least boast of the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇas, the *prathame vidvāṃsaḥ*, and which could therefore be seized upon by the Ālaṃkārikas as the foundation of their own theory of suggestion. It may also be pointed out that the sense of 'manifestation' which exists in the *vyañjanā* is an idea which, we have already noted[7], is not unfamiliar to Indian philosophical speculation. The *vyañjanā* does not consist in the utterance of something new, but in the manifestation of something already existing; it is, to use a familiar illustration from Indian philosophical systems, like the revealing of the already existing jar by the lamp. Although the general concept of *dhvani* connects itself with such half-mystical currents of thought, Ānandavardhana yet takes care to point out (pp. 232-4) that this *dhvani* is not, as often supposed, something mystical but it is something that can be properly defined and grasped; and he has no sympathy with those schools which would dismiss it, as Kapila has dismissed the *sphoṭa* from the philosophical realm, on the ground that it is something inexplicable (*anākhyeya*).

Although it accepted, with some modifications, the grammarian's analysis of the nature and function of speech and based its theory of *dhvani* on the analogy of the theory of *sphoṭa*, the school really started independently with a distinct theory of expression of its

7 See vol. i, p. 9.

own, which demonstrated a function of *vyāñjanā* and *vyaṅgyārtha* untraceable in earlier speculative literature. But the influence of other schools of Poetics on the composite work on the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana cannot be ignored. The latter, if not the former, appears to be perfectly familiar with the views of Bharata, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana, most of whom are cited directly by name; but even the Dhvanikāra must have known the theories of the Rasa, Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools in some form or other. For, the *Dhvanyāloka* has two professed objects in view, viz., (1) the establishment of the theory of Dhvani and demonstration that this idea cannot be comprehended by the theories of earlier or contemporaneous schools of Poetics, and (2) an examination of the existing ideas of *rasa, alaṃkāra, rīti, guṇa* and *doṣa* with a view to correlate them with the idea of *dhvani*, and thus by synthesis to evolve a complete and systematic scheme of Poetics. It succeeded so far in realising both these objects that not only was the concept of *dhvani* accepted inplicitly by almost all later writers, but the systems, which emerged after Ānandavardhana and of which Mammaṭa may be taken as the first and foremost representative, cannot be regarded strictly as constituting independent schools, nor can they be affiliated readily and entirely with the older Rasa, Alaṃkāra or Rīti schools. They constitute in substance a new aesthetic scheme in which the ideas of all these schools are worked and harmonised into a comprehensive doctrine, the outlines of this new adjustment being first clearly marked and the foundations firmly laid by Ānandavardhana.

Starting with a theory of expression, the Dhvani school concerns itself, first of all, with the grammatico-philosophical problem about the function of words and their meaning, or in other words, about the relation of a word to that which is expressed by it. The grammarians, logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas had already laid down that the function by which the primary or intrinsic meaning (*mukhya* or *śakya artha*) of a word is known as *abhidhā*, generally translated by the term

Denotation, which gives it its conventional significance (*saṃketita artha*). Thus, the concept of the cow is given by the word 'cow' by its power of Denotation. It has been defined as that power of a word which conveys to the understanding the meaning attached to it by convention, without the intervention of any power. This convention (*saṃketa*) consists in a particular word conveying a particular meaning (*asmāc chabdād ayam artho boddhavya ityākāraḥ śakti-grāhakaḥ samayaḥ*), which is comprehended by observing what takes place in the world (*vyavahāra*). We need not concern ourselves with the question whether this *śakti* is *īśvarecchā* or *icchāmātra* (divine or human will); but there are several theories as to where this convention is to be understood, held respectively by the grammarians, logicians, Saugatas and Mīmāṃsakas. The writers on Poetics maintain, after the grammarians[8], that it has reference either to genus (*jāti*), individual (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*).

When this *abhidheyārtha* or the primary meaning of a word is incompatible, another power called *lakṣaṇā* or Indication (i. e. transference of sense) is communicated, whereby another meaning connected therewith is apprehended, either through usage (*rūḍhi*) or from some special motive (*prayojana*). Thus, one can say 'the country rejoices', but since the country itself cannot rejoice, it is indicated that the people of the country rejoice. This power really belongs to the sense (*artha-vyāpāra*), as later analysis points out, but it is attributed to words and is thus an *āropita-śabdavyāpāra*. That is to say (as other writers explain it) we have first *śabda* or the word, then its *vācyārtha* or direct denoted meaning, after which or in connexion with which comes the *lakṣyārtha* or indicated meaning through the power or Indication. It is thus *sāntara* (and not *nirantara* like *abhidhā*), having the

8 Both Mukula and Mammaṭa (*Śabda-vyāpāra*°, p. 2) point out that this view of the Ālaṃkārikas is based on the dictum *catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ*, occurring in the *Mahābhāṣya* (ed. Kielhorn p. 19, l. 20).

vācyārtha coming in between ; for the *lakṣaṇā* is resorted to when the primary sense is incompatible (*bādhita*) and is so far *artha-niṣṭha* as based on the expressed sense[9]. Hence the three essential requisites of the *lakṣaṇā* are the incompatibility (or exhaustion) of the primary sense, the connexion of the indicated sense with the primary sense, and the reason or motive (*prayojana*) for resorting to it. As the Denotation is dependent on worldly convention (*vyavahārıka saṃketa*). so is the Indication (as Mammaṭa points out) upon the special convention based on these three requisites ; and as there can hardly be any indicated or transferred sense without the primary sense, the Indication is sometimes called the tail, as it were, of Denotation (*abhidhā-pucchabhūtā*). In fact, writers like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as we have seen[10], would include *lakṣaṇā* under *abhidhā*, of which it is supposed to be an extension.

The *lakṣaṇā* being thus of a derivative nature, its relations to *abhidhā* have been summarised differently in different works. The *Nyāya-sūtra* gives an exhaustive list of the relations on account of which a word is used in a secondary or transferred sense for another (ii. 2. 63), corresponding to the *lakṣaṇā* of the Ālaṃkārikas ; but Mukula quotes the authority of Bhartṛmitra[11] who summarises them in a verse

9 *śakya-vyavahita-lakṣyārtha-viṣayatvāc chabde āropita eva sa vyāpāraḥ, vastuto'rtha-niṣṭha evety arthaḥ, tad uktam—'sāntarārtha-niṣṭhaḥ' iti*, °*Pradīpa*, ed. N.S.P., 1912, p. 27.

10 See above ch. iv, p. 124.

11 *Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā* p. 17. The verse is also quoted anonymously in Mammaṭa's *Śabda-vyāpāra* p. 8, in *Kāmadhenu* p. 133 and in many other works. Abhinavagugta (°*Locana* p. 56) alludes to it, and discusses these five categories.—Mukula Bhaṭṭa's work consists of 15 Kārikās with prose Vṛtti. Its object is to examine the principle which should regulate words in their meanings. It includes Lakṣaṇā in Abhidhā, for it says that the functions of Abhidhā are twofold, direct and indirect, both of which lead to the understanding of the import of words. Mukula discusses Abhidhā only, but Mammaṭa on his *Śabda-vyāpāra-paricaya* establishes three distinct functions of words, of which the last is Dhvani.

into five categories, viz. *saṃbandha* (connexion), *sādṛśya* (similarity), *samavāya* (inherence), *vaiparītya* (contrariety) and *kriyā-yoga* (association through action). 'The fat Devadatta does not eat in the daytime' (*pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte*), 'the lad is a lion' (*siṃho māṇavakaḥ*), 'the herd-station on the Ganges' (*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*) ; 'this fool is a Bṛhaspati' (*bṛhaspatir ayaṃ mūrkhaḥ*) and 'in a great war thou art a Śatrughna' (*mahati samare śatrughnas tvam*) are given as respective instances of the usage. We need not further dilate upon these niceties of analysis, nor enter into the elaborate classifications of *lakṣaṇā*, but we may note here that the *lakṣaṇā* or transferred expression lies at the root of figures like metaphor and of metaphorical mode generally, which consist of the fancied transference of the qualities or action of one object to another. It has been pointed out that the transferred expression, resolving into the metaphorical, is the source of a particular beauty, because the special motive (*prayojana*) with which the poet chooses the transferred expression becomes realised along with it, without being directly or at all expressed. When we say, for instance, 'youth is the springtime of life', we mean to imply at once, without directly expressing it, the beauty, vigour or enjoyments of spring-time. The *prayojana* or motive, though unexpressed, is yet apprehended. This is supposed to be one of the reasons, as we shall see, why we should admit, besides Denotation and Indication, a third function of *vyañjanā* or Suggestion, by which something not expressed is revealed.

But there is a limited class of writers who postulate another function, called *tātparya* or Purport, which leads us to apprehend the connexion among the meanings of the constituent words in the form of the import of the whole sentence. This function conveys the connected meaning of the several words and therefore differs from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* which convey the meaning of a particular word, the *tātparyārtha* being manifested, not by word, but by a whole sentence, and therefore remaining distinct from the meanings

denoted or indicated by individual words The words have, according to this view, the power of denoting or indicating things and not the connexion (*anvaya*) among things, which is known not from the import of words as such, but from their relations of compatibility (*yogyatā*), proximity (*saṃnidhi*) and expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*). When the logical connexion or *anvaya* is thus known, a special sense arises which is called *tātparya*. Mammaṭa explains (ii. 1, Vṛtti) the position of these Abhihitānvaya-vādins, as they are called, thus[12]: "When the meanings of the words, to be hereafter explained, are connected in accordance with expectancy, compatibility and proximity, another sense arises, called purport, which has a distinct form and which, though not constituting the sense of words is yet the sense of the sentence—this is the view of the Abhihitānvaya-vādins". The theory of this school is rejected by another school of Mīmāṃsakas, called the Anvitābhidhāna-vādins, who deny the necessity of postulating a special function like *tātparya* ; for they hold that words have a power to denote not only things but also their purport or connexion along with them. To put it in another way, words do not express their sense generally but connectedly. In ordinary life, for instance, we first understand meanings from sentences, and words convey ideas not absolutely but relatively, i e., as having a connexion with one another. *Mutatis mutandis*, the theory would remind one of Berkeley's denial of abstract ideas.

The formulators of the *dhvani*-theory do not enter into these minute discussions but appear to recognise them implicitly, although most writers from the time of Mammaṭa (who deals with these questions in his *Kāvya-prakāśa* as well as separately in his *Śabda-vyāpāra-paricaya*) start with a preliminary analysis of word-function ; and some later works like Appayya's *Vṛtti-vārttika* are devoted specially to the

12 *ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-saṃnidhi-vaśād vakṣyamāṇa-svarūpāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣa-vapur a-padārtho'pi vākyārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvaya-vādināṃ matam.*

subject. All writers from Ānandavardhana's time accept as a rule the *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, but they are not unanimous with regard to the *tātparya* as a separate function, which they take as included in the *vyañjanā vṛtti*, this being the third and most important function established by the Dhvani school as the theoretical foundation of *dhvani* or the 'suggested sense' in poetry. The *vyañjanā* or power of suggestion is generally defined as that function of a word or its sense by which a further meaning comes into being, when the other functions, viz. *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, are exhausted in their scope. Ideas or notions are what are conveyed by words through their powers of Denotation and Indication; these, put together in a sentence, convey a complete thought through the supposed power of the sentence, styled Purport. Now, another power is postulated by which a deeper sense, the *vyaṅgya artha*, is revealed, consequent upon but distinct from the simple thought[13]. All good poetry, called *par excellence* the *dhvani-kāvya*[14], must have such a sense implicit in it, a sense which can only be realised by the *vyañjanā-vṛtti* or power of suggestion postulated by this school.

Now the question has been animatedly discussed as to whether it is necessary to postulate this separate function of *vyañjanā*, or whether it may not be comprehended in other recognised functions like *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*, and in other

13 A word (or its sense), in virtue of these three powers, is called respectively the expressive (*vācaka*), the indicative (*lakṣaka*) and the suggestive (*vyañjaka*); and the sense which arises is termed respectively an expressed (*vācya*), indicated (*lakṣya*) and suggested (*vyaṅgya*) sense.

14 The word *dhvani* (lit. 'echo' or 'tone') is used almost synonymously (cf. Hemacandra p. 26) with the word *vyaṅgyārtha* (suggested sense), and sometimes wrongly as co-extensive with *vyañjanā*, which term properly designates the process manifesting it. The *dhvani-kāvya* is so-called because the *vyaṅgyārtha*, which predominates in it over the *vācyārtha*, is 'echoed' *par excellence* in this class of poetry. Viśvanātha (p. 198) explains the term etymologically thus: *vācyād adhika-camatkāriṇi vyaṅgyārthe dhvanyate'sminn iti vyutpattyā dhvanir nāmo-ttama-kāvyam.*

intellectual processes like *anumāna* or inference. Jayaratha cites (p. 9) a verse which enumerates twelve different ways in which the problem of Suggestion may be and perhaps was explained away ; but broadly speaking, we need notice, as Ānandavardhana and his followers have done, only the principal attempted explanations. The first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka* summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the suggested sense in poetry. A second school, which is agnostic in this respect, holds that it is beyond the province of words (*kecid vācāṃ sthitam aviṣaye tattvam ūcus tadīyam*), and can only be perceived by a man of refined discernment (*sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-saṃvedyam*, Ānanda p. 10). A third school would try to trace it back to the recognised functions like *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *tātparya*, or to some such means of knowledge as *anumāna* or syllogistic reasoning. These three schools naturally divide themselves into two distinct standpoints: the one absolutely denies or ignores the concept of *dhvani* and thus does away with the necessity of *vyañjanā* ; the other admitting the *dhvani*, attempts to explain away the necessity of *vyañjanā*, as it is sufficiently accounted for by the ordinary recognised functions.

Against the attack of the systems which deny the existence of the suggested sense, the old argument that nothing can be denied which is not apprehended is applied ; but apart from such purely scholastic objections, the real grounds for postulating the suggested sense are, the consideration, in the first place, that being a profound verity, it can positively be established by an examination of aesthetic facts as well as facts of experience ; and in the second place, that there are some elements of poetry (e. g. the Rasa) which cannot be satisfactorily explained as revealed by *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā*, *anumāna* or similar other means.

This brings us to the consideration of the views of those who accept the concept of *vyaṅgya artha* but dispense with the necessity of such a separate and unauthorised Vṛtti as

vyañjanā, which is regarded as included in other functions of sound and sense. Some Mīmāṃsakas hold, for instance, that the so-called suggested sense is conveyed by the *abhidhā-vṛtti* or the denotative power of a word. In this connexion, the *dīrgha-vyāpāra-vādins*[15] are said to have maintained that as a single arrow, discharged by a strong man, destroys by a single movement, called velocity, the armour of the enemy, pierces through his body and takes away his life, so a single word, used by a good poet, brings before us by a single power, called *abhidhā*, the sense of the word, teaches us its logical connexion (*anvaya*) and makes us apprehend the suggested sense. The substance of this graphic description appears to be that such is the more and more expanding function of *abhidhā* that it is not to be measured in the balance and confined to the single business of making us understand the *saṃketita artha*, but it is competent to express whatever sense is apprehended after a word is heard. But it is urged in reply that the *abhidhā* has not the power to give us the perception of a matter (*vastu*), an imaginative fact (*alaṃkāra*) or an emotional mood (*rasa*), because it ceases, in the orthodox opinion, after conveying the conventional (i. e. literal) sense, and the Rasa etc. are not matters of mere convention. Nor is the denoting, for instance, of component *vibhāvas*, which give rise to Rasa, a denotation of the Rasa itself ; for it is acknowledged that the Rasa is not realised by a mere naming thereof but partakes of the nature of a self-manifested joy, the development of which can at most be suggested. These facts cannot be satisfactorily explained unless we assume with the *dīrgha-vyāpāra-vādins* an all-comprehensive power for the *abhidhā*, for which there is hardly any authority. Moreover, if we assign such extensive powers to Denotation, why even admit the power of Indication, since the sense conveyed by the latter might be understood from the Denotation itself ?

15 This view is sometimes ascribed to Lollaṭa ; but see on this question vol. i, p. 36-7.

Admitting the denoted sense, therefore, strictly as that conveyed by convention, it cannot be said to be manifold, for it exhausts itself after conveying the particular conventional concept ; the suggested sense, on the other hand, becomes varied in accordance with the diversity of the occasion, the speaker and similar other factors. The denoted meaning is shown to differ from the suggested (1) in point of *form*, for the suggested sense may sometimes be quite the opposite of the negative or positive (as the case may be) expressed sense, (2) in point of *location*, for the expressed sense resides in words alone, while the suggested sense may be found in the words, in their position, in their denoted meaning itself, in the affixes or suffixes, in the arrangement of letters and so forth, (3) in its *effect*, for the denoted sense brings a mere cognition, the suggested a surprise, (4) according to the nature of the speaker, the addressee, or the perceiver. The attempt to maintain that the suggested sense is conveyed by the *tātparya* or Purport, as some Naiyāyikas hold, is similarly shown to be insufficient ; for the function of the Purport is exhausted by simply making us apprehend the logical connexion of the ideas in the sentence itself and cannot, therefore, take us to the *vyaṅgyārtha*, which arises after the sentence is understood.

Nor is the *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti* sufficient to explain the subtle power of Suggestion. Those who maintain, however, that the suggested sense is no other than the *lakṣya* or indicated sense are asked (°*Locana* p. 51) whether they consider the non-difference of Suggestion and Indication to mean (1) that the two functions are identical (*tādātmya* or *tādrūpya*), (2) that they consider the Indication to be the constant differentiating property (*lakṣaṇa* or *vyāvartaka-dharma*) of Suggestion, or (3) that the Indication is an occasional differentiating mark (*upalakṣaṇa* or *taṭastha lakṣaṇa*) of Suggestion in special cases. The Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana discuss these views generally (pp. 50-9), but Abhinavagupta deals with them somewhat elaborately.

With regard to the first of these views, viz. the *tādrūpya* or identity of *dhvani* and *bhakti* (by which term *lakṣaṇā* is meant), the Dhvanikāra lays down that Suggestion cannot be identical with Indication, because both have properties peculiar to themselves (i. 17). Indication is based upon the consideration of the barring of the expressed sense, and consists merely in *upacāra* (*upacāra-mātraṃ tu bhaktiḥ*, Ānanda p. 51), or, as Abhinavagupta expresses it, in the secondary application of a word (*guṇa-vṛtti*). The suggested sense, on the other hand, though essentially distinct in character, does not yet cancel the expressed sense altogether. The later writers[16] explain further that it is not a mere secondary application of a word through usage or special motive. For, if you say that in such a sentence as 'a herd-station on the Ganges', the supposed motive, viz. the coolness and purity of the site, is not suggested but indicated, then the notion of 'the bank', which is the real indicated sense, would become the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges' (for the motive and the secondary sense of 'bank' cannot both be indicated), and consequently would be cancelled, since there can be no Indication without the primary sense being cancelled. We must, therefore, acknowledge another indicated motive for the indication of the first motive (for there can be no indication without the supposition of an indicated motive), and a third motive again to this second indication, and so on *ad infinitum*. In fact, as already noted before, the *prayojana* or special motive is not expressed at all; if it is left unexpressed, how is it then apprehended, unless we suppose that it is suggested? It has also been demonstrated that Suggestion is based on the peculiarity of the speaker, the addressee and various other circumstances; and there is a difference as well in location, the Indication resides in a word only, the Suggestion in a word, its parts, its sense and in the style. Mammaṭa adds that Suggestion cannot be said to be co-extensive with Indication and Denotation combined;

16 e.g. Viśvanātha in his *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* pp. 247-48.

for it is seen to come into existence from mere letters without any specific Denotation.

The second view that Indication is the *lakṣaṇa* or the constant differentiating characteristic of Suggestion is shewn by the Dhvanikāra to be vitiated by the logical fallacies of too wide (*ativyāpti*) or too narrow definition (*avyāpti*). This is more or less a scholastic objection, and is based on the characteristic notion of Suggestion defined by its champions ; for both Ānandavardhana and his commentator shew that Indication sometimes covers a much wider, sometimes a much more limited, field than Suggestion. The *vyañjanā*, for instance, is not accepted when the *prayojana* of the Indication is not charming ; on the other hand, in cases of *vivakṣitānya-para-vācya dhvani*, there is scope for Indication, for the Suggestion here is expressly based on Indication. The third view that Indication may be an occasional distinguishing mark (*upalakṣaṇa*) of Suggestion is not denied by the Dhvanikāra, for Suggestion may sometimes rest ultimately on Indication, e. g. those cases which are admitted by Dhvani-theorists as based on *lakṣaṇā* (*lakṣaṇā-mūla dhvani*) ; but this does not prove the opponent's position that Indication is identical with Suggestion.

Some of the oldest and most aggressive objectors to the admission of the *vyañjanā-vṛtti* are the adherent of the *anumāna*-theory, whose views are refuted at some length by Ānandavardhana himself. They are represented to us in later literature by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his *Vyakti-viveka*, a work which was written with the avowed object of establishing that the suggested sense can be arrived at by the process of syllogistic reasoning. Most of these controversies belong to the realm of scholastic speculation and are far removed from actual Poetics. We shall deal with Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory in its proper place ; it will suffice here to set forth the theory in its general outline as it obtained in Ānandavardhana's time and notice the arguments with which it is sought to be disproved.

From Ānandavardhana's repudiation (pp. 201 f) of the views of this school, it appears that its essential position consisted in establishing that the cognition of the unexpressed or suggested sense is nothing more than the cognition of the object of a logical conclusion, so that the relation of the suggestor and the suggested is that of the syllogistic middle and major terms (*vyaṅgya-pratītir liṅga-pratītir eveti liṅga-liṅgi-bhāva eva teṣām, vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāvo nāparaḥ kaścit*). One of the alleged reasons for this assumption is that the Dhvani school itself admits suggestivity as depending upon the intention of the speaker, which intention is always an object of logical conclusion. Ānandavardhana, however, demonstrates that this does not affect the general position of his school. He shews that words have two different aspects, the one inferable (*anumeya*) and the other communicable (*pratipādya*). The first, consisting of intention (*vivakṣā*), may either be the wish to utter a sound or the wish to express an idea by a word ; the former, being a common characteristic of all animals, does not come within the sphere of speech. The communicable is something different from this, and consists of the idea itself which forms the object of the speaker's need of communication (*pratipādyas tu prayoktur artha-pratipādana-samīhā-viṣayīkṛtaḥ*). It may be either expressed (*vācya*) or suggested (*vyaṅgya*) ; for the speaker sometimes wishes to communicate the idea directly by its Denotation, or sometimes he wishes to do so in such a way that it is not conveyed directly in words. This last-named inner content, Ānandavardhana maintains, cannot be recognised in the form of a syllogistic conclusion, but can be by some other artificial or natural relation ; for words, in the form of a logical middle term, can convey that an unexpressed idea is the object of intention, but cannot convey the unexpressed idea itself (*vivakṣā-viṣayatvaṃ hi tasyārthasya śabdair liṅgatayā pratīyate, na tu svarūpam*). If the contrary is maintained, then, as every idea could be logically established, there would be no dispute about the correctness or falsity of an idea, any

more than about any other conclusion from a logical syllogism (*yadi hi liṅgatayā śabdānāṃ vyavahāraḥ syāt, tac-chabdārthe samyaṅ-mithyātvādi-vivādā na pravarteran*). It is only when the unexpressed takes the form of the intention of the speaker that it may be a matter of ordinary inference ; but the inner content of the idea itself, when unexpressed, can be communicated only by the supposition of another power like Suggestion ; for the natural mode of direct expression, as well as inference, is out of the question.

With the establishment, against such hostile views, of the suggested sense and the function of Suggestion in poetry, which is variously termed *vyañjanā* (revealing), *dhvanana* (echoing), *gamana* (implication) or *pratyāyana* (acquainting), we are introduced to the special doctrine of the system. The unexpressed or the suggested sense (*vyaṅgya artha*), to which the name *dhvani* is appled when it is predominant, is definitely posed as the 'soul' or essence of poetry[17], and poetry is classified into three kinds in relation to the suggested sense. The best kind, specifically called *dhvani-kāvya*, is supposed to be that in which the suggested sense predominates and supersedes the expressed. It is thus defined by the Dhvanikāra (i. 13):

17 But the verse i. 2, in which this view is set forth appears, when literally taken, to state that "the sense which is praised by men of taste and which has been established as the soul of poesy, has two subdivisions, viz. *vācya* or the expressed, and *pratīyamāna* or the suggested", implying thereby that the *artha* itself is the 'soul' or essence of poetry and that it includes the *vācya* as well, as one of its varieties. The Dhvanikāra, therefore, apparently declares that the expressed sense is also the essence of poetry, although this, as Viśvanātha objects, is opposed to his own statement in the first line of his work, which speaks of the suggested sense alone as the essence of poetry in accordance with the tradition of ancient thinkers. Abhinavagupta tries to reconcile these two apparently conflicting dicta by supposing that the real object of the Dhvanikāra in i. 2 is to distinguish between the *vācya* and the *pratīyamāna* sense, and not to establish both as the 'soul' of poetry. The objection is really over-fastidious ; for it can be easily shown that in the elaboration of the theory, the suggested sense alone is throughout taken as the *ātman*.

"The learned call that particular kind of poetry *dhvani* in which the (expressed) word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest that (other suggested) sense"[18]. This is *par excellence* Suggestive Poetry, and therefore pointedly called *dhvani*[19]. The second class of poetry, in which the suggested sense is not predominant but subordinate, is called *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya* or Poetry of Subordinated Suggestion[20]. This Subordination consists in the suggested sense being either of equal or inferior prominence. It has been classified elaborately, if not logically, on the hint furnished by the *Dhvanyāloka* itself, into eight varieties, according as the suggested sense is (1) ancillary, (2) hinted by tone or gesture, (3) subservient to the completion of the expressed sense, (4) of doubtful prominence, (5) of equal prominence, (6) obscure, (7) unconcealed, or (8) not charming. That poetry, which is without any suggested element, is reckoned as the third and lowest kind, being merely 'pictorial in word' or 'pictorial in sense', and is called *citra* or Pictorial Poetry[21]. In it could be included all verse which, on account of sound or magnificence of pictorial representation, or some such mechanical means, flatter the ear and is considered worthy of admiration. Under it also comes the whole body of expressed poetic figures (*alaṃkāra-nibandho yaḥ sa citra-viṣayo mataḥ*, cited p. 221), which, containing no suggestive element, appeal by their turns of

18 *yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tam artham upasarjanīkṛta-svārthau / vyaṅktaḥ, kāvya-viśeṣaḥ sa dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ / /.* Here *tam arthaṃ* refers to *artha* defined in one of the pravious verses, e.g. in i. 4.

19 For the etymology of the word, see above footnote no. 14.

20 *Dhvanyāloka,* iii. 35.

21 Ānandavardhana describes *citra-kāvya* thus : *rasa-bhāvādi-tātparya-rahitaṃ vyaṅgyārtha-viśeṣa-prakāśana-śakti-śūnyaṃ ca kāvyaṃ kevala-vācya-vācaka-vaicitrya-mātrāśrayeṇopanibaddham ālekhya-prakhyaṃ yad avabhāsate tac citram* (p. 220). Abhinavagupta derives the word in different ways: *vismayakṛd-vṛttādi-vaśāt...kāvyānukāritvād vā citram, ālekhya-mātratvād vā, kalā-mātratvād vā* (p. 34). In deference to Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa speaks of *citra* as the third and lowest kind of poetry; but Viśvanātha altogether rejects its claim as poetry.

expression alone (*vaicitrya*) and which are characterised by Ānandavardhana as mere *vāg-vikalpa.* Ānandavardhana makes it clear that the *citra-kāvya* is not really fit to be called poetry, it is an imitation or copy thereof (*kāvyānukāraḥ*); for, strictly speaking, there can be no poetry in which there is no suggestion. It is admitted by him, however, to the category of poetry, because the poets, who are unfettered in their mode of expression, have, as a matter of fact, been found producing poetry of this kind, in which there is no intention of developing a suggested sense, but which is wholly taken up with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense.

These three types of poetry are then elaborated and classified with somewhat minute and subtle ingenuity. In this treatment, we find the characteristic passion for reducing everything to a formula and the scholastic delight in indulging in fastidious refinements ; but at the same time there is a sincere effort to do justice to all the aesthetic facts, so far as they have been recognised, and to unify the various currents of ideas obtaining in different schools by synthesising them with the central principle of suggestion in poetry. We see throughout the speculations of this school an anxiety to protect itself from the reproach of being too theoretical, of ignoring or doing violence to facts ; and this anxiety made the theorists evolve a scheme which should not overlook the inherited stock of notions but find a place for them in a comprehensive system. We need not take the Dhvani-theory here in all its minute details, and go through the five thousand, three hundred and fifty-five subdivisions[22] of suggestive poetry, the object of which was possibly to mark out not

22 Viśvanātha gives this number. Vidyānātha in his *Pratāparudrīya* gives 1326 as the number of Śuddha varieties of Dhvani, which with Miśra varieties mentioned by him, comes up to a total of 5304. Abhinavagugta works out the possible number as 7420, and indicates that this number will increase infinitely if infinite varieties of Alaṃkāra are taken into account.

distinct classes, but distinct properties or circumstances. But we shall attempt to trace here briefly the effort made by this school to dispose of the already accumulated matter of Poetics, represented by the notions of *rasa*, *rīti*, *guṇa*, *doṣa* and *alaṃkāra*, into the *dhvani*-system itself, by means of different arrangements or classification of the idea of suggestion.

The true poetry, the *dhvani-kāvya*, is divided into two broad classes, viz., *avivakṣita-vācya* and *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*, which two designations, clumsy as they are[23], respectively indicate their nature. In the first case, the expressed sense is not meant ; in the second case, it is certainly meant but ultimately amounts to something else, viz., the unexpressed, The first is obviously based on *lakṣaṇā* or Indication, which the poet employs with the conscious purpose of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension ; and the question involved is about words and expressions which are taken not in a literal but in a transferred sense. This poetic transference, as we have already noted before, is at the root of metaphorical expression generally, the importance of which both the Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools amply recognised and industriously examined, and which Daṇḍin specifically included in the *samādhi-guṇa*, and Vāmana treated under the special figure *vakrokti*. As such, therefore, it could not be very well ignored, and by including it, as the Dhvani-theorists did, in one of the principal divisions of good poetry, they rightly assigned to it a prominent place in the new system.

The second division of suggestive poetry, the *vivakṣitānya-para-vācya*, in which the expressed is meant but is made to resolve itself into the unexpressed, is obviously based on *abhidhā* or Denotation, and embraces the more important matter of Rasa, which has already been worked out by the

23 Mahimabhaṭṭa criticises both these terms, holding that the former is nothing more than a case of *bhakti* or *lakṣaṇā*, and the latter contains an inherent contradiction (i.e., if a thing is *vivakṣita* or *pradhāna*, it cannot be *anyapara*).

Rasa school in the sphere of the drama. Two possible cases of this division are enumerated, viz. (1) that in which the suggested is of imperceptible process (*asaṃlakṣya-krama*), i.e., where the expressed denotation brings the suggested sense imperceptibly into consciousness, and (2) that in which the suggested is of perceptible process (*saṃlakṣya-krama*). Under the first group comes the suggestion of *rasa* and *bhāva*, for it is made clear that these emotional states can be suggested only in this way. Under the second group are included the suggestions of matter (*vastu*) and of figure (*alaṃkāra*) by matter and figure in turns, based respectively on the power of word, or its sense, or both. Thus, the unexpressed, which is raised to comprehension by the suggestive power of a word, or its sense or both, can be an unexpressed fact or matter, an unexpressed imaginative mood which may be put into the shape of a poetic figure ; but in most cases—and these cases are of primary importance in poetry—it is an unexpressed emotional mood (*rasa*) or feeling (*bhāva*), which is directly inexpressible, but which can only be *suggested* by an expressive word or its sense. We have already seen[24] that the poet can at best directly express the three factors which bring about the Rasa, viz., the *vibhāva*, the *anubhāva*, and the *vyabhicāri-bhāva*, but not the Rasa itself as a mood which is inexpressible in its nature. At the most, we can give a name to it, e.g. we can call it love, sorrow or anger, but the mere naming of the Rasa in poetry is not capable of awakening the mood itself in the reader which consists of a self-manifested state of the mind. Therefore, with the denotation or description of these factors, the poet can only *suggest* the Rasa ; in other words, he can call up a reflection of the mood which the reader realises as a particular condition of his own mind[25]. The expressed factors, the *vibhāvas*

24 See above ch. iv, p. 130.

25 Abhinava explains (see above ch. iv, p. 132f) that the reader realises the feeling depicted because the artistic creations are generalised, and in this generalised form the reader realises them as his own, through

etc., are thus the suggestor or *vyañjaka* of the Rasa, which is the suggested or *vyaṅgya*. The suggested, no doubt, depends for its manifestation on the expressed (*vācyārthāpekṣa*), which consists of a denotation of the factors which suggest it, but it is in no way produced from it as an effect and differs entirely in essence. This suggestion is said to be 'of an imperceptible process', because the perception of the suggested Rasa by means of the various factors necessarily involves a process, but from its quickness the process is not perceived, like the process, as one writer graphically puts it, of the apparently simultaneous piercing of a hundred lotus-leaves placed one upon another. At the moment of relishing a poetic mood or feeling we are so absorbed in it that we do not perceive the process which suggests it, and this subtle suggestion may fittingly be described as one of 'imperceptible process'.

By the side of the *dhvani-kāvya*, the true poetry, in which the suggested sense is predominant, we have poetry of second-rate excellence, designated *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya*, in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part, in so far as it serves to emphasise or embellish the expressed. Here was an opportunity of including some of the results of earlier investigations of the Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools, which indirectly recognised a suggested sense but comprehended it, consciously or unconsciously, in some expressed poetic figures. Thus, in *samāsokti* was admitted the apprehension of a suggested matter, in *dīpaka* of another suggested figure, in *rasavat* of suggested Rasa. But in all these cases the expressed sense is meant to predominate and constitute the charm of the particular figure, the suggested sense being there only to emphasise or embellish it. Thus, in the much discussed figure *rasavat*, which was recognised by old Poetics and which helped to smuggle in, as it were, the idea of Rasa into their systems,

a certain community of human feelings, and because the germs of the feelings already remain in a latent form in his mind.

the moods and feelings were supposed to have been roused, not for their own sake, but only to embellish the expressed thought. But this was not doing full justice to the fundamental significance of Rasa, and the point was bound to be re-examined. The Dhvani-theorists did not reject but justified this kind of poetry, in which the Rasa is suggested not directly but secondarily, and included it in their second class of poetry. The other important case of this kind, known to earlier writers, in which something remains unexpressed but is understood, occurs in very many poetic figures which depend for their charm upon another analogous figure involved in themselves. Thus, Vāmana thought that the *upamā* or comparison was involved in all figures, and Bhāmaha stated (in which Daṇḍin substantially concurred) that all figures, in order to be charming, presupposed an *atiśayokti*, which he took as being involved necessarily in what he calls *vakrokti* (in the sense of a poetic figure). Udbhaṭa assigned an apparently similar function to *śleṣa* involved in some figures. Since the *upamā*, *atiśayokti* and *śleṣa*[26] are themselves independent figures, they can be involved in other figures as something unexpressed or suggested by the latter. But as the expressed figure is here in each case prominent, and the unexpressed merely helps to bring out its charm, these cases, in the opinion of the Dhvani-theorists, may also be fittingly relegated to this second class of poetry. In the third class are included those cases where there is no borrowed charm of a suggested sense at all, and where the appeal consists in some striking mode of direct expression, as in those figures of speech, for example, which delight us by their turns of expression alone.

Thus, the suggested sense, or the unexpressed, has three different aspects ; it may either be (1) a matter or an idea (*vastu-dhvani*), (2) a poetic figure (*alaṃkāra-dhvani*), or (3) a

26 Udbhaṭa, however, is said to have held that when the *śleṣa* is involved in another figure, it predominates and dispels the apprehension of the figure itself.

mood or feeling (*rasa-dhvani*). The first occurs when a distinct subject or thought (a matter of fact) is suggested ; the second, where the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative (not a matter of fact) which, if expressed in so many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure ; and the last, where a mood or feeling, which is directly inexpressible but which can be suggested, is the principal element. The Dhvani-theory, therefore, comprehends three kinds of poetry which deal with the communication of a fact (or a thought), or of an imaginative, or of an emotional mood. Abhinavagupta points out[27] that this doctrine is not expressly taught in the Kārikās, but is clear from Ānandavardhana's treatment in his Vṛtti[28].

It appears, however, that both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana put a special stress upon *rasa-dhvani* ; and in spite of the fact that the *citra-kāvya* or the lowest class of poetry is entirely devoid of it, it seems to afford the most weighty criterion by which a poem is to be judged. In a complete scheme, no doubt, the *alaṃkāra-dhvani* and *vastu-dhvani*, tacitly recognised by older writers and practised by the poets, must also be justified ; but the central question, which is carefully examined, is as to how a composition should help the Rasa to expression, for it is repeatedly laid down that neither the *alaṃkāra* nor mere narrative (p. 148) but the suggestion of *rasa* should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense[29]. In other words, the *rasa* appears to be the centre of gravity towards

27 *yas tu vyācaṣṭe—'vyaṅgyānāṃ vastavlaṃkāra-rasānāṃ mukhena' iti, sa evaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ—etat tāvat tri-bhedatvaṃ na kārikākāreṇa kṛtam, vṛttikāreṇa tu darśitam*, Locana p. 123.

28 e. g. *sa hy artho vācya-sāmarthyākṣiptaṃ vastu-mātram alaṃkārā rasādayaś cety aneka-prakāra-prabheda-prabhinno darśayiṣyate*, p. 15.

29 *ayam eva hi mahākaver mukhyo vyāpāro yad rasādīn eva mukhyatayā kavyārthīkṛtya tad-vaktyanuguṇatvena śabdānām arthānāṃ copanibandhanam*, p. 181 ; *paripākavatāṃ kavīnāṃ rasādi-tātparya-virahe vyāpāra eva na śobhate*, p. 221.

which everything else in a poem—*rīti, guṇa, doṣa* and *alaṃkāra*—should move ; and stress coming to be laid on emotion in poetry, the suggestion of Rasa came to prevail over other kinds of suggestion. No doubt, it is laid down in ii. 7 that the unexpressed, apparently in all its three forms, is the *aṅgin* or the principal element, and the Guṇas and Alaṃkāras are to be esteemed in so far as they rest upon it. But this all-important *aṅgin* is explained by Ānandavardhana practically with special reference to Rasa (*rasādi-lakṣaṇam*)[30], and the Dhvanikāra himself elesewhere discusses the merits of diction and the adjustment of words, letters and sentences with regard to their capacity of awakening the Rasa, a theme from which a theory of *aucitya* or propriety was evolved. Again, the Dhvanikāra lays down that the *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* class of poetry can become true poetry (*dhvani-kāvya*) from the consideration of its tendency, if any, of developing a Rasa (iii. 41). In several places, Ānandavardhana is so much carried away by his enthusiasm for Rasa that he goes almost near stating expressly that the Rasa is in fact the essence of poetry, as it is of the drama[31].

This borrowing from the Rasa-system—for the idea of Rasa, as Ānandavardhana himself says, was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others—fills the outlines of the Dhvani-theory with a fundamentally important aesthetic content, which was not yet fully recognised in the poetic art as it had been in the dramatic. And, in this sense, the Dhvani-theory has been characterised as an extension of the Rasa-theory. But in reality it was not an extension so much as a rearrangement ; for the Dhvani-theorists accept

30 The term *rasādi* should be interpreted to mean the *rasa, bhāva* etc. as the *aṅgin* ; but the word *ādi* might in every case be taken to imply strictly the other two kinds of *vyaṅgya artha*, viz. *vastu* and *alaṃkāra*, which would be as much of an *aṅgin* as the *rasa*, although such an interpretation is doubtful from the context.

31 *rasadāyo hi dvayor api tayoḥ* (=*kāvya-nāṭyayoḥ*) *jīvabhūtāḥ*, p. 182. See also the citations in fn 29 above.

the Rasa (despite the emphasis they put upon it) as only *one* of the aspects of the unexpressed in poetry. Neither the Dhvanikāra nor Ānandavardhana could, at least from the standpoint of theoretic consistency, explicitly make the suggestion of Rasa the exclusive end of poetry, inasmuch as the unexpressed may in some cases be a matter or an imaginative mood, although it can be shewn that their views practically tend to such a proposition and probably inspire later theorists to work out the thesis that the Rasa alone is the essence of poetry. The essentiality thus implicitly, if not explicitly, ascribed to Rasa by the formulators of the Dhvani-theory, is, however, expressed more definitely by Abhinavagupta, who appears to have attached little weight to mere theoretical considerations. The point will be dealt with later ; it will suffice here to indicate that Abhinavagupta in many places expresses himself unambiguously that the Rasa is in fact the essence of poetry ; and, admitting that the unexpressed may also take the form of Vastu or Alaṃkāra, he thinks that these two forms of suggestion terminate ultimately in the suggestion of Rasa[32]. We shall see that this opinion probably inspired the somewhat extreme theory of Viśvanātha that the Rasa alone constitutes the essence of poetry ; but the considerations, which had wisely restrained the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* from expressing it in clear terms, could not, as Jagannātha's criticism of Viśvanātha's view shews, be easily put out of the way, and recognition was refused to any further development of the theory out of itself.

The Dhvanikāra's idea was probably to make his conception of poetry wide enough to cover those varieties of

32 *rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryavasyete*, p. 27. An almost similar view is expressed in his comment on the word *ucita* in Ānandavardhana's exposition of the Dhvanikāra's remark on the essence of poetry: *ucita-śabdena rasa-viṣayam eva aucityaṃ bhavatīti darśayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvaṃ sūcayati*, p. 13.

poetry which develop no Rasa, or, which develop it imperfectly, although his real leaning to Rasa possibly betrayed itself in a different end, from which theorists like Viśvanātha drew the inevitable logical conclusion. Nevertheless, we have here an honest attempt to do justice to facts ; not only to set forth what poetry ought to be but to establish the actual facts of poetry as they appeared to these theorists. They could not ignore the fact that the matter (*vastu*) or the imagination (*alaṃkāra*) played an important part in some kinds of poetry, although they were alive to the consideration that the emotion (*rasa*) was in most cases the important criterion. This attitude towards empirical analysis is also exemplified by the anxiety which made them never spare themselves the trouble of going so far as to classify the cases of the unexpressed into more than five thousand different aspects, taking into consideration all conceivable facts and circumstances, which can be made out by a careful analysis of the forms of poetic speech. This fidelity to facts did not also allow them to ignore the aesthetic ideas of earlier speculation ; for though these were found insufficient for explaining the whole problem, the concepts of *rasa, rīti, guṇa, doṣa* and *alaṃkāra* had to be examined and their place properly defined in the new system before it could be established as a complete scheme. One of the triumphs of this school was, no doubt, the admission of the old idea of Rasa to its full importance in the art of poetry, as in the cognate art of the drama ; but the school did not forget at the same time to harmonise the other important elements into its comprehensive theory.

The justification of the Rīti is shown to consist in its relation to the suggestion of Rasa, and it is recognised in so far as it serves as a means to that end. The Dhvani-theorists, however, dispense with the somewhat useless classification of the varieties of Rīti (iii. 52, Vṛtti)[33], the nature of which

33 The numbering of this verse is wrong in the printed text: it should have been iii. 47. It is correctly given in the 4th ed. (1935).

is not discussed by Ānandavardhana, but which, Abhinava points out, is explained by the position assigned to the Guṇas (*rīter hi guṇeṣveva prayavasāyitā*)[34]. The function of the Guṇas is justified only by their part in the development of the Rasa in the theme ; and from this standpoint, as we shall see presently, their minute classification is needless, Ānandavardhana admitting only three Gūṇas corresponding roughly

34 Abhinava says (p. 231): *yad āha—'viśeṣo guṇātmā'* (Vāmana i. 2. 3) *guṇāś ca rasa-paryavasāyina eveti hy uktaṃ prāg guṇa-nirūpaṇe 'śṛṅgāra eva madhuraḥ'* (*Dhva.* ii. 8, p. 79) *ity atreti.* Vāmana has laid down that the *rīti* is nothing more than a particular arrangement of words (*viśiṣṭa-pada-racanā*) and that the essence of this particularity of arrangement consists in the *guṇas.* The nature and scope of the *guṇas,* therefore, determine those of the *rīti.* Now the Dhvanikāra has pointed out in ii. 8f how the three Guṇas, viz. *mādhurya* (in *śṛṅgāra*), *ojas* (in *raudra*) and *prasāda* (in all the *rasas*) contribute to the development of the Rasas ; and his remarks regarding the Guṇas apply to the Rīti, which need not be taken separately. Roughly speaking, his three Guṇas correspond, therefore, to the three Rītis of Vāmana. Ānandavardhana speaks of the Guṇas as having *saṃghaṭanā-dharmatva* (p. 5), but this is probably only giving an exposition of the view of Udbhaṭa who, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 134), had held that the Guṇas are *saṃghaṭanā-dharmāḥ.* He might mean, as Mammaṭa does, that particular combinations of letters or compounding of words produce particular Rasas (see ii. 8f). No doubt, in iii. 5f, both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana speak of *saṃghaṭanā* in connexion with the Guṇas ; but they define *saṃghaṭanā* as depending on the length or shortness of compounds (which would correspond to the definition of Rīti given by Rudraṭa). The appropriateness of the *saṃghaṭanā* depends on the ultimate object of manifesting the Rasa, as well as on the speaker and the theme. The question, therefore, resolves itself into a theory of suitability or propriety (*aucitya*) with regard to the disposition of words, letters and sentences, having a special reference to the Rasa (*rasa-niyama*), as well as to the theme in hand (*vācya-* or *viṣaya-niyama*) and to the temper and character of the speaker (*vaktṛ-niyama*). Ānandavardhana expressly lays down (p. 135) that the Guṇas are not equivalent to *saṃghaṭanā* (*na guṇāḥ saṃghaṭanā-svarūpāḥ*), nor do they depend on *saṃghaṭanā* (*na ca saṃghaṭanāśrayā guṇāḥ*) ; on the other hand, the *saṃghaṭanā* depends on the Guṇas. See S. K. De, *Some Problems*, pp. 91-94.

to the three Rītis of Vāmana[35]. The relation of the Guṇas to the Rasa is further made clear by drawing a sharp line of distinction between them and the Alaṃkāras, which also serve to embellish poetic expression. Expanding the dictum of Ānandavardhana in his Vṛtti on ii. 7, the later writers explain that the Guṇas are the inseparable attributes of the Rasa[36] without which they cannot exist, and are defined in terms of their having *rasa-dharmatva, rasāvyabhicāri-sthititva* and *rasopakārakatva.* If we sometimes speak of them as belonging to a word and its sense, it is said in a secondary or figurative way (*upacāra*), and the old distinction between *śabda-guṇa* and *artha-guṇa* must be regarded in this light. The Alaṃkāras, on the other hand, belong essentially to *śabda* and *artha*, and through these means indirectly embellish the Rasa. Mammaṭa describes their nature thus: "Poetic figures, like alliteration, simile and the rest, are those which sometimes help the existing (*rasa*), through the parts or members (i.e. *śabda* and *artha*), just as a necklace and the like (do to the human soul)"[37]. The Vṛtti explains[38]: "Poetic figures are those which help the principal existing *rasa*, through the excellence of the parts, consisting of the expressor

35 A similar function is assigned to the *vṛttis* recognised by Udbhaṭa. See p. 142, and also Abhinava's remarks on pp. 5-6.

36 Ānandavardhana says (ii. 7 Vṛtti): "The *guṇas* depend on that sense which is the principal existing content (*aṅgin*) in the form of *rasa* etc. Those, again, which rest upon the parts or members (*aṅga)*, namely the expressed word and sense, are considered to be *alaṃkāras.* The former may be compared to qualities like bravery, and the latter to ornaments like bracelet". Mammaṭa uses the term *acala-sthiti* (interpreted by Govinda as *apṛthak-sthiti*) to indicate the relation of Guṇa to Rasa.

37 *upakurvanti taṃ santaṃ ye'ṅga-dvāreṇa jātucit / hārādivad alaṃkārās te'nuprāsopamādayaḥ / /*

38 *ye vācya-vācaka-lakṣaṇāṅgātiśaya-mukhena mukhyaṃ rasaṃ saṃbhavinam upakurvanti te kaṇṭhādyaṅgānām utkarṣādhāna-dvāreṇa śarīriṇo'py upakārakā hārādaya ivālaṃkārāḥ. Yatra nāsti raso tatrokti-vaicitrya-mātra-paryavasāyinaḥ, kvacit tu santam api nopakurvanti.*

(word) and the expressed (sense), just as a necklace and the like add to the excellence of the soul through the adornment of a part of the body like the neck. Where there is no *rasa*, these end in mere strikingness of expression (*vaicitrya*) ; and sometimes when the *rasa* is existing, they do not help it". The Alaṃkāras, therefore, have only an indirect relation to the Rasa through their capacity of embellishing the expressed *śabda* and *artha*, and add to its excellence only secondarily. They can exist without the Rasa in the form of mere strikingness of expression (*ukti-vaicitrya*) ; and even when the Rasa is present, the poetic figures are not invariably necessary[39]. As to how the Alaṃkāra may sometimes help the Rasa, the question is discussed by the Dhvanikāra in ii. 19-20, and four possible circumstances are said to occur (1) when the poet, not dealing with it as the main point, intends its subordination to the main theme, e.g. the Rasa (*tatparatvena, nāṅgitvena*), (2) when he accepts or rejects it as suiting the occasion (*kāle graha-tyāgayoḥ*), (3) when he does not want to carry it out effectively to the end (*nāti-nirvāhe*), and (4) when accomplished effectively, it is still made subservient (*nirvāhe'-pyaṅgatve*)[40].

The comparatively subsidiary position thus assigned to the Alaṃkāra[41] must not, however, be taken to indicate any

39 This is explained by the following commentary: *guṇā rasaṃ vinā nāvatiṣṭhante: guṇā rasam avaśyam upakurvanti alaṃkārās tvavaśyaṃ nopakurvanti* ; *guṇā rasa-dharmā ataḥ sākṣād rase tiṣṭhanti, alaṃkārās tu na rase sākṣāt tiṣṭhanti kiṃ tu tvaṅga-dvāreṇa.*

40 Cf Hemacandra p. 17.

41 In Mammaṭa's much criticised definition of poetry, therefore, the Alaṃkāra is taken as an accident, not as an essential ; and though technically the phrase *analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* is open to the objections brought forward by Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, the views of the latter on the point under discussion does not differ substantially from those of Mammaṭa. In Mammaṭa's definition there is no direct mention of *vākyārthībhūta rasa* or of the *vyaṅgya* sense other than the Rasa (which are there by implication), but the Guṇas and Doṣas are expressly mentioned. The explanation of these peculiarities of the definition must

tendency to minimise its importance, for Ānandavardhana himself admits that poetry depends on it for its operation (*kāvya-vṛttes tadāśrayāt*). But the Alaṃkāra is accepted only in connexion with the *aṅgin* or the principal element in poetry, which in most cases takes the form of Rasa; and Alaṃkāras, other than such, which are devoid of or unconnected with the suggestion of Rasa and therefore unpoetic, are in Ānandavardhana's opinion, mere *vāg-vikalpas*, and should be included in the *citra-kāvya*, which is no poetry but an imitation thereof. The authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* ignored these because their system had no place for them; but the poet may sometimes intend not to awaken Rasa or anything else unexpressed, but to produce mere strikingness of expression in the form of a poetic figure. Such cases, therefore, should be acknowledged and analysed. We shall see that followers of the Dhvani-system like Ruyyaka realised this deficiency in the treatment of the Dhvanikāra and tried to supply it by admitting the significance of such figures for poetry and analysing their content after the indication given by Kuntaka.

The view indicated above regarding the nature of the Guṇas necessarily dispenses with their endless multiplication and differentiation. Mammaṭa and his followers, accepting the standpoint of the *Dhvanyāloka* in this respect, admit only three Guṇas, viz., *mādhurya* (sweetness), *ojas* (energy) and *prasāda* (lucidity), out of the ten recognised since Bharata's time. They shew elaborately that these ten are either included in the three mentioned above, or else constitute mere absence of defects, while some of them are even positive defects. In fact, these three Guṇas are defined broadly enough to include most of the ten Guṇas of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Thus, the *mādhurya*, found chiefly in the Erotic, the Pathetic and the Quietistic moods, is described

be sought in the historical development of these ideas in the earlier schools, and not in any attempt to invent an original definition. See below ch. vii.

generally as that excellence which brings delight (*āhlāda*) to the mind and makes it melt, as it were (*druti-kāraṇa*); the *ojas*, arising in the Heroic, the Furious and the Disgustful moods, is that property by which the mind is brilliantly expanded (*vistāra-kāraṇa*); while the *prasāda*, found in all poetic moods, causes them to pervade the mind (*vyāpti-kāraṇa*), like fire pervading dry fuel, or water pervading a pure piece of cloth. As they are related to the main poetic mood Rasa in the composition and made suitable to its particular kind, the classification, as given here, naturally proceeds on a psychological basis having reference to their influence on the reader's mind (so as to lead up to the particular mood), and supersedes the old differentiation resting on an adjustment of sound and sense. It will be also seen from the somewhat comprehensive definitions of the three Guṇas that the *śleṣa*, *samādhi* and *audārya* of older writers may be included in *ojas*, and the *artha-vyakti* in *prasāda*; while *saukumārya* and *kānti* are essentially the opposites of the defects of harshness (*pāruṣya*) and vulgarity (*grāmyatva*) respectively, and *samatā* or uniformity of diction may sometimes be a positive defect.

Consistently with this view of the Guṇas, the Doṣas or defects of a composition are recognised in so far as they are the repressors of the Rasa, as well as of the expressed sense. The Doṣas, therefore, convey a positive significance, like the Guṇas, in relation to the Rasa, in spite of the admitted fact that some Doṣas approach *guṇābhāva* (negation of Guṇas) and some Guṇas approach *doṣābhāva* (negation of Doṣas). The *punarukta* or tautology, for instance, is generally a fault, but it may sometimes be an excellence if there is an apprehension of the charm of the suggested Rasa through it. The justification of the distinction between invariable (*nitya*) and non-invariable (*anitya*) fault lies in the fact that in the case of some poetic moods, we can generalise the avoidance of particular combinations as being always damaging for the effect. Thus, the Dhvanikāra points out that when love or *śṛṅgāra*

is the principal suggested mood, one should always avoid faults like unmelodiousness (*śruti-duṣṭa*), although it is not a fault in the case of the Heroic or *raudra-rasa*.

The attempt, therefore, to estimate the worth of a poem by analysing two kinds of meaning the one explicit and the other implicit, and judging it by a reference to the latter rather than to the former, explains in a new light the nature and function of the Guṇas and Doṣas, as well as of the Alaṃkāras which were admitted by previous speculation, but over which there had been so much controversy. The explicit, or expressed word and sense, in which poetry is clothed constitutes its mere vesture, but this external or accidental feature alone appealed to earlier thinkers, whose attention was practically confined to the expressed *śabda* and *artha*. The Guṇas and Doṣas (along with the so-called Rīti), as well as the Alaṃkāras, are only certain forms of these, being merely turns given to *śabda* and *artha* in expression, and are justified as such. They cannot, therefore, be taken as essential, for they do not touch the essence of poetry which consists of the implicit or unexpressed meaning. But at the same time, they cannot be ignored because they are the means by which the unexpressed is suggested, the expressed word and sense being the *vyañjaka* of the deeper *vyaṅgya* sense. In classifying the implicit or the unexpressed, again, into communication of a fact (*vastu-dhvani*), or suggestion of an imaginative mood (*alaṃkāra-dhvani*), or manifestation of an emotional state (*rasa-dhvani*), the theorists recognised the truth that the essence of poetry may consist of fact, imagination or feeling as the predominant implicit factor, the outward expression being important as a means of pointing to this implicit significance. But it is also perceived that the emotional mood, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us, is of the highest importance in poetry ; and stress came to be laid on this emotional mood to the extent even of ignoring the imaginative or the realistic, and poetry came to have a deeper significance as a means of emotional realisa-

tion. This the Dhvani-theorists did by emphasising the *rasa-dhvani* in poetry.

This, in brief, is an outline of the new system which attempts to take into consideration all the known facts and dogmas and build a compact theory of poetry on their basis. But its chief merit consists in its elaboration of the most necessary and fundamental principle of all higher poetry, viz., the art of suggestion, which should lead the reader through diverse routes from that which is distinctly expressed to that which is left unexpressed. With the arrival at this point, one discovers the real significance of a poem and appreciates the taste or relish of the underlying poetic sentiment, which is in reality inexpressible. The ornamental fitting out of thought or word, as well as the literary excellences of structure or style, everything contributes towards this end. In this connexion, we must not mistake this suggestion to be a form of quiet hinting, or of absolute silence, such as we find in some modern poetic mystics, or that particular train of thought which holds that all things have their being in the unexpressed and resolve themselves into the indeterminable. Sanskrit poetry does not aim at leaving the unexpressed to be darkly gathered, nor does the theory of Poetics regard it as indeterminate. The unexpressed is bound up by means of definite links with the expressed, without which it cannot exist; but it is wrapped up in such a manner as to make it possible only for the initiated in the poetic hieroglyphics to comprehend it in its subtlety. The unexpressed is not understood by those who know grammar and lexicon, but only by men of taste and literary instinct who know the essence of poetry. It is the province of the *sahṛdaya*, the connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intricate meshes of veiled word and sense into the aesthetic relish of deeper significance, in which the pleasure of the beautiful is mixed up with the pleasure arising from the fineness of the problem itself.

This general scheme of Poetics outlined by the Dhvani

school, in spite of the loopholes that may be detected in the doctrinal edifice, is accepted as canonical by all important writers coming after Ānandavardhana. Here and there an isolated theorist arose who dared to question the general creed, but he was at once put down as a heretic and condemned to neglect and oblivion. The immediately following systems of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra and the Vyaktiviveka-kāra were, in spite of their able and ingenious efforts, unable to supplant the Dhvani-theory ; and, finding no strong adherents, themselves languished and died out. These views are taken notice of by later writers only for the purpose of refuting them. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, judging from the long quotations from his lost work in Abhinavagupta and others, seems to have made a greater impression ; but even he does not appear to have been very successful. All these writers, no doubt, accept the concept of a suggested sense, but when they endeavour to explain it in a different way, they could hardly find a patient hearing. Even Viśvanātha's attempt to push the theory to its logical extreme did not meet with universal approval. The labours, therefore, of all later writers, typified by Mammaṭa, consisted generally in working out the details of the Dhvani-theory and the scheme of Poetics standardised on its basis ; and they spent all their fine scholastic powers in refining and explaining but hardly in adding anything of abiding interest. No other work on Sanskrit Poetics has indeed exerted so much influence as the *Dhvanyāloka*, which brought to a focus the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers, and by its thoroughness and masterly exposition eclipsed all its predecessors, dominating, as it did, thoughts of generations of theorists even down to the present time.

CHAPTER VI

ABHINAVAGUPTA AND THE REACTIONARY SYSTEMS

(1)

Abhinavagupta

The importance of Abhinavagupta as a writer on Sanskrit Poetics lies in his learned exposition of the Dhvani-theory in his well known commentary on the text of Ānandavardhana ; and his erudition, reputation and influence as a great scholar and philosophical writer of his generation, no doubt, added weight to his championship of the theory, and contributed a great deal to its ultimate exclusive acceptance in later Poetics. His theoretical standpoint, however, does not differ, except in one material point which will be dealt with presently, from that of the formulators of the Dhvani-system ; and he may be fairly regarded as belonging to that group of faithful commentators who are more anxious to interpret than to incorporate new ideas into the system they comment upon. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta was also greatly interested in the dramaturgic work of Bharata and wrote an elaborate and stupendous commentary on this encyclopaedic text. From this interest in dramaturgy, we have seen[1], he came to be deeply interested in the various theories about the origin and function of Rasa, not only in the drama but also in poetry ; and one of the latest and most important theory on Rasa is directly associated with his name by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and others. In expounding this theory, he tried to explain clearly how the *vyakti* or *vyañjanā* of the Dhvani-theorists could be applied to the case of the manifestation of Rasa, thus correlating the Rasa-

1 See ch. iv, p. 128.

doctrine with the Dhvani-theory. He defined the concept of Rasa and its place in poetic theory, and furnished a brilliant aesthetic explanation of a phenomenon which had already taxed the ingenuity of many a previous thinker on the subject.

Having realised the importance of Rasa in poetry, Abhinava, however, went a step further than the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in boldly setting it up as the only essence or aesthetic foundation of poetry, a view which has greatly influenced all later speculation on the subject. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* had admittedly worked up the idea of Rasa into poetry and poetic theory ; but as the emotional mood in poetry, which the fact of Rasa emphasises, came to be more and more prominent, the Rasa stood out more and more in relief as its essential aesthetic basis. We have seen[2] that Abhinava's predecessors in the Dhvani school consider Rasa only as one of the elements of the unexpressed, which may take other forms in the shape of an unexpressed matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (*alaṃkāra*). No doubt, their theory puts great emphasis on the *rasa-dhvani* or suggestion of Rasa in poetry ; but both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana are yet careful in taking into account other kinds of suggestion and do not, as they could not, erect the Rasa into the very 'soul' of poetry. No doubt, it may be thought that they show a decided partiality to *rasa*, which would practically lead to a conclusion of its essentiality ; but they could not, having regard to theoretical consistency give exclusive preference to it ; for in their complete scheme of Poetics the *rasa-dhvani*, which is only one of the three forms of the unexpressed, plays as much part as the *vastu-* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. They had to recognise that the centre of gravity in a poem may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element. Abhinavagupta appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considera-

2 See ch. v, p. 166.

tions, which had restrained his predecessors from explicitly stating what they practically implied ; and brushing them aside, he carries their theory to its utmost logical consequence by declaring the essentiality of Rasa (*rasenaiva sarvaṃ jīvati kāvyaṃ*), without which, in his opinion, there could be no poetry (*na hi tac chūnyam*, i. e. *rasa-śūnyam, kāvyaṃ kiṃcid asti*, p. 65). He attempts, however, to explain the theoretical discrepancy by saying that the two other aspects of suggestion, concerned respectively with *vastu* and *alaṃkāra*, resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of *rasa*, which is in fact the essence of poetry (*rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryavasyete*, p. 27). This opinion, no doubt, influenced the view of later thinkers to a great extent ; for, although Mammaṭa carefully follows the cautious attitude of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, Viśvanātha, developing their theory (after Abhinavagupta) further out of itself, pushes it to its extreme limit and builds up his own scheme of Poetics on the basis of the theory that poetry consists of a sentence of which the 'soul' is Rasa (*vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyam*). But we shall see that the considerations which led the Dhvanikāra and his commentator to leave their view on this point wisely unstated could not be easily put out of the way, and they are repeated substantially by Jagannātha in his criticism of Viśvanātha's view. All later writers, however, agree in thinking that the *rasa-dhvani* is certainly the most important point for consideration in poetry ; and even if they do not explicitly state with Abhinava that the *vastu-* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani* resolve ultimately into *rasa-dhvani*, they yet show a decided partiality to the latter element.

This, in brief, is the general position of Abhinavagupta as a champion of the new system established by Ānandavardhana. The final dominance of this system in later speculation is due not only to the intrinsic worth of the theory itself and its masterly formulation by Ānandavardhana, but also probably to the authority which Abhinava's exposition as well as his

reputation lent to it. We find in the immediate followers of the system, however, not the extreme position of Abhinavagupta, but the theory and the scheme as finally outlined by Ānandavardhana. With Ānandavardhana, the Dhvani-theory, which was itself ancient, came to prevail; but with him also was evolved a more or less complete scheme of Poetics in which the divergent gleams of earlier thought and the accumulated stock of recognised ideas meet and are rationally adjusted. This scheme, with the concept of *dhvani* (especially *rasa-dhvani*) at its centre, was summed up and uttered in the concise form of a systematic text-book by Mammaṭa, another Kashmirian, whose influence perhaps was not less potent than that of Abhinavagupta in raising it to almost exclusive authority in later times. This system, which for convenience we have called the Dhvani-system, absorbed and overshadowed all previous schools and systems, and came to reign supreme, only to be improved in detail by the large crowd of its followers who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on Poetics. Jagannātha, one of the latest writers of this group, very aptly remarks, therefore, that the authors of *Dhvanyāloka* settled the path to be followed by later writers on Poetics (*dhvanikṛtām ālaṃkārika-saraṇi-vyavasthāpakatvāt*, p. 425).

But it must not be supposed that the theory or system of Dhvani could obtain universal acceptance without some vigorous opposition. Before we take up the post-dhvani followers of Ānandavardhana, it will be necessary to consider here some of the reactionary writers who either follow and develop other traditions of thought, or who refuse to acknowledge the new theory. Adherents of other schools, such as Pratīhārendurāja (pp. 79f) who commented on Udbhaṭa, or Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla (p. 72) who commented on Vāmana, carry on the older tradition and do not fail to criticise the new theory. Says Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja's Guru: *lakṣaṇā-mārgāvagāhitvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ sahṛdayair nūtanatayopavarṇitasya vidyata iti...etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagity evāsūyitavyam ity alam ati-*

prasaṅgena (p. 21). But more hostile opposition or attack came from some really thoughtful writers who urged new systems, or new explanations of the Dhvani-theory in terms of old ideas. Most of these theorists lived near enough in time to Abhinavagupta ; and coming later than the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, they accept or show themselves cognisant of the general concept of *dhvani*, but attempt to formulate other explanations of it. All of them, however, agree that the *vyañjanā vṛtti* need not be postulated or proved for explaining the suggested sense of poetry, and conservatively maintain that the suggested sense can be reached from the expressed sense by some of the recognised means or processes of knowledge (e. g. *anumāna*). None of these writers, therefore, is what the Dhvanikāra would call an *abhāva-vādin*, i.e., none of them would deny the existence of Dhvani, but they would try to explain it in terms of already recognised concepts or processes. These theorists are: Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who probably preceded Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka who was probably the latter's contemporary, and Mahimabhaṭṭa who was either a younger contemporary or lived immediately after Abhinavagupta. It will also be convenient to take up in this connexion the school of opinion represented by the writer on Poetics in the *Agni-purāṇa* and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects apart from the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani-theory.

(2)

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka

It is unfortunate that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* is now lost. From the citations of Abhinavagupta and others, the conjecture is likely that it was not a commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra*[3] but an independent work written in prose and verse (i.e., with verse-*kārikā* and prose-*vṛtti*) and

3 See vol. i, pp. 40f.

resembling Mahimabhaṭṭa's later *Vyakti-viveka* written in the same style and with the same object. Like the latter work, it was composed, if not for establishing a new theory of Poetics, at least for controverting the position of the *Dhvanyāloka* and formulating a different explanation of Dhvani, especially of *rasa-dhvani*. When Mahimabhaṭṭa later on took upon himself the task of "demolishing" the Dhvani-theory, he boasted at the outset of his elaborate attack that he had composed his *Vyakti-viveka* without looking into the *Darpaṇa*[4] (presumably *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, as explained by his commentator), which was therefore obviously written with the same object of *dhvani-dhvaṃsa*. No doubt, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was one of the four writers (mentioned by Abhinava, Mammaṭa and others) who formulated explanations of Bharata's original *sūtra* on Rasa ; but this in itself is no reason to take him as a commentator on Bharata's text[5].

4 It is curious that Mahimabhaṭṭa says that in composing his own work he has not also looked into the *Candrikā*, which was apparently an adverse commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is probably the same work as is referred to and criticised frequently by Abhinavagupta in his °*Locana* and as, he says, was composed by one of his ancestors. Abhinava's references and criticism also confirm the idea that it criticised the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* adversely on many points. This *Candrikā* is also apparently cited by Māṇikyacandra and Someśvara in their commentaries on Mammaṭa. See vol. i, p. 101.

5 The question has been already discussed by us in vol. i p. 40. There is a passage, already referred to by us, in the *Abhinava-bhāratī* ch. i, which appears (see Sovani's article on the Pre-dhvani Schools in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 390 ; *contra* in *JRAS*, 1909, pp. 450-52) to indicate that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* was a commentary on the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. The passage runs thus (commenting on *brahmaṇā yad udāhṛtam* in Bharata i. 1): *bhaṭṭa-nāyakas tu brahmaṇā paramātmanā yad udāhṛtaṃ kṛta-nidarśanaṃ.........tad anena pāramārthikaṃ prayojanam uktam iti vyākhyānaṃ hṛdaya-darpaṇe paryagrahīt*. This passage is indeed important, for the *relevancy* of any comment on Bharata i, 1, is difficult to explain in a work which *ex hypothesi* is not a commentary on the text. But it appears to militate against those references to and passages from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's work (prose as well as verse) which Abhinava cites and criticises in his °*Locana* (pp. 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 27,

On the other hand, Abhinava's references in °*Locana* make it reasonably clear that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, like the *Vyakti-viveka*, had the special object of criticising in detail the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* as well as its theory ; and its discussion of Rasa might have come in topically in connexion with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's general views regarding poetry and poetic expression.

The question, however, cannot be definitely settled so long as we get only glimpses of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views set forth in the brief exposition and adverse criticism of Abhinava and others. We have already considered at some length Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views regarding the origin and function of Rasa in poetry[6]. We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka regards *rasa-carvaṇā* as the essence of poetry, but he is apparently not prepared to accept the function of *vyañjanā* as its means of manifestation[7]. It is possible that he admits a suggested sense, as he accepts

28, 29, 33, 63, 67-68) and which consist mostly of direct criticism of the text of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Either of two explanations is possible: (1) that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* was in fact a commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra*, and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's criticism of the *Dhvanyāloka* might have constituted incidental discussions in it. But this does not explain the presence of *verses* in it, which later writers, including Abhinavagupta, quote from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in their exposition of his views ; or (2) that it was an independent work in prose and verse, consisting of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's propounding of his own views in opposition to those of the *Dhvanyāloka* ; and the discussions of Rasa-theory and of Bharata's text are not altogether inexplicable, as they might have been topical in connexion with his general theory. This latter explanation, which we have already discussed vol. i, seems to be more likely.

6 See ch. iv, pp. 123f.

7 Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's objection to the *abhivyakti*-theory is thus summarised by Abhinavagupta (°*Locana* p. 68): "If the potentially existing *śṛṅgāra* is supposed to be manifested by *abhivyakti*, then it would occupy its field of action in diverse degrees (*viṣayārjana-tāratamya-pravṛttiḥ*), i.e., thus contradicting the nature of Rasa as one. There would also be the difficulty mentioned before, namely, whether the Rasa is manifested as existing in oneself or in another person,"

the suggestion of Rasa as the essence of poetry (*rasa-dhvanis tu tenaivātmatayāṅgīkṛtaḥ*, °*Locana* p.15) ; but from Abhinava's twitting him on this score it is probable that he denied *vastu-dhvani* (*kiṃ tu vastu-dhvaniṃ dūṣayatā rasa-dhvanis tad anugrāhakaḥ samarthyata iti suṣṭhutarāṃ dhvani-dhvaṃso'yam*, p. 20). Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains in a verse attributed to him by Abhinava (p. 27), Hemacandra (p. 4), Māṇikyacandra (p. 4) and Jayaratha (p. 9) that the distinction between various kinds of literary composition lies in the fact that in the Śāstra *śabda* predominates, *artha* in the Ākhyāna (=probably *itihāsa*), while in the Kāvya, both *śabda* and *artha* are subordinated (*guṇībhūta* or *nyagbhāvita*). Elsewhere he is represented by Abhinava (p. 68) as saying that the verbal composition (*śabda*) which makes up poetry is different from other species of verbal composition by the fact that it possesses three elements. Of these elements, *abhidhā* or Denotation belongs to the province of expressed meaning, *bhāvakatva* or power of generalisation to that of Rasa, and the *bhojakatva* or the power of enjoyment to the appreciating audience ; thus we have three functions attributed to the three elements of poetry. If Denotation, among these, is taken by itself (i.e. without the other two), then what is the essential difference, he asks, between the poetic figures and the dogmas which form the method of Śāstras? Or, if this manifold distinction of functions is without importance (metaphorically as well as intrinsically), then why avoid faults like unmelodiousness (*śruti-duṣṭa*)? These considerations, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thinks, would give us the second function, viz. *bhāvakatva*, by which generalisation is accomplished of poetry as well as of its factors (*vibhāvas*). It is on account of this function that *abhidhā* or Denotation is also Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), i.e., the Denotation can give to the expressed sense a secondary or metaphorical significance as the basis of Rasa. After the Rasa is thus generalised (*bhāvita*), comes its enjoyment or *bhoga* which, we have seen, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka represents, after the Sāṃkhya philosophers, as a process of distinterested

contemplation akin to the philosophic contemplation of Brahma.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thus postulates a function of *bhoga*, beyond those of *abhidhā* and *bhāvakatva*, inherent in poetry, in order to explain the working of Rasa. He seems to imply that the Rasa, which the Dhvani-theorists would take as the suggested emotional sense of poetry, is, in his opinion, purely *sva-saṃvedya* and therefore transcending definition. In other words, he belongs to that class of objectors to the Dhvani-theory regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny *dhvani* but think that its essence lies beyond the province of words (i. 1c). In a verse attributed Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka by Abhinava (pp. 15, 11) and Jayaratha (p. 9), he speaks of *kāvyāṅgatva* and not *kāvya-rūpatā*[8] of what is known as *dhvani* ; a statement which would indicate that having assumed the concept, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's object was to establish an explanation different from that of the Dhvani-theorists. Ruyyaka thinks that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka would regard what is called *vyaṅgya-vyāpāra* to be an element (*kāvyāṃśatva*) and not an essence of poetry, being reached by the bold utterance of the poet (*prauḍhokti*). In this sense, the *kavi-karman* or act of imagination on the part of the poet (indicated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as Jayaratha points out, by the word *vyāpāra*), which makes *śabda* and *artha* subservient to itself, is the most important thing in poetry ; a view which approximates Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory to that of Kuntaka, who makes *kavi-karman* the source of what he calls *vakrokti* in poetry.

(3)

Kuntaka

Kuntaka, author of the *Vakrokti-jīvita*, on the other hand, had no direct intention of attacking or disproving the Dhvani-

8 Read in the verse *kāvyāṅgatvaṃ na rūpatā*, as given by the reading of MS *ga* indicated in °*Locana* p. 15.

theory. He appears to have accepted the fact of a suggested sense in poetry but, following the tradition of Bhāmaha's *vakrokti*, he develops a system of *vakrokti* of his own, in some aspects of which he includes all ideas of *dhvani* and *rasa*. Nearly the whole of his long lost work has been recently recovered, and a part of it (chs. i, ii and a part of iii) has been published by the present writer[9]; it is now possible, therefore, to depend no longer on the references to Kuntaka in later literature for an account of his views, but gather it independently from his own statements[10].

The central idea in Kuntaka is that the *vakrokti* is the essence (*jīvita*) of poetry ; and by Vakrokti he understands a certain striking or charming (*vicitra*) mode of expression (*vinyāsa-krama*), which is different from or excels the common or matter-of-fact expression of words and ideas in the Śāstras and the like (*śāstrādi-prasiddha-śabdārthopanibandha-vyatireki*). It is, therefore, a deviation from the established mode of speech for the purpose of attaining a certain strikingness (*vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*), or an imaginative turn of words and ideas (*bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti* or *bhaṇiti-prakāra*) peculiar to poetry, and abhorrent of common speech in which facts are more or less simply stated. This is the *vakratva* or *vakra-bhāva* underlying all poetic speech. A distinction, therefore, is implied not only between the method of the sciences and the scriptures (*śastrādi*), on the one hand, and that of poetry, on the other, but also between what may be called the "naturalistic" and the "artistic" mode of expression[11].

Kuntaka, therefore, holds that *sālaṃkṛta śabda* and *artha* or embellished word and sense alone constitute poetry, and this embellishment consists of Vakrokti. The so-called embellishments, which go by the name of poetic figures

9 In the Calcutta Oriental Series, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1928. The work consisted probably of four chapters. See vol. i. p. 128 above.

10 An account of Kuntaka's theory of poetry is given in the introduction to the above edition, which see for detailed references.

11 See above ch. ii, pp. 48-49.

(*alaṃkāras*) in orthodox Poetics, are merely aspects of this Vakrokti, and can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. So can also the ideas of *dhvani* and *rasa*. This Vakrokti being the only possible *alaṃkāra* and being essential as such, Kuntaka finds fault with the common statement that the *alaṃkāra* belongs to poetry ; for such a statement would imply that poetry may exist without it (i. 7, 11).

Kuntaka then explains that the Vakrokti charms us by the skill of the poet, and is therefore called *vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti*[12]. It rests ultimately on the conception (*pratibhā*) of the poet, or on his skill (*kauśala*), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed *kavi-vyāpāra* or *kavi-karman*. Kuntaka does not exactly define this *kavi-vyāpāra*, which is the ultimate source of poetry, perhaps because he is conscious of the fact that it is in its nature undefinable ; but he analyses it elaborately, and distinguishes and classifies its function in six different spheres, namely, in the arrangements of letters (*varṇa*), of the substantive and terminal parts of a word (*pada-pūrvārdha* and *pada-parārdha*), of a sentence (*vākya*), of a particular topic (*prakaraṇa*), and of the composition as a whole (*prabandha*). He devotes

12 The word *vidagdha* is used in opposition to the word *vidvat* to signify a man versed in *belles-lettres* as distinguished from a scholar ; and the *Dhvanyāloka* often speaks of an appeal to *vidagdha-vidvat-pariṣad* (pp. 201, 239). Avantisundarī is cited in *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* p. 46 as saying *vidagdha-bhaṇiti-bhaṅgī-nivedyaṃ vastuno rūpaṃ na niyata-svabhāvam*. The *vaicitrya* is discussed by Ānandavardhana at p. 243, in which connexion he uses the term *bhaṇiti-kṛtam vaicitrya-mātram*. Abhinava speaks of infinite variety of *upamā-vicchitti* (*upamā-vicchitti-prakārāṇām asaṃkhyatvāt*, °*Locana* p. 5), and uses it also synonymously with *cārutva* (p. 8). It would appear from the verse quoted by Ānandavardhana at p. 130, the word *vicchitti*, used in this sense in poetic theories, is applied analogically from the same word used to signify a certain feminine charm or elegance derived from carelessness in dress and decoration (Bharata xxii. 16). See on this point Haricand Sastri, *L'art poétiqne de l'Inde* pp. 64-65. The word *bhaṅgī* in the sense of a turn of expression is used in *Dhva*° pp. 139, 241. Etymologically it appears to have the same meaning as *vicchitti*.

nearly the whole of his work, with the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter, to the definition, classification and illustration of these varieties of *kavivyāpāra-vakratā*, which thus form the different categories into which poetic speech may be analysed.

It is clear from this brief exposition that Kuntaka cannot admit as poetry a composition involving mere *svabhāvokti*, which he takes to be plain description without the requisite strikingness; and he consequently develops Bhāmaha's indication that a kind of *atiśaya* is involved in *vakrokti-vaicitrya*. This *atiśaya*, if it is taken in the sense of the *lokātikrānta-gocaratā* of Bhāmaha's *atiśayokti*, would imply a kind of heightened charm of expression which is *lokottara* or dissociated from personal interests and relations. The dissociation, therefore, which is supposed in the artistic attitude involved in the relish of Rasa[13], is also implied in Vakrokti; and on this point Kuntaka appears to agree with the main position of the Rasa-theorists. Kuntaka also thinks that the ultimate test of this *lokottara vaicitrya* is *tadvidāhlāda* or pleasure of the appreciating *sahṛdaya*, who plays here apparently the same part as he does in the Rasa-theory or in poetic theories generally. It seems, therefore, that the exponents of the different theories approach ultimately the same standard, albeit through different avenues of thought, and agree in holding that *vaicitrya* or *camatkāra* (in Alaṃkāra or Rasa) must be finally subjected to the taste of the *sahṛdaya*.

Thus a new turn was given to the Alaṃkāra-system of Bhāmaha; or rather, what was implicit or naïvely expressed in it was developed to its logical consequence by Kuntaka's systematic analysis of its implications.[14] In spite of the obviously extreme nature of his central theory and his some-

13 See above ch. iv.

14 The Vakrokti-system of Kuntaka may properly be regarded as an off-shoot of the older Alaṃkāra-system (ch. ii).

what quaint nomenclature, his work is of great value as presenting a unique system, or rather as systematising the Alaṃkāra-theory of earlier writers in a refreshingly original way. The Dhvani-theorists had either dismissed the poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*) as mere *vāg-vikalpas*, or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. They speak of the relation of the Alaṃkāra to the principal suggested element of poetry (e.g. in the shape of Rasa); but there might arise cases where the poet's obvious intention is not to awaken Rasa or anything else unexpressed, but simply to produce a strikingness in the form of an expressed poetic figure. In these cases, the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* think that all such figures which, in connexion with an involved unexpressed element, possess a peculiar charm, belong to the class of poetry called by the *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*; if there is no such unexpressed element involved, the figures have a pictorial effect merely, and may be included in the lowest class of poetry, called by them *citra* and described by them as no poetry but an imitation thereof. In other words, they take into consideration such poetic figures as being connected with the unexpressed possess a peculiar charm, and thus justify their position in poetry; the figures unaccompanied by the unexpressed or in no way connected with it are condemned to the level of no-poetry, as phases of speech which is of infinite variety. As Ānandavardhana says: *anantā hi vāg-vikalpās tat-prakārā eva cālaṃkārāḥ.* Kuntaka, on the other hand, justifies the significance of such figures in poetry *as figures*, and shews that this significance is independent of all considerations of their connexion with the unexpressed; for it consists in the very *vaicitrya* or strikingness involved in them, which is sufficient in itself, and does not borrow its power of appeal from elsewhere.

But he justifies the *alaṃkāra* as such only when it involves the *vaicitrya*, *vicchitti* or *vakratva* and becomes a phase of Vakrokti. He admits that the poetic figures are particular forms of speech, aspects of the expressed denotation

(*abhidhā-prakāra-viśeṣāḥ*), in which there need not be any connexion with the unexpressed; but he supposes at the same time a specific differentia in them which consists in a peculiar turn of expression resulting in a characteristic strikingness (*vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*) and depending upon an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā-nirvartita*). Thus, the so-called *alaṃkāras* of orthodox Poetics are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile imagination of the poet; and these, therefore, constitute the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure[15]. Kuntaka in this way not only supplies a remarkable deficiency in the teaching of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but also justifies the existence and fixes the conception of a poetic figure as distinguished from a mere speech-figure. It is no wonder, therefore, that later followers of the Dhvani school, who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on Poetics, readily accept Kuntaka's analysis, and regard the two characteristics, viz. *vicchitti* and *kavi-vyāpāra*, as forming the ultimate test of a poetic figure. Mammaṭa lays down that where there is no suggested Rasa, the poetic figures simply result in *ukti-vaicitrya* or charmingness of expression, and states generally that Alaṃkāra is charmingness itself (*vaicitryam alaṃkāraḥ*). We shall see that Ruyyaka was the first writer who accepts Kuntaka's test of a poetic figure and applies it systematically to a detailed examination and classification of individual poetic figures.

On Rīti Kuntaka puts greater stress than Bhāmaha, and gives a more elaborate classification of Guṇas. He is aware of the classification of Mārga or Rīti made by Daṇḍin and

15 Hence, the word "poetic figure" or *kāvyālaṃkāra*, instead of "figure of speech." See above ch. ii. pp. 74. In a formal scheme of Poetics they no doubt correspond, but this point of view of its involving poetic charm would be entirely omitted in a treatise of rhetoric. It is, therefore, misleading to translate Sanskrit Alaṃkāra as Sanskrit Rhetoric. See *ZDMG*, lvi, 392 fn.

Vāmana, but he does not accept it. He does not also believe that a particular Rīti is determined by Deśa-dharma (regional characteristics) or that it should be named after a particular locality ; for in that case one has to admit infinite varieties of Rīti, as there is infinite number of countries. The classification of Rītis into good (Uttama), bad (Adhama and indifferent (Madhyama) is also futile, for the best kind of mode alone is acceptable, and there is no point in admitting or framing rules for the so-called Adhama or Madhyama mode. In Kuntaka's opinion, it is Kavi-svabhāva alone which furnishes the criterion, and Rītis (Kuntaka employs the term Mārga) should be classified according to the essential difference in the power (Śakti), culture (Vyutpatti) and practice (Abhyāsa) of particular types of poets. One class of poets has special fitness for composition characterised by what he calls Saukumārya, while others prefer Vaicitrya, these being the two extreme modes of composition admitted by him. But there may still be other poets who would prefer to steer a middle course, thus favouring a mixed mode. In the Sukumāra Mārga the natural powers of the poet find an unfettered scope in describing the Svabhāva of things, and consequently whatever ornamentation is required is effected with the least effort ; while in the Vicitra Mārga, favoured by all good poets, the art is chiefly decorative, and the Kavi-Kauśala is Āhārya, being characterised by more deliberate and greater skill. Each of these Mārgas, according to Kuntaka, should contain four sets of excellences or Guṇas, which are designated by the same name but defined differently. In the Vicitra-mārga, we have Mādhurya=compactness of skilful structure avoiding laxity of form ; Prasāda=lucidity due to the use of expressive words and easy syntax ; Lāvaṇya=beauty due to the arrangement of short and long syllables ; and Ābhijātya=elevatedness which is neither too soft nor too hard. In the Sukumāra Mārga, there should be Mādhurya=sweetness due to the fewness of compounds ; Prasāda=perspicuity ; Lāvaṇya=beauty arising out of proper

arrangement of letters and words ; and Ābhijātya=smoothness. The Madhyma Mārga, which stands midway, combines the excellences of both (*ubhāyātmaka*). To these characteristics Kuntaka adds Aucitya (i. 53-54) and Saubhāgya (i. 55-56) as excellences common to the three Mārgas. The Aucitya emphasises fitness of words and ideas, which Saubhāgya arises out of the realisation of all the resources of a composition[16].

It follows from the prominence given by Kuntaka to Vakrokti in poetry that all ideas of Dhvani and Rasa should be comprehended in certain aspects of *vakratā*, just as the Vṛttis of Udbhaṭa, connected with *anuprāsa*, as well as *anuprāsa* itself and *yamaka* of orthodox writers, are taken as kinds of *varṇa-vinyāsa-varkratā* or *vakratā* depending upon the peculiar arrangement of letters. The idea of Dhvani is included partly in *rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā*, where Ānandavardhana's own verse *tāla jaaṃti guṇa*, as well as the verse *snigdha-śyāmala-kānti°* cited by Ānanda as an example of *arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya dhvani* (i. e. suggestion where the expressed sense passes into another sense), is given as instances. Other aspects of Dhvani are ackowledged in *upacāra-vakratā*, where the verse *gaaṇam ca mattamehaṃ*, cited by Ānanda as an instance of *atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya dhvani* (i. e. suggestion where the expressed sense disappears entirely), is given as an example. From Kuntaka's treatment it appears that he takes *upacāra* in the sense of a supposed or fancied identification of two objects, however distinct, on the basis even of the slightest resemblance. As such, therefore, it is admittedly involved in figures like metaphor (*rūpaka*) and forms the basis of metaphorical expression generally. This would come under the comprehensive domain of transferred expression known as *lakṣaṇā*, and would be included by Dhvani-theorists under *lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani*, i. e. suggestion

16 See Har Dutt Sharma, Kuntaka's Conception of Guṇas in *Proc. A.I.O.C*, Patna 1933, pp. 581-91.

based on transference or Indication[17]. Kuntaka would thus belong to that group of writers regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny the existence of *dhvani* but regard it as *bhākta* (*bhāktam āhus tam anye*), i. e. depending on a transference of sense or Indication.

Regarding *rasa-dhvani* which comes under *asaṃlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya* (i. e. suggestion of an imperceptible process), it is clear that Kuntaka, who admits not the essentiality of Rasa but that of Vakrokti, can comprehend Rasa only as an element in some aspects of Vakrokti. In the third chapter of his work, dealing with *vākya-vakratā*, he discusses how poetry may be made charming by delineating appropriate Rasas. In this connexion he examines in some detail such figures as *rasavat*, *preyas* etc., in which Rasa was admitted as an element by early theorists, whose system, maintaining the importance of Alaṃkāra in poetry, could not otherwise recognise Rasa independently. The special poetic figures like *rasavat* etc., constituted the back-gate, as it were, for the admission of the idea of Rasa in the Alaṃkāra-systems. When, however, the theory of Rasa assumed its proper importance in the schools, the necessity naturally arose of explaining how Rasa, which is essential and therefore fit to be embellished (*alaṃkārya* or *upakārya*) can itself be regarded as a means of embellishment (*alaṃkāra* or *upakāraka*) in figures like *rasavat*. We find accordingly in the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana an attempt to comprehend the *rasavat* etc. under the class of poetry called by them *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*, in which the suggested sense (in this case the suggested Rasa) is subordinated to the expressed sense. The theory was put into shape by distinguishing the sphere of *asaṃlakṣya-krama dhvani* from that of figures like *rasavat* on the ground that when the Rasa is predominant and forms the essence of the poem in question, it constitutes the principal suggested

17 It is for this reason that Ruyyaka thinks that the Vakrokti-jīvita-kāra comprehended all ideas of *dhvani* in *upacāra-vakratā* and the like (p. 8 with Jayaratha thereon).

element, and as such it is *alaṃkārya* ; but when it is subordinate to the expressed sense, it constitutes mere *alaṃkāra* or embellishment (*Dhva*° ii. 4 f). The *Pradīpa* puts this concisely by saying: *yatra pradhānaṃ rasādis tatra dhvaniḥ, yatra tvapradhānaṃ tatrālaṃkāra iti bhāvaḥ*. Logically following this view, Mammaṭa does not regard the cases of *rasavat* etc. as poetic figures at all, but only as a variety of *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* poetry[18].

18 Later writers and commentators, however, unwilling to depart from the authority of the "ancients," attempt to explain the problem of *rasavat* in various ways by a method of ingenious interpretation, which keeps to the letter but changes the spirit of the old dictum. Most of these views are discussed by Viśvanātha. One school holds that the designation *alaṃkāra*, given to figures like *rasavat* merely because they help the development of Rasa, is a purely secondary application of the term (*bhākta*) ; for they are not really *alaṃkāras* but should be accepted as such in deference to the practice of ancient writers (*rasādyupakāra-mātreṇehālaṃkṛti-vyapadeśo bhāktaś cirantana-prasiddhy-aṅgīkārya eva*). These theorists admit a difference between *rasavat*, on the one hand, and *alaṃkāras* properly so called (such as *upamā*), on the other ; for in the one case the Rasa directly embellishes another Rasa, while in the other case, the Rasa is indirectly embellished through the form of word and sense. But they maintain at the same time that there is one thing in common between the two kinds, viz. that both of them embellish the Rasa, either directly or indirectly, by being subservient to it. On account of this similarity of function, the designation *alaṃkāra*, which is properly applicable to such figures as *upamā*, is applied to the *rasavat* by an extension of the sense (*bhakti*) ; and this usage has the sanction of ancient and respectable authority to which we must bow. But this explanation is rejected by others as being too fine. The difference between *alaṃkāras* like *upamā*, on the one hand, and the *rasavat*, on the other, which is supposed to be due to the fact of direct and indirect embellishment, is admitted to be true, but is explained away as purely accidental and immaterial ; and, strictly speaking, we should designate both as *alaṃkāras* instead of indulging in fine distinctions. A third view, which altogether rejects this distinction between direct and indirect embellishment, maintains that the general definition of *alaṃkāra* as that which embellishes the Rasa through word and sense is applicable as much to *rasavat* as to regular figures like *upamā*.

Kuntaka takes up the *rasavat* topically under *vastu-vakratā*, which may relate to both *sahaja* and *āhārya vastu*, the delineation of Rasa coming apparently under the latter head, which is described as *kavi-śakti-vyutpatti-paripāka-prauḍha*. He criticises the definitions of *rasavat* given by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others, and holds that it is neither *darśita-spaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādi-rasam*, nor *rasa-saṃśrayam*, nor again *rasa-peśalam*, but *rasena tulyaṃ vartamānam* ; and consequently it is not an *alaṃkāra* but an *alaṃkārya*. In other words, the Rasa is awakened in these cases for its own sake, and not for the purpose of embelishing the expressed word and sense. If not theoretically invulnerable, this view is interesting as indicating that the importance of Rasa, first advocated in poetic theories by the Dhvanikāra, appears to have influenced thinkers belonging to other traditions of thought. The Dhvanikāra attempts to reconcile the older idea of *rasavat* as involving the idea of Rasa secondarily, by admitting it in his second division of poetry ; but Kuntaka brushes aside even the view of his predecessor Bhāmaha in this respect, and thinks that this case should be regarded as one in which the poet has an opportunity of creating a kind of *vakrokti* in which the Rasa supplies the principal charm. But he allows Rasa to play the greatest part in what he calls *prabandha-vakratā*, i. e. in *vakratā* occurring in the composition as a whole which, he thinks, must be accomplished chiefly by the aid of pleasing Rasas (*rasāntareṇa ramyeṇa yatra nirvahaṇaṃ bhavet*). It is not the mere matter or plot, but the beauty imparted to it by the continuous sense of Rasa in it which can make the words of a poet live (*nirantara-rasoddhāra-garbha-saundarya-nirvarāḥ* / *giraḥ kavīnāṃ jīvanti na kathāmātram aśritāḥ*). Kuntaka even accepts the *Dhvanyāloka's* judgment that in the *Mahābhārata*, the *śānta-rasa* is the *aṅgin* or predominant Rasa and constitutes its principal charm, although he thinks that it is ultimately the *kavi-pratibhā* which is the all-important thing in poetry.

(4)

Mahimabhaṭṭa

Mahimabhaṭṭa begins his *Vyakti-viveka*, whose very name implies that it is a consideration of the theory of *vyakti* or *vyañjanā* established by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, with the proposition that his object is to comprehend all ideas of *dhvani* in the process of *anumāna* or syllogistic reasoning (*anumāne'ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum*). He proceeds, therefore, to consider in detail the text as well as the theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana. He criticises minutely the definition of *dhvani* given in *Dhva*° i. 13 which, if properly considered, applies, he thinks, to *anumāna*. He considers (especially in the third chapter) most of the examples given in the *Dhvanyāloka* and tries to demonstrate that they are really cases of *anumāna*. Indeed, throughout his work he proceeds by an elaborate process of destructive criticism and makes the definition of *dhvani*, propounded by its advocates, conform to his definition of what he calls *kāvyānumiti* as the process through which another sense is revealed by the expressed sense, or by a sense inferred from it connectedly (*vācyas tad-anumito vā yatrārtho'rthāntaraṃ prakāśayati*/, *saṃbandhataḥ kutaścit sā kāvyānumitir ity uktā*, p. 22).

This being his main position, he accepts only two senses of *śabda*, namely, the actually expressed (*vācya*) and the inferable (*anumeya*), including under the latter both *lakṣya* and *vyaṅgya* senses, whose independent existence he does not admit. He says (p. 7); "Meanings are of two kinds, the expressed and the inferable. Of these, the expressed belongs to the function of a word, and is alone called the primary sense of a word..... From it, or being inferred from it, as from a logical *hetu* or middle term in a syllogism, another sense which is inferred, is called the inferable sense. This again is threefold, consisting of mere matter (*vastu*), the poetic figures (*alaṃkāra*) or the mood and sentiments (*rasa*). The first

two of these varieties can also become the expressed, the last is always inferable". It is clear enough from this that Mahimabhaṭṭa apparently accepts the recognised concept of a suggested sense in the shape of a *vastu, alaṃkāra* and *rasa*, but maintains that these are not revealed by *vyakti* or suggestion but by *anumāna*[19]; for the expressed sense and the so-called suggested sense stand in the relation of *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, the middle and the major terms of a syllogism (p. 12).

Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, by analysing many examples taken from the *Dhvanyāloka*, that the expressed sense does not really suggest the unexpressed sense, but that between the two, inferences are possible and do occur. The *vyakti*, as Ānandavardhana himself admits (p. 192), is the manifestation of that which is desired to be manifested, and which becomes manifest along with that which manifests it, just as a jar in a dark room becomes visible along with the light which makes it visible. The *vastu, alaṃkāra* and *rasa*, which are the three suggested elements in the opinion of the Dhvani-theorists, are not manifested in this way; for they are not comprehended along with the expressed which suggests them, but only afterwards. The interval between the perception of the expressed *vibhāvas* and the suggested *rasa*, for instance, is indeed very short, and is therefore called by the Dhvani-theorists themselves a process of imperceptible sequence (*asaṃlakṣya-krama*); but this very nomenclature shows that the existence of a *krama* or sequence cannot be denied, and that the expressed and the unexpressed, therefore, are sequential. Being such, they must bear the relationship of a logical premise and its conclusion (pp. 11 f). Even in the case of the indicated sense, as in the phrase *gaur bāhīkaḥ*, what one first understands is that the two (*go* and *bāhīka*) are not identical, and from this the conclusion arises that

19 This is the only important point of his disagreement with the *Dhvanyāloka*; in other respects, he says, there is hardly any disagreement (*prāṇabhūtā dhvaner vyaktir iti saiva vivecitā/yat tvanyat tatra vimatiḥ prāyo nāstīty upekṣitam//*).

they are meant as possessing similar qualities ; the indicated sense here is ultimately reached by *anumāna* (p. 24). Thus, *artha* is merely a ground of inference and not a *vyañjaka*. The process of Anumāna or inference is very wide in its scope, much wider than that of Dhvani which is naturally included in it (*tasya*, i.e. *anumānasya, ca tad-apekṣayā mahāviṣayatvāt* p. 12). With regard to *śabda*, it cannot be taken as the *vyañjaka* or suggestor of anything else but its literal meaning. As it exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense, even the secondary indicated meaning (*lakṣya artha*) has admittedly to be inferred, not from itself but from the latter ; how can it be supposed to suggest any deeper sense? But such words, through their expressed sense, can well become the ground or source of inference (*anumāpaka*), pp. 27 f.

The process of inference in poetry by which the unexpressed may be thus reached is presumably the ordinary process of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the middle (*liṅga*) and the major (*liṅgin*) terms. The Dhvani or suggested sense is the *liṅgin*, and its suggestors (viz. word and sense) are apparently its *liṅga*. The invariable concomitance is ascertained in three ways, viz. by *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition), *tādātmya* (identity) and *tad-utpatti* (causation). In reply to Mahimabhaṭṭa's position, it has been shewn that none of these means of proving a syllogism is applicable to establishing the invariable concomitance between the *liṅga śabdārthau* and the *liṅgin dhvani*. The non-cognition of word and sense does not prove the existence of *dhvani* ; for non-cognition only proves that *liṅgin* which consists of the absence of something. That a jar is absent can be proved from its non-cognition. But here the *liṅgin dhvani* does not consist of the absence of anything. Therefore the *hetu* is vitiated, and the non-cognition of word and sense can only prove *their* absence, but not that of Dhvani. There can be no identity (*tādātmya*), again, between the suggested sense (*dhvani*) and that which suggests it (*śabda* and *artha*); for the suggested meaning is essentially different from

the expressed, and comes out prominently by keeping the latter in subordinate position. Similarly, the test of *tad-utpatti* or causation does not apply, for here the word and sense cannot be regarded as being caused by the suggested sense, in the same way as the smoke, which proves the existence of fire, can be taken as being produced from the fire itself.

Viśvanātha puts the objections in another way. Inference is the knowledge of the *liṅgin* by means of the *liṅga*, qualified by its existence in the subject (*pakṣa-sattva*), its existence in similar instances (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and its exclusion from opposite instances (*vipakṣa-vyāvartatva*). For example, we conclude in the subject, e. g. a smoky hill, the existence of the *liṅgin* fire by the *liṅga* smoke, which we see existing in it, as well as in similar instances (such as in the culinary hearth, where there is no doubt as to the existence of fire), and which we see absent from opposite instances (e. g. such places where the absence of fire is certain). But this syllogistic method is not strictly applicable to establishing the suggested sense from the expressed ; for logical inference, Viśavnātha points out, has nothing to do with works of imagination. Take, for instance, the following verse :

dṛṣṭiṃ he prativeśini kṣaṇam ihāpy asmad-gṛhe dāsyasi
prāyeṇāsya śiśoḥ pitā na virasāḥ kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati //
ekākiny api yāmi satvaram itaḥ srotas tamālākulaṃ
nīrandhrās tanum ālikhantu jaraṭha-cchedā nala-granthayaḥ //

"O neighbour, will you cast your eyes for a moment here on our house? The father of this child will scarcely drink the tasteless water of a well. Though alone, I go quickly hence to the river whose banks are covered with *tamāla*-trees. Let the densely swarming knots of reeds with their hard projections scratch my body". Here the reed-knot's scratching the woman's body and her going alone to the quiet river-side may be taken as the *liṅga* of her enjoyment with a lover, which is the suggested sense (*liṅgin*) here. But these alleged reasons, though they help to reveal the unexpressed sense, are not

invariable; for dalliance with a gallant is not, from the logical point of view, universally predicable of a woman going alone to a river-side or from her being scratched by the reed-k nots.

It is noteworthy that Mahimabhaṭṭa relies (p. 26) also upon the arguments of those objectors of the Dhvani-theory who think that *dhvani* is identical with *bhakti*[20] ; but he opposes alike the views of those Mīmāṃsakas who believe in the single pervasive power of the expressed sense[21], as well as the view of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra. His objection to the latter system is naturally based on his own idea of the importance of Rasa and unimportance of Dhvani. In his opinion, any deviation from common usage involving charmingness of expression, such as Kuntaka upholds, may take either of two forms, viz. (1) it may resolve itself more or less into a theory of propriety (*aucitya*)[22], or (2) it may mean the manifestation of an implied sense other than the expressed sense. If the first alternative is meant, it is superfluous to one who admits Rasa in poetry, as no theory of Rasa can dispense with a theory of propriety or suitability with regard to the adjustment of its factors. To admit the other alternative is to bring in the idea of *dhvani* in a more or less disguised form.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's work is undoubtedly a masterpiece of

20 See above ch. v, pp. 152f.

21 See above ch. v, 168 fn.

22 Mahimabhaṭṭa treats the question of *aucitya* (already dwelt upon in the *Dhvanyāloka*) in the second Vimarśa of his work. He divides the subject of impropriety, which may be *śabda-viṣaya* and *artha-viṣaya*, into two heads according as it concerns the matter or form of poetry. The former, called *antaraṅga anaucitya*, consists in improper employment of the *vibhāvas* etc. in the manifestation of Rasa. It has already been dealt with in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The formal impropriety, called *bahiraṅga anaucitya*, is chiefly concerned with the occurrence of five defects, viz. *vidheyāvimarśa* (pp. 37-58), *prakrama-bheda* (pp. 58-66), *krama-bheda* (pp. 66-69), *paunaruktya* (pp. 69-84) and *vācyāvacana* (pp. 84-109). The question of *aucitya* will be dealt with in the next chapter.

scholastic argumentation, exhibiting much fastidious criticism and great learning of a miscellaneous kind ; but its avowed object is polemical and it does not pretend to set up a new system. Mahimabhaṭṭa possesses all the qualifications of a subtle controversialist and enters into his task with a decided animus, which constitutes the source at once of his weakness as well as of his strength. A fine product of a scholastic age, he cannot yet look beyond the pettiness of immediate issues ; and whatever might be the value of his peculiar proposition, he hardly ever adds to its limited interest any independent treatment of the larger problems of Poetics. This is perhaps one of the reasons why even his logical acumen and his erudition failed to keep the interest of his work alive ; but the chief reason why his book was forgotten in later times and was cited only to be condemned —a fate which it shared with the *Vakrokti-jīvita* of Kuntaka—was that it pitted itself against the more formidable theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana which was destined to supersede it by attracting away the best thinkers of later times. The *anumāna*-theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa, like the *vakrokti*-theory of Kuntaka, appears to have never received any liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists, nearly all of whom, since Mammaṭa's time, accepted without question the system of the *Dhvanyāloka*. In attempting to explain away the new theory of Vyañjanā in terms of the already recognised idea of Anumāna, or reviving Bhāmaha's old position in the face of the more widely received theory of the new aesthetic school, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka were apparently fighting on behalf of a cause already doomed.

(4)

Bhoja and the Agni-purāṇa

The school of opinion, represented in Poetics by the *alaṃkāra*-portion of the *Agni-purāṇa* apparently follows a tradition which departs in many respects from the orthodox

systems, and which we find developed by Bhoja in his own way in his *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*[23].

This apocryphal Purāṇa of uncertain date is ambitiously cyclopaedic. There is hardly any doubt, however, that the *alaṃkāra*-portion of this work, as we have already remarked, is chiefly a compilation, in a somewhat eclectic fashion, by a writer who was himself no theorist but who probably wanted to collect together and present a workable epitome, conforming in essentials to the teachings of no particular orthodox school, but gathering its material from all sources. This will be borne out not only by its independent, if somewhat loosely joined and uncritical treatment, but also from the presence of verses culled from various old writers.

Taking the Alaṃkāra-section of the *Agni-purāṇa* and the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* side by side, one is struck at once by some fundamental characteristics which are common to both. The most peculiar feature of the *Agni-purāṇa* theory is the absence of the doctrine of Dhvani, although the concept of *dhvani* is included casually, after the manner of ancient authors, in the figure *ākṣepa* (*sa ākṣepo dhvaniḥ syāc ca dhvaninā vyajyate yataḥ*, 344. 14). The word *dhvani* is also used in the opening verse (336. 1=Bhoja i. 1), which says generally that speech consists of *dhvani*, *varṇa*, *pada* and *vākya* (*dhvanir varṇāḥ padaṃ vākyam ity etad vāṅmayam matam*) ; but apparently this alludes to the grammatical word which reveals the *sphoṭa*, and which is indicated by the same term in the *Vākyapadīya*. The work, however, recognises *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*, the ideas of which were already elaborated by philosophers and philosophical grammarians. At the same time, apart from obvious borrowings or copyings from Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, this work cannot be taken as substantially following the views of any one of the schools represented by these names.

23 Much of this section was printed originally as an article contributed to *JRAS*, 1923, pp. 537-49. On *Viṣṇu-dharmottara* Puraṇa see vol. i, p. 95f and on *Agni-purāṇa* i, p. 97f, where an account of their contents is given.

There is no doubt that in one verse, which is conveniently cited by Viśvanātha in support of his own extreme view, the *Agni-purāṇa* speaks of Rasa as the "soul" of poetry in contrast with mere verbal ingenuity (*vāg-vaidagdhya-pradhane'pi rasa evātra jīvitam,* 336. 33). It devotes a somewhat lengthy chapter to the description, after Bharata, of *rasa* and *bhāva* ; yet there is nowhere any central theory of Rasa or any elaboration of a system of Poetics on its basis. As to the origin of Rasa, it propounds a peculiar view that from infinite bliss (*ānanda*) proceeds self-consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*), from self-conciousness proceeds conceit (*abhimāna*), from conceit pleasure (*rati*), of which *śṛṅgāra* (love), *hāsya* (laughter) and other *rasas* are modifications (338. 2-4). It admits with Bharata four fundamental Rasas, from which are derived five others. Although partiality is thus shown to Rasa in poetry and drama, the *Agni-purāṇa* cannot be affiliated to the Rasa school ; for it does not make any attempt to correlate with this central priciple the other factors of poetry, viz. *rīti*, *guṇa* and *alaṃkāra*, which are also recognised as of great, if not of equal, importance. One fact, however, worth noticing in this connexion is that although the *Agni-purāṇa* recognises nine Rasas, adding *śānta* to the orthodox eight, it extols and gives prominence to *śṛṅgāra*: a trait which is unique and which is found fully developed in Bhoja who, as we shall see presently, accepts no other Rasa than *śṛṅgāra* in his *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* and gives almost exclusive attention to this important Rasa in his *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*.

On the other hand, although treatment is accorded to *rīti* (ch. 339) and *guṇa* (ch. 345), the *Agni-purāṇa* does not follow the tenets of the Rīti school, as represented by Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Daṇḍin classifies Rīti, which he calls Mārga, into two extreme types, *vaidarbhī* and *gauḍī*, to which Vāmana adds *pāñcālī* as an intermediate type ; but the classification, according to both, depends upon the presence or absence of certain fixed excellences of diction, known as Guṇas. To

this enumeration Rudraṭa adds *lāṭī*, but by Rīti he means a definite arrangement of sentences with reference to the use of compound words of variable length. The *Agni-purāṇa* accepts this four-fold classification, but the distinction is supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of compound words, but also in the qualities of softness or smoothness, as well as in the prominence or otherwise of metaphorical expression (*upacāra*). The Guṇas, again, are regarded as fundamental characteristics both by Daṇḍin (i. 42) and Vāmana (i. 2. 6-8), who take them as forming the essence of Rīti, and distinguish them carefully from Alaṃkāras, which, in the opinion of Daṇḍin, form the general characteristics of both the Mārgas, and, in the opinion of Vāmana, are merely accidental characteristics enhancing the charm of poetry already brought out by the Guṇas. The *Agni-purāṇa*, however, defines the Guṇas, which are nowhere connected directly with Rīti, simply as those characteristics which reflect great beauty on poetry (*yaḥ kāvye mahatīṃ chāyām anugṛhṇāty asau guṇaḥ*, 345. 3), a definition which hardly distinguishes them from Alaṃkāras, the definition of which is here almost the same: *kāvya-śobhākarān dharmān alaṃkārān pracakṣate* (341. 17)[24], and is merely copied uncritically from Daṇḍin ii. 1. The classification of Guṇas themselves, again, in this work is peculiar to itself. Ordinarily, the Guṇas are classified as either *śabda-guṇas* or *artha-guṇas*, and this procedure is sanctioned by Vāmana. The *Agni-purāṇa* brings in finer distinctions (345. 3 f.). The Guṇas are here said to be of two kinds, specific (*vaiśeṣika*) and general (*sāmānya*), the former apparently confining itself to any specific part or feature of a composition, the latter existing as common to its several component parts. The *sāmānya guṇa*, again, is in its turn classified into three subdivisions,

24 This verse is also cited by Bhoja (ch. v, p. 355) ; but he remarks: *tatra kāvya-śobhākarān ity anena śleṣopamādivad guṇa-rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsa-praśamanādīn apy upagṛhṇāti*, apparently as a commentary on Daṇḍin's view !

according as it appertains to *śabda*, *artha*, or both ; the *Agni-purāṇa* (and Bhoja) admitting for the first time, so far as we know, this threefold classification. An altogether different scheme of enumeration of these Guṇas then follows. Vāmana mentions in all ten Guṇas, making each of these a *śabda-guṇa* as well as an *artha-guṇa*. The *śabda-guṇas*, according to the *Agni-purāṇa*, are seven in number, viz., *śleṣa*, *lālitya*, *gāmbhīrya*, *saukumārya*, *udāratā*, *satyā*, and *yaugikī* ; the *artha-guṇas* are six, viz. *mādhurya*, *saṃvidhāna*, *komalatva*, *udāratā*, *prauḍhī*, and *sāmayikatā* ; the *śabdārtha-guṇas* are again six, viz. *prasāda*, *saubhāgya*, *yathāsaṃkhya*, *praśastyatā*, *pāka*, and *rāga*. The characteristics of some of these Guṇas are not very clearly marked[25] ; and in Guṇas like *saṃvidhāna* and *yathāsaṃkhya* are included ideas which are credited by other writers to Alaṃkāras. Although not enumerated as such, Daṇḍin's *ojas* is reproduced (345. 10=Daṇḍin i. 80) in the course of the treatment of individual *śabda-guṇas*.

In the same way, it can be easily shown that the influence of the Alaṃkāra school, as represented by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, is not very marked in this work. The *śabdālaṃkāras* are, with some modification, developed, no doubt, on the general lines of Daṇḍin's treatment[26], but the *arthālaṃkāras* do not strictly conform to the orthodox classification or definition. The *Agni-purāṇa* gives eight varieties of the latter, viz. *svarūpa* (or *svabhāva*), *sādṛśya*, *utprekṣā*, *atiśaya*, *vibhāvanā*, *virodha*, *hetu* and *sama* (343. 2-3) ; the figures *upamā*, *rūpaka*, *sahokti*, and *arthāntara-nyāsa* being included separately under *sādṛśya* (343. 5), and mention being made of eighteen kinds of *upamā* embracing most of

25 See V. Raghavan, Rīti and Guṇa in the Agni-purāṇa in *IHQ*, x (1934) pp. 776-79. The printed text in the Ānandāśrama ed. appears to be corrupt; Raghavan suggests corrections and interpretations.

26 It recognises nine classes of Śabdālaṃkāras, viz. Chāyā, Mudrā, Ukti, Yukti, Gumphanā. Vākovākyam, Anuprāsa (including Yamaka), Citra and Duṣkara (including Prahelikā).

Daṇḍin's numerous subvarieties of that figures (343. 9 f). The *Agni-purāṇa* is also one of the earliest known works which adds a separate chapter on the *ubhayālaṃkāras* (not recognised by earlier writer), and this includes six varieties, viz. *praśasti, kānti, aucitya, saṃkṣepa, yāvad-arthatā* and *abhivyakti* (344. 2), some of which would come under Guṇas of other writers[27]. Indeed, the classification and definition of the Guṇas and Alaṃkāras, which are not differentiated very clearly, would appear crude and unsystematic, when compared to the elaborate critical treatment of the Rīti and the Alaṃkāra schools.

From this brief outline, it will be clear enough that the *Agni-purāṇa* follows, in its general standpoint, none of the orthodox schools of Poetics, so far as they are known to us, although with regard to its material it attempts to cull, in its cyclopaedic spirit, notions, expressions and even whole verses from the authors of the different schools, without, however, connecting them with a central theory. It borrows, for instance, Daṇḍin's definition of the *kāvya-śarīra* (*iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī*), but the attempt to supplement it by adding *kāvyaṃ sphuṭad-alaṃkāraṃ guṇavad doṣa-varjitam* (336. 6-7), is merely eclectic and hardly constitutes an improvement. The same remarks apply to its definitions of fundamental notions like *guṇa* or *alaṃkāra*, which are merely copied or paraphrased uncritically from earlier writers. At the same time, mere eclecticism is not enough

27 It is noteworthy in this connexion that Daṇḍin's *samādhi-guṇa* is treated here under the context of *lakṣaṇā* with a hint apparently of identifying them.—The borrowings from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin by the Purāṇa are extensive. For instance, the definitions of the figures *rūpaka, ākṣepa, aprastuta-praśaṃsā, samāsokti* and *paryāyokta* given by the Purāṇa (343. 22 ; 344. 15, 16, 18, 17) are almost the same as those of Bhāmaha (ii. 21, 68 ; iii. 29, 8 ; ii. 79) ; while the definitions of *rūpaka, utprekṣā, viśeṣokti, vibhāvanā, apahnuti* and *samādhi* (343. 23, 24-25, 26-27, 27-28 ; 355. 18, 13) appear to have been repeated from Daṇḍin (ii. 66, 221, 323, 199, 304 ; i. 93) respectively.

to explain certain features of this work; the peculiar treatment and arrangement, for instance, of the *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras* which depart very strikingly from orthodox views of the matter. In order to explain this novelty, we should, having regard to the essentially derivative nature of the work itself, admit the probable existence of an altogether different line of speculation, of which unfortunately no other early traces are preserved.

This tradition of opinion we find fully developed in Bhoja. The prominence given to *rasa* and the absence of the *dhvani*-theory in Bhoja, therefore, need not surprise us; nor should the peculiar arrangement of the *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras* appear unintelligible. The same reverence to Bharata and Daṇḍin is shown throughout; and in fact, Daṇḍin is estimated to have supplied Bhoja with more than two hundred unacknowledged quotations[28]. At the same time, Bhoja very freely incorporates definite verses and illustrative stanzas from most of his well-known predecessors, especially from Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Rudraṭa and Dhanika. He even appropriates Kārikās from the *Dhvanyāloka*[29], although he does not accept its theory. His huge compilation, like its prototype the *Agni-purāṇa*, in more or less cyclopaedic in scope and eclectic in spirit, and represents apparently one of the several forms of arranging the teachings (with the exception of ignoring the *dhvani*-theory) of earlier schools in the light of a different tradition, of which another form is perhaps preserved, to a certain extent, in the two Jaina Vāgbhaṭas. But in some of the main points, similarity of his treatment to the *Agni-purāṇa* is obvious, and here the teachings of the orthodox schools are of no avail. The verbal borrowings are numerous. Thus *Agni* 341. 18 f has much in common with *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* ii, some

28 While the *Agni-purāṇa* takes no less than 160 passages from Daṇḍin.

29 As the *Agni-purāṇa* appropriates six of its Kārīkās.

verses of the former being literally adopted by the latter. The *Agni* 341. 18-19, says:

ye vyutpattyādinā śabdam alaṃkartum iha kṣamāḥ |
śabdālaṃkāram āhus tān kāvya-mīmāṃsā-kovidāḥ[30] ||

This definition of a *śabdālaṃkāra* is adopted by Bhoja, with the only verbal change of the defective last line into *śabdālaṃkāra-saṃjñās te jñeyā jātyādayo budhaiḥ* (ii. 2). Such instances can be easily multiplied, and we may cite for comparison *Agni* 341. 21 and Bhoja ii. 39; *Agni* 342. 10 and Bhoja ii. 79; *Agni* 338, 11 and Bhoja v. 3, etc. Apart from this fact of literal similarity, which, however, is not conclusive, there is a striking coincidence, as we shall see presently, of treatment, as well as agreement of views on fundamental points, which is more than merely accidental. It is not suggested that Bhoja is directly copying from the *Agni-purāṇa* or the Purāṇa copying directly from Bhoja; it is quite possible that they exploit in common an unknown source. But there is hardly any doubt that they follow a common tradition which is different in many respects from that of the Kashmirian writers.[31]

30 Instead of *kāvya-mīmāṃsakā vidaḥ* in the text.

31 With regard to the relation between the Agni-purāṇa-compiler and Bhoja, our views do not appear to have been clear to P. V. Kane and V. Raghavan. We have explicitly stated them in *Poona Orientalist* ii, p. 15-17; we repeat them here. A comparative study of Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-k.* and the Alaṃkāra-section of the Purāṇa would, in our opinion, indicate that (1) Both the works are more or less compilations, (2) As compilations both are eclectic, but not very well assorted and critical, (3) Both follow a tradition of opinion which is distinctive and which stands apart from that of the orthodox Kashmirian writers, (4) Bhoja is more systematic and certainly more elaborate, and the distinctive topics are found in Bhoja in a more developed form. These considerations led us to believe that there might be no question of direct mutual borrowing, but both were drawing upon a common source, and that the more elaborate and systematic Bhoja was probably chronologically later. If the Purāṇa-compiler was later and took from Bhoja, it would be strange indeed that he should present as undeveloped and

Bhoja develops the definition of poetry given by the *Agni-purāṇa* by adding expressly Rasa among its essential characteristics, which, as the commentator Ratneśvara points out, indicates the influence of the "Kāśmīrakas":

nirdoṣaṃ guṇavat kāvyam alaṃkārair alaṃkṛtam/
rasānvitam...........(i. 2).

In conformity to this definition, which mentions rather uncritically all the requisite elements, Bhoja deals in the first chapter with the Doṣas and Guṇas and devotes the next three chapters respectively to the consideration of poetic figures (Alaṃkāras) of *śabda*, of *artha*, and of both *śabda* and *artha*. In the last chapter is given a detailed treatment of Rasa, for Bhoja thinks that *rasokti* is essential in poetry (v. 8). But like the author of the *Agni-purāṇa*, Bhoja is not explicit with regard to the question of correlating this aesthetic element with other elements of poetry, and his conception of Rasa bears resemblance to that of the *utpatti-vādins* whose causal theory, as Abhinavagupta points out, is accepted by earlier authors like Daṇḍin. No doubt, in one verse (i. 158) Bhoja is apparently of opinion that a poem is relished only if it contains the Guṇas, even though it may possess various kinds of poetic figures ; for even excellent poetic figures in a composition without the Guṇas present an ugly aspect, as the form of a woman, destitute of youth, looks ugly even though she wears excellent ornaments. But this verse is only an unacknowledged quotation from Vāmana (iii. 1. 2, Vṛtti), and must be taken as an instance of eulogistic statements, not unusual in Sanskrit writers, made for the purpose of simply emphasising a point, or as a characteristic of the uncritical and confused nature of the work itself ; for otherwise we cannot reconcile this dictum with others of a similar nature made in connexion with Rasa or Alaṃkāra.

unsystematic what was already developed and systematic in his presumed source. It would hardly make any difference if the Purāṇa-compiler is proved later than Bhoja ; but as our available evidence is at best uncertain, it would be better to leave the question open.

Although Bhoja puts a great deal of emphasis on Rasa, probably in accordance with the views of the new school of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, he cannot yet be taken as an adherent of the Dhvani school, nor of the older Rasa school. Bhoja mentions here as many as twelve Rasas, adding the *śānta, preyas, udātta* and *uddhata*, to the eight orthodox Rasas mentioned by Bharata (vi. 15)[32] ; but in his treatment he follows the *Agni-purāṇa* tradition in singling out the Śṛṅgāra for almost exclusive attention. This trait is also noticeable in his other work, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*, in which he accepts only one Rasa, the Erotic[33], thus justifying its title.

Bhoja modifies the *Agni-purāṇa's* classification of the Guṇas by dividing the general (*sāmānya*) Guṇas, according as they relate to *śabda* and *artha*, into external (*bāhya*) and internal (*ābhyantara*), on the one hand, with specific (*vaiśeṣika*) Guṇas on the other. By the last he understands those which under special circumstances are Guṇas in spite of their being essentially Doṣas or faults (i. 60 f). He carries the differentiation and multiplication of Guṇas still further, and enumerates twenty-four *śabda-guṇas* and as many *artha-guṇas*, again, of identical names. Like the *Agni-purāṇa*, Bhoja is not very precise or critical in his definitions of individual Guṇas, and he assigns to some Guṇas properties which are ascribed to Alaṃkāras by other writers. It is curious to note that the *artha-guṇa kānti* is defined, after Vāmana, as *dīpta-rasatvam* (i. 81), including Rasa therein ; and in the *śabda-guṇa gāmbhīrya* (i. 73) is incorporated the concept of Dhvani. At the same

32 Of these Śānta and Preyas are already recognised. The four additional Rasas (to orthodox eight) are meant to be associated with the four kinds of heroes, namely, Dhīra-śānta, Dhīra-lalita, Dhīrodātta and Dhiroddhata respectively. See V. Raghavan, *Number of Rasas*, pp. 121-22.

33 So says Vidyādhara, p. 98 ; also Kumārasvāmin, p. 221, and the author of *Mandāra-maranda-campū* ix, p. 107. See Vol i pp. 136-38, for a detailed account of Bhoja's conception of Rasa in *Sarasvatī-k.* and *Śṛṅgāra-pr.* See V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* pp. 418-542.

time, Rasa is taken elsewhere as a fundamental aesthetic concept, and the idea of Dhvani is omitted from his treatment. Bhoja, however, does not pay any homage to Vāmana's classification of Rīti, the elaboration of which he carries still further. He adds two more types of Rītis, viz. *āvantikā* and *māgadhī* (ii. 32), to the four mentioned by the *Agni-purāṇa*, the former of these being an intermediate kind between *vaidarbhī* and *pāñcālī*, and the latter forming only a Khaṇḍa-rīti, i.e. defective or incomplete type. It is also noteworthy that some of the *upamā-doṣas*, such as *hīnatva* and *adhikatva*, are included in the general discussion of Doṣas as *hīnopamā* and *adhikopamā*, and not mentioned, in the usual manner, in connexion with the figure *upamā* itself.

In the treatment of Alaṃkāras, Bhoja is one of the earliest writers who, in common with the *Agni-purāṇa*, classifies them into three groups, viz. *śabdālaṃkāra*, *arthālaṃkāra*, and *ubhayālaṃkāra*. Without entering into details here, we may state that Bhoja's treatment is much fuller[34]. He enumerates, for instance, and defines the largest number of *śabdālaṃkāras* mentioned by any author, namely twenty-four, and develops further the treatments of Daṇḍin, the *Agni-purāṇa* and Rudraṭa. The number of *arthālaṃkāras*, however, is surprisingly limited, and a love of symmetry probably leads him to enumerate them also as twenty-four in number, which is also the number of the *ubhayālaṃkāras*. The most curious chapter is that which deals with the last-named class of poetic figures, which includes figures like *upamā*, *rūpaka*, *utprekṣā*, *dīpaka*, *atiśaya* and other well-recognised *arthālaṃkāras*. Mammaṭa later on admits this three-fold classification of poetic figures, which is not recognised by all, but unlike

34 His treatment also is sometimes very curious. He makes poetic figures, for instance, out of the six *pramāṇas* of Jaimini (cf. Māṇikyacandra on this point at p. 304). One of the results of this is that he has to admit the philosophical idea of *upamāna* (as a means of knowledge) in a poetic figure of that name, and distinguish it as a figure from the well-known figure *upamā*.

Bhoja, he includes a very limited number in the mixed third class of Ubhayālaṃkāra, such as *punaruktavad-ābhāsa*, in which stress is laid equally on *śabda* and *artha*.

This novel and somewhat unorthodox standpoint, which follows a peculiar line of speculation different in some respects from the accepted views of the various established schools, makes Bhoja's work an interesting study ; but its theoretic importance has been exaggerated. The work, no doubt, possesses a certain importance for this unique treatment in the history of Sanskrit Poetics ; but its value consists, not in its theories, nor in its discussion of general principles, but in its being a very elaborate, if somewhat diffuse, manual and an exhaustive store-house of definitions and illustrations, for which not only the works of Ālaṃkārikas but also of almost all the well-known poets have been laid under contribution. The later writers, in spite of the fascination which the magic name of Bhojarāja carries with it, cite this work chiefly for its abundant wealth of illustration, or for the purpose of supporting some unorthodox view to which Bhoja might have lent the authority of his name. The learning which this work parades, though extensive, is ill-assorted and uncritical, its ideas lacking in system and its expression in preciseness. The school of opinion which Bhoja represents does not appear to have received any support or following in later times[35].

35 Apart from occasional citations from Bhoja by later authors, Vidyānātha (as well as Prakāśavarṣa in his *Rasārṇavālaṃkāra*) appears to be the one writer who goes to the length of following Bhoja's elaborate classification of the *Guṇas* (see below, ch. vii).—Bhoja's truly "mammoth" work, the *Śṛṅgāra-prakāsa*, has not yet been published, but a detailed account of its contents will be found in V. Raghavan's thesis on the same. It has the same eclectic and encyclopaedic character of an all-comprehending type (but on a much more extended scale) as his presumably earlier and smaller work, the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*. With regard to subject-matter and essential ideas, however, it adds nothing substantially new which is not contained in a brief form in *Sarasvatī-k*. In spite of its name the *Śṛṅgāra-pr.* comprehends in its

36 chapters most of the important topics of Poetics and some of Dramaturgy. Thus, ch. i-vi. deal with Śabda and Artha; ch. vii-xi with grammatical and poetical aspects of Sāhitya of Śabda and Artha, including treatment of Doṣa, Guṇa and Alaṃkāra; ch. xii. mainly with Drama and its general features; ch. xiii-xiv with a preliminary treatment of Rasa; ch. xv-xvii with Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas of Rati; ch. xviii-xxi with four Śṛṅgāras of four Puruṣārthas—viz. Śṛṅgāras of Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa; ch. xxii-xxxvi with elaboration of the lower Śṛṅgāra Rasa (apart from the higher Śṛṅgāra of Abhimāna explained in ch. xi) of Rati between man and woman. Thus, after dealing with Doṣa-hāna, Guṇopādāna, Alaṃkāra-yoga and Rasa-viyoga (which last should be avoided) he gives an exposition of his theory of Ahaṃkāra-Abhimāna-Śṛṅgāra Rasa. With reference to the general features of the Drama he devotes a large part of his work to the two phases of Vipralambha and Sambhoga Śṛṅgāra viewed as a relation between man and woman.

CHAPTER VII

MAMMAṬA AND THE NEW SCHOOL

(1)

The foregoing sketch of the progress of the principal schools and systems, terminating in the dominance of the Dhvani school, will make it clear that the history of Sanskrit Poetics is marked by two or three well-defined stages.[1] The dim beginnings of the science are indeed hidden from us, but we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation, in a more or less developed form, in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. This is followed by a fruitful and creative stage, ending with Abhinavagupta, in which the theories of the different schools or systems were settled in their general outlines, giving rise to four distinct schools of opinion, respectively represented by the Rasa-, Alaṃkāra-, Rīti- and Dhvani-systems. It covers more than three centuries, and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline, like those of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa, of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, of the Dhvanikāra, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, of Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhoja: all of whom helped, in a constructive or destructive way, to shape the different currents of thought which ultimately ran into one stream in the standard text-book of Mammaṭa.

If we attempt to discriminate between these different schools of thought and roughly indicate the broad steps taken in the progress of the discipline, we can state generally that the Alaṃkāra system proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment (*alaṃkāra*) of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the discipline;

1 See vol. i, pp. 322 f.

the Rasa system, starting with the consideration of the drama, was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of *rasa,* represented by the feelings, moods and sentiments ; the Rīti system laid stress on the objective beauty of representation realised by means of diction (*rīti*) and its constituent excellences (*guṇas*) ; while the Dhvani system, admitting the underlying truth of all these doctrines, elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry (*dhvani*), including the suggestion of *rasa*, to which everything else was correlated. It will be seen from this that a relative emphasis was laid on the elements of *alaṃkāra, rasa, rīti* (including *guṇa* and *doṣa*) and *dhvani* by each of these systems ; and although the soft hand of Indian dialectics drew lines of fantastic ideas, consisting of odd and abstruse schemes, it is on these essential points that the theories centred themselves, and the main currents flowed thereof in different directions. It was, however, realised in the end that all these gleams of thought must be gathered into a focus, and all these currents must be made to flow into one stream. The purely normative character of the discipline began to disappear, and it was understood that, however much importance was attached to the fact of externalisation, to the consideration of embellishment or diction, it was far outbalanced by the most necessary and important principle of higher poetry, viz, the art of suggestion, especially connected with the art of suggesting a peculiar mental condition of enjoyment, technically known as *rasa,* of which the charm lies in a disinterested and impersonal pleasure in the mind, the attitude proper to contemplation of the beautiful[2].

2 The problem, therefore, does not concern rhetoric merely, and the ideal of beauty (if the expression is allowable) is no longer conceived from the outside, being associated with a peculiar condition of artistic enjoyment, the suggestion of which is taken as the chief function of poetry. As explained by an able critic of Sanskrit literature (Oldenberg, *Die Literatur des alten Indien,* pp. 207f), the Indian theorists permit intellectual vigour and subtlety, the masculine beauty, to stand behind that of purely feminine enjoyment born of the finest sensibility. Both

This period ends with the ultimate standardisation of a more or less complete scheme of Poetics, outlined in the *Dhvanyāloka*, in which an attempt is made to bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation. The period which followed this and with which we are concerned in this and following chapters, is necessarily a stage of critical elaboration, the chief work of which consists in summarising and setting forth, in the concise form of text-books, the results of earlier speculations. The stage is marked by great scholastic acumen, if not by remarkable originality or creative genius, but it denotes also a progressive deterioration of the study itself. It covers the age of numberless commentaries, which may be characterised, like the scholia of European classical literature, as consisting mostly of "comments on comments of annotated annotations". They busy themselves with the explanation, expansion or restriction of the already established rules. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and textbook-makers who wanted to simplify the science for general enlightenment, the lowest stage being reached when we come to manuals and school-books of comparatively recent times.

It is difficult to classify some of these writers. Here and

these traits are found in the literature from the earliest times ; the idea of ecstatic rapture side by side with a strong inclination towards sagacity and subtlety. It is true that the dogmatic formalism of a scholastic discipline naturally sank to the level of a cold and monotonously inflated rhetoric ; but at the same time it must be admitted that the theorists were not blind to finer issues, nor were they indifferent to the supreme excellence of real poetry and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it. They always take care to add that despite dogmas the poetic imagination must show itself ; and the ultimate test of poetry is the appreciation of the *sahṛdaya*, the man of taste, whose technical knowledge must be equal to his finer capacity of aesthetic enjoyment, born out of wide culture and identification with the feelings and sentiments of the poet. As this capacity, which is likened to the bliss of divine contemplation, is vouchsafed only to the fit and few, the critic as well as the poet is born, and not made.

there we find isolated and straggling followers of the older schools. Some are frankly uncritical, some merely eclectic; while others are characterised by the very modest ambition of producing nothing more than a popular text-book. But the majority of the writers of this period, which covers more than five or six centuries, accept, with some reservations, the Dhvani-theory and the scheme of Poetics as finally determined by Mammaṭa. There are small groups of writers who devote themselves to special topics, like *kavi-śikṣā* or the subject of *rasa* (especially *śṛṅgāra-rasa*), but this apparent branching off from the main stem of the finally authoritative Dhvani system, is to be explained as due rather to the following of older traditions, or perhaps to the refining or analytic spirit of the times, than to any real split in the domain of general theory. With regard to matters of general theory and the main problems, the decadent Post-dhvani writers as a rule thought that there was nothing new to set forth; they consequently fell back on matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing speculative passion for fine distinctions and their scholastic bent for controversy. It would be tedious, as well as useless, therefore, to treat them here at any great length, for they repeat more or less the same idea in their own way, sometimes in the same stock manner and phraseology, and differ from each other only in matters of no great theoretic importance. The only subject worth studying in them is their minute analysis and elaboration of numberless poetic figures, which are not treated, as not coming perhaps within the scope of their general exposition, by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but which occupy a very considerable position in later literature. Here was room enough to supplement, as Ruyyaka expressly states, the treatment of their predecessors; and this portion of their work is beaten out with such extreme nicety and elaborateness that the Alaṃkāra-śāstra, judging from these works alone, would be, as it often has been, designated as a study of Rhetoric merely. But even from

Ruyyaka's time, the scope and nature of most of the individual figures appear to have been fairly fixed, only to be criticised and improved upon here and there by such later writers as Jagannātha.

It is important, however, to note that although this new school (*navyāḥ, aravācīnāḥ*) accepts in the main the general position of the Dhvani school, it is yet not entirely free from the influence of older schools. It betrays a lurking regard for older writers and brings back, rightly or wrongly, some of the old ideas into the elaboration of its own theory of poetry. It is difficult, for this reason, to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the Dhvani school. Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, for instance, is not altogether free from the influence of the views of such older writers as Vāmana; Ruyyaka follows Udbhaṭa and Kuntaka extensively in his detailed analysis of poetic figures; Viśvanātha clearly betrays the influence of the Rasa school on his own system; while Jagannātha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Daṇḍin. It is remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry, a task which was wisely left alone by the Dhvanikāra; but in doing so, they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula to cover the old ideas as well as the new, although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless inconsistencies. This reactionary tendency, however, is interesting as indicating that they were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views as they were not entirely content with the clear-cut scheme of the *Dhvanyāloka*; a fact which would go to demonstrate, to some extent, that want of originality is a charge which cannot be brought in its entirety against these followers of the finally dominant Dhvani system.

(2)

Mammaṭa

The first and foremost writer of this group is Mammaṭa,

whose *Kāvya-prakāśa* must have helped a great deal, judging from its popularity and influence, in finally establishing the authority of the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana. This work, combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness, not only summed up previous speculations in Poetics in the succinct form of a text-book, but it became in its turn the starting point of endless text-books and exegesis.

Mammaṭa's general standpoint will be obvious at a glance by examining his well known definition of poetry. Although he adheres in the main to the teachings of the Dhvani school and accepts Rasa as an important element of poetry, his definition *tad a-doṣau śabdārthau saguṇāvanalaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* ("poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of the defects and possessing the excellences, and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures") follows the time-honoured custom of starting with word and sense (*śabda* and *artha*) and mentioning the *guṇa, doṣa* and *alaṃkāra* ; but it does not expressly include any reference to *dhvani* and *rasa*, which are apparently comprehended by implication. For, following up this definition, Mammaṭa begins with the discussion of the functions of *śabda* and *artha*, incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) and the superiority of the suggested sense (*vyaṅgya artha* or *dhvani*), and divides poetry into three classes (viz. *dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* and *citra*) in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify the various subdivisions of these three classes of poetry, and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of Rasa, which is included in the scope of "suggestion of imperceptible process" (*asaṃlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya*). In this context, he examines and rejects the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and accepts the *vyakti-vāda* which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta. Mention is made of eight orthodox dramatic Rasas, (*aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ*), but the ninth Rasa, the *śānta*, is added, apparently as relevant to poetry.

Mammaṭa then proceeds to discuss the Guṇa and Doṣa, not in relation to poetry in general as his definition would imply, but in relation to their subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of Rasa. The Guṇas as excellences of composition are interpreted in a new sense (after Ānandavardhana) and brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work, as qualities which serve to heighten its charm. The verbal form of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness (except by way of analogy), unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The Guṇas, therefore, are related to the Rasa, as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. The verbal form, the mere sound, produces the excellences only as a means or instrument ; the real cause is the Rasa, even as the soul is the true cause of virtues like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also to the case of poetic figures (Alaṃkāras), and their place in poetry is justified by their relation to Rasa. They are compared to ornaments on a man's body; and as such, they adorn words and meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly (through sound and sense) the underlying soul of sentiment, but not invariably. If the Rasa is absent, they produce mere variety of expression. It should also be noted that the Guṇas are accepted, after Ānandavardhana, as three in number[3], and it is maintained

3 Mammaṭa demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the ten Guṇas of Vāmana, but that it is quite enough if we postulate three comprehensive excellences, viz. *ojas* (energy), *prasāda* (lucidity) and *mādhurya* (sweetness). If we examine the Guṇas of Vāmana critically, we find that some of them can very well be included in these three ; some constitute mere absense of defects ; while others are sometimes positive defects. Thus, Vāmana's *śleṣa*, *samādhi* and *udāratā* are comprehended by *ojas* ; *artha-vyakti* is merely an aspect of *prasāda* ; *samatā*, consisting of a certain uniformity of diction, is sometimes a fault ; while *saukumārya* and *kānti*, defined respectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity, are simply the reverse of the defects *śruti-kaṣṭa* and *grāmyatva*. These consi-

that combination of particular letters signify particular Guṇas, so that the three Vṛttis of Udbhaṭa (and roughly the three Rītis of Vāmana) are equalised to the three Guṇas defined by himself[4]. Mammaṭa admits Doṣas of *pada*, *vākya*

derations simplify the classification of the Guṇas and put a limit to their useless multiplication or differentiation (witness, e.g. Bhoja's elaborate scheme of 24 Guṇas). Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that the distinction between *śabda-guṇa* and *arthā-guṇa* is meaningless, for the latter need not be separately considered. The mental activity, involved in the enjoyment of Rasa, is made to justify only three (and not ten) Guṇas which are thus brought into effective relation with the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus, the *ojas* is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (*vistāra*) of the mind and resides in the moods of heroism, horror and fury ; the *prasāda*, proper to all the moods, is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense, extending over the mind at once (*vyāpti* or *vikāsa*), like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire among dry fuel (cf. Bharata vii. 7) ; while the *mādhurya*, residing normally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to and rising successively in degree in pathos, love-in-separation and calm, is regarded as causing a softening or melting of the heart (*druti*). The three conditions of the mind, viz. expanding pervading and melting, which accompany the poetic sentiments, are thus made the basis of the three Guṇas ; and though these mental states are sometimes mixed up and lead to various other mental conditions, these latter effects are too many and too indistinct to be taken as the basis of new Guṇas. This exposition follows and expands *Dhvanyāloka* ii. 8-11 (see above pp. 171f) ; but it is possible that the original hint of associating these effects on the mental condition of the reader with the three Guṇas was supplied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (°*Locana* p. 68) who speaks of the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of Rasa as being characterised by the mental conditions of expanding (*vistāra*), prevading (*vikāsa*) and melting (*druti*). Viśvanātha substantially agrees with this view of Mammaṭa ; but he takes the technical objection that the *ojas* etc. are not the *causes* of, but identical with, the process of expansion etc.

4 See above p. 104. We have seen above that Mammaṭa explains away the so-called excellences of sense (*artha-guṇas*), so that the Guṇas are confined to the sphere of sound. They are produced by a particular arrangement of letters (*varṇa*), compounds (*samāsa*) and mode of composition (*racanā*). Thus, the *mādhurya* or sweetness results from the employment of (i) all *sparśa* letters or mutes (from *k* to *m*), excepting

and *artha,* as well as Doṣas of Rasa, a mode of treatment which is followed by most later writers. Although the poetic figures are not, in his opinion, always necessary to poetry[5], he rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are of a mixed kind), enumerating as many as sixty-seven independent figures.

From this brief summary of the topics of Mammaṭa's work, it will be clear that its value consists not in its originality but in its orderly and concise discussion of the main issues (excepting those of Dramaturgy, which Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha include in an attempt to supplement). His definitions as well as general treatment attempt to cover almost all fields of thought traversed by his predecessors.

the cerebrals (*ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh*) coming with the last letters (nasals) of their respective class, (ii) *r* and *ṇ* with short vowels, as well as from (iii) complete absence of compounds or presence of short compounds. The *ojas* or energy is produced by (i) compound letters formed by the combination of the first and third letters of a class with the letters immediately following them (i.e. with the second and fourth letters respectively) (ii) conjunct consonants of which *r* forms a part, (iii) cerebrals other than *ṇ* (which letter is indicative of *mādhurya*), (iv) doubled letters, i. e. combinations of the same letters, (v) palatal and cerebral sibilants (*ś, ṣ*), (vi) long compounds, and (vii) a formidable or bombastic style. For obvious reasons there are no rules for *prasāda.* The letters mentioned here are mostly the same as those given by Udbhaṭa as suggestors of *upanāgarikā, puruṣā,* and *komalā* (or *grāmyā*) Vṛttis respectively. Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that Udbhaṭa's three Vṛttis, which Udbhaṭa himself comprehends under *vṛttyanuprāsa,* are really equivalent to the three Rītis of Vāmana and to his own three Guṇas.

5 From the new standpoint, Vāmana's view that the Guṇas produce the beauty of a poem, while the Alaṃkāras merely heighten the beauty thus produced, is clearly inadequate. Mammaṭa argues in this way. If the doctrine is taken to mean that the possession of all the excellences constitutes poetry, the *gauḍī* and the *pāñcālī* which are not marked by all the Guṇas, would not be poetical ; if, however, the presence of a single excellence is enough to dignify a composition to the rank of poetry, then we are driven to accept even a perfectly unpoetical passage as poetry, if it contains, say, the quality of energy.

The great popularity and authority which the *Kāvya-prakāśa* has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the clear and lucid (albeit the obscurities due to its brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already accumulated stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the *Dhvanyāloka*.

But from the theoretical point of view, Mammaṭa's definition of poetry has been subjected to much vigorous criticism. Viśvanātha, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammaṭa's work as the basis (*upajīvya*) of his own, but begins his *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* with a trenchant attack on his definition. He points out, in the first place, that the Guṇas being merely properties of Rasa, should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials. He shows next that if only faultless (*adoṣa*) compositions be called poetry, some of the best poems will have to be given up, inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of all blemishes. Nor could it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur ; for if they are faults at all, bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition, they must mar the whole poem. Lastly, he maintains that no reference to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition, as they are admittedly non-essential. Jagannātha's criticism is more fundamental, although he agrees with Viśvanātha as to the impropriety of including a reference to *guṇa*, *doṣa*, and *alaṃkāra* in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by the term 'poetry'; for the universal use of such expressions as 'a poem is read but its meaning is not understood' shows clearly that a particular kind of words only is what is meant. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of producing a mood (*rasa*), and that inasmuch as a word and its sense have this capability, both constitute poetry, then it can be replied that, according to this too wide

view, musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry.

Some of these and other arguments appear, no doubt, fastidious and pedantic, and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and followers of Mammaṭa ; but the whole controversy indicates the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry and the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The earlier theorists probably realised this and carefully avoided the task, for even the Dhvanikāra contents himself with describing its general nature and its divisions, an omission on which Mahimabhaṭṭa ridicules him by saying: *kiṃ ca kāvyasya svarūpaṃ vyutpādayitukāmena matimatā tallakṣaṇam eva sāmānyenākhyātavyam.*

From the historical point of view, however, the definition is interesting, its apparent inconsistency and obscurity being a curious fact which can reasonably be explained by a reference to the views of the older schools and systems. The term *rasa* does not occur in the definition, and the fact that Mammaṭa accepts the *citra-kāvya,* which is grudgingly admitted by Ānandavardhana as a division of poetry, would indicate, as Viśvanātha points out, that Mammaṭa does not consider Rasa to be essential. Yet he defines Guṇa and Doṣa in terms of their relation to Rasa, a procedure which is not justifiable if the essentiality of Rasa is not admitted. On the other hand, if it is maintained that all reference to Rasa is omitted in the definition because it is such a well known and established fact in the poetical and critical world, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis are hardly explicable. The mention of Guṇa and Doṣa should in that case be omitted, as done by Jagannātha, from the definition, which corresponds more to the definition of Vāmana (i. 1. 1-3) ; and these two elements must be understood in the sense in which Vāmana takes them, viz. as properties of *śabda* and *artha.*[6] This and other discrepancies

6 This is the modified view of Jagannātha who realises the difficulty

make it probable that Mammaṭa, belonging as he does to the new school, is influenced to a great extent by the views of the older schools. He accepts, no doubt, the general scheme and theory of the Dhvani school, but in trying to reconcile them with those of earlier theorists, he lands himself in objectionable inconsistencies.

(3)

Viśvanātha

Even the definition of Viśvanātha, who took upon himself the task of criticising Mammaṭa, is open to similar objections, and has been criticised in its turn by Govinda and Jagannātha. In declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the 'soul' is *rasa* (*vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyaṃ*), he is indeed betraying the unmistakable influence, of the Rasa school; but he is also putting into a shape, in a way clearer than Abhinavagupta does, the essentiality of *rasa-dhvani*, wisely left unstated but practically meant by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*.[7] In taking up this extreme position, Viśvanātha involves himself, however, in the somewhat clumsy subterfuge of admitting a distant touch of Rasa (*rasa-sparśa*) in all poetry, even in what is professedly descriptive or ornamental. Even if it is ideally correct to say that a poem ought always to manifest the Rasa alone, it does not, as a matter of fact, always do so. Jagannātha rightly objects[8] that Viśvanātha's definition would exclude poems in which the centre of gravity lies only in the matter (*vastu-dhvani*) or in the imaginative mood (*alaṃkāra-dhvani*). The opponent cannot reply that this is exactly his own opinion, for thereby he goes against the view of ancient authorities, as well as against the establi-

and does not agree with Mammaṭa (see *Rasa-gaṅgādhara* p. 55). Similarly Vidyānātha, though belonging to the new school, would accept (p. 334) Udbhaṭa's dictum *saṃghaṭanā-dharmā guṇāḥ*.

7 See above ch. v, p. 166; ch. vi, p. 178f.

8 p. 7-8. Cf *Prabhā*, ed. N. S. P. 1912, p. 11.

shed practice of great poets, who have admitted the scope of fact and imagination, and described subjects like a flood or narrated a travel, in which there is hardly any touch of Rasa. It would not do, therefore, to accept the *rasa-dhvani* alone; for a complete definition must also take into account *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. Viśvanātha anticipates this objection by saying that in cases other than those admitted expressly by himself there is always a semblance of Rasa (*rasābhāsa*); and the verse given in the *Dhvanyāloka* as an instance of *vastu-dhvani* is, in his opinion, admissible only because there is such a touch of Rasa in it, and not because mere *vyaṅgya vastu* can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannātha replies that nothing is gained by such a supposition of an indirect reference to Rasa, because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like 'the cow moves' or 'the deer leaps.' This cannot be taken as the sole criterion, because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of an excitant, an ensuant or an accessory of Rasa.

Apart from this technicality and the emphasis put on the essentiality of Rasa, which however is not reconciled to other elements of poetry, Viśvanātha's scheme does not substantially differ from that of Mammaṭa, on whose work he also appears to have written a commentary. In one passage, indeed, he pays an elegant tribute to his predecessor's work by admitting his own indebtedness to it. After defining poetry as a sentence the 'soul' of which is Rasa, he proceeds in the usual way to analyse the 'sentence' (*vākya*) and the different functions of its constituent word and sense, establishing suggestion or *vyañjanā* as the function necessary and important for the purpose of conveying the suggested Rasa (*bodhe rasādīnām*). He accepts only two divisions of poetry, viz., *dhvani* and *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya*, and rejects the third, the *citra-kāvya* (which is suffered by Ānandavardhana and accepted by Mammaṭa) on the ground that it is entirely devoid of Rasa and therefore inconsistent with his own

definition of poetry. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha, following Ānandavardhana, partially admits the suggestion of *vastu* and *alaṃkāra* under suggestion of perceptible process (*kramoddyota-vyaṅgya*), based on the power of word or sense or both. The case of poetry of subordinate suggestion (*guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya)*, where the Rasa involved is secondary, is justified by holding that the mere circumstance of the Rasa being collaterally suggested does not destroy the claim of such poetry ; for the relish of Rasa alone, whether circumstantial or essential, is the true criterion. It is this partiality for Rasa which makes him include a treatment, omitted by most writers on Poetics, of dramatic composition, in which the delineation of the Rasas, the moods and sentiments, is already established as fundamental by both poets and theorists. Consistently with the same idea, a Doṣa or blemish is defined as the detractor of the Rasa (*rasāpakarṣaka*), while a Guṇa is explained as a particular mode or quality of the Rasa depending on *śabda* and *arthā* and enhancing the charm of the Rasa when Rasa is principal. The Guṇas are really attributes of Rasa, but they are secondarily spoken of as belonging to a word and its sense: which secondary use also explains the old distinction between *śabda-guṇa* and *artha-guṇa*. The Guṇas are accepted as three in number, viz. *mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, depending upon a combination of particular letters and justified by the attributes of expanding, pervading and melting the mind in its enjoyment of Rasa ; and the ten Guṇas of older writers are mentioned and criticised after the manner of Mammaṭa. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha admits the Rītis separately, instead of comprehending them, as Mammaṭa does, under the Vṛttis or considering them redundant after the enumeration of the three Guṇas. He defines the Rīti as *pada-saṃghaṭanā*[9] or particular arrangement of words (and letters) which helps the Rasas (*upakartrī rasādīnām*). The Rīti, however, relates

9 By the term *saṃghaṭanā* stress in laid on its technical sense of Samāsa-vṛttti, but this is not the only criterion.

entirely to the external framework of poetry, and is likened to the conformation of the body in relation to the soul[10]. Finally, the poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*), which are treated substantially after the manner of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, are defined as those non-permanent attributes of word and its sense which add to their beauty and thus embellish the Rasa indirectly. The term 'non-permanent' (*asthira*) is explained, after Mammaṭa, by the statement that the presence of the Alaṃkāras is not necessary but accidental, as compared to the Guṇas which are necessary attributes.

The above sketch of Viśvanātha's general position will sufficiently indicate that he is more or less a compiler and not an original writer, although he shows some constructive ability in elaborating a full and compact system of his own on the basis of *rasa-dhvani*. His borrowings from Ānanda-vardhana, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka are very extensive ; and sometimes his judgment forsakes him, making him copy his originals rather slavishly. He is not always happy in his innovations, and sometimes (though rarely) he is wrong or inconsistent in his interpretation. In spite of these and other defects his work is interesting in the history of Sanskrit Poetics as an attempt at a further development of the Dhvani-theory out of itself, an attempt to which recognition was not

10 Viśvanātha speaks of four Rītis as follow: (i) *vaidarbhī* or sweet style (marked by letters indicative of *mādhurya*, and by short compounds or absence of compounds). (ii) *gauḍī* or bombastic style (marked by letters indicative of *ojas* and possessing a large number of compounds). (iii) *pāñcālī* (marked by letters other than those mentioned above and containing five or six compound words). (iv) *lāṭī* or the style intermediate between *vaidarbhī* and *pāñcālī*. This is only a variation on the conventional enumeration ; but strictly speaking, Mammaṭa is right in not considering the Rītis separately, as they are comprehended by the three Vṛttis or even by the three Guṇas accepted by the new school. Viśvanātha alludes to Vṛttis under *vṛttyanuprāsa* and simply says (after Ruyyaka): *rasa-viṣaya-vyāpāravatī varṇa-racanā vṛttiḥ, tad-anugatatvena prakarṣeṇa nyasanād vṛttyanuprāsaḥ*.

universally accorded by other strict followers of the theory. The *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, written like the *Kāvya-prakāśa* in the form of Kārikā with Vṛtti, has also the great merit of being written in a more simple and less controversial style than the treatises of Mammaṭa and Jagannātha respectively ; and as a suitable and complete manual of Poetics, including a treatment of the dramatic art, it has always held its popularity as one of the most convenient text-books on the subject as a whole.

(4)

Ruyyaka

One of the most important writers of this group is Ruyyaka, who comes immediately after Mammaṭa and who also appears to have written a commentary on Mammaṭa's work. In his treatment of the poetic figures with which his work (as its name *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* implies) is directly concerned, he shows, however, a remarkable degree of insight and independence of judgment which distinguishes him from his predecessor. The value of his contribution in this respect may be judged from the fact that his *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* not only helped to define and fix the conception of an *alaṃkāra*, of which the first indication was given by Kuntaka but which was left untouched by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, but it had also a great influence in establishing by its careful analysis the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, so that his views on this matter have been accepted as authoritative by such important later writers as Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Appayya Dīkṣita.

The plan of Ruyyaka's work, written in the form Sūtra with Vṛtti, is stated by himself in the introductory portion of his Vṛtti. He starts, in common with other followers of the Dhvani school, with the suggested sense (*pratīyamāna artha*) and demonstrates by a rapid survey of the views of older writers that it was directly or indirectly recognised by

all. But he thinks that, in the opinion of the authorities who came before the Dhvani school, the chief function of the suggested sense consisted in embellishing the expressed meaning (*vācyopaskāra*), and therefore it was naturally comprehended in the sphere of poetic figures in which the expressed sense prevailed[11]. This is generally the view of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Rudraṭa. The Vakroktijīvita-kāra, who came after Ānandavardhana, includes all ideas of Dhvani in a variety of Vakrokti based on *upacāra* or metaphorical expression. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that the suggested sense, established chiefly through the forcible utterance of the poet (*kavi-prauḍhokti*) is only a secondary element in poetry, the essential thing being the relish of Rasa realised through a function called *bhoga* or enjoyment, which is distinct from and which transcends the denotative or generalising functions of words. The Vyakti-viveka-kāra takes the relation of the expressed and the suggested in terms of the logical *liṅga* and *liṅgin*, and regards the process of suggestion as a process of inference. None of these views comes up to that of the Dhvanikāra, which is, therefore, accepted indisputably by Ruyyaka, who lays down sententiously at the end: *asti tāvad vyaṅgya-niṣṭho vyañjanā-vyāpāraḥ*. The three divisions of poetry into *dhvani*, *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya* and *citra* are also recognised; but as the first two are already discussed in the *Alaṃkāra-mañjarī*[12] (p. 15) and the *Dhvanyāloka* respectively, Ruyyaka proposes in this treatise to take up the remaining *citra-kāvya*, which, including in its scope all poetic figures devoid of suggestion[13],

11 *vācyopaskārakatvaṃ hy alaṃkārāṇām ātma-bhūtatvam*, Jayaratha p. 3.

12 Presumably this work was composed by himself. But Jayaratha does not expressly say so. In the Trivandrum edition, the reading is different. It reads *kālidāsādi-prabandheṣu* (instead of *alaṃkāra-mañjaryāṃ*) *darśitaḥ*. The *Alaṃkāra-mañjarī* appears to have dealt particularly with *rasa-dhvani*, apparently laying stress on *śṛṅgāra-rasa*.

13 See above ch. v. p. 171.

naturally covers an extensive field. As all detailed consideration of this topic is omitted in the *Dhvanyāloka* (as coming not properly within the sphere of its theory), here was an opportunity of supplementing the work of his predecessors.

But the point had already been taken up and discussed in his own way by Kuntaka who recognised that the poet's intention need not always be to awaken the Rasa or anything else unexpressed but may be directed simply to producing a certain strikingness of expression in the form of an expressed poetic figure. He analysed poetic expression and found that the elements which went to make up the being of such a figure consisted of a peculiar turn of expression, which produced a certain charm (called *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti-viśeṣa*) and which ultimately depended on the conception of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā-nirvartitatva*)[14]. Both these terms are not new, the *kavi-pratibhā* having been acknowledged as essential in a poetic composition by older theorists, and the *saundarya* of Vāmana reappearing under the name of *vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*. The *ukti-vaicitrya* is discussed in another connexion by Ānandavardhana (p. 243) ; and Mammaṭa (probably under the influence of Kuntaka) lays down that the *alaṃkāra* is nothing but *vaicitrya* itself. Abhinavagupta speaks of endless varieties of *upamā-vicchitti* (p. 5), and in another passage (p. 8) uses the term as almost synonymous with *kāmanīyaka* or *cārutva-hetu*.

Ruyyaka does not elaborate a doctrine on this point but he accepts Kuntaka's analysis implicitly and applies it to the detailed examination of individual poetic figures, a procedure which is followed by Viśvanātha, Appayya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha. That he derived this idea from Kuntaka is indicated by Jayaratha in a passage in which the commentator, while rejecting on this ground the claim of the *yathā-saṃkhya* to be counted as a poetic figure, says: *etac ca*

14 See above ch. vi, p. 188f.

vakroktijīvita-kṛtā saprapañcam uktam ity asmābhir nāyastam (p. 149). In the *Alaṃkāra-sarvasva* Ruyyaka does not define the term *vicchitti*, but in the commentary on the *Vyakti-viveka* attributed to him, he says (p. 44): *tathā ca śabdārthayor vicchittir alaṃkāraḥ, vicchittiś ca kavi-pratibhollāsa-rūpatvāt kavi-pratibhollāsasya ānantyād anantatvaṃ bhajamāno na paricchettuṃ śakyate* ('Then again, an *alaṃkāra* consists of the charm or *vicchitti* of sound and sense ; and it is not possible to define *vicchitti* exactly, inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of the poetic imagination, which itself is infinite in its scope'), the boundlessness or infinite scope of poetic conception having been already admitted by Ānandavardhana himself (ch. iv), as well as by Kuntaka.

Ruyyaka, however, takes this *vicchitti*, brought out by the productive imagination of the poet, to be the test of a poetic figure ; or, in other words, a form of expression or a mere speech-figure (if the phrase is allowable) becomes a poetic figure when a certain charm is lent to it by the peculiar conception of the poet. Thus, a form of expression involving the logical *anumāna* would not *prima facie* constitute the figure *anumāna*, unless this special charm is involved in it ; or, the doubt involved in the figure *saṃdeha* must be brought into being by the imagination of the poet, for it should not be an ordinary doubt but a 'poetic' doubt. Jayaratha makes this doctrine more explicit than his author in many places in his commentary. He lays down repeatedly that a special charm (*vicchitti-viśeṣa*) depending on the conception of the poet (*kavi-karma* or °*pratibhā*) is to be taken as the essential factor of an Alaṃkāra (pp. 144, 149-50, 183), and all so called figures are to be accepted or rejected accordingly[15].

15 The question has been dealt with in some detail by Jacobi in his Ueber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen Figuren in der indischen Poetik in *GN*, 1908, and also in the present writer's introduction to *Vakrokti-jīvita*, 2nd ed. 1928, pp. xlvi-lviii.

In later writings this doctrine is admitted as settled beyond question. Appayya Dīkṣita explains it at the beginning of his *Citra-mīmāṃsā* (p. 6), and Jagannātha repeatedly states: *alaṃkārāṇāṃ bhaṇiti-viśeṣa-rūpatvam.* In addition to the terms *bhaṇiti-viśeṣa, vaicitrya* and *vicchitti,* Viśvanātha and Jagannātha use the terms *cārutva, hṛdyatva, camatkāritva* and *saundarya* almost synonymously, while the latter attempts to define it (p. 466, 470) more precisely as the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production ; or rather, as the charm which is thereby brought into being, upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities.

Ruyyaka's work is also important for its acute analysis of the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, of which nearly eighty independent varieties are dealt with. At first sight one would be inclined to classify him as belonging to the Alaṃkāra school. There is no doubt that Ruyyaka was a great admirer of Udbhaṭa, on whose work his father Tilaka (as Jayaratha informs us) wrote a Viveka or Vicāra. Ruyyaka himself tells us (and he is borne out by Jayaratha and Samudrabandha)[16] that he is a follower of the views of the "ancients" (e. g. *cirantana-matānusṛtiḥ,* p. 205), by which he means apparently the older Alaṃkāra school of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa ; but of course, he corrects, modifies or expands older authoritative opinions in the light of the progressive study of the subject. Ruyyaka's development of Udbhaṭa's idea of *śleṣa* may be taken as a typical instance. The controversy regarding the divisions of *śleṣa* and its relation to other figures in cases of combination, started, as Ruyyaka himself and his commentators point out, from Udbhaṭa's time.

16 Jayaratha refers to Ruyyaka's following of *cirantana-mata* at pp. 72, 83, 103, 172 etc., and of Udbhaṭa at pp. 10, 20, 34, 87, 93, 97, 98, 125, 126, 150 etc. Samudrabandha's references are at pp. 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 21, 74, 82, 103 etc. Ruyyaka's own references to Udbhaṭa's views will be found in numerous places, at pp. 3, 7, 23, 59, 82, 86, 92, 123, 126, 148, 174, 191 etc.

Ruyyaka accepts the division of this figure into *śabda-śleṣa* and *artha-śleṣa* (adding *ubhaya-śleṣa*), and holds that the principle of this distinction consists in the dictum *yo'laṃkāro yad-āśritaḥ sa tad-alaṃkāraḥ*. He rejects Mammaṭa's view that the distinction is based on the ground that the *śabda-śleṣa* is incapable of enduring a change of synonym (*parivṛtti-asaha*), while the *artha-śleṣa* is capable of doing so; for Mammaṭa holds that it is not *āśrayāśrayi-bhāva* (mutual dependence or inherence) but *anvaya* (connexion) and *vyatireka* (contrast) which must be taken as the test for determining whether a figure is of *śabda* or of *artha*. According to Ruyyaka, however, a *śabda-śleṣa* occurs when the expression, being differently split up, yields two different meanings. Here the words are really different, as is indicated by a difference of accent as well as by the effort required in pronouncing them. They present the appearance of sameness or coalescence (*śleṣa*), just in the same way as the lacquered wood appears to be one single object, though really lac is put on the wood. The *artha-śleṣa* occurs where the expression is the same and has the same accent and effort, but possesses two meanings, just as two fruits hang down from a single stem. The *ubhaya-śleṣa* is the case where both these circumstances exist[17]. Rergarding the implication of *śleṣa* in other poetic figures, the question has been raised whether it should be regarded (i) as stronger than and thus dispelling the notion of the accompanying figure, (ii) as being equally powerful and therefore entering into combination with them, or (ii) as being weaker and therefore not prominent where other figures occur[18]. Udbhaṭa takes the first position, and thinks that where the *śleṣa* is present (e. g. along with *upamā*) there is only the appearance (*pratibhā*) of the other figure,

17 Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa, but Vidyādhara agrees with Ruyyaka's interpretation in this matter.

18 Jagannātha, p. 393, sums up the views thus: *ayaṃ cālaṃkāraḥ prāyeṇālaṃkārāntarasya viṣayam abhiniviśate, tatra kim asya bhādhakatvaṃ syād āhosvit saṃkīrṇatvam utāho bādhyatvam iti.*

the real figure being in such a case the *śleṣa* (and not *upamā*). Ruyyaka demurs to this view, and agrees with Mammaṭa in pointing out that in such cases of conflict the possession of common attributes (*sādharmya*) inherent in *upamā* is alone sufficient to constitute the latter figure ; for the unqualified definition of *sādharmya* as community of attributes or circumstances is not exclusive of the verbal sameness conveyed by the accompanying *śleṣa*. The *upamā*, therefore, is predominant and the subordinate *śleṣa* only helps it ; for in such cases, the common property is not arrived at without the *śleṣa*, and without the common property there can be no *upamā*. If the two figures are thus found together, one helping the other, we have *saṃkīrṇatva* of *śleṣa* and *upamā*.

From these and other instances which we need not multiply, the influence of the Alaṃkāra school on Ruyyaka will be obvious ; but it will be also obvious that the views of the older school never receive unqualified acceptance from him. His following of ancient opinions, a trait which he shares with Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha in their following of Vāmana and the Rasa-writers respectively, should be explained as an earnest attempt on his part to reconcile the views of later theorists with those of the earlier, of which he was a professed admirer. It is this impulse probably which made him take up the Vakroktijīvita-kāra's conception of a poetic figure, and apply it to his own detailed analysis of individual figures, as this topic of Poetics was not sufficiently dealt with in the *Dhvanyāloka*. It cannot be said[19], however, that Ruyyaka was a follower of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra, for Ruyyaka himself declares his own adherence to the Dhvani-theory ; and, in spite of his borrowing from Udbhaṭa and Kuntaka, he cannot by any means be directly affiliated with the Alaṃkāra school.

19 As suggested by Harichand Sastri p. 108.

(5)

Vidyādhara and *Vidyānātha*

To most of the writers who followed in the footsteps of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, there was hardly any original work that seemed left or unaccomplished. The details of the new system having already been established, there was apparently no occasion for any creative work, and even the task of critical elaboration had well-nigh run its course. Nor did any of the writers possess the genius of making an entirely new departure. This was also the period of early Muhammadan incursions, and was marked, as it was to be expected, by a general decadence of all investigations, reflecting a corresponding ebb in the tide of intellectual, as well as social and political, activity. In the centuries that follow there arose a host of commentators, Mammaṭa alone claiming no less than seventy, who busied themselves in interpreting the already established rules and in adding here and there minor points of detail, not clearly made out by their predecessors. The task of remodelling and presenting the new theory in an easier style was also undertaken, giving birth to works like the *Ekāvalī* of Vidyādhara and the *Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhūṣaṇa* of Vidyānātha, the chief merit of which consisted in systematic compilation and arrangement. On the main problems, these treatises and even the later works of Jayadeva and Appayya Dīkṣita, which carry in particular the process of analysing the poetic figures to its utmost limits, throw little valuable light.

Vidyādhara, for instance, models his text (consisting of Kārikā and Vṛtti) on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* of Mammaṭa, and in the treatment of poetic figures follows Ruyyaka in the main.[20] After characterising the Kāvya as *dhvani-pradhāna*[21], and

20 In this he agrees with Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha and others. See his definition of figures like *vicitra*, *vikalpa* or *ullekha* which are passed over by Mammaṭa.

21 In the first chapter of his work Vidyādhara follows the *Dhvanyāloka* very closely, and some of his Kārikās, e. g. i. 6, 13, are mere paraphrases of the Kārikās of the older work.

setting forth its purpose as well as the qualifications necessary for the poet, he devotes the first chapter to the establishment of the *dhvani* or suggested sense in poetry. In this connexion, he refutes at some length the views of those schools which maintain the non-existence of Dhvani or its inclusion in other processes and draws mostly on the *Dhvanyāloka* and the *Kāvya-prakāśa*. The second chapter deals with the three functions of word and sense, viz. *abhidhā*, *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*, while the third chapter classifies the *dhvani-kāvya*, in which the suggested sense excels the expressed, explaining incidentally the different theories of Rasa, which constitutes the province of one of the eight varieties of the imperceptible process of suggestion (*asaṃlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya*). The second class of poetry, the *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya*, is taken up in the next fourth chapter. The fifth chapter defines the *guṇas*, distinguishing them from the *alaṃkāras*, and concluding with the treatment of the *rīti*, with an incidental attack of older views and general support of Mammaṭa's position. The next chapter is concerned with the *doṣas*, while the last two chapters deal with the poetic figures, the *śabdālaṃkāras* and *arthālaṃkāras* respectively, adhering in general to the treatment of Ruyyaka. This brief enumeration of the contents of Vidyādhara's work will sufficiently indicate the scope and nature of these subsequent treatises, as well as the fact that they embrace the same topics as are dealt with in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, even the different chapters sometimes corresponding, in regard to their subject-matter, to the different *ullāsas* of the latter.

The scope of Vidyānātha's work, written also in the form of Kārikā with Vṛtti, is much wider, and its plan somewhat different, but from the theoretical point of view it is perhaps less interesting. Its nine *prakaraṇas* cover almost the same ground as the ten *paricchedas* of Viśvanātha's *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*. Like Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha follows Mammaṭa in general, but prefers Bhoja in the matter of Guṇas and Ruyyaka in the matter of poetic figures. The author justifies the pro-

duction of his work by stating that although the older writers have already dealt with the different branches of the subject, none of them has described a *nāyaka* or hero in it; but as the greatness of a composition depends on the representation of the merits of the hero described in it, the first *prakaraṇa*, entitled *nāyaka-prakaraṇa*, deals with the attributes of a hero, as well as of the heroine, and their necessary adjuncts. Then follows the *kāvya-prakaraṇa*, which describes in the usual way the nature of a Kāvya and its constituents, the *vṛttis* and *rītis* suitable to the development of different sentiments, the *śayyā* or repose of words in their mutual favourableness, the *pāka* or maturity of sense, and the divisions of Kāvya. It is curious that Vidyānātha's definition of poetry (*guṇālaṃkāra-sahitau śabdārthau doṣa-varjitau / gadya-padyobhayamayaṃ kāvyaṃ kāvya-vido viduḥ*) follows closely Mammaṭa's known definition which is quoted in a slightly modified form immediately afterwards. He speaks of *śabda* and *artha* as the 'body' of poetry, *vyaṅgya* as the 'soul', the *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras* in the usual manner being likened to natural qualities like heroism and to outward ornaments like bracelets respectively. The *rītis* are described as natural dispositions which lead to the excellence of the soul (*ātmotkarṣāvahāḥ svabhāvāḥ*). After dealing with the three functions of word and sense, he goes on to the consideration of the *vyañjanā-vṛtti* (pp. 52 f) and mentions (pp. 77 f) in passing 5304 varieties of Dhvani. And yet he defines the excellence, called *gāmbhīrya*, as *dhvanimattā*, after Bhoja! He lays down *racanāyā api rasa-vyañjakatvaṃ prasiddham*, which leads him to a separate consideration of the suggestion of Rasa. The third chapter, styled the Nāṭaka-prakaraṇa, deals with the subject of Rupaka or dramatic composition, a theme generally omitted by most writers, taking up the Nāṭaka as the most important variety and analysing its plot into five *saṃdhis*. Although based avowedly on Dhanañjaya's *Daśa-rūpaka*, this chapter is one of the important later contributions to the subject of Dramaturgy, and a great interest attaches to its inclusion of a model

drama illustrative of all its characteristics and eulogistic of the author's patron Pratāparudra. Next comes the *rasa-prakaraṇa* dealing with the nature and theories of Rasa. The next two chapters are the *doṣa-prakaraṇa* and the *guṇa-prakaraṇa*, while the last two chapters are devoted to the topic of *śabdālaṃkāra*, *arthālaṃkāra* and *miśrālaṃkāra*.

It is curious that Vidyānātha follows Bhoja in mentioning as many as twenty-four Guṇas. The definitions are almost identical in the two authors. The Guṇas are: (i) *śleṣa*, coalescence of words (owing to the imperceptibility of *saṃdhi*, when it is not harsh to the ear and when the letters belong to the same *sthāna* or organ of pronunciation). (ii) *prasāda*, lucidity arising from carefully selected words which lead to the intended sense at once. (iii) *samatā*, uniformity of diction (rejected by Mammaṭa as being often a defect). (iv) *mādhurya*, distinctness of words (*pṛthak-padatva*) on account of the absence of *saṃdhi*. (v) *saukumārya*, softness of expression due to the use of soft-sounding letters. (vi) *artha-vyakti*, clearness of sense due to the completion of a sentence in all its parts, (vii) *kānti*, gracefulness of diction, explained as follows by the commentator Ratneśvara: *apratihata-padair ārambhaḥ saṃdarbhasyaiva kāntiḥ......'kusumasya dhanur' iti prahatam, 'kausumam' ity aprahatam; 'jalanidhau' iti prahatam, 'adhijalam' ity aprahatam; 'gurutvam' ity prahatam, 'gauravam' iti aprahatam ityādi......asti tu tulye'pi vācakatve padānāṃ kaścid ābhyantaro viśeṣo yam adhikṛtya kiṃcid eva prayuñjate mahākavayaḥ, na tu sarvam.* (viii) *audārya*, where the sentence is so arranged with formidable letters (*vikaṭākṣara*) or hard vocables (*vikaṭa*, explained as *kaṭhina-varṇa-saṃghaṭanā-rūpa* by Jagannātha) that the words proceed as if they were dancing (*nṛtyadbhir iva padair yad vākya-racanā*). (ix) *udātta*, the use of praiseworthy epithets (cf *Agni-purāṇa* 345. 9) ; Kumārasvāmin notes that it is the absence of the defect known as *anucitārtha*. (x) *ojas*, strength due to the presence of compounds. (xi) *sauśabdya*, elegance in the use of nominal and verbal forms (cf Bhāmaha i. 14-15 ; Rājaśekhara p. 20). (xii) *preyas*, statement of agree-

able or flattering things (Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and some other writers regard this as an Alaṃkāra and not a Guṇa) ; the commentator notes that this is the absence of the defect *paruṣa* (see above p. 14, fn 38). (xiii) *aurjitya*, compactness of structure[22]. (xiv) *samādhi*, attribution of the properties of one object to another (an echo of Daṇḍin's *samādhi*), e.g., attribution of the properties of an inanimate object to an animate object (what Kuntaka would comprehend under *upacāra-vakratā* and other writers under the figure *rūpaka*). (xv) *vistara*, detailed corroboration of what is said. (xvi) *saṃmitatva*, use of the absolutely necessary words, neither more nor less, to convey the intended sense, i.e. balance of sound and sense (*arthasya padānāṃ ca tulā-vidhṛtatvāt tulyatvena saṃmitat-vam*). (xvii) *gāmbhīrya*, presence of the suggested sense or *dhvani* (*dhvani-mattā*). (xviii) *saṃkṣepa*, brevity of statement. (xix) *saukṣmya*, minuteness or subtlety of sense. (xx) *prauḍhi*, maturity of sense (this comes under *pāka* detailed below). (xxi) *ukti*, cleverness of speech. (xxii) *rīti*, homogeneity of manner (corresponding to Vāmana's *samatā*), consisting of the completion of a sentence or theme in the manner in which it was begun. (xiii) *bhāvika*, conduct of a sentence according to its underlying emotion or sentiment (*bhāvataḥ)*. (xxiv) *gati*, a pleasing effect produced by long and short vowels (*suramyat-vaṃ svarārohāvarohayoḥ*, in which *svarāroha* is explained as *dīrghākṣara-prāyatva*, and *svarāvaroha* as its reverse)[23].

22 This is said to be the absence of the defect called *visaṃdhi*. This defect, mentioned also by Bharata and Bhāmaha, is explained as *visaṃhito virūpo vā yasya saṃdhiḥ*, Kumārasvāmin explaining *visaṃ-hitaḥ* as *vigatā saṃhitā varṇānāṃ paraspara-saṃnikarṣo yatra*, and *virūpaḥ* as simply *karṇa-kaṭhoraḥ*. The *saṃhitā* therefore, means close proximity of letters which leads to euphonic, combinations sanctioned by grammar. The fault occurs (a) when there is no *saṃdhi* (*viśleṣa*) and (b) when the *saṃdhi* is harsh to the ear (*kaṣṭa*). Mammaṭa (pp. 331f) adds a third case of its occurrence when the *saṃdhi* gives rise to the implication of an indecent (*aślīla*) idea. See Trivedi's note to *Pratāparudra* pp. 73-75.

23 The *Agni-purāṇa*, while admitting most of these excellences,

The theory of *pāka* and *śayyā*, mentioned by Vidyādhara and Vidyānātha follows from the stress laid on felicity of expression, which depends on poetic genius and which lies at the root of all discussions on style, poetic figure and kindred topics. The word *śayyā* is old, having been used, apparently in this sense, by Bāṇabhaṭṭa in one of the introductory verses of his *Kādambarī*; while the *Agni-purāṇā* uses the word *mudrā* with a similar connotation. Vidyādhara and Vidyānātha develop it further as a special excellence of expression. The *śayyā* is defined as the repose of words in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in a bed, the similitude explaining the etymology of the term. This mutual friendship (*maitrī*) of words is so close that they cannot, as Mallinātha explains, be replaced even by synonyms: a theory of the immutability of words which *mutatis mutandis* would remind one of Flaubert's half-platonic view, developed by Walter Pater, that each idea has its fixed word-counterpart. The theory of *pāka*, is very closely allied with this. The word *pāka*, meaning literally 'ripeness', 'maturity' or 'fruition', is as old as Vāmana. He speaks of *pāka* (i. 2. 21 Vṛtti), resulting from the *vaidarbhī rīti* in a delightful effect on the connoisseur, as "that attaining which the excellence of a word quickens and in which the unreal appears as real". Elsewhere he says (i. 3. 15) that *śabda-pāka* occurs when the words are so carefully chosen that they cannot bear an exchange of synonym. Later theorists elaborate the doctrine as consisting of (1) *śabda-pāka*, which may be explained, after Vāmana, as maturity of expression due to the perfect fitness of a word and its sense, and (2) *artha-pāka* or depth of sense which is of various kinds brought about by the different tastes of different poetic Rasas. Maṅgala, according to Rājaśekhara, regards *pāka* only as *sauśabdya* (excellence of words) or *tiṅāṃ supāṃ ca vyutpattiḥ* (proficiency in the use of nouns and verbs. cf.

classifies and defines them somewhat differently. See ch. 345, and above p. 204.

Bhāmaha i. 14-15). Vidyādhara admits only what is called *artha-pāka* above ; but he alludes to the other theories which say that *pāka* consists of *pada-vyutpatti* (Maṅgala) or of *pada-parivṛtti-vaimukhya* (Vāmana). Vidyānātha calls this last *śayyā*, and accepts and defines *pāka* as depth of sense. Bhoja would call it *prauḍhī* and enumerate it as a *śabda-guṇa*.

Rājaśekhara's discussion of earlier views on this point (p. 20) is interesting and deserves quotation. "The *ācāryas* ask: 'what is *pāka*?' Maṅgala says: 'it is maturity (*pariṇāma*)'. 'What again, is maturity?' ask the *ācāryas*. Maṅgala replies: 'it is the skill in the use of nouns and verbs'. Hence it is *sauśabdya* or excellence of language. 'The *pāka* is fixedness in the application of words' say the *ācāryas*. It is said [by Vāmana i. 3. 15]: 'The insertion and deletion of words occur so long as there is uncertainty in the mind ; when the fixity of words is established, the composition is successful'. So the followers of Vāmana say: 'the *pāka* is aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms'. Therefore it is said [Vāmana, *loc, cit.*] : 'The specialists in the propriety of words have called that *śabda-pāka* in which the words abandon the capability of being exchanged (by synonyms)'. But Avantisundarī thinks that this want of capability is not *pāka*. Since the varied expressions of great poets, with regard to one and the same object, all attain maturity, the *pāka* consists in the composition of word and sense proper to the development of Rasa. So it is said: 'That is *vākya-pāka* to me by which the mode of stringing together word and sense, according to *guṇa, alaṃkāra, rīti* and *ukti*, is relished'. And again: 'There being the speaker, there being the word, there being the *rasa*, there is still not that by which the nectar of words flows'. Hence the Yāyāvarīyas say: 'Since the *pāka*, which is capable of being communicated by *śabda* (word) through its inferrability from its effect, is in a high degree the province of Denotation (*ābhidhā*), still it is subject to usage of what is established by the sanction of the *sahṛdaya*'."

From this passage it would seem that Rājaśekhara admits that the *pāka* is conveyed chiefly through words ; and taken as *sauśabdya* or *śabda-vyutpatti*, it comes primarily under the province of *abhidhā* ; but it finds its scope only in the *artha* which is established by the taste of the *sahṛdaya*. In this connexion it is proper to note that the term *pāka*, like the word *rasa*, has a reference to its etymological meaning of physical taste which has been fancifully likened to that resulting from the ripeness of fruits. As such ripeness of fruits bears different tastes, some theorists carry the analogy into distinguishing and naming *pākas* after various kinds of fruits. Thus, Vāmana quotes two old verses (under iii. 2. 15) which speak of *vṛntāka-pāka* ; while Vidyānātha speaks of two kinds of *pāka* (1) *drākṣā-pāka*, or the maturity of grapes in which the taste flows both in and out, and (2) *nārikela-pāka*, the ripeness of cocoa-nut which is rough outside but tasty inside. Bhoja similarly distinguishes between *mṛdvīkā-pāka* and *nārikela-pāka* ; but Ratneśvara in his commentary alludes to various kinds of *pāka*, named after *sahakāra* (mango), *vārtāka* (egg-plant) and *nīlakapittha* (feronia elephantum). Rājaśekhara goes to the length of mentioning nine such cases of *pāka* named after the following nine fruits (pp. 20-21) :, *picumanda* (*nimba*, azadirachta indica), *badara* (jujube), *mṛdvīkā* (grapes), *vārtāka* (egg-plant fruit), *tintiḍī* (tamarind), *sahakāra* (mango), *kramuka* (betel-nut), *trapusa* (cucumber) and *nārikela* (cocoa-nut).

CHAPTER VIII

SOME LATER WRITERS OF THE NEW SCHOOL

(1)

Hemacandra and *the Vāgbhaṭas*

The group of three Jaina writers, Hemacandra and the older and the younger Vāgbhaṭas, may be conveniently mentioned here, but they do not call for any special remark. Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana*, written in the form of Sūtra with Vṛtti, and its commentary, called *Viveka*[1], composed by himself, indicate extensive learning and constitute a compact manual of Poetics in eight chapters; but there is hardly anywhere any striking trait of originality[2] or even indepen-

1 The Sūtra-portion is called *Kāvyānuśāsana*, the Vṛtti is styled the *Alaṃkāra-cūḍā-maṇi*, while the brief commentary which explains the Vṛtti may be called *Viveka* from its *maṅgala*-verse.

2 Hemacandra's treatment of poetic figures, however, is somewhat peculiar. He speaks of six *śabdālaṃkāras*, viz. *anuprāsa*, *yamaka*, *citra*, *śleṣa*, *vakrokti* and *punaruktavad-ābhāsa*. The *arthālaṃkāras* are much reduced in number and limited to twenty-nine (viz. *upamā*, *utprekṣā*, *rūpaka*, *nidarśana*, *dīpaka*, *anyokti*, *paryāyokta*, *atiśayokti*, *ākṣepa*, *virodha*, *sahokti*, *samāsokti*, *jāti*, *vyāja-stuti*, *śleṣa*, *vyatireka*, *arthāntara-nyāsa*, *sasaṃdeha*, *apahnuti*, *parāvṛtti*, *anumāna*, *smṛti*, *bhrānti*, *viṣama*, *sama*, *samuccaya*, *parisaṃkhyā*, *kāraṇamālā* and *saṃkara*). He includes *saṃsṛṣṭi* under *saṃkara*, and treats *ananvaya* and *upameyopamā* as varieties of *upamā*. The *aprastuta-praśaṃsā* similarly goes under *anyokti*. All figures like *rasavat*, *preyas*, *ūrjasvin* and *samāhita* that have a touch of Rasa and Bhāva are omitted as being comprehended (so also Mammaṭa thinks) in the class of poetry called *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*. Hemacandra does not deal with *parikara*, *yathā-saṃkhya*, *bhāvika*, *udātta*, *āśīḥ* and *pratyanīka* for reasons explained by himself at pp. 292-4. Hemacandra, however, defines some figures somewhat broadly so as to include other recognised figures in them, e. g. his *dīpaka* would include *tulyayogitā*, his *parāvṛtti* would contain the *paryāya* and *parivṛtti* of Mammaṭa, his *nidarśana* would comprehend *prativastūpamā*, *dṛṣṭānta* and *nidarśanā* of other writers.

dent thinking out of the main problems. This work is chiefly a compilation[3]. Hemacandra not only paraphrases literally most of the standardised definitions, and reproduces almost unhesitatingly the illustrative quotations of Mammaṭa; but his acknowledged and unacknowledged borrowings from the *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, from the *Abhinava-bhāratī*, from the *Vakrokti-jīvita*, from Rājaśekhara's *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, as well as from other well known works are indeed numerous. No doubt, Hemacandra adds a chapter on Dramaturgy, chiefly compiled from Bharata and others, but the account of the doctrines of *dhvani*, *rasa*, *guṇa*, *doṣa* and *alaṃkāra* is closely and somewhat uncritically copied from Mammaṭa, supplemented, however, by excerpts, in the commentary, of other views on the subject. In trying to improve upon Mammaṭa's imperfect definition of poetry by substituting *sālaṃkārau ca* in the place of *analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi*, he puts himself open to greater technical objection, although he adds the gloss: *ca-kāro niralaṃkārayor api śabdārthayoḥ kvacit kāvyatva-sthāpanārthaḥ*.

The older and the younger Vāgbhaṭas, on the other hand, though making considerable use of Mammaṭa's text (the latter especially borrowing from Hemacandra's version too), do not admit *dhvani*, and are allied in their sympathies with the Pre-dhvani schools. The authority of Daṇḍin, for instance, carries great weight with them; and the younger Vāgbhaṭa admits some of Rudraṭa's peculiar poetic figures. At the same time, the unmistakable influence of the new

3 The eight chapters of Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana* comprehends the following topics: i. The purpose (*proyojana*) of poetry, its causes (*hetu*) viz. *pratibhā* to which are added *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa*; the definition of poetry; the nature of *śabda* and *artha*; the denoted, indicated and suggested meanings. ii. The *rasa* and its factors. iii. The *doṣas* of *pada*, *vākya*, *artha* and *rasa*. iv. The *guṇas*, accepted as three after Mammaṭa, and the letters which produce them. v. Six figures of sound. vi. Twenty-nine figures of sense. vii. The *nāyaka* and *nāyikā*. viii. Division of poetry into *prekṣya* and *śravya*, and their characteristics and subdivisions.

school on them precludes us from affiliating them directly with the older Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools. The older Vāgbhaṭa defines poetry as:

sādhu-śabdārtha-saṃdarbhaṃ guṇālaṃkāra-bhūṣitam |
sphuṭa-rīti-rasopetaṃ kāvyaṃ kurvīta kīrtaye | |

while the younger Vāgbhaṭa, whose work is written in the *sūtra-* and *vṛtti*-form like Hemacandra's, adopts literally the latter's modification of Mammaṭa's definition. The criterion of poetry, according to them, is that it must contain, through its word and sense, the *guṇa, alaṃkāra, rīti* and *rasa,* but these elements are mentioned rather in an eclectic than critical spirit. The older Vāgbhaṭa accepts without question the ten Guṇas of older writers, but the younger Vāgbhaṭa follows Mammaṭa in limiting them to three, with the pointed remark: *iti daṇḍi-vāmana-vāgbhaṭādi-praṇītā daśa kāvya-guṇāḥ, vayaṃ tu mādhuryaujaḥ-prasāda-lakṣaṇān trīn eva guṇān manyāmahe.* The younger Vāgbhaṭa speaks of Rasa as the 'soul' of poetry[4]; but beyond a description, after Hemacandra and others, of the different Rasas, he does not touch upon the theoretical aspect of the question, nor does he indicate the mutual relation of the different elements of poetry with reference to the Rasa. Indeed, both of them do not appear to accept the reconciliation proposed by the Dhvani-theorists; and the younger Vāgbhaṭa specifically includes *dhvani,* after Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, in the figure *paryāyokta* with the remark: *evamādi-bhedair dhvanitoktir bhavati, paraṃ grantha-gaurava-bhayād asmābhir nodāhriyate, sa prapañcas tvānandavardhanād avagantavyaḥ* (p. 37). The object of these Jaina manuals (though there is nothing specifically Jaina in them) appears to have been the presentation of a popular and easy epitome of the subject, allaying themselves to no particular school or system, but following

4 *doṣa-muktaṃ guṇa-yuktam alaṃkāra-bhūṣitaṃ śabdārtha-rūpam uktam kāvya-śarīram, paraṃ tat tvaprāṇi-śarīram iva nirātmakaṃ na pratibhāsate, ataḥ kāvyasya prāṇa-bhūtaṃ rasam āha,* ch. v, p. 53).

the traditional notions in a spirit of eclecticism, without critically systematising them in the light of a central theory. In this respect, they bear a close resemblance to the *alaṃkāra*-section in the *Agni-purāṇa* and the *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* of Bhoja, whose definition of poetry is forcibly recalled by that of the older Vāgbhaṭa quoted above.

The topics dealt with in the five *paricchedas* of the *Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra* are as follow: (i) The definition of Kāvya; *pratibhā* as the source of Kāvya, aided by *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa*; the circumstances favourable to poetry and the conventions observed by poets. (ii) The language of poetry (Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhraṃśa and Bhūta-bhāṣā); forms of poetry (metrical *chandonibaddha* and non-metrical); its divisions into *padya* (verse), *gadya* (prose) and *miśra* (mixed verse and prose); eight *doṣas* of *pada* and of *vākya* respectively, and the *doṣas* of *artha*. (iii) The ten *guṇas*. (iv) Four poetic figures of sound, viz. *citra, vakrokti, anuprāsa* and *yamaka*, and thirty-five figures of sense; the two *rītis* (*vaidarbhī* and *gauḍīyā*). (v) Nine *rasas*; kinds of *nāyaka* and *nāyikā* and kindred topics. The *Kāvyānuśāsana* of the younger Vāgbhaṭa is, unlike the *Vāgbhaṭālaṃkāra* (which is written in the metrical form, generally in the *anuṣṭubh* with only one prose passage at iii. 14), composed in the Sūtra- and Vṛtti-style of Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana*. It is also divided into five chapters with topics as follow: (i) The *prayojana*, and the *hetu* (*pratibhā* aided by *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa*) of Kāvya; its division into *padya, gadya* and *miśra*; the classification of poetical composition into *mahākāvya, ākhyāyikā, kathā, campū* and *rūpaka*. (ii) Sixteen *doṣas* of *pada*, fourteen of *vākya*, and fourteen of *artha*; the ten *guṇas* of Vāmana and Daṇḍin reduced to three, viz. *mādhurya, ojas* and *prasāda*; three *rītis*, viz. *vaidarbhī, gauḍīyā* and *pāñcālī*. (ii) Sixty-three figures of sense, in which some of Rudraṭa's old figures reappear. (iv) Six figures of sound, viz. *citra, śleṣa, anuprāsa, vakrokti, yamaka* and *punaruktavad-ābhāsa*. (v) Nine *rasas*; the topic of *nāyaka-nāyikā*; and the *doṣas* of *rasa*.

(2)

Jayadeva, Appayya and *Jagannātha*

We have now practically closed our survey of the principal Post-dhvani writers who deserve mention and treatment. The school of *kavi-śikṣā* and the erotic *rasa*-writers stand apart in many respects, and we propose to deal with them separately in the following chapters. But the above account of the Post-dhvani writers must not be supposed to exhaust the extraordinary wealth of scholastic activity of this period. The commentators and textbook-writers continued to multiply, and a glance at their names given in our preceding volume[5] will show the extent to which their activity was carried ; but hardly any of these later works, except perhaps Jagannātha's *Rasa-gaṅgādhara*, with an account of which we shall close our survey, deserves separate or detailed mention. Even Keśava Miśra's *Alaṃkāra-śekhara*, or Acyuta Rāya's more modern *Sāhitya-sāra*[6], convenient and well-written compendiums as they are, and standing as they do much above the average, add hardly anything fresh to our knowledge.

Keśava Miśra draws largely upon Mammaṭa and the younger Vāgbhaṭa (besides older writers). He declares that his work is based upon the Kārikās of one *alaṃkāra-vidyā-sūtrakāra bhagavān* Śauddhodani (see vol. i, pp. 220f) ; but it does not present any theory nor set up any new system. There are, however, certain opinions which are peculiar to the work, the chief of which is that it sets up Rasa as the essence of poetry. The work is divided into eight *ratnas*, consisting of twenty-two *marīcis*. The first *ratna* defines Kāvya as *rasādimat vākya*, and discusses *pratibhā* etc. as its sources. After an enunciation of three Rītis, *vaidarbhī*, *gauḍī* and *māgadhī* (which are defined with reference to the em-

5 See vol. i, ch. x, pp. 262-315, Minor Writers. For commentators, see Bibliography given under each writer.

6 For a summary of the contents of this work, see vol. i, p. 264.

ployment of compounds), along with *ukti* (4 kinds) and *mudrā* (4 kinds), it goes on to discuss the three usual Vṛttis, viz. *śakti* (=*abhidhā*), *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā*. Then comes the *doṣa-ratna*, in which are detailed two series of eight faults each of word and sense, and twelve defects of sentences. The next third section, called *guṇa-ratna*, deals with five excellences of *śabda* (viz. *saṃkṣiptatva*, *udāttatva*, *prasāda*, *ukti* and *samādhi*), and four excellences of sense (viz. *bhāvikatva*, *suśabdatva*, *paryāyokta* and *sudharmitā*). This is followed by a discussion of the cases where some of the above Doṣas may sometimes become Guṇas. The influence of Bhoja's opinions on this part of the work is obvious. Then comes the *alaṃkāra-ratna*, where mention is made of eight figures of sounds (*citra*, *vakrokti*, *anuprāsa*, *gūḍha*, *ślesa*, *prahelikā*, *praśnottara* and *yamaka*) and only fourteen figures of sense (*upamā*, *rūpaka*, *utprekṣā*, *samāsokti*, *apahnuti*, *samāhita*, *svabhāva*, *virodha*, *sāra*, *dīpaka*, *sahokti*, *anyadeśatva*= *asaṃgati* of Mammaṭa, *viśeṣokti*, and *vibhāvanā*). This is followed by a curious chapter, entitled *varṇaka-ratna*, in which are detailed the *upamānas* appropriate for describing a damsel, her complexion, hair, forehead, eyebrows etc. It goes on to give practical hints as to how poets should describe the physical characteristics of the hero, mentions words which convey the idea of similarity, details the conventional usages of poets (*kavi-samaya*), as well as the topics for description (such as the king, the queen, a town, a city, a river etc.) and the way of describing them, the colours of various objects in nature, words that convey numerals from one to one thousand, certain tricks of words such as *bhāṣā-sama* (where a verse reads the same in Sanskrit as in Prakrit), *samasyā-pūraṇa*, the nine Rasas, the kinds of hero and heroine, the different Bhāvas, the Doṣas of Rasa, and lastly, the arrangement of letters favourable to each Rasa.

Jayadeva's *Candrāloka*[7] has been a deservedly popular

7 See vol. i, p. 199 for a résumé of its contents.

manual, but in spite of its clearness and brevity of exposition and aptness of its illustrations, it is nothing more than a convenient epitome, its most remarkable feature being its detailed treatment of poetic figures, which occupy nearly half its bulk.

The *Candrāloka* deals with ten *guṇas* and one hundred *alaṃkāras*. The third chapter, curiously enough, is devoted to *lakṣaṇas*, which are not mentioned by later writers except in connexion with Dramaturgy (as by Viśvanātha). Instead of Bharata's thirty-six *lakṣaṇas* (ch. xvi 6-39 ; see above pp. 3-5), Jayadeva defines and illustrates only ten, viz. the economical combination of letters to convey a striking meaning (*akṣara-saṃhati*), the prohibition of a fault by the indication of an excellence (*śobhā*). the deliberation resulting in a negation of what is said (*abhimāna*), the determination of a proposition by a rejection of other possible alternatives (*hetu*), the disregard of well established causes (*pratiṣedha*), the interpretation of a name both as true and false (*nirukta*), false attribution where both the major and middle terms of a proposition are absent (*mithyādhyavasāya*), substantiation of the excellence of an object by emphasising its well-matched resemblance to a well known object (*siddhi*), establishment of a particular attribute through the drift of two different meanings (*yukti*), and the accomplishment of a purpose through some action or occurrence (*phala*). Viśvanātha, however, adds thirty-three dramatic embellishments (*naṭyālaṃkāras*) to his *lakṣaṇas*, which are enumerated after Bharata as thirty-six in number, but which do not correspond exactly to Bharata's *lakṣaṇas*, as some of the latter fall also under Viśvanātha's *nāṭyālaṃkāras*. The two classes cannot indeed be distinguished on any conceivable theory ; and though Viśvanātha adopts the conventional enumeration, he remarks in the end : *eṣāṃ ca lakṣaṇānāṃ nāṭyālaṃkārāṇām ekarūpatve'pi bhedena vyapadeśaḥ gaḍḍalikā-pravāheṇa.*

Thus, we find included under *lakṣaṇas* the combination of Guṇas with Alaṃkāras ; the economical grouping of letters to produce a charming import ; the use of *double*

entendre for the purpose of conveying a less known import along with one more well known ; the use of analogy and example ; the brief citation of a reason for the intended meaning ; the expression of doubt in the case of an object whose nature is not known ; the surmise from a matter coincident with the course of nature ; the fitting of expression to the sense ; the citation of admitted facts to refute inadmissible views ; the supposition of a non-existent object or fact from resemblance ; the inference of an object from some of its peculiarities ; the deduction by reasoning of a fact which is not capable of sense-perception ; the description of an object under the similitude of time and place ; the statement of agreeable views in accordance with the Śāstras ; the indication of acts contrary to one's qualities ; the attribution to an object of qualities in excess of its ordinary qualities ; the discrimination of a particular meaning out of other well known meanings by an allusion to the literal sense ; the repetition of a proposition already established ; the mention of various objects in eulogy of the intended object ; the unconscious expression, under the influence of passion, of the contrary of what one means ; the alteration of a conclusion through doubt ; the compliance with other people's views by words or acts ; the persuasion by means of affectionate words ; the statement in succession of several means to attain a desired object ; the suggestion and strengthening of one view by a different view ; the reproach ; the respectful enquiry ; the employment of names of well known persons or things in eulogy of the person or thing under description ; the mistaken resemblance of apparently similar things causing resentment ; the offer of oneself in the service of another ; the flattering statement ; the employment of a comparison to convey a sense which is not directly desired ; the indirect expression of desire ; the veiled compliment ; and the expression of gratitude in pleasing terms.

The *nāṭyālaṃkāras* are the benediction, the lamentation, the deception, the unforgiving attitude, the arrogant ex-

pression, the expression of a resolution or of an excellent purpose, the raillery, the desire for a charming object, the agitation due to reproach, the repentance for missing an object through folly, the use of an argument, the longing for an object, the request, the commencement of an undesirable act, the mentioning of a purpose, the provocation, the reproach, the observance of the Śāstras, the covert rebuke administered by citing a common opinion, the narration, the prayer, the apology, the reminding of a duty neglected, the recounting of previous history, the determination of an act by reasoning, the ecstacy and the instruction.

It will be seen that the division is not only overlapping, but both the *lakṣaṇas* and the *nāṭyālaṃkāras* refer largely to modes of exposition, to the use of what other writers would regard as specific figures or excellences of diction, or they may sometimes appertain to the feelings and emotions which come within the sphere of Rasa and Bhāva. This fact is recognised very early by Daṇḍin who includes *lakṣaṇas* under *alaṃkāras* in the wider sense. Dhanañjaya does the same, but he recognises also that some of them come under Rasa and Bhāva. Viśvanātha, therefore, includes them under the *guṇa*, *alaṃkāra*, *bhāva* and *saṃdhi*, but deals with them only in connexion with the drama. There is practically no need for them in later Poetics from which they ultimately disappear, their function having been assigned to other recognised elements of poetry.

Appayya Dīkṣita's three well known manuals[8] one of which is directly based on Jayadeva's work, and Viśveśvara's *Alaṃkāra-kaustubha*[9] are indeed noteworthy for their elaborate treatment of poetic figures and have merits of their own, but they are in reality nothing more than elementary text-books, excellent résumés which methodically register

8 See vol. i, pp. 223-25.

9 See vol. i, p. 303. The work, as its name implies, deals entirely with poetic figures in an elaborate way. The number of independent figures dealt with is about 76.

previous speculations on the subject. There is such a general sameness of characteristics, such a monotony of treatment, as well as repetition of conventional topics in conventional phraseology, that it is not worth while to linger over the activity of these lesser writers. The work of the great Kashmirian writers was over, and although Bengal and the Deccan had come into prominence as fields of later activity, the age of really original or thoughtful writers was long gone by. It was succeeded by an age of commentators, interpreters and critics (some of them were very able and painstaking) as long as there was the need of critical elaboration, of understanding and explaining a great author. But in course of time, even this became superfluous, and there was nothing to be done but the writing of smaller and simpler manuals adapted to general comprehension. The declining age of most of the schools witnessed a host of such manuals and manuals of manuals ; but this was the period when the declining age of the Post-dhvani school, as represented by Mammaṭa, went through the same process. Even this was not enough. Out of the debris of these schools there grew up a spirit of eclecticism, of which we have already an early indication in the works of Bhoja and the Vāgbhaṭas after the decline of the older Rasa, Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools ; and we meet with hand-books which depend upon no system but which are apparently written for the enlightenment of lay understanding. The different systems of Sanskrit Poetics may now be supposed to have well-nigh run their course and attained their natural termination.

(3)

Jagannātha

Jagannātha's *Rasa-gaṅgādhara* is the last remarkable work on Poetics. We do not, however, find in it a complete presentation of the subject, as the available text forms about two-fifths of what the work was originally designed to be by

its author and is thus extant only in an unfortunately incomplete shape. Nearly three-fourths of this, again, and the whole of his *Citra-mīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana* are taken up with the discussion and illustration of poetic figures, a topic which, as here set forth, forms indeed one of the most exhaustive and noteworthy presentation of later times, but is of little theoretical interest from the standpoint of general Poetics. Jagannātha's style is erudite and frightens the student by its involved language, its subtle reasoning and its unsparing criticism of earlier writers. The most criticised authors in this respect are Ruyyaka, his commentator Jayaratha and his follower Appayya Dīkṣita. But in spite of this tendency towards controversy, which is combined with an aptitude for hair-splitting refinements, Jagannātha's work displays an acute and independent treatment, or at least an attempt at a rethinking of the old problems. He shows himself conversant with the poetic theories of older writers, which he does not ignore but which he endeavours to harmonise with the new currents of thought. Along with some other important writers of the new school, Jagannātha marks a reaction in this respect ; and the school of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka does not receive from him unqualified homage.

Jagannātha defines poetry as a word or linguistic composition which brings a charming idea into expression (*ramaṇīyārtha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ*) : a definition which reminds us of Daṇḍin's well known description of *kāvya-śarīra* as *iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī*, but which is further explained in this way. The charmingness belongs to an idea which causes unworldly or disinterested pleasure. This quality of disinterestedness is an essential characteristic, which is a fact of internal experience and which is an attribute of pleasure, being synonymous with *camatkāra* or strikingness. The cause of this pleasure is a conception or a species of representation, consisting of continued contemplation of something characterised by the pleasure itself. Thus, there is no disinterestedness in the pleasure conveyed by the ap-

prehension of the sense of a sentence like 'a son is born to you' or 'I shall give you money'; in such a sentence, therefore, there is no poetry. Hence poetry consists of words which express an idea that becomes the object of contemplation causing such pleasure[10].

The beautiful (*ramaṇīyatā*) in poetry, therefore, is that which gives us disinterested or impersonal pleasure. This pleasure is specifically different from that which one finds in the actually pleasing, and depends upon taste formed by continued contemplation of beautiful objects. It will be noticed that this definition not only gives us a remarkable analysis of the beautiful but includes in its generality and comprehensiveness all the elements of poetry recognised by previous theorists, without specifically naming them. We have already noted that the poetic sentiment or Rasa, excited in the reader's mind, is peculiar in its nature; it is, no doubt, a fact of one's own consciousness but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common to all trained readers and possessing no significance to their personal relations or interests. A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment; the former is individual and immediately personal and therefore may be pleasurable or painful, but the latter is generic and disinterested and marked by impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernormal (*alaukika*), and those things which cause disgust, fear or sorrow in ordinary life and those normal emotions which are far from pleasant in actual experience, being conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal, and bring about this supernormal pleasure which is not to be compared

10 *ramaṇīyatā ca lokottarāhlāda-janaka-jñāna-gocaratā; lokottaraṃ cāhlāda-gataś camatkāratvāpara-paryāyo'nubhava-sākṣiko jāti-viśeṣaḥ; kāraṇaṃ ca tad-avacchinne bhāvanā-viśeṣaḥ punaḥ punar anusaṃdhānātmā; putras te jātaḥ, dhanaṃ te dāsyāmīti vākyārtha-dhī-janyasyāhlādasya na lokottaratvam, ato na tasmin vākye kāvyatva-prasaktiḥ. Itthaṃ ca camatkāra-janaka-bhāvanā-viṣayārtha-pratipādaka-śabdatvam.* Cf Jacobi in *Internat. Wochenschrift*, 1910, ix. 821.

to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of Rasa ; it is also the essence of all poetry, as conceived by Jagannātha.

In the same way, the definition includes the concept of the suggested sense (*dhvani*), and Jagannātha proceeds to divide poetry on this basis into four (viz. *uttamottama*, *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama*) classes, corresponding to the three classes recognised by his predecessors since the Dhvanikāra's time. The first occurs where the sound and sense, subordinating themselves, suggest another charming sense ; it corresponds to the principal *dhvani-kāvya* of the Dhvanikāra. The second and third classes, the *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* and *citra*, mentioned by the Dhvanikāra, are split up[11] into three cases, viz. (i) where the suggested sense, though not principal, is yet the cause of special charm, (ii) where the charm of the expressed sense is predicated equally with the charm of the suggested, and (iii) where the charm of sound, being embellished by the charm of sense, is principal. This lowest class of poetry, corresponding to the *śabda-citra* and *artha-citra* of Mammaṭa (a distinction which is rejected by Jagannātha), apparently comprehends those cases where the *artha-camatkṛti* is swallowed up or strengthened by *śabda-camatkṛti*. Jagannātha adds that although it is possible to count a still lower fifth class of poetry, in which the charm of sound is altogether devoid of all charm of sense (e. g. cases of conundrums like the *padma-bandha*) and which is allowed by the practice of some poets, yet in view of the definition of poetry already given, as consisting of words expressing a charming sense, these instances have to be excluded or ignored.

11 The object of this splitting up is to dispense with the necessity of minutely subdividing the various cases of the *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya* and also to include generally all poetry which is *alaṃkāra-pradhāna*.

After this classification, Jagannātha follows the conventional way of dividing Dhvani, infinite aspects as it may present (*asaṃkhya-bheda*), into two broad groups, based on Denotation (*abhidhā-mūla*) and Indication (*lakṣaṇā-mūla*) respectively. The former has a threefold aspect, according as it is a suggestion of *rasa*, *alaṃkāra* or *vastu*, while recognition is given to the two cases of the latter, viz., (i) where the expressed meaning passes over to another sense (*arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya*) and (ii) where the expressed sense is made to disappear entirely (*atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya*). This brings our author topically to a detailed consideration of Rasa-dhvani which is characterised as *parama-ramaṇīya*, and an elaborate discussion of the nature and theory of Rasa and Bhāva and its constituent elements. He speaks in this connexion of *bhāva-dhvani* (pp. 74-98) and takes into consideration different phases of Rasa and Bhāva, such as *rasābhāsa* (p. 99), *bhāva-śānti* (p. 102), *bhāvotpatti*, *bhāva-saṃdhi* and *bhāva-śabalatā* (p. 103f)[12]. The discussion of the Guṇas come in this context, inasmuch as they are related to the Rasa. Jagannātha enumerates and discusses the ten *śabda-* and *artha-guṇas* of Vāmana and other older writers ; but he appears to accept only three Guṇas after Mammaṭa, viz. *mādhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, classifying them on the basis of their respective effects on the reader's mind, viz. *druti* (melting), *dīpti* (brilliance, i. e. expansion) and *vikāsa* (pervasion). Jagannātha remarks in this connexion: *guṇānāṃ caiṣāṃ druti-dīpti-vikāsākhyās tisraś citta-vṛttayaḥ krameṇa prayojyaḥ, tat-tad-guṇa-viśiṣṭa-rasa-carvaṇā-janyā iti yāvat*, making it clear that the justification of this classification consists in the divergent nature of the mental activity involved in the relish of Rasa. He does not agree, however, with Mammaṭa in the latter's statement that when we speak of a composition as *madhura* we use the word in a secondary

12 These topics are also dealt with by Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others.

sense (as when we say "the appearance of this man is brave"), inasmuch as the Guṇas being the properties of Rasa, we apply to the 'body' what appertains to the 'soul' of poetry by an extended use of the term. Jagannātha maintains that when we say the sentiment of love (*śṛṅgāra*) is *madhura* in a particular case, we mean to imply its influence, such as *druti* etc. on the mind, and this must be taken to refer not only to Rasa but also to *śabda* and *artha* and the composition in general (*śabdārtha-rasa-racanā-gatam eva grāhyam*).

The next chapter proceeds to discuss other varieties of suggestion, including suggestion based on *lakṣaṇā*, which is dealt with in detail. It then takes up the poetic figures (to the number of about 70), to which the rest of the work, breaking off in the middle of the figure *uttara*, is devoted. The poetic figure or Alaṃkāra comes in as the source of the charm or *ramaṇīyatā* essential in the principal suggested element of poetry already defined (*prāg-abhihita-lakṣaṇa-sya kāvyātmano vyaṅgyasya ramaṇīyatā-prayojakā alaṃ-kārāḥ*, p. 156). The aesthetic pleasure (*camatkāra* or *lokottaratva*) into which this *ramaṇīyatā* resolves itself is an essential element in the poetic figure ; Jagannātha thus harmonises his own conception of poetry with Ruyyaka's theory of the *alaṃkāra* (which he accepts and elaborates) as involving this *camatkāra* (also called *hṛdyatva*, *cārutva*, *saundarya*, or denoted by the technical terms *vaicitrya*, *vicchitti-viśeṣa* or *bhaṇiti-prakāra*) imparted by the conception of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā*). Kuntaka, from whom Ruyyaka appears to have derived his analysis, laid down that in every poetical production the activity of the poet, which consists in an act of the productive imagination (*pratibhā*), is the principal point, and it should result in poetic expression. Jagannātha asserts that the *pratibhā* alone is the source of poetry and therefore of poetic expression, and as such it fixes the nature of the *alaṃkāra*. The special charm (*vicchitti-viśeṣa*), which is thus imparted to poetic figure by the imagination of the poet, is taken (pp. 466, 470) as the basis upon

which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities, and is explained as an act of imagination on the part of the poet in so far as it is produced in the poem, or as that aesthetic pleasure[13] which is thereby brought into being. As to how this *vicchitti* is determined, Jagannātha settles the question by resting it not only upon established usage (*saṃpradāya*) but also upon one's own internal experience (*anubhava*). On this fundamental principle, the various figures are minutely defined, differentiated, illustrated and classified ; and this portion of Jagannātha's work, in spite of its subtlety and polemic attitude, is one of the most acute, though unfortunately uncompleted, treatment of the subject.[14]

13 This translation of the term *camatkāra* is justified by Jagannātha's own definition of poetry.

14 For an elaborate account of Jagannātha as a literary critic see V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, *Jagannātha Paṇḍita* (Annamalai Univ. Skt. Series 1942), pp. 78f (chs. iv-vi).

CHAPTER IX

LATER WRITERS ON RASA

(1)

The doctrine of Rasa, which is advocated, if not first enunciated, by Abhinavagupta, is finally adopted by almost all writers on general Poetics who accept *rasa-dhvani* as an important element of poetry. With the exception of Viśvanātha and Keśava Miśra, they do not indeed go so far as to declare expressly with Abhinavagupta that Rasa alone is the essence of poetry, but they accept in reality the suggested sense in the form of Rasa as essentially the main element. The Rasa is viewed as a pleasant sentiment belonging to the reader whose dormant emotions, derived from experience or inherited instincts, are evoked by the reading of poems into an ideal and impersonalised form of joy ; an appreciation or enjoyment, consisting of a pleasant mental condition in which the reader identifies himself with the feelings of the hero and experiences them in a generic form, the fulness of the enjoyment depending upon the nature and experience of the particular reader. The sentiment thus evoked is essentially universal in character, and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it is not individual (even though enjoyed as an intimately personal feeling), but generic and disinterested, being such as would be common to all trained readers (*samasta-bhāvaka-svasaṃvedya*). It is, therefore, described as something supernormal (*alaukika*) and invariablv pleasant, not to be compared to the normal pleasures of life which have always a reference to one's personal relations or interests, and which may be pleasant or painful. Things, which would be called causes of an emotion in the normal sense and which may produce disgust, horror or pity in real life, awaken these feelings indeed in poetry and drama, but convey them in such an ideal and generic form that these emotions, which

are far from pleasant in ordinary life, are converted into an impersonal joy, which is ineffable and indivisible. One may be moved by disgust, horror or pity and shed real tears; but the underlying sentiment is always one of exquisite joy[1], which must be distinguished from an ordinary feeling.

This is the general position of all later theorists with regard to the nature and function of Rasa in poetry. Dhanañjaya, for instance, gives us the same process of transformation of an ordinary emotion, dominant in a composition, into a poetic sentiment, as formally laid down by Bharata and interpreted by Abhinavagupta; and in this he is practically in agreement with Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara Viśvanātha and others. The dominant emotion (*sthāyi-bhāva*), he says, becomes a sentiment (*rasa*) when it is brought into a relishable condition through the co-operation of the excitants, the ensuants and the accessories (including the *sāttvika bhāvas*). This statement is further amplified by the assertion that the enjoyer of Rasa (*rasika*) is the audience (*sāmājika*) on whose capacity of enjoyment it depends, and that the dominant feeling becomes a sentiment when it is so enjoyed. The Rasa, being a mental state, a subjective experience of the reader, in which enjoyment (*āsvāda, carvaṇā, rasanā* or *bhoga*) is essential and in which the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment become identical, the reader receives the represented feeling into his own soul and thereby enjoys it[2]. The locus of the Rasa is not in the

1 But the *Nāṭya-darpaṇa*, as noted above (p. 132 fn), as well as Bhoja (*sukha-duḥkhāvasthā-rūpa*), believes that Rasa is *sukha-duḥkhātmaka*. The *Rasa-kalikā* (vol. i, p. 318) also holds this view. See the elaborate arguments set forth in *Nāṭya-darpaṇa* (ed. GOS, p. 159) in support of this view. Siddhicandra (*Kāvyaprakāśa-khaṇḍana* pp 16-21) refers to this theory of the "Navyas" that all Rasas are not pleasurable, but some distinctly painful. They accordingly admit the four pleasurable Rasas, viz. Śṛṅgāra, Vīra, Hāsya and Adbhuta only, and not those which involve pain, viz. Karuṇa, Raudra, Bībhatsa and Bhayānaka. See the question discussed by V. Raghavan, *Number of Rasas*, ch. viii.

2 Cf. Jacobi in *GgA*, 1913, pp. 308f.

represented hero who belongs to the past ; nor is it in the poem itself, the task of which is merely to exhibit the excitants etc. by which the dominant emotion is brought into expression and the Rasa, on its part, becomes revealed to the reader. Nor does the Rasa consist of the reader's mere apprehension (*pratīti*) of the emotions exhibited in the poem or enacted by the actor ; for the reader would then apprehend not the Rasa but a feeling varying in different individuals, just as in real life the spectacle of a pair of lovers in union gives different spectators who witness it the varying emotions, according to their individual nature, of shame, envy, desire or aversion[3]. The *vibhāvas* etc., therefore, bring the *sthāyi-bhāva* to the enjoyment of the *rasika*, the aesthetically receptive reader or spectator, and thereby convert it into *rasa* ; but they must be generalised and have no specific relation to a particular individual (*parityakta-viśeṣa*). Thus, the *vibhāva* Sītā, Dhanika explains, must refer to woman in general, and not to the particular individual who was the daughter of Janaka. Hence things, which are the exciting, ensuing or accessory circumstances in ordinary life, act as *vibhāvas* etc. in poetry, and generalise the dominant feeling into Rasa. The spectator, say, of the deeds of Arjuna on the stage may be compared, therefore, to the child who, in playing with clay elephants, experiences the sensation of its own energy as pleasant. The enjoyment in the spectator's mind is a manifestation of that joy which is innate as the blissful nature of self, a circumstance which gives us the frequent comparison of *rasāsvāda* with *brahmāsvāda*.

The mental activity involved in this enjoyment has got four aspects taken in connexion with the four primary sentiments of the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the heroic (*vīra*), the

3 These circumstances, Dhanika thinks, disprove the *vyaṅgyatva* of Rasa. It seems that Dhanika does not accept the *vyaṅgya-vyañjaka* relation of Rasa to Poetry, but holds some views similar to the *bhāvya-bhāvaka* theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (ed. Parab, 1917, p. 96).

horrible (*bībhatsa*) and the furious (*raudra*) admitted by Bharata[4], and consists respectively of the conditions of unfolding (*vikāsa*), expansion (*vistāra*), agitation (*kṣobha*) and distraction (*vikṣepa*). We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (along with Abhinavagupta) speaks of the *bhoga* (or *āsvāda*) of Rasa as involving only three mental conditions, named *vikāsa* (pervasion), *vistāra* (expansion) and *druti* (melting), which later theorists have taken as the basis and justification of the three Guṇas of *prasāda, ojas* and *mādhurya* respectively. With regard to the ninth Rasa, the quietistic, which is not mentioned by Bharata but which is acknowledged by some theorists, Dhanañjaya forbids its delineation in the drama (iv. 35) ; for the sentiment of absolute peace is in its own nature undefinable, and consists of four states mentioned by philosophers[5], viz. *maitrī, karuṇā, muditā* and *upekṣā*, which are not realisable by the Sahṛdaya. If it exists at all as Rasa, it must comprehend the fourfold mental activity enunciated above, as corresponding to the fourfold states recognised by philosophers in *śama*[6].

It is not necessary in this connexion to take up in detail the views of Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara and other writers, for it would be repeating substantially what has already been said regarding the final doctrine of Rasa. Viśvanātha is the only important writer, among later theorists, who boldly accepts Abhinavagupta's extreme view that the *rasa-dhvani* alone is the essence of poetry and builds up a system of Poetics on its basis[7].

4 See above p. 23. The fourfold division is probably adopted as an ostensible rationale for the doctrine of four primary and four secondary Rasas recognised by Bharata.

5 E. g. *Yoga-sūtra* i. 33.

6 *na ca tathābhūtasya śānta-rasasya sahṛdayāḥ svādayitāraḥ santi, atha tad-upāyabhūto muditā-maitrī-karuṇopekṣādi-lakṣaṇas tasya ca vikāsa-vistāra-kṣobha-vikṣepa-rūpataiveti.*

7 Bhānudatta, who substantially follows the doctrine of Rasa detailed here, is however singular in his classification of some aspects of Rasa.

Following up his own definition of poetry as "a sentence of which the soul is the Rasa", Viśvanātha gives us an elaborate analysis of Rasa in almost all its aspects. He sums up at the outset the characteristics of Rasa in two verses thus: "The Rasa, arising from an exaltation of the quality of *sattva* or goodness, indivisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity, free from the contact of aught else perceived, akin to the realisation of Brahma, and having for its essence supernormal wonder (*camatkāra*), is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself". He explains *camatkāra* as consisting of an expansion of the mind and as synonymous with *vismaya*. In this connexion, Viśvanātha quotes with approval an opinion of his ancestor Nārāyaṇa who put a premium on the sentiment of the marvellous (*adbhuta rasa*) and maintained that it was essential in all Rasas. It is also explained clearly that the Rasa is identical with the enjoyment of itself, or, in other words, there is no distinction between the object and the operation in the apprehension of Rasa; so that when we say 'the Rasa is enjoyed', we only use a figurative expression. It follows from this that the enjoyment of Rasa is different in its nature from the ordinary processes of knowledge.

Viśvanātha insists very strongly on the necessity of *vāsanā*

He speaks of Rasa as *laukika* and *alaukika*, subdividing the latter into *svāpnika* (enjoyed in a dream), *mānorathika* (fanciful like a castle in the air) and *aupanāyika* (as depicted in poetry). He again gives us (*Rasa-taraṅ.* ch. viii, p. 65, ed. Regnaud) a three-fold arrangement of Rasa with reference to its manner of manifestation: (i) *abhimukha*, when it is manifested by means of the *bhāva*, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*. (ii) *vimukha*, when these elements are not directly expressed; so called because it is comprehensible with difficulty. (iii) *paramukha*, which has again two aspects according as it is (a) *alaṃkāra-mukha*, i. e, where the *alaṃkāra* is principal and the *rasa* is secondary. This includes probably the cases of figures like *rasavat*, which are included in *guṇī-bhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya* by the Dhvani-theorists, and (b) *bhāva-mukha* where the *bhāva* is in the same way principal.

in the spectator, which consists of experience (*idānīntanī*) or instincts acquired from previous births (*prāktanī*). If one is not endowed with these germs of the capacity of appreciation, one may develop them by study of poetry and experience of life. In the case of the grammarian, the philosopher or one well-versed in the sacred lore, these susceptibilities are deadened. If it is sometimes found that an eager student of poetry is still deficient in the capacity of relishing Rasa, we must assume that it is the result of his accumulated demerit of a previous birth. Thus, Viśvanātha is anxious to show that experience and cultivation of the power of imagination are essential in one who seeks to enjoy Rasa.

Viśvanātha also insists that the *vibhāvas* etc. as well as the dominant feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) must be felt as generic or impersonalised. The reader must not take the feeling as his own individual emotion ; for it would then remain as *his* feeling (and never become Rasa) and would sometimes (e.g. in the case of the pathetic sentiment) cause pain, and not joy. Nor should the feeling be taken as pertaining solely to the hero ; for then it can not, as the feeling of another person, affect the reader and become Rasa. It is necessary, therefore, that the excitants etc. as well as the dominant feeling, should be generalised by a generic function (*sādhāraṇī kṛti*) inherent in themselves, which corresponds to the generic power (*bhāvakatva*) postulated for poetry by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. This universalisation of the factors and the feelings enables the reader to identify himself with the personages depicted ; and this conceit of community removes all difficulty about accepting extraordinary episodes of exalted personages who may be superior in virtue or prowess to the average reader. The excitants etc. are indeed normally called causes, but in reality the Rasa is not an effect in the ordinary sense ; for in the case of Rasa there is the simultaneous presence of itself and its excitants, which is not true of an ordinary cause and effect. It is also pointed out that all the factors (*vibhāvas* etc.) need not be present at once, for the presence of one would revive

the others by association of ideas. In other words, what might seem wanting in the utterance of poetry is supplied, from the suggestive character of poetry itself, by force of association of ideas. It also follows from the character of Rasa described above that it is not necessarily found in the actor, who in assuming the rôle of the hero performs his part only mechanically by rule and rote ; he ranks as a spectator (and therefore as a recipient of Rasa) in so far as he is himself a man of taste and actually experiences the feelings he enacts.[8]

(2)

In spite of the unquestioned dominance of the Dhvani School, which no doubt recognised the importance of Rasa but regarded it as one of the phases of the unexpressed only, one class of writers, who still adhered to Rasa as the only element worth considering in poetry, continued to devote exclusive attention to it and built up a system, so to say, on the basis of the Rasa alone. Of all the Rasas, however, as *śṛṅgāra* (or love) forms the absorbing theme of Sanskrit poetry and drama in general, and as this particular poetic sentiment has an almost universal appeal, these writers naturally work out this important Rasa in all its phases ; and we have in consequence a series of erotico-rhetorical treatises, of which the earliest known and the most remarkable is Rudrabhaṭṭa's *Śṛṅgāra-tilaka*[9]. Rudra states distinctly at the beginning of his work that although Bharata and others

8 This follows Dhanañjaya's dictum that the enjoyment of Rasa is not precluded in the actor, if he realises in himself the feelings depicted.

9 The topics dealt with in its three chapters are: I. The *rasas*, the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, the dramatic *vṛttis* ; *śṛṅgāra* and its division ; the Nāyaka, classified with illustrations ; his assistants ; classification of the Nāyikā, II. Characteristics of love-in-separation, of *pūrva-rāga*, the ten stages of love, the *upāyas*, etc. III. The other *rasas*, viz. *hāsya*, *karuṇa*, *raudra*, *vīra*, *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa*, *adbhuta* and *śānta* ; the four *vṛttis* appropriate to the *rasas*.

have spoken of Rasa in the drama, his object is to apply it to the case of poetry, and that a Kāvya, in his opinion, must possess Rasa as its constant theme. Following upon this we have Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśā*[10], which deals with the subject in the usual elaborate cyclopaedic manner of its author, with profuse illustrations of every phase of the erotic sentiment in no less than eighteen out of its thirty-six chapters. After this come innumerable works of a similar nature[11], which take Rasa, especially *śṛṅgāra,* as their principal theme and which were composed apparently with the object of guiding the poet in the composition of erotic pieces so popular and profuse in Sanskrit poetry. Of these, the *Bhāva-prakāśa*[12] of Śāradātanaya, which reproduces the substance of most of the chapters of Bhoja's work, and the exhaustive *Rasārṇava-sudhākara* of Siṅga Bhūpāla[13], as well as the two well-known works of Bhānudatta[14], deserve mention. But none of these later treatises adds anything new or original to a subject already thrashed out to its utmost.

A new turn was given to the theory by Rūpa Gosvāmin's

10 See above p. 209.

11 See vol. i, pp. 238f, and chapter on Minor Writers.

12 See vol. i. p. 240.

13 See vol. i. p. 241f. The three *vilāsas* of this extensive work deal with the following topics: i. The hero, his qualities and classification ; his adjuncts ; the heroine, her classification and qualities, her *sāttvika* excellences ; the *uddīpana-vibhāvas* ; the *rīti* and the *guṇas* ; the dramatic *vṛttis* ; the *sāttvika bhāvas*. ii. The *vyabhicāri-bhāvas,* the *anubhāvas,* the eight *sthāyi-bhāvas,* the eight *rasas.* iii. The drama and its varieties, characteristics etc.

14 The eight *taraṅgas* of *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* are: i. Definition of *bhāva* and subdivisions thereof ; the *sthāyi-bhāvas.* ii. The *vibhāvas.* iii. The *anubhāvas.* iv. The eight *sāttvika bhāvas.* v. The *vyabhicāri-bhāvas.* vi. The *rasas* and detailed treatment of *śṛṅgāra.* vii. The other *rasas.* viii. The *sthāyi-bhāvajā* and *rasajā dṛṣṭi.* The *Rasa-mañjarī,* a much smaller work, devotes more than half of itself to the *nāyikā* and her companions, and applies the rest to the *śṛṅgāra-nāyaka,* his assistants, the eight *sāttvika guṇas,* the two aspects of *śṛṅgāra* and the ten stages of *vipralambha-śṛṅgāra.*

Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi, which attempted to deal with Rasa in terms of the Vaiṣṇava idea of *ujjvala* or *madhura rasa*, by which was meant the *śṛṅgāra rasa*, the term *ujjvala* having been apparently suggested by Bharata's description of that Rasa[15]. The *madhura rasa*, however, is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of *bhakti-rasa* (*madhurākhyo bhakti-rasaḥ*, i. 3) ; for according to Vaiṣṇava theology there are five Rasas forming roughly the five degrees of the realisation of *bhakti* or faith, viz., *śānta* (tranquillity), *dāsya* (servitude or humility, also called *prīti*), *sakhya* (friendship or equality, also called *preyas*), *vātsalya* (parental affection) and *mādhurya* (sweetness). The last, also called the *ujjvala rasa*, being the principal, is termed *bhakti-rasa-rāj*[16] and constitutes the subject-matter of the present treatise. The *kṛṣṇa-rati* or the love of Kṛṣṇa forms the dominant feeling or *sthāyi-bhāva* of this sentiment, and the recipient here is not the literary *sahṛdaya* but the *bhakta* or the faithful[17]. This *sthāyi-bhāva*, known as *madhurā rati*, which is the source of the particular Rasa, is defined in terms of the love of Kṛṣṇa[18] ; and the nature of *nāyaka* and *nāyika* is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by adducing examples from poems dealing with the love-stories of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. The work is, therefore, essentially a Vaiṣṇava religious treatise presented in a literary garb, taking Kṛṣṇa as the ideal hero, with the caution, however, that

15 *yat kiñcil loke śuci medhyam ujjvalaṃ darśanīyaṃ vā tac chṛṅgāreṇopamīyate*, ed. Grosset, pp. 89-90.

16 i. 2, explained by Viśvanātha Cakravartin as *śānta-prīti-preyo-vātsalyojjvala-nāmasu mukhyeṣu.........sa evojjvalāpara-paryāyo bhakti-rasānāṃ rājā madhurākhyo rasaḥ.*

17 *svādyatvaṃ hṛdi bhaktānām ānītā śravaṇādibhiḥ/eṣā kṛṣṇa-ratiḥ sthāyī bhāvo bhakti-raso bhavet*, cited by Viśvanātha Cakravartin, p. 4.

18 *madhurākhyāyā rater lakṣaṇaṃ coktam—mitho harer mṛgākṣyāś ca saṃbhogasyādi-kāraṇam/madhurāpara-paryāyā priyatākhyoditā ratiḥ*, ibid, loc. cit.

what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i. 18-21)[19].

With the exception of the *Ujjvala-nīla-maṇi*, which attempts to bring erotico-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of Rasa, these specialised treatises have, however, very little importance from the speculative point of view; and as they belong properly to the province of Erotics rather than Poetics, treatment of them should be sought elsewhere. The simple idea, elaborated more or less in all these works is that the awakening of Rasa is all-important in poetry, and that the fundamental Rasa is *śṛṅgāra* or the erotic, which is consequently treated in its various phases with copious illustrations. This is clearly expressed in the attitude of the author of *Agni-purāṇa* and of Bhoja, who accept only one poetic Rasa, viz. the erotic[20]. In the same way, Rudrabhaṭṭa declares *śṛṅgāro nāyako rasaḥ* (i. 20), and Bhānudatta appears to take it for granted that *śṛṅgāra* occupies an honoured place among all the Rasas (*tatra raseṣu śṛṅgārasyābhyarhitatvena* etc, ed. Benares, p. 21).

(3)

It is unnecessary, as it is unprofitable, in the discussion of general principles, to enter here into the elaborate definitions, distinctions and classifications of the amorous sentiment with all its varying emotional moods and situations, which these treatises industriously discuss and which have always possessed such attraction to mediaeval scholastic minds. The theorists delight in arranging into divisions and sub-

19 The orthodox theorists (cf Jagannātha pp. 47f) would regard *bhakti* (which being based on *anurāga* or attachment cannot be comprehended by *śānta rasa*) as included in *bhāva*, being *devādi-viṣayā rati*, and as inadmissible as a fully developed *rasa*. Cf. Bhānudatta, *Rasa-taraṅgiṇī* ch. vi.—On *Ujjvala-nīlamaṇi* and Vaiṣṇava theory of Rasa see S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement*, Calcutta 1942.

20 See vol. i, p. 137. Cf. also *Mandāra-maranda-campū* ix, p. 107 (ed. Kāvyamālā).

divisions, according to rank, character, circumstances and the like, all conceivable types of the hero, the heroine and their adjuncts, together with the different shades of their gestures and feelings, in conformity with the tradition which already obtained in the cognate sphere of dramaturgy.[21] Thus Rudrabhaṭṭa, after a preliminary enumeration and definition of the Rasas and the Bhāvas, proceeds to speak of two aspects of Śṛṅgāra, viz. *saṃbhoga* (love in union) and *vipralambha* (love in separation)[22], and classify the hero (*nāyaka*) into the faithful (*anukūla*), the gallant whose attention is equally divided among many (*dakṣiṇa*), the sly (*śaṭha*), and the saucy (*dhṛṣṭa*), according to his character as a lover. Later writers, however, subdivide each of these, again, into the best (*uttama*), the middling (*madhyama*) and the lowest (*adhama*), and arrange the whole classification under the fourfold division of the genus hero into four types viz., (i) the brave and the high-spirited (*dhīrodātta*) (ii) the brave and haughty (*dhīroddhata*) (iii) the brave and sportive (*dhīra-lalita*) and (iv) the brave and serene (*dhīra-praśānta*), thus giving us altogether forty-eight subdivisions of the hero[23].

21 See Bharata ch. xxii-xxiv ; *Daśa-rūpaka* iv. 50f and iii.

22 This statement follows Bharata and is accepted by most theorists including Bhoja ; but Dhanañjaya distinguishes three cases, privation (*ayoga*), sundering (*viprayoga*) and union (*saṃbhoga*): the first denoting the inability of lovers, through obstacles, to secure union, and the second arising from absence or resentment. The first case of love may pass through the well-known ten stages (longing, anxiety, recollection, praise of the beloved, distress, raving, insanity, fever, stupor and death ; cf Śiṅgabhūpāla ii. 178-201) ; while the second condition may be caused by a quarrel, due to discovery or inference of unfaithfulness (which may be counteracted by six *upāyas*, viz. conciliation, winning over her friends, gifts, humility, indifference or distracting her attention) or by absence arising from business, accident or a curse.

23 The good qualities of the hero are innumerable. For his characteristics, see Dhanañjaya ii. 1f ; Viśvanātha iii. 30f ; Śiṅgabhūpāla i. 61f ; etc. On the theme of Nāyaka-Nāyikā, as treated in Alaṃkāra works, see V. Raghavan, Introd. to his ed. *Akbarshahi Śṛṅgāra-mañjarī* pp. 14-90.

Then follows a brief description of the assistants of the hero[24] in matters of love (*narma-saciva*), viz. the Comrade (*pīṭha-marda*), the Companion (*viṭa*) and the Buffoon (*vidūṣaka*), some adding *ceṭa* (or the servant) in the enumeration.

In the same way, the heroine is taken broadly in threefold aspects in her relation to the hero as his wife (*svīyā*), or belonging to another, (*parakīyā*) and as common to all (*sāmānyā*). The Śvīyā is subdivided again into the adolescent and artless (*mugdhā*), the youthful (*madhyā*), and the mature and audacious (*pragalbhā*), i.e. the inexperienced, the partly experienced and the fully experienced. Later authors introduce greater fineness by subdividing each of these according to her temper, into the self-possessed (*dhīrā*), the not-self-possessed (*adhīrā*), and the partially self-possessed (*dhīrādhīrā*), or according to the rank, higher (*jyeṣṭhā*) or lower (*kaniṣṭhā*), each holds in the affection of the hero. The Parakīyā or Anyadīyā who, according to Vaiṣṇava ideas, is the highest type of the heroine, is twofold, according as she is a maiden (*kanyā*) or married (*ūḍhā*)[25]; while the *sāmānyā* heroine, who is sometimes extolled (Rudrabhaṭṭa) and sometimes deprecated (Rudraṭa), is only of one kind, the *veśyā* or courtesan[26]. The sixteen types of heroine thus

24 The Pratināyaka or the rival of the hero is *dhīroddhata*, haughtiness being his essential characteristic; but he is described also as stubborn and vicious (*Daśa°* ii 9; *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* iii. 130, p. 136). The *pīṭhamarda* of the hero possesses, in a lesser degree, the qualities of the hero (e. g. Makaranda in the *Mālatī-mādhava*). The term *pīṭhamardikā* in the feminine occurs in the *Mālavikāgnimitra* in the sense of a trusty go-between, applied to the nun Kauśikī. The *viṭa*, usually neglected in the serious drama, except in *Cārudatta* and *Mṛcchakaṭika*, appears in all his glory in the Bhāṇa, for which he is prescribed as the hero.

25 An amour with a married woman cannot, according to Rudraṭa and Rudrabhaṭṭa form the subject of dominant Rasa in a play or poem; but this is the central theme of Vaiṣṇava yrics.

26 Bharata xxii. 197-206: Dhanañjaya ii. 21f: Viśvanātha iii. 67-70; Siṅgabhūpāla i. 121-51. Rarely a heroine, she must be represented as in love when she is a heroine; but she cannot be so when the hero

obtained are further arranged according to eightfold diversity in their condition or situation in relation to her lover, viz. the heroine who has the lover under absolute control (*svādhīna-patikā*), the heroine disappointed in her assignation through misadventure or involuntary absence (*utkā*), the heroine in full dress expectant of her lover (*vāsaka-sajjikā*), the heroine deceived (*vipra-labdhā*), the heroine separated by a quarrel (*kalahānataritā*, also called *abhisaṃdhitā*), the heroine outraged by the discovery of marks of unfaithfulness in the lover (*khaṇḍitā*), the heroine who meets her lover by assignation[27] (*abhisārikā*) and the heroine pining for the absence of her lover gone abroad (*proṣita-patikā*). We arrive in this way at an elaborate classification of the heroine into three hundred and eighty-four types ; and one of the later writers states characteristically that there are other types also, but they cannot be specified for fear of prolixity (Viśvanātha iii. 88, p. 120).

But here the theorists do not stop. The hero is endowed further by a set of eight special excellences, as springing from his character (*sāttvika*): e. g. brilliance (*śobhā*) including heroism, cleverness, truthfulness, emulation with superiors and compassion to inferiors ; vivacity (*vilāsa*) indicated by his glance, step and laughing voice ; grace (*mādhurya*) displayed in placid demeanour even in trying circumstances ; equanimity (*gambhīrya*) consisting of superiority to emotions ; steadfastness (*sthairya*) in obtaining one's object ; sense of honour (*tejas*) manifested in his impatience of insult ; gallantry (*lalita*) in his word, dress or deportment ; magnanimity (*audārya*) exhibited in generosity, agreeable words and equal treatment to friend or foe. The heroine is allowed a

divine or royal. The exception occurs in a *prahasana* or farce (and incidentally in a *bhāṇa* or the erotic monologue) where she can be represented in her low and avaricious character for comic effect.

27 The usual meeting places are given as a ruined temple, a garden, the house of a go-between, a cemetery, the bank of a stream, or any dark place generally.

more generous set of qualities. First we have the three physical (*aṅgaja*) characteristics ; *bhāva* or first indication of emotion in a nature previously exempt, *hāva* or movement of eyes and brows indicating the awakening of emotion, *helā* or the decided manifestation of feeling. Then we have seven inherent qualities: e. g. brilliance of youth, beauty and passion, the touch of loveliness given by love, sweetness, courage, meekness, radiance and self-control. Then are enumerated her ten graces, to which Viśvanātha adds eight more. All her gestures, moods or different shades of emotion, e.g. giggling, trepidation, hysterical fluster of delight, involuntary expression of affection, self-suppression through bashfulness, affected repulse of endearments, as well as the deepest and tenderest display of sentiments, are minutely analysed and classified. To this is added a detailed description of the modes in which the different types of heroines display their affection, the maidenly modest demeanour of the *mugdhā* or the shameless boldness of the more experienced heroine. We should recognise the subtle power of analysis and insight which these attempts indicate ; but speaking generally, the analysis is more of the form than of the spirit, based on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials. At the same time, marked as it is by much of scholastic formalism, there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts, not only as they appeared to the experience of these theorists but to the observation of general poetic usage ; and in the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the Rasa is evolved on the basis of one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods, with the help of the various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves a separate study.

(4)

The discussion of this extensive topic of the *nāyaka* and *nāyikā* comes in topically under the theory of *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*, which act as factors of Rasa. The mood, which is at the root of sentiment, is held to be the *sthāyi-bhāva*, the dominant feeling, the main theme of the composition in question. These feelings, according to Bharata, who is accepted on this point by all writers, can be classified into eight categories, viz. Love (*rati*), Mirth (*hāsa*), Sorrow (*śoka*), Anger (*krodha*), Energy (*utsāha*), Fear (*bhaya*), Disgust (*jugupsā*) and Astonishment (*vismaya*), though some later writers add, as we shall see, Tranquility (*śama* or *nirveda*) to the number. These dominant feelings are worked up into a corresponding number of sentiments or Rasas through the means of the *vibhāvas* etc[28]. The *vibhāvas* or Excitants are said to be of two

28 Theoretically the Rasa is one, a single ineffable and impersonal joy, but it can be subdivided, not according to its own nature but according to the emotions which form its basis. Bharata (ch. vi) and other theorists give a full description of the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, *vibhāvas* etc. in the case of each Rasa, into which space forbids us to enter. A summary of it will be found in Lindenau, *Rasalehre* Leipzig 1913, pp. 18f. Thus, in the case of the heroic sentiment (*vīra*), the dominant feeling is energy (*utsāha*) ; the excitants (*vibhāvas*) are coolness (*asaṃmoha*), resolve (*adhyavasāya*), circumspection (*naya*), strength (*bala*) etc. ; the ensuants (*anubhāvas*) are firmness (*sthairya*), heroism (*śaurya*), sacrifice (*tyāga*) etc. ; the *vyabhicārins* or accessory feelings are those of assurance, arrogance etc. Viśvanātha gives them somewhat differently. The essential excitant (*ālambana-vibhāva*) of the heroic sentiment, according to him, consists of those to be vanquished, and their acts and gestures form the enhancing excitants (*uddīpana-vibhāvas*) ; the ensuants comprehend the desire or seeking for assistants and adherents ; while the accessory feelings are patience, intelligence, remembrance, cogitation etc. The sentiment may take three forms of courage (Bharata vi. 79=ed. Regnaud vi. 80), viz. in battle (*yuddha-vīra*), in virtuous deeds (*dharma-vīra*) and in liberality (*dāna-vīra*), to which later writers (e.g. Viśvanātha) add *dayā-vīra*. It should also be noted that a special colour and a presiding deity is attributed to each Rasa. Thus, red, black, white, dark (*śyāma*) and grey are associated, not unreasonably, with

kinds[29], viz., (1) the Substantial or Essential (*ālambana*), which consists of such material and indispensable ingredients as the hero, the heroine, the rival hero and their adjuncts, and (2) the Enhancing (*uddīpana*), viz. such conditions of time, place and circumstance as serve to foster the Rasa, e.g. the rising of the moon, the cry of the cuckoo etc. in the case of the erotic sentiment. The *anubhāvas* or the Ensuants, which follow and strengthen a mood, comprise such outward manifestations of feeling as sidelong glances, a smile, a movement of the body, or such involuntary action of sympathetic realisation of the persons depicted (*sāttvika*)[30] as fainting (*pralaya*), change of colour (*vaivarṇya*), trembling (*vepathu*) etc., which are, again dogmatically classified into eight varieties. There are other feelings of a more or less transitory nature, which accompany or interrupt the permanent mood without, however, supplanting it ; and these are known, as we have noted, by the name of Accessories or *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*. These are likened to servants following a king or to waves of the sea, whereby the dominant mood is understood as the king and the sea respectively, and classified elaborately into thirty-three categories, first mentioned by Bharata (p. 23f above) and implicitly accepted by his followers.

All these elements contribute towards developing the eight or nine *sthāyi-bhāvas* into eight or nine different types of

the furious, terrible, comic, erotic and pathetic sentiments, although it is difficult to explain why horror is dark blue (*nīla*), wonder is orange, and heroism is yellow. The respective deities are Viṣṇu (erotic), Yama (pathetic), Pramatha (comic), Rudra (furious), Indra (heroic), Kāla (terrible), Mahākāla (disgustful), Brahmā (marvellous).. Viśvanātha adds that Nārāyaṇa is the presiding deity of *śānta rasa* and the colour associated is that of jasmine (*kunda*).

29 These two divisions of *vibhāva* are not maintained by Bharata but distinguished by Dhanañjaya (iv. 2) and traditionally handed down by Viśvanātha.

30 See above p. 24, fn 55. The *sāttvika bhāvas* in later works form a special class of *anubhāvas*.

Rasa. We have the earliest and most orthodox mention in Bharata (p. 23 above) of eight *sthāyi-bhāvas* and the resulting eight Rasas corresponding to them, of which the Erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the Heroic (*vīra*), the Furious (*raudra*) and the Disgustful (*bībhatsa*) are the main, leading to four others, the Comic (*hāsya*), the Marvellous (*adbhuta*), the Pathetic (*karuṇa*) and the Terrible (*bhayānaka*). Daṇḍin accepts this classification (ii. 280-87), but Udbhaṭa (iv. 4) adds [31] the Quietistic (*śānta*) as the ninth Rasa, although Bharata[32] neither defines it nor mentions its corresponding *vibhāvas*. Rudraṭa is singular in postulating a tenth Rasa, called the Agreeable (*preyas*), which is accepted by Bhoja, with the addition of two new Rasas, Udātta and Uddhata, as well as Śānta. Rudrabhaṭṭa admits nine Rasas in poetry ; so do Hemacandra and the two Vāgbhaṭas. The *Agni-purāṇa* in the same way mentions nine Rasas (and eight *sthāyi-bhāvas*), but follows Bharata in regarding four as principal and lays special stress on the Śṛṅgāra. Ānandavardhana admits Śānta (pp 138, 238). Those later authors who accept the ninth Rasa, the Quietistic, necessarily postulate *nirveda* or self-disparagement, arising out of the knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*), as its *sthāyi-bhāva*, which is called by some authorities *śama*, or repose resulting from freedom from mental excitement[33]. The Vaiṣṇava writers (especially Kavikarṇapūra add Dāsya, Sakhya, Vātsalya, Preman and Bhakti.[34]

31 If the verse is genuinely Udbhaṭa's. See above p. 114, fn 15.— On the Śānta Rasa in Bharata and Dhanañjaya see S. K. De, *Some Problems* pp. 139-41. On the number and nomenclature of Rasas generally see V. Raghavan, *Number of Rasas*, Adyar 1940.

32 The Śānta texts in Bharata, available in certain recensions, are interpolations. See Raghavan, *op. cit.* pp. 15f. Kālidāsa knew only eight Rasas, *Vikramorvaśīya* ii. 18, where Muni Bharata is also mentioned.

33 This sentiment is also closely related to the sentiment of disgust ; for it arises from an aversion to worldly things.

34 See S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement*, p. 145.

The author of the *Daśa-rūpaka*, however, contends that there can be no such *sthāyi-bhāva* as *nirveda* or *śama*, for the development of that state (if it is at all possible to destroy utterly love, hatred and other human feelings) would tend to the absence of all moods ; and in the drama, the object of which is to delineate and inspire passion, it is inadmissible. Others, again, hold that the Quietistic Rasa does exist, as it is experienced by those who have attained that blissful state, but it has no *sthāyi-bhāva* in dramatic composition ; for *nirveda*, being the cessation of all worldly activity, or *śama* being freedom from all mental excitement, it is not fit to be represented. Hence Mammaṭa takes eight Rasas in the drama (p. 98) and nine in poetry (p. 117). Bhoja, in accordance with the views of the school which lays special emphasis on the Śṛṅgāra, accepts only one Rasa, the Erotic, in his *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* ; and although he mentions as many as ten Rasas in his *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, including the *śānta* and the *preyas*, he appears to devote almost exclusive attention to the Śṛṅgāra in his treatment of the Rasas in this work. The views about the admissibility of the *śānta* are discussed by the author of the *Ekāvalī* (pp. 96-7) who maintains that Bharata has mentioned *nirveda* as a *vyabhicāri-bhāva* immediately in context after the enumeration of the *sthāyi-bhāvas* and at the beginning of the list of the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* ; and this fact is interpreted as indicating that the sage meant it both as a *sthāyi-bhāva* and as a *vyabhicāri-bhāva* ; but Hemacandra (p. 81) anticipates and rejects this quibble of verbal interpretation, though agreeing in the general proposition as to the admissibility of Śānta as the ninth Rasa.

Viśvanātha primarily admits eight orthodox Rasas (iii, p. 160) but adds the ninth Śānta in deference to the views of these authorities, and a tenth Rasa, called *vātsalya* or parental affection, subscribing apparently to Vaiṣṇava ideas (pp. 185-6)[35]. He quotes a verse to explain that the mood,

35 Bhānudatta counts (*Rasa-taraṅgiṇī*) *māyā* under the Rasas.

called by the great sages the Quietistic, which has, among all sentiments, tranquillity (*śama*) as its basis, is that state in which there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor hatred, nor affection, nor any desire[36]. But the question arises how can the Quietistic, being of the nature described, arising only in a state of emancipation wherein there is an absence of all feelings like the Accessories etc., be Rasa, which implies a state of relishable enjoyment[37]. To this objection Viśvanāthā replies that the Quietistic is a Rasa because in that state the soul is only about to be emancipated (*yukta-viyukta-daśā*) and is not completely absorbed in the Divine, so that the presence of feelings, like the Accessories etc. in it is not incompatible. As for the statement that there is an absence of even pleasure in it, it is not contradictory, for it refers only to worldly pleasure[38]. Jagannātha, the latest writer on the subject, advocates nine Rasas and maintains (pp. 29-30) that like all other Rasas, the Śānta is capable of being represented and appreciated by the audience. Since the clever performance of the actor, representing such a state of mind, free from disturbance and not affected by passions or desire, is found in actual experience to produce an impression on the mind of the audience, it is their state of mind, exhibited by their silent and rapt attention, which ought to settle the question. The representation of absolute indifference or the actor's power of representing it is not the point in issue: it is the capacity of

Rudraṭa mentioned *preyas* (friendship), which Rasa is accepted by Bhoja. Some writers add *śraddhā*, along with *bhakti*. See Bhānudatta, *op. cit.* p. 56, ll. 25f (ed. Regnaud). Siṅga-bhūpāla admits only eight Rasas, but his treatment is from the standpoint of dramaturgy.

36 *na yatra duḥkhaṃ na sukhaṃ na cintā, na dveṣa-rāgau na ca kācid icchā / rasaḥ sa śāntaḥ kathito munīndraiḥ, sarveṣu bhāveṣu śama-pradhānaḥ / /*, cited also in *Daśa*° iv. 49 (comm).

37 *ity evaṃ-rūpasya śāntasya mokṣāvasthāyām evātma-svarūpāpatti-lakṣaṇāyāṃ prādurbhūtatvāt tatra sañcāryādīnām abhāvāt kathaṃ rasatvam.*

38 *yaś cāsmin sukhābhāvo'pyuktas tasya vaiṣayika-sukha-paratvān na virodhaḥ.*

the spectator who actually feels the sentiment. Jagannātha also adds that even those, who do not admit this Rasa in the drama, should accept it in poetry from the fact that poems like the *Mahābhārata* have for principal theme the delineation of Śānta Rasa, which is thus established by universal experience (*akhila-lokānubhava-siddhatvāt*). Nāgeśa remarks on this that the *śānta rasa* should also be admitted in the drama on this ground, inasmuch as the *Prabodha-candrodaya* is universally acknowledged as a drama (p. 30).

Coming to the essential basis of Rasa, viz. the *bhāva*, we have seen that Bharata defines it in general terms as that which manifests the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, *vācika*, *āṅgika* and *sāttvika*[39]; it is the emotion which ultimately becomes a sentiment, if it is dominant and therefore, serves as the basis of Rasa. But later writers arrive at a greater precision and apply the term technically to those cases where there is no proper or complete development of Rasa. Both Dhanañjaya and Bhānudatta expand the definition of Bharata, the latter defining it as a deviation from the natural mental state (*vikāra*) which is favourable to the development of Rasa (*rasānukūla*) and which may be either physical (*śārīra*) or mental (*āntara*). But Mammaṭa fixes the conception of Bhāva as *ratir devādi-viṣayā vyabhicārī tathāñjitaḥ* ('love having for its object a deity or the like, and also the suggested Accessory'), on which he adds the gloss: *ādi-śabdān muni-guru-nṛpa-putrādi-viṣayā, kāntā-viṣayā tu vyaktā śṛṅgāraḥ* ('by the term *the like* are meant sages, preceptor, the king, son etc., the one having a beloved woman for its object becomes the erotic') Govinda explains that the word *rati* here implies the *sthāyi-bhāva* which has not attained to the state of Rasa[40]. What is meant is that when the *sthāyi-bhāvas*, like *rati*, have for their objects

39 A fourth kind of *abhinaya* is sometimes added, viz. *āhārya* (extraneous) i.e. derived from dress, decoration etc.

40 *ratir iti sthāyi-bhāvopalakṣaṇam, devādi-viṣayety apy aprāpta-rasāvasthopalakṣaṇam*, p. 206.

god, king, son and the like, or when the *vyabhicāri-bhāvas* are manifested as the principal sentiment in a composition, there is no *rasa* but *bhāva* ; and this definition is accepted by all writers after him.

Thus, Viśvanātha explains the Bhāva as follows:

sañcāriṇaḥ pradhānāni, devādi-viṣayā ratiḥ/
udbuddha-mātraḥ sthāyī ca. bhāva ity abhidhīyate//

In other words, when the Accessories are principal, or when love etc. has a deity or the like for its object, or when a dominant feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) is merely awakened, we have Bhāva. His own gloss upon the above verse explains it in this way. Although they are always concomitants of Rasa in which they finally rest, such Accessories as are for the time being principally developed, like a servant for the time being followed by his king in his marriage procession ; or love etc. having a deity, a sage, a spiritual guide, a king and the like for its object ; or such *sthāyi-bhāvas* as are merely awakened or have not attained the state of a Rasa from their not being fully developed, are denoted by the term *bhāva*. In all these cases apparently there is no complete or proper development of Rasa ; and a Bhāva, therefore, in later terminology, may be generally described as an incomplete Rasa. But this must be distinguished from the *rasābhāsa* or semblance of Rasa and the analogous *bhāvābhāsa*, which occur when the poetic sentiments and emotions are falsely attributed (e.g. sentiments in animals such as described in *Kumārasaṃbhava*, iii. 36-7), or when they are brought out improperly, i.e. when there is a lack of entireness in them as regards their ingredients[41]. The cases occur, according to Bhoja (v. 20) when the mood or emotion is developed in an inferior character (*hīna-pātra*), in animals (*tiryac*), in the rival hero (*nāyaka-pratiyogin*) or in any other subordinate object (*gauṇa*

41 *anaucitya-pravṛttatve ābhāso rasa-bhāvayoḥ* (Mammaṭa) explained as: *anaucityaṃ cātra rasānāṃ bharatādi-praṇīta-lakṣaṇānāṃ sāmagrī-rahitatve tveka-deśa-yogitvopalakṣaṇa-paraṃ bodhyam.*

padārtha)[42], but Viśvanātha elaborately summarises various other cases (iii. 263-66), especially noting improprieties in connexion with particular Rasas. Thus, there is an impropriety if the Terrible (*bhayānaka*) is made to reside in a noble personage, or the Comic (*hāsya*) in a spiritual guide. It must be noted, as Jagannātha explains, that if a mood or feeling is developed by impropriety, the impropriety, unless it acts as a bar, does not constitute a fault[43].

In the same way (1) when there is an excitement only (and not full development) of sentiments, (2) when two opposing sentiments, striving for mastery, are represented as being relished in one and the same place and at the same time, or (3) when a number of sentiments, of which each succeeding one puts down the preceding, they constitute respectively *bhāvodaya*, *bhāva-saṃdhi* and *bhāva-śabalatā*. Now, all these phases of sentiment are taken as Rasa topically, inasmuch as they are capable of being tasted (*sarve'pi rasanād rasāḥ*). These cases do not seem to have been formally recognised by Bharata, though hinted at by him in vi. 40, as we learn from Abhinava's commentary on ch. vi, which is partially reproduced also in his °*Locana*, p. 66. They are first met with in Udbhaṭa, who includes them under *ūrjasvin* (iv. 6) ; but in Rudraṭa (xii. 4) and the Dhvanikāra (ii. 3) we find them definitely established.

This incomplete development of Rasa and its subordination must be distinguished from the cases of the opposition (*virodha*) of simultaneously existing sentiments in the same theme. It is laid down formally that some Rasas are intrinsically inconsistent with one another, e.g. the Erotic is opposed to the Disgustful, the Heroic to the Quietistic, and so forth[44].

42 Śiṅga-bhūpāla (pp. 141-2) distinguishes two cases (i) where Rasa is ascribed to an inanimate object and (ii) where it is developed in an inferior character or in animals.

43 *yāvatā tvanaucityena rasasya paṣṭis tāvat tu na vāryate, rasapratikūlasyaiva tasya niṣedhatvāt.*

44 Some Rasas again are mutually consistent, e. g. *karuṇa* and

The incongruity or opposition results in three ways, viz. (1) from identity of the exciting cause (*ālambana-vibhāva*) (2) from identity of the subject of emotion and (3) from immediacy of succession. The incongruity in the first two cases may be removed by representing the sentiments as having different exciting causes respectively, or as existing in different subjects (e.g. in the hero and the rival hero). The last case of conflict may be removed by placing, between the two immediately succeeding sentiments, a sentiment which is not opposed to them. These are cases where two or more Rasas stand in the relation of principal and subordinate; the term 'subordinate' being misleading, it is sometimes called a concomitant Rasa (*sañcārin*), which implies that it cannot terminate absolutely in itself and at the same time is distinct from a fully developed Rasa, as well as from a mere undeveloped Bhāva[45]. There is also no incongruity where a conflicting Rasa is recalled or described under a comparison. All these questions properly come under the theory of Propriety or Aucitya in relation to Rasa, elaborated by Ānandavardhana and his followers, and is ultimately based on the dictum attributed to the Dhvanikāra (p. 145, cf. °*Locana* p. 138), which lays down in general terms that the secret of Rasa lies in conforming to the established rules of propriety.

bībhatsa go with *vīra*; *śṛṅgāra* goes with *hāsya* (cf Bharata vi. 40) etc. On this question see Lindenau, *Rasalehre* (pp. 71f). According to Viśvanātha, the Rasas hostile (i) to *śṛṅgāra* are *karuṇa, bībhatsa, raudra, vīra* and *bhayānaka* (ii) to *hāsya—bhayānaka* and *karuṇa* (iii) to *karuṇa —hāsya* and *śṛṅgāra* (iv) to *raudra—hāsya, śṛṅgāra* and *bhayānaka* (v) to *vīra—bhayānaka* and *śānta* (vi) to *bhayānaka*-*śṛṅgāra, vīra, raudra, hāsya* and *śānta* (vii) to *śānta—vīra, śṛṅgāra raudra, hāsya* and *bhayānaka* (viii) to →*bībhatsa—śṛṅgāra*. Bhānudatta gives the antagonistic Rasas as follow: *śṛṅgāra*→*bībhatsa*; *vīra*→*bhayānaka*; *raudra*→*adbhuta*; *hāsya*→*karuṇa*.

45 *ata evātra pradhānetareṣu raseṣu svātantrya-viśrāma-rāhityāt, pūrṇarasa-bhāva-mātrāc ca vilakṣaṇatayā, sañcāri-rasa-nāmnā vyapadeśaḥ prācyānām*, Viśvanātha, p. 420.

The doctrine of the *Dhvanyāloka* that in a composition in which the sentiment is awakened, proprieties of various kinds (e. g. with reference to the speaker, the theme, the employment of the *vibhāvas* etc., the use of the *alaṃkāras* and other elements, pp. 134f, 144f) should be observed, and that certain items of conflict (*virodha*) with the dominant sentiment should be avoided, gave rise to a theory of Propriety, which is generally comprehended by later writers under the discussion of the Doṣas of Rasa. Thus, in later treatises, the *rasa-doṣas* occupy a separate and important place, in addition to the conventional *doṣas* of *pada*, *padārtha*, *vākya*, *vākyārtha* recognised since Vāmana's time. It is Kṣemendra alone who emphasises the importance of the subject by making it the theme of his *Aucitya-vicāra-carcā* which will be noticed in its proper place. Mahimabhaṭṭa, in the second chapter of his work, considers the question of *anaucitya* in some detail. According to him, impropriety or incongruity has two aspects, according as it refers to *śabda* or to *artha* respectively. Then he speaks of propriety as external (*bahiraṅga*) or internal (*antaraṅga*), apparently as it is *śabda-viṣaya* or *artha-viṣaya*. The cases of internal propriety, which consists in the proper employment of the *vibhāvas* etc. have already been explained by previous writers (e.g. the *Dhvanyāloka* pp. 144f). Mahimabhaṭṭa, therefore, takes up the question of external propriety, which he thinks falls under five faults of composition, viz. *vidheyāvimarśa* (non-discrimination of the predicate), *prakrama-bheda* (violation of uniformity in the expression), *krama-bheda* (syntactical irregularity), *paunaruktya* (tautology) and *vācyavacana* (omission of what must be expressed), to the explanation and exemplification of which he devotes, amidst several digressions, the rest of the chapter (ch. ii). It is difficult to say why these faults of expression alone are singled out as defects resulting in a violation of Rasa (*rasa-bhaṅga*). Later writers would include them under general defects, reserving the cases of *virodha* or opposition of Rasas as specific instances of *rasa-doṣas*.

CHAPTER X

WRITERS ON KAVI-ŚIKṢĀ

The small group of writers who deal with the theme of *kavi-śikṣā* ("education of the poet") does not, strictly speaking, come directly under general Poetics, but deserves notice, partly from the reputation and authority enjoyed by some of these authors but chiefly because it displays a peculiar tendency which emphasises one aspect of Poetics as a discipline, namely, its practical object which developed side by side with the theoretical consideration of general principles These treatises do not deal with the conventional topics of Poetics, with its theories, dogmas and definitions, but they are meant chiefly as manuals to guide the poet in his profession, their primary object being *kavi-śikṣā* or instruction of the aspiring poet in the devices of the craft. It is difficult, in the absence of data, to determine the origin of this school, but the attitude adopted is significant, being almost co-extensive with what may be supposed to have been the original standpoint of Poetics itself as a more or less mechanical *Ars Poetica*[1]. The ancient as well as the modern writers on general Poetics, no doubt, touch occasionally upon the question of the practical training of the poet[2] ; and it is not improbable that this in course of time formed the object of a separate study and multiplied these convenient handbooks, of which necessarily we possess comparatively late specimens.

(1)

Kṣemendra

Kṣemendra's two works, *Aucitya-vicāra-carcā* and *Kavi-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, which may be conveniently grouped here, are

1 See above pp. 33-34 and footnote 3.

2 See above pp. 42f.

curious and valuable in many respects. In his theory of Aucitya[3] or propriety, he takes as his thesis, mainly, Ānandavardhana's treatment of the same question with reference to Rasa which is crystallised in the oft-quoted verse from the *Dhvanyāloka*: "There is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of Rasa than impropriety ; the supreme secret of Rasa consists in observing the established rules of propriety"[4]. To depict Rasa, it is necessary to observe the rules of propriety ; and the subject, which is anticipated by Bharata (who, for instance, speaks of the proper employment of *anubhāvas*), may take various forms according as it relates to the subject-matter, the speaker, the nature of the sentiment evoked or the means employed in evoking it. We have already noted that this theme has been discussed topically at some length by the formulators of the Dhvani-theory, by Mahimabhaṭṭa, as well as by most post-dhvani writers who consider it generally in connexion with *rasa-doṣas*. Kṣemendra develops and pushes the idea to its extreme, and speaks of Aucitya as the essence of Rasa (*rasa-jīvitabhūta*), and as having its foundation in the charm or aesthetic pleasure (*camatkāra*) underlying the relish of Rasa. The Alaṃkāra and Guṇa in poetry are justified by and receive their respective significance from this element which may, therefore, be fittingly regarded as the 'soul' of poetry[5]. That which is suitable or conformable to another is called *ucita* in its relation to that object[6]. This Aucitya may have application with reference to various points in a poem, such as word (*pada*), a sentence (*vākya*), the sense of the composition as a whole (*prabandhārtha*). its literary excellences (*guṇas*) its

3 V. Raghavan (*Some Concepts*, pp. 194-257) gives an able and detailed account of the history of Aucitya.

4 *anaucityād ṛte nānyad rasa-bhaṅgasya kāraṇam /*
prasiddhaucitya-bandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā / /

5 ed. Kāvyamālā, Gucchaka i, pp. 115-16.

6 *ucitaṃ prāhur acāryāḥ sadṛśaṃ kila yasya yat*, explained by the gloss as: *yat kila yasyānurūpaṃ tad ucitam ucyate.*—On the theory of Pāka and Śayyā, allied to the theory of Aucitya, see above pp. 240-41.

poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*), the Rasa or the sentiment in a poem, the employment of the verb (*kriyā*), the use of the case (*kāraka*), of the gender (*liṅga*), of the number (*vacana*), of preposition, adjective, particles (*upasarga*), or considerations of time and place (*deśa* and *kāla*) etc. ; and the cases of application are dogmatically summarised as twenty-seven in number (*śl.* 8-10). The treatment of each of these cases is accompanied by profuse illustrations of every point from the works of various poets, the favourite method being first to cite examples of verses which comply with a rule and then adduce one or two examples of verses which do not do so. There is hardly anything original in the theory itself ; for though it rightly insists upon a standard of propriety in poetic expression, it ultimately resolves itself into assuming a more or less variable criterion of taste or personal appreciation, which Ānandavardhana and others admit as *sahṛdayatva*, but which is bound to be, as it is, rather vaguely defined and therefore incapable of exhaustive formal treatment. It is really the province of taste or criticism rather than of Poetics proper.

At the same time, the fact must not be overlooked that works of this nature in Sanskrit, ostensibly meant as they are for the guidance of the aspiring poet, display, in their discussion of what is right and proper in poetry, a tendency towards genuine criticism, taken apart from the beaten paths of orthodox Poetics ; and they set up in their naïve way a standard, whatever it may be, of taste and critical judgment. No doubt, most writers on general Poetics, betray some critical acumen and give us a great deal of critical or semi-critical matter while considering the application of a rule or principle, especially in the chapters on Doṣa and Guṇa ; but their outlook is often and necessarily limited by their confining themselves to rigid rules and specific definitions[7].

7 The growth of artificial poetry, we have seen, made the technical analysis of rhetoric and instruction of it, a necessity ; but rhetoric involves (and sometimes becomes identical with) criticism ; and it is

Kṣemendra's work, in this respect, possesses a unique value, and the part of his treatment which discusses the illustrative verses is extremely interesting as an evidence of "appreciation" which is comparatively rare in Sanskrit. Kṣemendra deals out praise and censure, within his limits, as a true critic who is no respector of persons ; even the honoured names of Amaru, Kālidāsa or Bhavabhūti make no difference. In more than one instance, he illustrates two sides of a question, regarding both merit or defect laid down by a rule, by different verses from his own work ; and in some cases he does not hesitate to go against orthodox opinion[8]. Whatever may be the intrinsic value of his critical dicta, some of which may appear too trivial or crude to us, he shows a wide acquaintance with the whole range of classical Sanskrit Poetry and an undoubtedly cultured taste. If the common saying that a bad poet often turns out to be a good critic carries any wisdom in it, it is very apt in the case of Kṣemendra whose critical powers cannot indeed be ignored.

almost impossible for Ālaṃkārikas, who also theorised on principles, not to busy themselves with the forms and general phenomena of literature. Thus, most works, whether on general poetics or on rhetoric, do involve some amount of criticism which could not be avoided. It must also be borne in mind that our modern ideas of Aesthetics, Poetics or Rhetoric are not sharply distinguished in these old authors, nor was there any well-defined notion of the respective spheres of these studies. The theorists drew their ideas of poetry mainly from existing classical Sanskrit literature which, though magnificent in partial accomplishment, was not fully equipped for purposes of general criticism. The absence of some other literature for comparison—for later Prakrit and allied specimens are mainly derivative—was a serious drawback. This will explain partially why their outlook is so limited, and their principles and definitions so stereotyped.

8 E. g. while discussing the question of propriety of the contents of a composition, he cites (p. 120) from *Kumāra-saṃbhava* viii—which canto he accepts as Kālidāsa's—and severely censures the poet's manner of describing the amours of Hara and Pārvatī in terms of ordinary dalliance, against the authority of Ānandavardhana who defends (p. 137) it against the imputation of vulgarity.

Kṣemendra's other work, *Kavi-kaṇṭhābharaṇa*[9], though less interesting, is equally remarkable for its refreshingly novel treatment. Kṣemendra postulates two impulses for the attainment of poetic capacity, viz. divine help (*divya-prayatna*) and individual effort (*pauruṣa*). The first includes prayer, incantation and other heavenly aids; but from the latter standpoint, he classifies three groups of persons[10] with whom instruction in the art of poetry is concerned, viz. those who require little effort (*alpa-prayatna-sādhya*), those who require great effort (*kṛcchra-sādhya*), and those in whom all effort is fruitless (*asādhya*), and sums up by saying that the capacity for poetry is vouchsafed only to the fit and few. The next chapter discusses with illustrations the question of borrowing or plagiarism[11], a theme which is just touched upon in the fourth chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka*[12] but which is dealt with extensively by Rājaśekhara[13]. Kṣemendra divides

9 A sketch of this work will be found in *Kṣemendra's Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa* by J. Schönberg (Wien 1884), pp. 9f. The five *saṃdhis* or sections of this work deal respectively with the following themes: (i) attainment of poetry by an unpoetical person (*akaveḥ kavitvāptiḥ*), (ii) instruction of the poet already gifted (*śikṣā prāpta-giraḥ kaveḥ*), (iii) strikingness (*camatkṛti*), and the faults and excellences of poetry, (iv) familiarity which a poet should possess with other arts and sciences as a source of charm to his poetry (*paricaya-cārutva*).

10 Cf Vāmana 1. 2. 1-5; Rājaśekhara iv.

11 Bāṇa (*Harṣa-c.* i. 5-6) distinctly condemns poetasters and plagiarists. Vāmana appears to be the first writer on Poetics who in his classification of Artha refers to the question of plagiarism.

12 In Ānandavardhana's opinion, the province of poetry is unlimited, in spite of the fact that hundreds of poets have composed works for centuries; but the thoughts of two inspired poets may bear certain resemblance, which may be like that between an object and its reflection, between a thing and its picture, or between two human beings. The first two kinds of resemblance should be avoided, but the third is charming (iii. 12-13).

13 In ch. xi-xii. For a summary of his views see V. M. Kulkarni, Sanskrit Writers on Plagiarism in *JOS*, iii (1954), pp. 403-411. Rājaśekhara declares that "there is no poet that is not a thief, no merchant that does not steal, but he who knows how to hide his theft flourishes without

poets from this point of view into those who imitate the general colour of a poet's idea (*chāyopajīvin*), those who borrow a word or a verse-line (*padaka-* and *pāda-upajīvin*), or an entire poem (*sakalopajīvin*) and lastly, those who borrow from sources considered universally as legitimate (*bhuvano-pajīvya*, e.g. Vyāsa). Then he lays down elaborate rules for regulating the life, character and education of the poet. This is followed by a discussion of *camatkāra* or poetic charm, without which, we are told, no poetry is possible, and an illustration (by means of examples draw from the works of various poets) of its tenfold aspect, according as it appeals with or without much thought (*avicārita-ramaṇīya* or *vicārya-māṇa-ramaṇīya*[14]), resides in a part or in the whole composition, appertains to the sound, the sense or both, or relates to the poetic figure, to the sentiment, or to the well-known nature of the theme. Then we come to the treatment of the excellences and defects with reference to the sense (*artha*), the verbal expression (*śabda*), or the poetic sentiment (*rasa*) involved; and the work is rounded off by indicating the extent of knowledge which a poet must possess and giving a long list of the arts and sciences in which he must be proficient, which is thus set forth: *tatra tarka-vyākaraṇa-bharata-cāṇakya-vātsyāyana-bhārata-rāmāyaṇa-mokṣopāyātmajñāna-dhātuvāda-ratnaparīkṣā-vaidyaka-jyotiṣa-dhanurveda-gaja-turaga-puruṣa-lakṣaṇa-dyūtendrajāla-prakīrṇeṣu paricayaḥ kavi-sāmrājya-vyañjanaḥ*. This rapid summary of the contents of this work

reproach". He deals with two kinds of plagiarism, namely, that which should be avoided and that which should be adopted. In his opinion, a poet may be a creator (Utpādaka) or an adapter (Parivartaka), or a coverer up (Ācchādaka) or a collector (Saṃgrāhaka). He who sees something new in word and sense and writes up something old may be accounted a great poet. Rājaśekhara accordingly gives an elaborate classification of Artha so far as it is Anya-yoni, Nihnuta-yoni or A-yoni from the point of view of plagiarism. See below under Rājaśekhara.

14 Rājaśekhara attributes a dictum to Udbhaṭa which says that the sense may be *vicārita-sustha* or *avicārita-ramaṇīya*, according as it is found in the Śāstra or the Kāvya respectively. See above p. 59, fn 33.

will show that it hardly puts forward any special claim as a work of great theoretic importance, but that its value consists not in its substance but in its treatment of practical issues, its careful and minute illustration of every point by examples taken from various poets, with not a little amount of knowledge and critical discernment[15].

(2)

Arisiṃha, Amaracandra and *Deveśvara*

The *Kāvya-kalpalatā-vṛtti* of Arisiṃha and Amaracandra and the *Kavi-kalpalatā* of Deveśvara, written in imitation of that work, need not detain us long. They are essentially treatises on the composition of verses, including a practical treatment of prosody and rhetoric. They furnish elaborate hints on the construction of different metres, on the display of word-skill of various kinds, on *jeu de mots* and tricks of producing double meaning, conundrums, riddles, alliterative and rhyming verses, and various other devices of verbal ingenuity, concluding with a chapter on the construction of similes and enumeration of parallelisms for the purpose of ordinary comparisons. It gives also a list of *kavi-samayas* or conventions observed by the poets, and states in detail what to describe and how to describe it. These decadent treatises, therefore, offer such adventitious aids for ready-made poetry, as may—to take a particular point—be afforded, for instance, by a modern rhyming dictionary or works of similar nature.

A summary of the main topics dealt with in the *Kāvya-kalpalatā* and its *Vṛtti* will make the standpoint clear and give an idea of the general scope and nature of such works. The first *pratāna* of this work is called *chandaḥ-siddhi* (prosody)

15 For Kṣemendra's satiric and didactic works see S. K. De, *Aspects of Sansk. Lit.* Calcutta 1959, pp. 279-83 and *Hist. of Sansk. Lit.*, Calcutta 1947, pp. 404-410.

and consists of five sections on (i) the construction of the *anuṣṭubh* metre (*anuṣṭubh-śāsana*), (ii) enumeration of the principal metres, shifts in grammatical forms of the verb, Prakrit loan-words (where Hemacandra seems to be superficially quoted), transmutation of one's own or another poet's ideas into the same or different metres, conversion of one metre into another, caesura (*yati*), the whole section being generally entitled *chandobhyāsa*, (iii) use of expletive particles and words for filling up the verse (*chandaḥ-pūraṇa*), such as *śrī, sam, sat, drāk, vi, pra* etc. (*sāmānya-śabdaka*), (iv) argumentation, pointed sayings, subjects of laudation or vituperation, interrogations, e.g. in *kula-śāstrādi, sva-śāstrādhyayana-prathā* etc. (*vāda*), (v) subjects for descriptive poetry, how to describe the king, his ministers, the prince, the army, battle and hunting, as well as a city, a village, a garden, a lake and so forth ; enumeration of the *kavi-samayas* (*varṇya-sthiti*). The second chapter, called *śabda-siddhi* treats of etymology, derived meanings of compounds, alliteration and rhyme in the middle of a verse, with a list of words suitable for this purpose, enumeration of *saṃbandhin* expressions ; denoted, indicated and suggested meanings, showing the influence of the Dhvani school. The next chapter, entitled *śleṣa-siddhi*, upon play on words of various kinds, consists of the following sections: (i) composing of words in such a way that they can be read differently according as they are divided, with a list of *ślesopayogi* words, (ii) a kind of *śleṣa* occurring in the description of an object by analogies, in which the same quality or condition has to be traced in the same words or in synonyms, (iii) cases of double meaning, produced by homonyms capable of widely different interpretations, (iv) ambiguity produced by similarity of inflections of different origins, (v) surprises of different kinds, such as verses in which the same consonant or vowel is repeated in each syllable, verses spread out in diagrams to be read in different ways, e.g. according to the move of the knight in chess etc:—a subject which is treated in some detail, for

instance, in the *Vidagdha-mukha-maṇḍana* of Dharmadāsa Sūri[16]. The last chapter, called *artha-siddhi*, is devoted to the construction of similes, ellipsis and similar figures, and gives long lists of parallelisms arising from like conditions or attributes of the objects compared, e. g. the lips may be compared to the coral, to the bimba fruit or fresh-blown twigs and so forth.

A large part of this treatment is repeated in Keśava's *Alaṃkāra-śekhara*, as well as in Deveśvara's *Kavi-kalpalatā*, the latter work being directly modelled on the *Kāvya-kalpalatā* with considerable plagiarism of passages *in extenso* These works, therefore, do not require any separate notice.. Keśava's text (see vol. i, pp. 220-21 above) deals, besides this, with the ordinary topics of Poetics, set forth as the views of his master Śauddhodani, but in substance and form it follows the views of Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and the Vāgbhaṭas ; it thus possesses hardly any claim to originality either in theory or in treatment. Most of the works of Jaina authors, even including those of Hemacandra and the Vāgbhaṭas, are written apparently from the practical standpoint of composing a suitable text-book, and they always, in their discussion of general principles, incorporate hints on matters helpful for the practical working out of poetry[17].

(3)

Rājaśekhara

(Although written in a fanciful style and hardly presenting one systematic theory, Rājaśekhara's *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* may be noticed here, inasmuch as it mixes up the topics of *kavi-śikṣā* with those of Poetics proper, at the same time giving us a somewhat rambling treatment of various extraneous matters.

16 The subject is dealt with as early as Daṇḍin, Rudraṭa, and the *Agni-purāṇa*.

17 E. g. Hemacandra, pp. 5-15, 126-135 ; the younger Vāgbhaṭa pp. 38-68. Both borrow largely from Kṣemendra and Rājaśekara.

The work is also remarkable for its varied collection of different opinions, as well as for the light it throws on the literary practices of a certain period. Its views cannot be directly connected with any particular school, but it is quite possible that its author follows in the main a tradition of opinion inherited from his literary ancestors, whom he frequently quotes as the Yāyāvarīyas.

The origin of Poetics is attributed by Rājaśekhara to the Supreme Being and the celestials, and he claims a very high position for the discipline, which is regarded as the seventh *aṅga* without which the significance of Vedic texts cannot be grasped. The self-born Śrīkaṇṭha taught this science to his sixty-four will-born disciples, among whom the most venerable was the Kāvya-puruṣa, born of Sarasvatī, who figures as the nominal hero of this half-allegorical work. As Prajāpati set him to promulgate the science to the world, he imparted it to his seventeen divine pupils, Sahasrākṣa and others, who embodied it in eighteen separate *adhikaraṇas* on the portions learnt by each[18]. Our author seeks to set forth in one book, consisting of eighteen *adhikaraṇas*, the substance of these teachings which were in his time, to some extent, lost. If we are to accept this plan of the author, only the first *adhikaraṇa* on *kavi-rahasya* exists of this ambitious work. The Kāvya-puruṣa, from whom metrical speech first began and who stands symbolically for the spirit of poetry, is the son born to the goddess of learning, Sarasvatī, as the result of her long penance on the Himālayas. In order to keep the boy company, Sasasvatī creates Sāhitya-vidyā as his bride who follows him and wins him over. On this slight conceit the book proceeds to set forth its peculiar doctrines, including in its desultory scope various literary remarks and dogmas, as well as topics like general geography, conventions observed by poets, a disquisition on the seasons, an account of *kavi-goṣṭhī* and other relevant and irrelevant subjects.

18 See vol. i, pp. 1-2.

The work begins (ch. ii) by dividing literature (*vāṅmaya*) into *śāstra* (both human and revealed) on the one hand, and *kāvya*, on the other. It enumerates the differnt Śāstras and defines their nature and form, including under the revealed Śāstras the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, and the six *aṅgas* (the Yāyāvarīyas taking Alaṃkāra-śāstra as the seventh), and comprehending under human Śāstras the Purāṇas, Itihāsa, Ānvikṣikī, the two Mīmāṃsās and the Smṛtis. It then mentions fourteen (or eighteen) *vidyā-sthānas*, bringing under it several technical and philosophical disciplines. The meanings of the terms *sūtra*, *vṛtti*, *bhāṣya*, *samīkṣā*, *ṭīkā*, *pañjikā*, *kārikā* and *vārttika*, which are the different forms or styles of the Śāstras, are then explained, incidentally giving an etymological definition of *sāhitya-vidyā*[19]. Then, after a digression (ch. iii) on the fable of the Kāvya-puruṣa, the author goes on to deal (ch. iv) with the different kinds of pupils to whom a knowledge of the science can be imparted, viz. *buddhimat* and *āhārya-buddhi*, the latter of whom may be again *anyathā-buddhi* and *durbuddhi*, and discusses in this connexion the force of *śakti* (genius), *pratibhā* (poetic imagination), *vyutpatti* (culture) and *abhyāsa* (practice). The Yāyāvarīyas think that *śakti* is the only source of poetry and it gives rise to *pratibhā* and *vyutpatti* ; but others hold that the aid of concentration (*samādhi*) and practice (*abhyāsa*) is also required. The *pratibhā*[20] may have a twofold aspect, according as it is creative (*kārayitrī*) or discriminative (*bhāvayitrī*). The creative faculty may be natural (*sahaja*), adventitious (*āhārya*) or acquired by instruction (*aupadeśika*), and poets are accordingly classified as *sārasvata*, *ābhāyasika* and *aupadeśika*. The discriminative faculty (*bhāvakatva*) is distinguished from the poetic (*kavitva*). The *bhāvaka* may be either 'the dicontented' (*arocakinaḥ*, i.e. those who possess the faculty but

19 See above p. 37, fn 5.

20 Defined as: *yā śabda-grāmam artha-sārtham alaṃkāra-tantraṃ mukti-mārgam anyad api tathāvidham adhihṛdayaṃ pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā.*

require to be guided), 'those feeding on grass' (*satṛṇābhyava-hāriṇaḥ*, i.e., vulgar persons absolutely devoid of the faculty[21]), 'the envious' (*matsariṇaḥ*) and lastly, 'the really discerning' (*tattvābhiniveśinaḥ*) who are rare.

In the next chapter (ch. v) we have elaborate classifications of the poet from different points of view. Poets may be grouped generally into three classes, the *śāstra-kavi*, the *kāvya-kavi* and the *ubhaya-kavi*. The *śāstra-kavi* may either compose the *śāstra*, or produce *kāvya*-effect in the Śāstra or *śāstra*-effect in the Kāvya. The *kāvya-kavi* is classified elaborately, if not very logically, into eight groups, viz. *racanā-kavi*, *śabda-kavi*, *artha-kavi*, *alaṃkāra-kavi*, *ukti-kavi*, *rasa-kavi*, *mārga-kavi*, and *śāstrārtha-kavi*. Then we have an enumeration of ten grades of apprenticeship through which a poet has to pass until he becomes a *kavi-rāja*, which is indeed not the highest distinction but which, according to Rājaśekhara who was himself so designated, indicates a status even higher than that of a *mahākavi*. Elsewhere in ch. x, he gives an account of the test or literary examination of poets for such honour and recognition, in which the successful poet was conveyed in a special chariot and crowned with a fillet (*paṭṭa-bandha*). He speaks also of purity of body, speech and thought necessary for a poet, and describes the house of the poet, his attendants, his writing materials, the division of his whole day into eight parts and duties appropriate thereto. The chapter under discussion concludes with a reference to the theory of *pāka*[22], of which as many as nine varieties, named after the taste of different fruits, are mentioned.

The next chapter (ch. vi) deals with the word and the sentence, and their functions grammatical, logical or otherwise. In this connexion Rājaśekhara states that a sentence possessing the literary excellences (*guṇas*) and embellished by poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*) constitutes poetry (*guṇavad alaṃkṛtaṃ ca vākyam*

21 Cf Vāmana 1. 2. 1-3.

22 See above pp. 240-42.

eva kāvyam, p. 24). If any definite conclusion can be drawn from this statement, Rājaśekhara, in general theory, appears to recognise tacitly the position of the Rīti school ; for in this sentence he reproduces Vāmana's well-known dictum (*kāvya-śabdo'yaṃ guṇālaṃkāra-saṃskṛtayoḥ śabdārthayor vartate*, on i. 1. 1). This is supported also by the apparent disfavour he shows towards the view of Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa, as well as by the marked partiality attached to the opinions of Maṅgala and Vāmana, whose classification of Rīti is accepted on p. 31. It is true that his school lays special stress also on Rasa[23], and like most writers coming after Ānandavardhana, Rājaśekhara does not fail to bring Rasa into prominence. This makes it difficult to take his work as framed definitely for any particular system. But it is clear that his sympathies ally him with the older Rīti and Rasa schools, rather than with the new school of Ānandavardhana who, though cited at p. 16, does not appear to have influenced his views greatly. It is probable that he is following some old tradition, which stands apart from orthodox schools, but which has many things in common with the older currents of thought and opinion.

The rest of the work, devoted to topics of a similar character, does not throw any further light on his general view of Poetics. The seventh chapter, which comes next, analyses modes of speech on a novel basis, having reference to the promulgation of different religious doctrines, into *brāhma*, *śaiva* and *vaiṣṇava*, with their sectarian subdivisions ; and after a brief mention of the three Rītis of Vāmana[24], we have some remarks on Kāku and on the methods of reading or pronunciation of different peoples, incidentally discussing the question of appropriate language and style of gods,

23 E.g. *kiṃ tu rasavata eva nibandho yuktaḥ, na nīrasasya* p. 45.

24 Rājaśekhara's account of the origin of Rītis is curious. He says that on account of the Sāhitya-vidyā's wanderings through various countries, different poetic forms evolved themselves, the important among them being the three Rītis mentioned by Vāmana.

Apsarasas, Piśācas etc. The eighth chapter enumerates the sources or auxiliaries of poetry (*kāvya-yonayaḥ*), already referred to by Bhāmaha (i. 9) and Vāmana (i. 3), such as the scriptures, the law-books, the epics, the Purāṇas etc., and gives a long list of arts and sciences, as well as philosophical systems, which contribute to the content of poetry[25]. The next chapter (ch. ix) is concerned with the possible themes of poetry, topically referred to by Ānandavardhana (p. 146), according as it deals with incidents and personages, human, divine, or pertaining to the lower world (*pātāla*), by themselves or in different combinations. But he adds that the subject-matter must be *rasavat*. The tenth chapter speaks of the conduct of a poet, his household and surroundings, his daily duties and routine of work ; it then proceeds to speak of the king who patronises him, and one of whose duties is to call assemblies of poets and scholars. Two very interesting chapters (xi-xii) follow on the elaborate[26] classification of the different shades of borrowing or plagiarism (*haraṇa*). with reference respectively to borrowing of words and borrowing

25 These are: *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *pramāṇa-vidyā*, *samaya-vidyā*, *rāja-siddhānta-trayī* (*artha-śāstra*, *nāṭya-śāstra* and *kāma-śāstra*), *loka*, *viracanā* (= *kavi-manīṣā-nirmitaṃ kathā-tantram artha-mātraṃ vā*), and *prakīrṇaka* (miscellaneous, like *hasti-śikṣā*, *ratna-parīkṣā*, *dhanur-veda* etc.). In ch. x. he speaks of (i) *kāvya-vidyās*, viz. *nāma-dhātu-pārāyaṇa* (=grammar), *abhidhāna-kośa* (lexicon), *chando-viciti* (prosody) and *alaṃkāra* (poetics), (ii) sixty-four *kalās*, called *upavidyās* (accessory studies) and (iii) *kāvya-mātaraḥ*, viz. *kavi-saṃnidhi*, *deśa-vārttā*, *vidagdha-vāda*, *loka-yātrā*, *vidvad-goṣṭhī*, and *purātana-kavi-nibandha*.

26 Hemacandra (pp. 8f) and Vāgbhaṭa (pp. 12f) plagiarise and reproduce this portion of Rājaśekhara's treatment and draw also partly upon Kṣemendra (see above p. 287f). On these passages, see F. W. Thomas in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 379-383). To Ānandavardhana's classification of three kinds of resemblance which may be found in two poets (see above p. 287 fn 12) these writers add a fourth kind, viz. "foreign-city-entrance" likeness (*parapura-praveśa-pratimatā*), i. e. where there is substantial identity, but the garnishing is widely different. And of these four kinds, the superiority is in the ascending order.

of ideas. A verse is cited towards the end which says that there is hardly any poet who does not 'steal' from others, but the best of stealing is cleverly concealing the fact[27]. But mere reflection or copying of ideas is condemned as unpoetical (*so'yaṃ kaver akavitva-dāyī sarvathā pratibimba kalpaḥ pariharaṇīyaḥ*, p. 68). The true poet is said to be one who discovers something novel in the expression of words and ideas, as well as restates what is old[28]. The next chapter (ch. xiii), therefore, details thirty-two different modes by which plagiarism or literary borrowing may be skilfully turned to advantage (a question which must have assumed some importance in Rājaśekhara's time), all the points in these interesting chapters being profusely illustrated by examples drawn from the works of various poets. This discussion is followed by three chapters (ch. xiv-xvi) on the established poetic conventions (*kavi-samaya*), with reference to countries, trees, plants, flowers etc., as well as about intangible things (e. g. a smile should always be described as white). There are two more chapters (ch. xvii-xviii) on geography (*deśa-vibhāga*) and the seasons (*kāla-vibhāga*) respectively, the former mentioning the countries, rivers, mountains etc. of India, the products peculiar to each, the colour and complexion of various peoples, and the latter describing the winds, flowers and birds, and actions appropriate to various seasons.

This bare outline of the eighteen chapters of the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, so far as it is available and actually published, will make it clear that nearly the whole of its content falls, strictly speaking, outside the province of general Poetics, whose conventional topics have thus far been hardly touched upon. At the same time, some of the subjects dealt with by Rājaśekhara have been referred to, if not elaborately dealt

27 *nāsty acauraḥ kavi-jano nāsty acauro vaṇig-janaḥ /*
sa nandati vinā vācyaṃ yo jānāti nigūhitum //

28 *śabdārthoktiṣu yaḥ paśyed iha kiṃcana nūtanam /*
ullikhet kiṃcana prācyaṃ manyatāṃ sa mahākaviḥ //

with, by even orthodox writers like Vāmana ; and the unique evidence of the comparatively early work of Rājaśekhara on this topic, written ostensibly in conformity with some old tradition, will go to support the hypothesis that *sāhitya* or the art of poetry originally included in its comprehensive scope all such varied literary topics, until there was a gradual branching off of *kavi-śikṣā* as an allied but separate discipline, and a limiting of the Śāstra itself to the discussion of more or less general principles. In themselves, however, these topics are extremely interesting and throw a great deal of light on some of the literary aspects of classical Sanskrit Poetry and its practice, They are made all the more delightful reading by Rājaśekhara's concise but easy and picturesque style, especially as it is enriched by judiciously selected and varied illustrations, very unlike the conventional illustrations one meets with in an ordinary text-book on Poetics.

SUBJECT-INDEX
TO
Vol. II

Entries are confined to those passages which contain a substantive reference to, and not mere citation of, the persons, works or subjects indicated. The figures denote pages, and references to footnotes are marked with an asterisk. Occasional references to vol. i are given with figure i. The following abbreviations are used: fig=poetic figure; Agp=Agnipurāṇa; Anv=Ānandavardhana; Abh=Abhinavagupta; Bh=Bharata; Bhā=Bhāmaha; Bh N=Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka; Bhānu=Bhānudatta; D=Daṇḍin; Dh=Dhanañjaya; Dhk=Dhvanikāra; Hc=Hemacandra; Jg=Jagannātha; Knt=Kuntaka; Ks=Kṣemendra; L=Lollaṭa; Mmt=Mammaṭa; Mkc=Māṇikyacandra; Mbh=Mahimabhaṭṭa; Rdt=Rudraṭa; Rk=Ruyyaka; Ud=Udbhaṭa; Vg I=the older Vāgbhaṭa; Vg II=the younger Vāgbhaṭa; Vm=Vāmana; Vis=Visvanātha; Vid=Vidyādhara; Vin=Vidyānātha; Snbh=Śiṅgabhūpāla.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS

Vol. i. p. 99. Add the following as fn. 4 to l. 12 : For a review of the Alaṃkāra-section in the *Agni-purāṇa* see Suresh Mohan Bhattacharya in *Bulletin of DCRI*, xx, pt. i, pp. 42-49.

p. 202, fn 1, l. 2. Read śabdā- (for śadhā-).

p. 292, No. 69. Read BHĀṢYA.

p. 294, fn. 1. Read *Catalogue* after *Tanjore*.

Vol. ii. p. 141, l. 28. Read *kuśāgrīyayā*.

p. 173, l. 2 and p. 183, l. 28. Read *śruti-kaṣṭa* in both places.

p. 204, l. 13. Read *praśastatā*.